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ABSTRACT
Until recently, the period of Late Antiquity had been largely regarded
as a sterile age of irrationality and of decline in science. This
pioneering work, supported by first-hand study of primary sources,
argues that this opinion is profoundly mistaken. It focuses in
particular on Proclus, the head of the Platonic School at Athens in
the 5th c. AD, and the chief spokesman for the ideas of the dominant
school of thought of that time, Neoplatonism.
Part I, divided into two Sections, is an introductory guide to
Proclus' philosophical and cosmological system, its general principles
and its graded ordering of the states of existence. 	 Part II
concentrates on his physical theories on the Elements and the
celestial bodies, in Sections A and B respectively, with chapters
(or sub-sections) on topics including the structure, properties and
motion of the Elements; light; space and matter; the composition and
motion of the celestial bodies; and the order of planets.
The picture that emerges from the study is that much of the
Aristotelian physics, so prevalent in Classical Antiquity, was
rejected.
	 The concepts which were developed instead included
the geometrization of matter, the four-Element composition of the
universe, that of self-generated, free motion in space for the
heavenly bodies, and that of immanent force or power. Furthermore,
the desire to provide for a systematic unity in explanation, in
science and philosophy, capable of comprehending the diversity of
entities and phenomena, yielded the Neoplatonic notion that things
are essentially modes or states of existence, which can be arranged
in terms of a causal gradation and described accordingly. Proclus,
above anyone else, applied it as a scientific method systematically.
Consequently, that Proclus' physical thought is embedded in his
Neoplatonic philosophy is not viewed as something regrettable, but as
proof of his consistent adherence to the belief, that there must be
unity in explanation, just as there is one in the universe, since
only the existence of such unity renders the cosmos rational and
makes certainty in science attainable.
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PREFACE
This study explores the physical thought in late Neoplatonism, and
focuses in particular on Proclus, the head of the Platonic School
at Athens from about AD 437 until his death in 485.
It offers a reconstruction and an examination of his views on the
perennial subjects of ancient science and philosophy, the elements
and the celestial bodies, within their philosophical enviroment.
Two factors have influenced the choice of the subject-matter:
the historical importance of the period, and the disproportionately
scant scholarship devoted to it. 	 Neoplatonism, the main
intellectual movement of Late Antiquity, represents not only the
final expression of ancient thought, but also the mode in which
it was transmitted to the Islamic and to the Western European
civilization, where it remained influential as an intellectual
force even after Newton. Yet the amount of studies available is
pityfully small by comparison to the earlier "Classical" period of
Aristotle, Ptolemy and Galen, and the later periods of the Middle
Ages and the Renaissance.
Much of the lack of interest may be traced to the persistent
preconceptions about the so-called decline and fall of classical
thought, the spread of superstition, and the rigidity and forbidding
complexity of the philosophical systems of that time. Such
opinions, which have become commonplace, became prevalent around
the turn of the century, when the very term "Neo-Platonism" was
coined in an effort to distinguish it from the original, "pure"
form of Platonism. Although their echoes still survive, more
recent and more penetrating scholarship has begun to acquaint us
with both the dynamic changes of the period and its intellectual
life.
	
In the context of the history of science, S.Samburskyls
unequalled work, "The Physical World of Late Antiquity", has
afforded us glimses of the lively debate over those pillars
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of ancient science, Aristotelian physics (whose premises were
critically examined and largely rejected) and Ptolemaic astronomy
(whose cosmological value was questioned), and the innovative
thinking on the role of mathematics in physics, and on the concept
of space.
	
But, even he admonishes Neoplatonic philosophy (p.xii)
for having a "retarding and confusing influence on scientific
thinking", because, inter alia, it adhered to "the irrational
belief in the ultimate unity of the cosmos" (sic). 	 Plainly,
there is more to Neoplatonism.
The combination of the exiguous amount of available or indeed known
literature on the subject, and the limitations inherent in a thesis,
led me to concentrate on the ideas of one individual thinker,
rather than embark on a general assessment of many.
Fortunately, Proclus provides a good balance, since he systematized
comprehensively all the Neoplatonic versions before him and
dominated the ones after him. Furthermore, it was under him,
that Neoplatonism reached its peak of influence. Thus, he can be
rightly considered the spokesman of Neoplatonism in general, and
his concepts may be treated as representative of Neoplatonism as
a whole.
Although Plotinus was in a sense the originator of this form of
Platonism, he stands, in many ways, much like the so-called
flunparticipated cause" in Proclus' philosophy, outside mainstream
Neoplatonism as it developed soon after his death. Trends of
thought which were already present in Porphyry (Plotinus' student
and compiler of his doctrines) were expanded and added to by
Iamblichus. In the Athenian School and with Proclus they developed
into the famous Neoplatonism which proved to be influential in
Late Antiquity and beyond. 	 This form of Neoplatonism (4th-6th c.)9
which effectively became the Neoplatonism, is usually called
"late" Neoplatonism to distinguish it from the earlier forms,
especially Plotinus'.
The concentration on Proclus is more than justified, m reover,
by the sheer number of his writings, the majority of which
(L.J.Rosgn I s estimate is 3/5 th.) are extant. 	 Titles cover the
span of human interest of the time, from philosophy on the structure
of existence, the nature of divinity, fate, free-will, ethics,
astrology, theurgy, and poetry, to mathematics, astronomy and
physics.
	
In addition, they include some of the most voluminous
works of all time. 	 A conservative estimate of his extant corpus
would yield 1,700,000 words of text, which makes him one of the
most prolific writers in all antiquity (Galen notwithstanding).
Since the subject-matter belongs to a rather distant era, but whose
terminology has somewhat familiarly uncomfortable overtones, a
note of explanation and caution is necessary. 	 This, as I hope it
will become obvious, has a crucial bearing on the way Neoplatonism
and its scientific contribution are evaluated.
Although there are recognizable similarities between the subjects
of ancient and modern science, eg. cosmology, the elements, matter,
the heavenly bodies, motion, their framework of thought was
different, and in many parts it appears distinctly alien. In the
case of (late) Neoplatonism especially, these differences may be
grouped under the headings, (i) science or physical thought as
part of philosophy, (ii) the inclusion of religious entities in
such a philosophy.
(i) How and why modern science has come to differ from the ancient
constitutes, of course, the subject-matter of the history of science.
Suffice to note here, that much of what is now called "science" as
opposed to philosophy, was thought to be philosophical as late as
the 18th c.	 The emergence of science in its present, distinct
form may be traced to the debate on the role of God in the world,
and the withdrawal of philosophical interest even from cosmology.
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(ii) Perhaps the more incongruent element in Neoplatonic
philosophical physical thinking is the presence of and references
to entities which would otherwise belong exclusively to religion.
If it is difficult enough to appreciate the scientific relevance
of "form" and "sympathy", it is even more difficult to appreciate
the relevance of "soul" and "divinity".
	 To make matters worse
still, most of these references belong to the universe of the
mystery religions, astrology and theurgy, a universe which was
largely not only pre-Christian, but, in the period under
consideration, anti-Christian to boot. Understandably it is
this aspect of Neoplatonism which has given it a more infamous
reputation, and the concomitant indifference, if not outright
rejection.
	
A rather abrupt response to any possible questioning
of the value of Neoplatonic thought on this basis alone may run
along the line, that one man's religion is another's superstition,
and, let the one who is blameless cast the first stone. 	 But,
of course, a more elaborate answer has to be found in history, or
at least the history of religion. 	 The separation of religion
from philosophy may thus be traced to the rise of theocratic
cultures (Christian and Islamic) by the 8th-9th c., and the
subsequent tensions between religious orthodoxy and philosophy.
Ancient philosophical thought about divine nature was embedded
in a more secular ground, and was intrinsically connected to the
network of concepts about order, symmetry, perfection and truth,
not to the world of arbitrary, supernatural deities, who require
obedience.
The path of the Neoplatonic philosopher, like Proclus, to religion
was still that of the philosopher, through contemplation about
the "real" things in an ordered universe. 	 Theurgy seems to have
been the more emotional, ritualistic aspect, as well as the means
for an active relationship with divinity.
For the Neoplatonist, science was part of his overall philosophy,
and this philosophy encompassed the metaphysical, religious entities
in a grand cosmology of all that exists, both visible and invisible.
The thesis is divided into two Parts.	 Part I is a self-contained
guide to Proclus° philosophical and cosmological system.
	
It also
provides a readily accessible reference to the various technical
terms and concepts which appear in Part II, the main exposition of
his work on the Elements and the celestial bodies. 	 The inclusion
of a rather substantial orientation to Proclus s system (viz. Part I)
was deemed necessary, partly because of the intimate connection
between his science and philosophy, and partly because of the lack
of any easily obtainable, comprehensive account of it. 	 Besides,
even among some of the more well-known literature on or with
references to Proclus° scheme there seem to be misunderstandings
of his philosophy at quite a fundamental level.
Part I is subdivided into two Sections. 	 The first contains the
general principles which permeate all of his philosophy, and which
are present in most of his works.	 The second follows the full
expansion of his universe, and the hierarchical arranging of the
modes of existence. It is complete inasmuch as it presents all the
the chief entities of his system, as derived from primary textual
sources.
Part II is also subdivided into two Sections. 	 Section A focuses
on his theory on the Elements, their structure and properties.
There are also chapters on their contribution to the concepts about
light, space, aether and the soul-vehicle. 	 Section B examines
Proclus l views on the celestial bodies. 	 Some aspects of his
Element theory reappear within the context of the discussion on the
substance of the heavenly bodies, but most of this Section is
inevitably devoted to celestial motion and its particular problems.
The role of the earth in relation to the celestial bodies is also
discussed.
Part II relies m re heavily on primary sources, since the existing
secondary literature on Proclus l conception of the Elements and the
heavenly bodies is distinctly more conspicuous by its paucity.
As a result, most f the material detail on Proclus° physical
theories appears to my knowledge here for the first time.
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BIOGRAPHICAL AND HIS 	 NOTE
Proclus lived from about AD 411 until 485, ie. he died fifteen
hundred and one years ago. Although there are still uncertainties
regarding his year of birth, his year of death is more confidently
determined by the data in his biography, which gives even a date
for it: 17th of April.
His biography, one of the two sources of information for his life,
was written by Marinus of Neapolis (modern Nablus, near Samaria,
ie. he was probably a Jew), his disciple and immediate successor.
Stylistically it follows a characteristic plan based on the
Neoplatonic theory that "true happiness" (eudaimonia) depends on
the kinds of "virtue" man acquires during his life, and reviews
how Proclus fared according to each. This pattern is similar to
other biographies, such as Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, Philostratus'
Life of Apollonius of Tyana„ and Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras,
which can be best described as "Hellenic", as opposed to Christian,
hagiographies.	 Thanks to it, his Life is not just a dry account
of biographical details, but a rich source of inside information on
Proclus and the kind of community he lived in, as presented by
someone who knew him intimately and shared his way of thinking.
It was written less than a year after his death.
The other source is Damascius' Life of Isidorus (extant only in
few fragments), both of whom were Proclus' students, Damascius
being the head of the School at the time of Justinian's ban in 529.
It is a more prosaic account but is full of invaluable information,
including some irreverent anecdotes, about the later Platonic
philosophers and Proclus.
Proclus was born in Byzantium in a family originally from Xanthus,
a wealthy seaside town in Lycia (with an ancient temple of Apollo),
to which they returned when he was still a young child. His
father, a barrister, seams to have intended him for a legal career too
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for after studying for a short while in Xanthus he was sent to
Alexandria to study rhetoric and Roman Law. In these, according
to Marinus, he excelled: this would explain his methodical approach
to philosophy.	 In addition he became proficient in Latin. But
Proclus seems to have become more interested in philosophical
matters, and his studies turned to Aristotle and mathematics:
his subsequent perfomance certainly bears testimony to his interest
and competence in mathematics and the mathematical form of
presentation.	 It is highly probable that Proclus entered a
Neoplatonic circle about this time, and certainly while on a short
visit to Constantinople (Saffrey and Westerink, Pl.Th. Bude, vol.I
p.xii, suggest that all this activity is linked to the complete
re-organization of the Schools by Theodosius II.in 425, and is a
pointer to the concomitant university politics). Upon completing
the round of studies at Alexandria (the study of Aristotelian logic
was also considered as the preamble to the study of Plato, in the
Neoplatonic curriculum), he proceeded to Athens, the seat of late
Neoplatonism.
At Athens he became quickly accepted in the close-knit circle of
devout pagans who administered and lectured at the "Academy" in a
predominantly christian town. According to Marinus, all this took
place by his 20th year. Whether the transition happened with his
parents' approval we do not know, for they drop entirely out of the
picture.
	
Significantly, the biography turns its attention to how
Proclus became very intimate with Syrianus, the effective head of
the School, whom he later acknowledged as his spiritual father.
It is as if Proclus' material origins, the parents of his body,
had ceased to be important: upon coming to Athens, the city sacred
to the goddess of wisdom, he had entered the world of philosophic
spirituality.
Under Syrianus he was instructed both in Plato and Aristotle in
the distinctive Neoplatonic manner of exegesis, Aristotle and each
Platonic Dialogue corresponding to the appropriate level of
understanding of "reality".
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Fortunately this education included less "elevated" subjects as
well, such as political philosophy, which, as Marinus points out,
was to prove useful later in the administration of the School and
in the dealings with the civic authorities. He was also instructed
in the theurgic aspect of Neoplatonism, as derived from the Orphic
and Chaldean writings, and was initiated in its secret rites by
the daughter of the official head of the School, Plutarch (not the
2nd c. biographer).	 Plutarch was then very old. 	 Upon his
death Syrianus succeeded to the headship (ca 432).	 Proclus by
this time had definitely become one of the 'family', he lived with
Syrianus' family, he was treated on equal terms with Syrianus' own
son, and he called Syrianus "father", while speaking of Plutarch as
"forefather".	 With Syrianus' influence and certainly his lecture
notes, Proclus embarked on the grand task of composing a commentary
on Plato's Timaeus, and "much else", as Marinus phrases it, which
he completed, perhaps in a first draft form, by his 28th year.
There is evidence that he may have actually begun the work near
the time of Syrianus' death (ca 437). 	 After a short interlude,
during which an. antagonist, Domninus of Larissa (Syria), was elected
the head or perhaps a co-head, but who soon returned to Syria
(most probably ousted by the Proclan faction), Proclus remained the
sole leader of the School and became the Platonic "Successor"
(Diadochos) of the "Golden Chain" around his 26th year.
Proclus spent approximately fifty years in charge of the last
institution of learning at Athens, during which he taught and
preached the Neoplatonic philosophy, wrote his numerous works,
discharged his administrative duties to the School and the Imperial
authorities, and also found time to practise his religion rigorously.
He never married, not through lack of offers or predisposition but
because he was already married to his work.
His time spans most of the 5th c., a period which saw some of the
most dramatic changes in history, the great Barbarian Migrations
and the final phase of the Ancient world. It was certainly a time
of destruction: the collapse of the western frontiers of the
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Roman Empire (406-10), the invasion of the Huns (440-452), the sacking
of Rome first by the Visigoths (410) and then by the Vandals (455),
and the end of the Western Empire itself (476). One of Proclus'
occasional students, Anthemius, a patrician from Byzantium, became
Emperor of the West and was subsequently murdered (467-472) in those
final days.
	
On another front, closer to home, the pagan
Neoplatonists had their temples closed and practises forbidden by
the Eastern Emperors, and in Proclus' own time Athena's great
statue was removed from the Parthenon. They had also witnessed
the anger of the Christian mob in the lynching of Hypatia, in
Alexandria (415).	 In their frequent dark references to the
Christians, this was the "wild beast" which had to be left sleeping
at any cost. But it was also a period of settlement and new
beginnings, the birth of the Western European kingdoms: of the
Franks and Burgundians in Gaul (450's), of the Visigoths in Spain
and Toulouse (420's) and of the Ostrogoths in Italy (480's), who
continued the Roman culture, and of the Anglo-Saxons and Scots in
Britain (450's), who did not. Meanwhile in the East, the
traditionally more wealth-producing half of the Empire found itself
freed from any responsibility for the West, and seems to have enjoyed
an economic increase.
The world was changing, and in the process of attempting to manage
the demands made on the Empire as a whole, viz, the variety and
increase of pressure at both the western and eastern frontiers, as
well as the constant problem of internal war for succession, the old
landmarks of "Antiquity" which were still evident in Plotinus' time
(204-270) had disappeared: Rome's central authority, the legion with
its cohorts, the footsoldier with his "pilum" and "gladius", long-
distance trade and travel, and religious tolerance.
	 The horizons
of the world in Proclus' time had in many ways shrunk, and, as
Peter Brown puts it, everyone was consolidating his own roots. In
the West, central authority became shadowy and finally non-existent.
Goverment fell into the hands of the local people, the dukes and counts
of the Late Empire and then the chiefs and kings of the barbarian
nations. In the East, the Emperor consolidated his own position as
the absolute and eventually the sole monarch at the New Rome.
He was at the head of a highly structured state hierarchy
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whose classes in order of rank or dignity were, the Illustrious
(the consuls, the patricians, the masters-general of the army and
the Palace ministers), the Respectable (the vice-praefects or vicars,
the counts and dukes) and the simply Dignified (proconsuls and
presidents of provinces).	 Below them were to be found the Emperor's
"agents" or messengers, his eyes and ears, and the various military
and civil ranks.	 They, together with the ordinary people, were
classed as mere "subjects" of the sovereign, the peasants being tied
to their farming land.
To what degree Proclus was consciously affected by all these events
is difficult to ascertain. He clung to his own cultural and
intellectual roots, classical education, philosophy and religion.
Nevertheless in one aspect at least, the similarities between the
state hierarchy of his region and his philosophical system are
inescapably apparent.
Athens was still a university town, although most of the Schools
whose Chairs had previously been endowed with Imperial funds had
passed away together with the funds. The Platonic School alone
(which in an effort to rekindle a link with the first institution
of learning to be founded in the 4th c. BC,	 had begun to refer
to itself as the "Academy") still functioned and prospered. 	 It
managed to do so not only because of the positive spirit Neoplatonism
was offering, but also because it had become entirely self-supporting.
This had been achieved through a series of recent benefactions,
doubtless from the estates and investments of its scholarchs, and
the endowments given to it by the remaining pagan, old aristocratic
families. Its wealth seems to have been considerable. Proclus
as a "Successor" received a revenue of 1000 gold solidi a year;
the gold , solidus was the only coinage which had kept its value
through the huge inflation of that period, mainly because it was the
coin of the Imperial authorities themselves and the army ("soldier"
is-etyMologically derived from solidus). For comparison purposes,
that amount was the annual pension of a chief Palace minister.
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The existence of this private wealth in the School, plus the pagan
beliefs of its professors, combined with the usual problems
associated with the presence of a high status university in an
otherwise low status town (as civic Athens had become), life must
have been full of frictions which demanded the outmost diplomacy.
Proclus fared rather well. There is only one recorded instance
when he thought it fit to take a sabbatical for a year in Lydia,
Minor Asia, and apply the Pythagoric rule "live unobtrusively"
(lathe binsas) until, as he put it, "some god freed me from those
many unending troubles" (Hyp.Astr. proem.). Yet, he must have
felt sufficiently confident in his position to continue to practice
his religion not only at his place of work but also at the temples
which had been ordered closed by Imperial decree. His religious
pantheon included, according to the syncretic tendencies in Late
Antiquity, not only the Hellenic, but also the Egyptian (Isis),
Chaldeo-Babylonian, Arabic, et al. As he was quoted of saying,
"it is not befitting to the philosopher to worship at one temple
only, either of his town or of his native land, but he must be a
minister of the whole world in common" (Marinus Life, ch.19).
And this is key to the kind of religious view Neoplatonism was
expounding: divinity takes many particular shapes and forms, but
there is one divine nature common to all.
He seems to have had an acute sense of responsibility, probably
spurred by an appreciation of his predicament, both for the people
in his direct charge at the School and of the city. Marinus
mentions the many times he helped them directly or prayed for their
welfare, even calling for rain to fall during a drought in which he
was naturally successful as a good theurgist. He seems to have
been a very good lecturer. Marinus tells us how he inspired his
audiences, and that many would flock to Athens from all over the
Empire to hear him speak or become his disciples. A list derived
from many sources includes such attendants from Alexandria, Pergamum,
Antioch, Judea, Egypt, including high ranking dignitaries from
Constantinople, Dalmatia and Rome. But above all he was a
'workaholic'.
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During Proclus' tenure the "Academy" gained a popularity probably
unattained since its ancient days. Athenian Neoplatonism spread
far and became the Neoplatonism which was to remain so influential.
Proclus lived until the old age of 75. In the last five years or
so he seems to have suffered from a brain-centred disease (perhaps
a tumour). Marinus indicates that he could have lived longer, if
it had not been for his obstinancy in keeping to his arduous work
schedule (and diet). Marinus also gives us a flavour of how his
last days were spent and the mixture of awe and sorrow felt by his
friends and disciples who surrounded him, not the least because
like Marinus they must have appreciated that they and the School
had been exceptionally fortunate with Proclus, and things would
never be quite the same again.
PART I
A GUIDE TO PROCLUS ' SYSTEM
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SECTION A. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Introduction
There is no work of Proclus which is devoted entirely to all of the
general principles (the ontology) of his system. The works which
come closest to presenting an integrated picture are the "Elements
of Theology", and vol. I and II of the "Platonic Theology"; "Theology"
has the meaning of "first" philosophy or metaphysics. However, a
more accurate impression can only be gained by reading at least all
six books of the extant "Platonic Theology", Proclus' magnum opus,
where the general principles may be observed operating through his
Neoplatonic cosmos.	 Proclus' ontology is thus a distillation of
certain repeatedly used philosophical themes, which are the
following :
(i) The triadic structure of things.
(ii) That "everything is in everything but appropriately in each".
(iii)Causal linking is afforded by similarity and sympathy.
There are perhaps tmDways of presenting the material, each suited to
its purpose.	 The one most generally employed (eg. R.T.Wallis) is
to approach Neoplatonism historically and emphasize the continuity
from Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics and Middle Platonists, while
concentrating on the Athenian School and Proclus after presenting
a thorough account of Plotinus and to a lesser degree of Iamblichus.
The other (eg. L.J.Rogn) is to commence from the deep-end, so to
speak, from definitions about "existence", "power", predication,
and their relationships in Proclus. For the purposes of this
introductory account I have opted for the latter approach of
starting directly from Proclus° basic concepts, since the more
general works are already widely available. However, my starting
premises are different from Ros gn's, mainly because I think that
those selected by him are perhaps too basic and may somehow lessen
the sense of continuity with past philosophical notions and concerns
-27 -
and with the body of knowledge representing at least nine centuries
of philosophical thought, an important factor in attempting to
understand ideation in Late Antiquity.
I prefer, therefore, to use as a starting premise the basic
assumption central to Proclue philosophy, that the whole universe
exists and functions by analogy to the relationship between "one
cause" and its "manifold effects": viz. the Neo-Platonic answer to
the old problem of One and Many.
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1. THE TRIADIC MOTIF
The idea that the many phenomena are due to simpler causes and may
ultimately be due to one principal cause has a long history.
It suffices to note here, that Plotinus properly established the
central role of the "One" in Neoplatonism, as well as the
significance of existing by "imitation" or "analogy" to It
(the concept3of imitation, mimesis, and participation, methexis,
were characteristic of the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition).1
The necessity of having the One (to hen) both logically and causally
prior to all pluralities or manifolds (plethos) can be found in
Proclus in El.Th.5 & 11, for example. Yet these pluralities are
not true pluralities, that is, composed of an unlimited or infinite
number of members, which can also be pluralities, because that would
lead to infinite (eis apeiron) regress and multiplication, which,
as Aristotle had established, was unacceptable. 	 Thus Proclus'
pluralities are limited by the quality of unity, which is the
first statement of the "Elements of Theology" : "Every plurality
partakes in some way (0) of unity" (1). By this definition
he imposed, in effect, a limit to the quantity or number of member-
.
entities found in the universe,2 which in turn was in accordance
3
with the general view of one limited universe, literally "unus-versus".
But the One and the plurality still have nothing in common to serve
as a causal bridge from the one type of existence to the other.
The One and the multitude are still very dissimilar despite the
underlying limitation by unity. And for Proclus "causation" can
only take place by similarity (see ch. 3).
	
"For since the producer
(paragon) is necessarily superior to the product (paragomenon; NB.
order of pri6rity becomes, also, order of superiority), they can
never be identical without qualification, or equal in power. And
if they are not identical and equal, but different and unequal,
either they are entirely distinct from each other or they are at on
once united and distinguished (hen3tai kai diakekritai). But if
they are altogether distinct they will be unrelatable (asumbata) and
there will be no sympathy between effect and cause" (2).
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Proclus' characteristically Neoplatonic solution to the problem
of relating two extremes is the employment of a third, mean -
term, an intermediary (mesos) 4which can be similar (homoion) to
both extremes but not exactly the same.	 This is the origin of
the "triad".
Thus after the one cause comes a more proximate effect which can
simultaneously be the more proximate and similar cause to the
remotely different effect (which is a manifold since it is not-one).
The mediating type of existence is also a manifold, since it is
not-one, but with a lesser number of members than the more remote
since it is closer and more similar to the One. This is the basic
triad : one - one & not-one - not-one (cf. quute 2 above), or in
more general terms x - x & not-x - not-x. By re-applying the
same formula a train of "intermediaries" can be unfolded each being
the intermediary between the previous and the next. Fortunately
their number cannot regress to infinity since "all pluralities
partake of unity".	 With such reasoning Proclus could "bridge"
every conceivable disparity or discontinuity between different
types of existence and ensure, at least to his satisfaction, that
the universe as a whole is a continuum.5
Another concept associated with the One and the many is that of
universality or wholeness (holot -es) and the particular (merikos).
Since the One is the cause of all the universe then its causal power
must be all-universal. As existence becomes gradually, through
the train of intermediaries, less unified and more pluralized, the
extent of the range of the causal power at each grade becomes
correspondingly less universal, ie. more particular or particulated.
In this sense it becomes less powerful. 	 "They which are more
remote from the One (porriiteron) are participated by more composite
(sunthet;terc3n) beings, whose power is diminished (dunamei
elassoumen;n) but which are multiplied in number and quantity
- _(arithmo plethei pollaplasiazomenon).	 For in general, additions
(prostheseis) to them are subtractions of power (aphaireseis
duname12). And that whichisnearer (enguteron)tothe One...is more
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uniform (henoeidesteron) and exists with the more universal
(holik;terais) causes.	 And it takes place according to the
proportion of power...for the things which are the causes of a
greater number (pleionc7n aitia) imitate the power of the cause of
all (ie. the One) " (3). 	 In other words, since the intermediary
causes cannot by definition add to the all-universal power of the
6One, their power can only be more divided and particular (meristos).
Apart from the view of a scale of increasingly particularized causes,
there is some evidence that Proclus had a scale of "effects".
This secondary scale would emphasize the effect-aspect of the
intermediaries ie. the ability to receive, instead of to exercise,
causation. This more passive power seems to be called "imperfect"
(ateles), as opposed to the more active power-to-cause which is
called "perfect" or complete (teleia). 7 A scale based on receiving
(pathein dunamenon) probably refers to a parallel hierarchy of
"substrates".	 This will be further discussed in the chapters on
Matter (I.B.8.5.2 & 3).
From the relationship between cause and effect via "power" follows
another form of the triad8:
(i) cause (aition, aitia) or producer (paragon) or agent (poioun)
(ii) power or potential (dunamis)
(iii) effect (aitiaton) or product (paragomenon) or subject (ginomenon).
To recapitulate, each intermediary plurality after the One cause
of all is in succession less universal and potent cause, and
has correspondingly more member entities. 	 This is in short the
basis of the Proclan hierarchy.
Still another form of the triad is9 :
remaining or abiding (mon;) - procession (prohodos) - return
(epistrophe). Essentially it is (i) proceeding from remaining,
expressing the sequence from the One to plurality, and (ii)
returning to remaining, namely the sequence from plurality and
division back to the One.
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This more dynamic process follows mainly from three "analogies":10
(a) The causal entity "by imitation to the One" can be thought of
as unmoved or stable (akin;ton), and therefore the relationship
cause - power can be regarded as the relationship unmoved -
self-moved & moving (auto-kin;ton), whereas the effect can be seen
as that which is "moved by something else" (heterokin;ton). 11
(b) The cause is like the arithmetical monad, which is able to
yield a series of numbers while itself stays undiminished. 12
(c) The favourite Plotinian analogy, that the procession from the
One is like the radiation or emanation (eklampsis) of light from
the Sun, which leaves the source undiminished. 13
Plotinus had also introduced the idea that the first cause should
also be the "final cause". In this way the stability of the
Platonic "arch" (ultimate principle) was preserved.14
Of the last two analogies, both of which refer to procession from
an unabated, "remaining", origin, the numerical seems to have
been rather more of a favourite with Proclus inasmuch as it allowed
for return to unity. "Every order has its origin (archomene) in
a monad and proceeds (proeisin) to a manifold coordinate with it,
and the manifold of any order may be carried back (anagetai) to a
single monad...Thus in each order there exists a single monad
prior to the manifold, which determines for the members of the
order or sequence the unique relation (logon) to one another and
to the whole " (4).
Thus, by combining a harmonized Platonic-Aristotelian motion theory
(unmoved, self-moved, moved by another) with (neo)Pythagorean
number symbolism and Plotinian emanationism, Proclus felt able to
address such diverse topics as mathematics, cosmology, ethics
(moral descent - procession, ascent - return of soul), and the
knowledge of God (return) with one set of basic principles.
The sequence	 remaining	 is appropriately called cyclic:15
returning	 proceeding
- 32 -
It is essentially the metaphysical relationship between cause and
effect seen in dynamical terms, and therefore it is primarily a
motion outside space and time. Proclus derives the paradigm of
"circular" motion not from a geometro-philosophical axiom like
Plato, but from the ontology of causality.	 However, inasmuch as
corporeal motion is ultimately due to incorporeal action, such
metaphysical motion can and does manifest itself in space and time, as
for example in the classic case of celestial motion.16
The previous triad is frequently interchanged with the triad,
being or existence (on) - life (zoe) - intellect (nous), which
is mainly derived from Plotinus.17
Another is	 substance (ousia, hyparxis) - power (dunamis) -
activity (energeia), which is based on Aristotle. 	 In late
Neoplatonism, and especially in Proclus, it developed into a
more technical and sophisticated concept, which denoted the three-
into-one relationship of substantial existence, the capacity or
power to act, and the execution of the action, in a continuous state.
By re-introducing the triad within each of its three elements
(eg. activity of power, power of activity, etc. ), and by combining
it with the triad cause - power potential - effect, all of the
minute stages in causation could be accommodated. 18
There is also the important triad finite or limit (peras) -
infinity or infinitude(apeiria) - mixture (mikton). It originated
in the Pythagorean pairs of opposites, but it can also be found
in Plato (Philebus 16C ff.) and Aristotle (Physics III, Meta. I).
A parallel triad is male (arr;n) - female (th;lus) - resultant
(apotelesmata, genn;mata). 	 For Proclus the first member of these
two triads seems to represent 'discreteness', the second 'continuity'
whereas the third is the mixture-product of the two, virtually
19
everything in the universe kfor Limit-Infinity see I.B.1.2).
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The group of triads, which typifies perhaps most of all the late
Neoplatonism, is
a) The unparticipated (amethekton) - the participated (metechomenon)
- the participant (metechon).
b) The unparticipated - the participated and self-subsistent
(authupostatos) - the participated but mere irradiation (ellampsis).
a) The expression "to participate in" or "to partake of" 20had been
used by Plato to describe the manner by which a sensible particular
could have a "form". Such a relation between a /higher and a
'lower' accorded with the hierarchical mode of explanation in late
Neoplatonism, since "participation" (methexis) emphasized that an
inferior (the "effect" or the subject) cannot in itself possess
the entire property of a superior (the "cause" or the attribute,
not forgetting that such attributes or characteristics are for
Proclus entities).
	 For example, in the relationship of body-soul,
the body does not itself possess the means of its own motion, but
it can be said to "partake of"(metechei) soul, the principle of
motion, and thereby acquire movement.
	 The body is the participant
and soul the participated.
The "unparticipated" arose from the reasoning about the One and
many. The participated attributes must have been produced by an
appropriate cause, which like the One must be in some sense unique
and singular. But the chief requirement was that it should be
exempt from the divisibility Implied in direct participation (for
participation and divisibility see Plato ref. above). Hence such
a cause has to be unparticipated, although the series of attributes
cum entities which emanate from it can be participated. 21
Other jargon terms for the unparticipated include, the "monad"
(monas), the "first" or "prime" (pi:Otos), and,normally, the "whole"
or "universal" (holon), although in the case of soul especially,
"universal" soul may also refer to the World-Soul, which is
participated (by the world), as opposed to the "monad" of souls,
which is the unp-rticipated.
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Each unparticipated cause is thus the originative entity of the
family of participated attributes, which pertain distinctly to it,
eg. Intellect and intellects, Soul and souls etc. 	 It also marks
a substantial change in the procession, the properties which are
characteristic of intellect, for example, are different from those
of soul.
The participated entities, like the "intermediaries", are the ones
which actually "take part" in causation. By contrast to the
simplicity of the unparticipated, they constitute the "plurality"
or "multitude" (p1;thos) of the relevant attribute, as in souls.
The substructure of each of the unparticipated causes is the
subject of the "Platonic Theology", and the participated are mainly
examined in the "Elements of Theology" and the "Commentary on the
Parmenides".
The "participants" are the attributes cum entities affected by the
participated, or from another point of view, the entities which
have the "participated" properties. 	 They correspond more or
less to the third part in the triadic causation, hence another
name for them is "resultant" (apotelesma).	 The participants are
always on a lower 'rung' hierarchically than their participated
entity, and are members of the particular lower order.
El.Th. 24 summarizes well this triad : "All that participates
(metechon) is inferior to the participated (metechomenou), and
the latter to the unparticipated (amethektou). For the participant
is (on) incomplete prior to the participation, and by participation
has been made complete (teleion), it is therefore in all ways
subordinate to the participated...Again, the participated being
due to some one, is alloted a lower mode of existence; for the
latter is more akin (sungenesteron) to the cause of all (viz. the
One), while the former is less (hrtton). 	 The unparticipated,
then, precedes (heieitai) the participated, and these the
participants.
	
For to express it in short, the first is
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one prior to plurality (pro t(11 poll -On); the participated is
within plurality (en tois pollois) and is one-and-not-one, while
every participant is not-one (ouch hen) yet is one (ie. is still
limited by unity ; see earlier)." And this links with the basic
triad one - one & not-one - not-one.
b) The series arising from the triad unparticipated - participated
and self-subsistent - participated but not self-subsistent, is
known today as the "horizontal" hierarchy, as distinguished from
the "vertical" hierarchy of participated - participant.
	
The
horizontal hierarchy contains essentially the same family of
attributes, intellects, souls etc., and therefore can be represented
along a x-axis.	 The vertical involves substantial changes, eg.
from intellect to soul, and essentially different families of
attributes. This can then occupy the y-axis. The scholars who
originated or promulgated (eg. E.R.Dodds) these labels
maintained, that they had an actual basis in Proclus t own
conceptualization if not in his nomenclature. This has been
much debated and is now very much in doubt, not least because
all of the jargon terms which were supposed to refer either to
the transverse or to the descending series seem to appear
indiscriminently in both. So, the only possible value of these
two labels is perhaps that they facilitate a graphic representation
of Proclus' system.22
Both this and the previous triad are based on the principle, that
"every producing cause brings into existence things similar to
itself (homoia pros heauto) before the unlike (anomoi3n)" (5),
which is another form of expressing x - x & not-x - not-x.
Of the participated members some are most like their unparticipated
origin.	 They are called "self-constituted" (authupostatos),
-
"self-complete" (autoteles), "self-sufficient" or independent
(autark-es), and are said to be separable (ch;riston) from their
participants, thus able to exist by themselves. 23 This independence
is a measure of their similarity to the most-independent, as it
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were, unparticipated cause.
The self-constituted are very important in Proclus' system.
They represent the more perfected or proper aspect of the
corresponding attribute; for example, "ideas" or "forms" in
intellect, "rational" in soul, etc., and in the case of the One
the self-determined, "independent" unities-"henads" (see I.B.1.1-3,
also	 In this respect, applying 'aspects' or similar
terms to the self-constituted may 	 convey the impression that
they are mere features of something more absolute and can be
particularly misleading, for virtually the contrary is true : as
their title testifies, they are the independent, 'absolute' qualities
cum entities in the universe.
The ones which are indeed 'aspects' are the participated but
merely "irradiations". If the self-constituted are the
participated members most like the unparticipated "monad", the
so-called irradiations are the least like. 	 Other technical names
for them include, "images" or reflections (eidaa), "copy-images"
(eikones), mere "appearances" (indalmata), and perhaps, "symbols",
"signs" (sunth;mata). 	 They are "inseparable" (ach;ristos) from
their participants, and are in need (deontai) of them for existence.
They invariably represent the "particulated", divided, and
"incomplete" or imperfect (ateleis) aspect of the relevant
characteristic.	 At their most remote states of irradiation, the
characteristic is only just a phantom of its proper nature : so,
for example, even plants have a kind of "life" (by partaking of
a. mere appearance of life), and irrational animals have an echo
of "intellect".24
With regards to the links of causation or participation between
two adjacent ranks in the hierarchy, Proclus defines a twofold
path between a participated member of the lower and the
unparticipated monad of the higher : "Every particular member of
any order can participate (metechein dunatai) the monad of the
rank-diacosm immediately supra-jacent (huperkeimen;) in two ways
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(dichiis); either through (dia) the whole-universal of its own
order, or through the particular member of the higher rank which
is correspondent to it (sustoichou pros auto) by relation (analogian)
to that whole series.
	 For since every reversion takes place
through similarity, and the particular member of the inferior order
is dissimilar (anomoion) to the monad of the superior both as
particular to universal (h.3s hol; merikon) and as one order to
another...it is evident, that the reversion of the former to the
latter can take place, as through similars to a dissimilar, through
these two mean terms (mes -cin : viz, the particular member of the
higher series, or the monad of the lower). 	 For the one is similar
to it as particular to appropriate particular, and it is closely
related to the other as a member of the same series, while the
whole-universal of the supra-jacent series is dissimilar in both
respects" (6). 25
But perhaps it requires first the clarification, that alth pugh an
unparticipated cause is not directly participable by any member
of a lower series, it is itself a participant of a higher.
Indeed, in the Proclan universe every attribute-entity (bar the One
and the substrate of Body or of Matter, including their corresponding
series of members) is both a participant in some other higher
attribute-entity and participable, directly or indirectly, by others
below.
"Every unparticipated term arises 'qua' unparticipated from no
cause other than itself (N.B. especially true for the One)...If
there be superior terms from which it is derived, it proceeds
(proeisin) from them not in the capacity of unparticipated but
in the capacity of participant (ouch he amethekton...all' he
metechon)...°Qua' caused, it is a participant, not an unparticipated
principle; 'qua' unparticipated, it is a cause of participated
and not itself a participant" (7). 	 "And the Intellect is filled
(ie. partakes of) with'real-existence and life', but is imparticipable
to souls and to those postrrior to it" (8).
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Returning to the twofold line of reversion and participation, the
two paths may be schematically represented thus :
(i) A — aB 2 B — b
(ii) A — aB — ab 2 b
"A" is the monad, "a" is a participated member of the higher series,
"B" is the monad, "b" is a member of the lower series and the
end-participant of this sequence.
The subscripts to the terms of the higher series identify their
participant in the lower, while the superscript "p" stands for
such direct participation.
This schema gives some idea how the terms of successive 'strata'
in the hierarchical arrangement relate to each other, but it also
emphasizes that each entity retains its specificity, while being
a member of a family of terms at each level.
	 For example, a
celestial body is thought to move circularly both according to its
own individual "moving principle" (b), as it is determined by its
"formal" characteristic (ab ), and according to the general moving
principle, the "World-Soul" (as in B — b, although strictly the
World-Soul is a participated term), whilst its individual "formal"
principle is also part of a more general whole (A, a B — ab)
(see II.B.2.,6.1.; cf. I.B.5.1.&2.).
Finally, on the triadic motif, one should mention the various
"dialectical" triads, which Proclus uses extensively to produce
the proofs of the "Elements of Theology" : If X and Y then
(i) X the same as Y, or (ii) X not the same but similar to Y, or
(iii) X altogether dissimilar to Y; (i) X the same as Y, or
(ii) X superior to Y, or (iii) X inferior to Y.
He also employs similar kinds of logic to tidy the inconsistencies
which in his opinion existed in some doctrines, inherited from
previous less rigorous Neoplatonists ; a good example is the
logical demolition of the "partial descent" of soul into body,
Plotinus' teaching, and his conclusion that soul descents totally
(El.Th. 211; cf. Plotinus Enn.IV,8; V,1 ; see E.R.Dodds notes on
prop. 211, p309-10).
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NOTES ON I.A.1
1 It involves, inter alia, the notions, that there are causes and
effects, that there are certain simple substances common to all
natural entities, viz, the notion of composite entities, and
that the events of the changeable natural world are due to
more durable and permanent principles, besides the notion that
there is one cause of everything.
	
The operative term denoting
the ultimate principle and the basic substance is "arch".
For the notion of cause and effect, M.Frede "The original notion
of cause" in "Doubt and Dogmatism" (1980) p.217-249
G.E.R.Lloyd "Magic, Reason and Experience" (1979) P.49 -55, 25 -8;
and in "Polarity and Analogy" (1966) p.230-2;
R.Sorabji "Necessity, Cause and Blame"(1980)esp. ch . 1 - 3;
also, P.H.de Lacy "The problem of causation in Plato's philosophy"
Classical Philology 34 (1939) p.97-115.
The pre-Aristotelian Greek theories about ultimate causes are
given mainly in Arist. Meta 983a-993a. 	 The notion of One cause
is Parmenidean, cf. Die Fragm. der Vorsokratiker Diels frg.8,
as well as Pythagorean - albeit as an "opposite" to the dyas.
For Plotinus' One, Enn. 1,7; V,4 & 5; VI,2 & 9.
For the background to the Neoplatonic One, and the development
of the hierarchical ordering, see E.R.Dodds "The Parmenides
of Plato and the origin of the Neoplatonic One" Classical
Quarterly 22 (1928) p.129-42 ; J.M.Rist "The Neoplatonic One
and Plato's Parmenides" Trans. and Proceed. of the American
Philological Association 93 (1962) p.389-401 ; and concisely
accounted in Saffrey's and Westerink's introduction to the Bude
edition of the Pl.Th., vol.I p.lxv-lxxxix.
It should be noted that the Neoplatonists, especially after
Iamblichus, thoughefPlato largely as a "Pythagorean" Plato.
Eg., see Proclus' intro, to the Timaeus_Comm. In Tim.1 1,
and Syrianus In Meta. 10, 80, 190.
2 Aristotle's arguments against infinite body and quantity may be
found eg., in Phys.III, ch.4-8 ; cf. Wicksteed's and Cornford's
intro, to the Loeb ed. of Phys. vol.I.
Proclus seems to have accepted infinity in potential and in
"power" as well as in division into parts, eg. In Tim 1,453,15-30:
infinite "kata dunamin" exists both in the celestial and the
sublunary realm, "kata plEthos" never as an indivisible whole
but only as parts. Also see Sorabji e s discussion in "Time,
Creation and the Continuum" (1983).
That the One first cause cannot be an actual manifold, was also
a requirement of the theory of knowledge; an infinite One would
render certainty and knowledge In science impossible, cf. E12h,11,
also see Dodds comments p.188-9 and 245; Pl.Th. 11,4-14 (Buds).
3 For Proclus' arguments for one, finite universe, and the existence
of a finite number of "forms': In Tim. I 448-458; it includes
accounts of other theories on the plurality of worlds, both as
infinities and as finite infinities.
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4 The law of "mean" terms (see Wallis p.11, 123, 130 etc) was
formulated out of a variety of backgrounds, philosophical,
religious and social. With the increasing emphasis on the
transcendence of God came the need of "intermediaries" between
man and God.	 This had its parallel in the structure of the
Empire, especially with the gradual theocratic elevation of the
Emperor (cf. Historical note), and in the heavily bureaucratic
administration: the latter meaning of "meson" seems to survive
in modern Greek to indicate the person, official who can
'intervene' and 'mediate' on one's behalf.
Philosophically, Plato had employed the terms "mesos" and
"metaxu" to describe the class of entities between the Forms
and the sensibles, representing the mathematicals, Phaedo 74C,
Parm.129B, and the status of soul, Soph.248E-249D, Tim.90A-D;
however, the passage more directly related to the role of
"binding' intermediaries was Tim.31B-C, where the Elements
Fire and Earth are said to be in need of a third intermediary
bond (cf. In Tim. 11,13-18).
5 Train of intermediaries, cf. Prov. Fato III co1.163-4, II co1.153
The multiplication of hypostases, as Sambursky and Pines
reiterate in the "Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism" (1971)
p.12-3, narrowed the gap between adjacent levels, but the motive
for doing this may be better appreciated in the context that
the levels of existence are modes, grades of power and activity,
see A.C.Lloyd "Cambridge History of Later Greek ... Philosophy"
p.281-2,294-5; cf. S.E.Gersh "Spiritual Motion in the phil. of
Proclus" (1973) p.94-8.
6 The equation, unity-universality-power, and their relation to
division, also El.Th.60-2, 93-5; in the latte4 division and loss
of unity is equated to infinite division, through stages of
relative infinity, see Dodds' notes p.248, 233.
Also see Pl.Th.III 14,20-2.
7 The concepts of "perfect", complete-ing, and "imperfect",
incomplete power are those of active and potential power, the
distinction being more perspicuously defined and maintained than
in Aristotle, see El.Th.77-80.	 The active power is creative,
the potential is capable only of receiving. For a detailed
analysis see L.J.RosAn p.68-80, S.E.Gersh id. p.41-8, 63-72,
and A.C.Lloyd "Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic"
Phronesis 1 (1955-6) p.58-72 and 146-60, cf. Lloyd "The principle
that the cause is greater than the effect" Phronesis 21 (1976)
p.146-56.
8 For this triad, eg. El.Th. 7,11,57
9 Eg. El.Th. 25-35; see A.C.Lloyd "Procession and division in
Proclus" in H.J.Blumenthal and A.C.Lloyd "Soul and the structure
of Being in Late Neoplatonism" (1982) p.18-45.
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10 The concept of analogy in late Neoplatonism was central to the
description of properties, and was characteristic of the
Neoplatonic mode of exegesis. See, J.A.Coulter "The literary
Microcosm" (1976) p.39-59,68-72; J.Dillon "Image, Symbol and
Analogy" in "The significance of Neoplatonism" (1976) ed.R.B.Harris
p.247-258.
11 Eg. El.Th. 26,14,17,20, also Dodds' notes p.201,
cf. El.Phys. 1,19;31, also see Pl.Th. 1,60.
12 Eg, El.Th. 21,extract quote (4), 22, 10; Pl.Th.III 7-9, also see
Dodds' notes p.209; A.Charles-Saget "1, 1 architecture du divin
Mathematique et Philosophie chezPlotin et Proclus" (1982)p.201-5.
13 Plot. Enn.1V,3 ; V,1,6. Cf. Proclus In Tim.II 102,7-27.
14 Plot. IV,8,6; V,4; V,1,6; V,2,1.
15 El.Th. 33; see S.E.Gersh "Spiritual motion in Proclus" cll. three,
diagram p.72; cf. L.Sweeney "Participation and the Structure of
Being in Proclus° El.Th." in "Structure of Being" ed.R.B.Harris
(1982) p.141-55, but esp. diagram on pg.151.	 Another way is to
represent clearly the triangular/triadic frame of the circle, see
Gersh's diagrams in "From Iamblichus to Eriugena" (1978).
16 The dynamic view of causation is at the basis of Proclus'
metaphysical system and cosmology. His development of the
concept of "unmoved motion", as Gersh called it, represents
the marrying of the notions of motion and rest in all their
ramifications. It is also indicative of the high level of
sophistication and innovation in the philosophy of late
Neoplatonism.	 For a most cogent treatment see S.E.Gersh
"Spiritual motion" op.cit. esp.from ch.three till the conclusion,
particularly f.note 3 p.60-1.
Corporeal motion due to incorporeal powers or agents,
cf. El.Th. 14-17, 80; incorporeal and corporeal motion, cf.
In Rep.II,126,8-10; celestial motion, cf. P1.Th.IV,21,1-5 (Bude),
In Tim.I1,279-292.
17 Eg. El.Th.101-3; cf. Plato Sophist 248E.	 In Plotinus, Enn.VI,6
VI,7; 11,4,5. Actually, in Plotinus it appears to be existence
- intellect - life, see VI,6,8, ie. the last two terms are
reversed.
18 Eg. El.Th. 169,cf. In Tim. 1,255,30-256,2 also 1,205,12-14,
1,242,9; Pl.Th.II 50-1. 	 For a detailed examination of the
combined operation of the two triads see Rosan "The philosophy
of Proclus" p.67-70, and Gersh "From Iamblichus to Eriugena"
p.27-45.
19 Male-female, father-mother,limit-unlimited, eg.In Tim. I 48-50;
I 206,12; II 221,12-5; Pl.Th. I 122-3 (Bude).
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20 "metechein", "methexis", "metalambanein", eg. Plato Phaedo 100,
Parm.129-133; see R.E.Allen "Participation and Predication in
Plato's Middle Dialogues"(1960) art.4 in "Studies in Plato's
Metaphysics" ed. R.E.Allen (1965), cf. G.E.L. Owen "The place of
the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogued"(1953) art.16 in Allen.
	 This
was not proper predication but an adaptation of it to the theory
of Forms and Copies, Being and Becoming, participation being the
"communion" (koin3nia) between a primary and a derivative, a
non-symmetrical share-in, cf. Sophist 251-9; also J.L.Ackrill
"Plato and the Copula" art.11 in "Plato" vol.1, ed. G.Vlastos
(1978).
	 The asymmetry is consistently maintained by Proclus,
"to participate" cannot mean "to possess" as Rosan translates it
except perhaps in the case of a "dependent" property; another
term in Proclus is "metousia" eg.In Tim. 1,18,16; Decem.Dub.22.
Moreover, "partaking" seems to have almost Eucharistic connotations
esp. in connection with the notion of "overflowing power" _
(periousia dunamezs), cf.E1.Th.27,121, and ps.Dionysios Div.Nom.
viii,6.	 Proclus'sources would be non-, even pre-Christian.
However, the sense of "communion" seems to predominate over the
asymmetry, 'higher entities are not totally unaffected by 'lower'
eg. quote 39; also E1.Th.80.
21 Eg. E1.Th.23,21; cf. E1.Th.160 with 161, and E1.Th.100. 	 However,
there is some form of participation, or else no continuous chain
of procession from and return to one cause, El.Th.1;23; the
amethekton can be indirectly participated via the metechomena:
see E1.Th.109.
22 For the above interpretation of "horizontal" and "vertical" see
Ros.in p86-9. But this does not mean that the horizontal does
not descend like the vertical: both, if a distinction need be
made, descend to plurality by becoming gradually dissimilar to
the One. Dodds encountered many problems in his attempt to
segregate the technical terms for each, eg. p.208-9, 282-3.
For a most thorough examination of Proclus i terminology, and
refutal of the separation into "horizontal" and "vertical" see
A.C.Lloyd "Procession and Division" in "Soul and Being" etc id.
esp. p30-1, 38-41; also see S.E.Gersh "From_Iamblichus to Eriugena"
p.150-1, in note 120 he strongly condemns such distinction as
unnecessary and misleading, but cf. his earlier use of "vertical"
and "horizontal" in his "Spiritual motion" p.120-1, in diff. context.
The relative value of the x-y type of diagram (Dodds p.282,
reproduced in Wallis p.150) is itself questionable for the above
reasons, although ironically it may not have been too alien to
Proclus himself: see A.Charles-Saget's uncovering of its
similarity to a table of arithmetical progression derived from
the "Intr.Arithmetica" of the Neopythagorean Nicomachus (Proclus
seems to have written a Comm. on it and besides he occasionally
thought that he was a reincarnation of Nicomachus, Marinus ch.28),
"L' architecture du divin" op.cit. p.202-4. Nevertheless, in
view of the problem of horiz. and vert., a better alternative is
Lloyd's slanting descent, "Proc. and Div." id. p29.
note 22 continued
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(note 22 cont.) However I feel that a great deal more work is
needed to address the difficulties arising from the imposition
of a quantitative structure on such purely qualitative relations,
eg. the paradox that according to all the aforementioned graphic
representations, the mind of a rat qua mind would rank above the
World Soul qua soul. Hence I have refrained from offering in
this work a schema of my own, relying instead, in the Platonic
fashion, on the imagination of the reader.
23 E1.Th.40-51, 63, 64, 81. Also see Gersh "Spiritual motion" op.cit.
p.128-135; J.Trouillard "La Mystagogie de Proclos" (1982)
p.187-206; for an analysis of E1.Th.63&64, L.Sweeney "Particip.
and the structure of Being" in "Structure of Being" ed. R.Harris
op.cit. esp. p144-9, I would opt for his diagram one. Also,
J.Whittaker "The historical background of Proclus' doctrine
of the authupostata" art.7 in "De Iamblique h Proclus" (1974)
identified with the notion of self-causation.
24 Eg. El.Th. 9, 63, 64, In Perm col. 1026, Pl.Th.III 23-4 (Bud);
also see J.Trouillard supra p.198-206; J.A.Coulter "The literary
Microcosm" (1976) p.39-54, 60-8, 105-6.
The "inseparable" participation is also denoted as "kath' hexin",
In Tim. II 313,1-4, meaning in the form of "permanent possession".
Cf. with In Tim.I 10,25-30, distinction between a "separable"
soul and an "inseparable" nature, the one "participated"
but the other "possessed" (echon).
25 As A.C.Lloyd rightly points out, "Procession and Division"
op.cit. p29-30, in this theorem Proclus deals with the "return"
rather with the "procession" and the acquisition of properties,
nevertheless as Dodds states (El. of Th. p255) it also describes
the causal path(s) for the latter, see Dodds refs and cf.
quote 37 in I.B.4.
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2. "ALL THINGS ARE IN EVERYTHING, BUT APPROPRIATELY"
"All things are in every-thing, but appropriately in each" (panta
en pasin, all' oikei;s en hekast;) is, as A.C. Lloyd accurately
observes, "the golden rule of Neoplatonic metaphysics":1 It is
indeed the golden rule, for it exemplifies the syncretic tendency
prevalent in Late Antiquity and Neoplatonism in particular.
Blended in this rule are the ideas of universality (as eg., the
concepts of "sympathy", "wholeness", "similarity", "unity") and
specificity or individuality (as eg.,"variety", "difference", and
"particularity" in terms of "analogy" and "relation"). The first
part of the rule "all things are in every-thing" refers to the
inherent unity and sympathy of every entity with every other, by
virtue of their common origin in the One ; whereas the second part
"appropriately in each" refers to the particular niche occupied
by each entity in the hierarchical procession from the One.
It is essential to appreciate that this 'theme' is central to
Proclus' philosophy, it is his means for synthesizing in an
"universal whole" the plurality and diversity of entities, qualities,
types of existence, causes, effects and phenomena, while retaining
their "particularity", their specific properties and relationships.
It is also at the heart of his method of assigning analogous,
corresponding - therefore interchangeable - names to the modes of
existence and the triads, as well as of his use of shifting
emphasis in the description of their properties (see eg.
also II.A.4.1.).
Which of the two parts is more important for Proclus, is difficult
to ascertain, because the two are supposed to be complementary ;
indeed even attempting to make such a judgement is probably
contrary to the intention of the overall theme. Nevertheless,
inasmuch as the second part has the role of a modifier on the
first, and since the Unity is both the origin and goal of every-
thing, then the "all things in everything" may be more important.
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Among the many applications of the rule, there is one which is
particularly noteworthy
"All that subsists in any way, is either in a causal mode (kat'
aitian) like a principle (archoeidSs), or in its proper state of
existence (kath l huparxin), or in a participated mode (kata
methexin) as an image (eikonikSs). 	 For either we see the product
in the producer (en tS paragonti to paragomenon), as pre-existing
in its cause,...or we see the producer in the product (ie. the
third case above)...or else we contemplate each thing in its own
order, neither in its cause nor in its resultant" (9). 	 And so,
"All things are in everything, but appropriately in each...for if
each thing may exist in a causal mode or in its proper state of
existence or by participation, in the first term (en tS protS) the
other two are as in a cause (kat' aitian), while in the intermediary
term (mess) the first exists by participation (kata methexin) and
the third as a cause, and finally in the third term (trit4S) its
priors exist by participation (10). E.R. Dodds submitted that this
triadic formulation of the "all in everything, but appropriately"
may be original to Proclus. 2 Another minor variation on this triad
is "as in a cause" - "in essence" or "substantially" (kat' ousian)
- "in participation" (see eg., Pl.Th. V 274-5 Portus)
Since Proclus gives about six main types of existence, being -
life - intellect - soul - nature - body, their presence in the
triadic formulation of "all is in everything, but appropriately"
is frequently "bunched"; so, for example, intellect may be said to
have life and being by participation whereas soul, nature and/or
body as in a cause • In addition, some of these levels of
existence may be omitted altogether, the most usual ones being
"life" and "nature".
The One and Matter have a special status in relation to this
arrangement. The One is said invariably to exist as a cause,
transcending even its own existence. The unities-henads, but
especially the self-constituted, so-called divine henads seem to
share this transcendency, as the participable members of Unity,
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hence their appellation the "summit" (akrot;s) or the "flower"3
(anthos), viz, the causal mode in an emphatic sense (also see
I.B.1).	 Matter eems to exist by participation only, as an image,
lacking, in itself, even a proper level of existence of its own
(the mass-matter type of existence seems to correspond to body
plus matter ; also see I.B.8.5).
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NOTES ON I.A.2
1 A.C.Lloyd "The Camb. Hist. of Later Greek & Early Med. Philos."
p.307, in Part IV.	 Also see Dodds "El. of Th." p.254 and his
addenda on p.346, and Wallis "Neoplatonism" p.33, 123-4; he
calls the "all is in all" theme, "the principle of Correspondencev
Proclus did not use it indiscriminately, stressing the "oikei3s"
part, viz, that of appropriate and characteristic mode of
existence, as an essential control over the 'everything goes'
part: hence, I prefer to call it the "appropriateness rule".
Cf. Pl.Th.I 42,20-43,21 (Bud); In Tim.I 36,7; 43; II 26-28 and
43-5 (on Element theory); III 65 (on Celestial theory) and esp.
In Tim.III 169, 171-5, where it appears as the variant
"panta pantachou ana logon esti". J.A.Coulter gives a good
account of how Proclus applied the "appropriateness rule"
"The literary Microcosm" p.86-94.
As to the origins of this theme, both the "all is in all" and
the "predominance" (kratein) of a specific quality may be found
in Anaxagoras, cf. Arist. Phys.I ch.4, 187a-b & see J.Longrigg
"The roots of things" Isis 67 (1976) p420-38, although its
extension to the intelligibles according to Iamblichus, the
systematizer of this rule in late Neoplatonism, is attributed
to Numenius, the 2nd c. neoPythagorean; prob. this is the
reason for Syrianud citation of the "Pythagoreans",In Meta 82
as the originators of it.
2 . E.R.Dodddhotes on prop.65 "El.of Th." p236; as with every
element of Neoplatonic philosophy, Proclus is more systematic
with formulating and applying it than the previous
Neoplatonists.	 Also cf. In Tim. I 8,15-20.
The upshot of it is, that everything in the universe is a mode
of existence, and that every (entity with a) characteristic
property has many modes of existence, which can be reduced
to broadly three states or sorts.
3 "akrotes" generally denotes the "highest" in any particular
grouping, for example the celestial bodies and the Element of
Fire with respect to the physical world see Part II, and it
carries a hierarchical value-connotation; but insofar as the
"unity"-henad and esp. the divine kind is the "highest" attribute
of all (counting from the "participant") it is the "akrotes" of
being eg. E1.Th.201 cf. El.Th.146; In Alc.31,10.
"anthos" is very much a jargon term derived chiefly from the
Chaldean Oracles; a good example is a ref. to the "unit-like
flowers" (anthe henoeide) which decorate the world,
In Tim.III 118,26, almost a coded expr. for the (celestial) henads.
As part of a phytological imagery, seed-stalk-flower-fruit,III 296.
For the "Chaldean" background and phraseology, E.de Places
"Oracles Chaldaiques" (Bude 1971), and H.Lewy "Chaldean Oracles
and Theurgy" (1956, 78).
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3. SIMILARITY AND SYMPATHY
"And you will find, that all progressions and reversions are
effected and completed on account of the cause of similarity.
For everything which proceeds and everything which returns subsists
by similarity to its producer" (11).
Similarity (homoiot;s) is, as it were, the binding principle of
the hierarchy, because, as has been mentioned already in the chapter
on the triadic motif, it is the similarity between entities, and
particularly between producer and product, which makes the procession
(and return) possible. With similarity the hierarchical chain is
kept continuous and unified, like its source the One. 	 "And there
is one series and one indissoluble order...extending from on high
the First-most Cause (pr3tist;s aitias)...For because it is One it
is the supplier of union ; and because it the Good (see I.B.1.1) it
constitutes things similar to it prior to such as are dissimilar.
Thus all things are in continuity (sunecheian) with each other" (12).
"But if they (the producer& the product) are altogether
incompatible (asumbata), there will be no sympathy between effect
and cause" (2). In other words, cause and effect would not
"imply" each other, as in the triad in-a-causal-mode - substantially
- by-participation or the triad cause - power - effect (see ch. 2
& 1, previously), and there would not be "causation".
Similarity can also be regarded as a measure of an entity's
hierarchical proximity to the One, and therefore a measure of all
the associated qualities, such as universality, wholeness, power,
perfection, transcendence, etc. 	 "Series extend from above as far
as to the last of things (eschatal)...but the procession is
diminishing the similarity (homoioteta elattouses)" (13).
"And all things aspire (ephietai) after their leading principles,
and there is a token of the appropriate monad in everything, but
in some it is more clear (tranesteron) and in others more
obscure (amudroteron). 	 Likewise, similarity subsists...in
proportion to the procession" (14). The hierarchy proceeds by
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diminishing similarity (cf. ch. 1. on the triad), diminishing both
in relation to the One, and mutually between the member-entities.1
So, for example, the unities-henads are most similar to the One
and to each other, souls are less similar, while material bodies
are least similar.
Not surprisingly, similarity has a vital role in maintaining the
"sympathy" of the world.	 The famous concept of cosmic sympathy
seems to have been formulated among the Stoicism around Posidonius'
time (2nd c.BC), although supporting ideas may also be traced in
the Platonic view of the cosmos as a whole living-being.
	 But its
relation to similarity, in Neoplatonism, is almost certainly due
to Plotinus' development of sympathy. 2
 With the late Neoplatonic
ideas of "intermediaries" and individualised "powers", sympathy
seems to have become also a more specific unifying principle
between appropriate and suitably disposed entities, in addition
to being a rather general, diffuse cohesive force. Furthermore,
since such a universe was peopled by numberless "intermediaries",
the (Aristotelian) requirement, that action is effected by contact
could be "harmonised" into the theory, with "contact" taking on a
much wider meaning.
So, for Proclus, sympathy and generally any type of influence, or
power-to-affect, are essentially a contact-like action, insofar as
their activity takes place in a plenum. Yet these contiguous
"touchings" are not necessarily corporeal.
	 Indeed in most cases,
including the influence of the celestial bodies, the transmission
of sympathy or any kind of power is effected via incorporeal
immaterial entities, or channels.
	 "Plenum" and "contact" have
both material and immaterial, corporeal and incorporeal, and in
general, physical and metaphysical connotations. Thus such a
contact type of action may give the appearance of being an action
at-a-distance, if the "intermediary" stages or agencies in the train
of transmission - which are very likely to be undetectable by the
physical senses, anyway - are ignored, and the only known, or
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assumed, factors are the originative causal entity and its long-
range effects. 3
"For if the procession of beings is to be continuous (suneches),
and no void (kenon) is to enter either in the incorporeals
(asiimatois) or in the corporeals (somasin), it is necessary that
everything which proceeds naturally, proceeds through similarity"(15).
"Connexion (sunaphe) and participation (methexis) are indeed the
communion (koin-Onia) of the entities that are joined together
(sunaptomen1), and is the sympathy (sumpatheia) of the participants
to the participated" (16).	 "For as the 'Timaeus' says (58D, cf.
II.A.2) the heaven envelopes all the elements which are under it,
so there is no void space. Just as the visible heaven is
connective of all things that are under it, and is the cause of
continuity (sunecheias aitios) and of sympathy - for the insertion
(parempt;sis) of void interrupts this continuity, and the
cancellation (anairesis) of the continuity cuts-through (diakoptei)
the sympathy between bodies" (17).
This view of sympathy and similarity also provided the theoretical
basis for an "active" kind of astrology and for theurgy, according
to which the wise man may operate on and manipulate the various
sympathetic" powers, rather than just suffer their effects
passively.
Proclus describes the function of "dissimilarity" (anomoiot;s) as
follows : "Similarity proceeds by analogy to the intelligible
limit (perati), but dissimilarity by analogy to the intelligible
infinitude (apeiria)...The subsistence of dissimilarity is analogous
to the prolific causes and to those that preside over plurality
and division" (18).	 This confirms similarity's role as being
analogous to the "defining" aspect of the One, and dissimilarity's
as analogous to the One's infinite power (see I.B.1.1 & 2).
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NOTES ON I.A.3
1 Eg. Pl.Th. III 6, 7, 12 (Bude).
There is also the marginally different "twofold similarity"
(dittZ homoiotZs): to each other, according to the degree of
procession from the One, and to the direct producing causes
Pl.Th. VI p352 (Portus).
Similarity as a cosmological principle derives from the very
old and well established notion of "homoios" in Greek thought.
2 For "similarity" and "sympathy" in Plotinus, see Enn.IV,4,32, 38-45.
Also cf. Iamblichus "De Mysteriis Liber" p.192 & 207 (Parthey)
for "sumpatheia","homoiofes" and "epitedeiot-ds".
In Proclus' El.Th.28 (quote 2) Dodds explains . "sumpathes" as
"attuned" p.216 of his notes; "sumpatheia" seems to follow
!similarity" in being both general and specific. Cf. In Tim.I 36.
On the concept of cosmic sympathy, M.Pohlenz "Stoa" esp. I 230,
360, 391-2, and C.Reinhardt's "Kosmos und Sympathie"(1926) p170-209.
3 Whether the Neoplatonists originated, or anticipated, the
concept of action at a distance is a vexed question.
For M.Jammer, "Concepts of Force" (1957),p.36ff, 148f, the
sympathetic linking across the body of the universe was equivalent
to action at a distance. S.Sambursky, "Conceptual developments
in later Greek scientific thought" in "Scientific Change" ed.
A.C.Crombie(1963),esp. p.61-4 & 78, maintained that thanks to
their mystical philosophy, the Neoplatonists progressed further
from the Stoic "sympathetic" field of force of the "pneuma" and
originated the notion of action at a distance; however, G.E.L.
Owen in his comment. ,p98-102, was critical of this claim,
pointing out, that the non-corporeal aspects of "contact" and
"touching", such as the psychological, had already been under
debate among the Peripatetics and Stoics, and that it was these
kind of arguments which were further developed by Plotinus and
Iamblichus.
The wider issues of the notion of action at a distance are
discussed in M.Hesse's art. "Action at a distance", "Concept of
Matter in modern philosophy" (1963) ed. E.McMullin, p.119-37,
where she deals with the problems of defining the concept; there
is also a mention of the extra-sensory kind of phenomena in
relation to action at a distance, which may, but not necessarily,
be relevant to Neoplatonism._
The long range action of the Neoplatonic "sympathy" and causality
does share some of the features of action at a distance, as
outlined by M.Hesse, esp. that of continuous action; but the
aspects of action through a plenum of media, and the affecting
of suitable entities make it more like action transmitted (or
emanated) through a field.
An appropriate compromise is, perhaps, A.E.Taylor's "contact at
a distance", "A Comm. on Plato's Timaeus" p278, which he employed
to describe Plato's theory of vision and light (Tim.450).
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SECTION B. THE MODES OF EXISTENCE
Introduction.
A complete list of Proclus' modes of existence, the "hypostases",
can be found mainly in the "Platonic Theology". In the "Elements
of Theology" they are scattered in various parts of the text, and
therefore a reconstitution, as it were, is necessary. Yet there
is an advantage in such reconstitution over the comprehensive
account of the "Platonic Theology", inasmuch as that the hypostasis
of Nature is included more or less explicitly (for the problem see
I.B.6).
A useful synopsis of the hierarchical arrangement of the hypostases
and their associated properties may be found in Pl.Th. I 63-73
(Bude edition) and in III 20-26. The first seems to be based on
a hierarchy of moved and moving entities, and therefore is similar
to El.Th. prop.20.	 The second is based on the more familiar
attributes of "being", "intellect", "soul" etc. 	 Of the two, the
second is perhaps broader than the first, since motion or the lack
of it in terms of "unchangeability" were usually among the properties
attributed to soul and intellect respectively , for example.
In Pl.Th. III 20-26 (Bude), Proclus commences with the last mode
of existence, hierarchically speaking, and continues in an ascending
order; ie., the emphasis is on the "return" (see I.A.1).
"Of all types of being the very last (eschaton) is the corporeal
(s;matikon)...For no body has either its own means of existence
(ou authupostaton) or its own means of coming-to-be (oude autogenes)"
..."From where, then, comes the existence (to einai) of bodies,
and what does immediately (prosech;s) procure them by nature
(pephuken) with being ? Is it not as we say the cause primarily
of existence of bodies, that which by being present renders the
nature of a body (s;matos phusin) more perfect and complete
(teleioteran) than of its kindred bodies (homogenli : ie. the ones
which do not have it)...This is soul (psuch;s); for we say that
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the animated bodies are more perfect than the inanimate (empsucha..
apsucha cf. Arist. de gen. anim. II 731b29)•	 Soul therefore is
primarily over and above bodies (s;matiin epekeina), and it must be
admitted that all the heaven and everything corporeal(s;matoeides)
is a vehicle of soul. Hence, there are two orders of being, as
we have shown, one is of the body (sLatike), the other which is
above it (huper) is of the soul (psuchike)"...
"Just as perfect is the body which partakes of soul, likewise
perfect (teleia) is the soul which participates in intellect (nou).
Not everything partakes of a soul which is capable of rational
life, however, intellect and intellectual irradiation (noeras
ellampse;s)	 is participated even by those which have just a
certain amount of cognition (gn;se;s hestinosoun). 	 Soul's
activity (energein) is in Time, but the intellect's in Eternity...
every intellect is always perfect (aei teleios)...therefore the
class of the intellect (noeron genos) is in its existence over
and above that of the soul"...
"But is the intellect the first-most of the kinds of being ? No,
for prior to it is the breadth and plane of life (z(7) -es platos).
For the soul is indeed self-living (autoziis), supplying itself
with life, and the intellect is the best, most perfect, and as we
have already said, eternal life...it is necessary therefore to
exist life-itself (autoz;en)...If the beings which are capable of
cognition participate in intellect, whereas such beings which are
without even a share (amoira) in the faculty of cognition partake
of life - for we say that plants live (cf. Plato Tim. 77B) -
it is certainly necessary that life should be arranged over and
above the intellect, since it is the cause of a greater number of
effects (pleionli aitian)...than the intellect".
"What then ?...is to-live the same as to-be ? But this is impossible
...for everything which partakes of being should also partake of
life...but there are many beings which are without a share in life,
although all living beings have both essence and being (to on
also transl. real-existence).	 Therefore the real-existence (viz.
being itself) was given subsistence prior to the first-most life ;
for that which is more universal (holiOteron) and the cause of
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a greater number is closer to the One (enguter; tou henos ; cf.
quote 3 in I.A.1)" (19).
"The One gives subsistence to the unities-henads of the class of
real-existence (t;r1 ontal), prior to real-existence itself"...
"And the henads of the beings are given subsistence by the
unparticipated (amethektou) and the transcendent from all, Unity
(tan holOn exeremenes henados)" (20).
The complete list of the "hypostases", including Nature as a
separate order, is as follows
1. Unity (henas)	 The origin (and goal) of the universe
2. Being (on, ousia) The existence and the model of the universe
3. Life (z(N)	 The intelligible heavens
4. Intellect (nous)	 The crafting, the creation of the universe
5. Soul (psuch;)	 The principle of motion
6. Nature (phusis)	 Physical existence
7. Body (silima)	 The visible heavens, and the corporeal world
Proclus frequently eliminates or absorbs Life and/or Nature in an
adjacent hypostasis, according to his customary use of shorthand,
and shifting of emphasis in the description of properties (cf.I.A.2;
also see I.B.3 & 6). Matter is generally the substrate, although
as mass-matter it is the determinant factor of sublunary existence
(see eg. I.B.8.5, II.A.6).
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NOTE ON SECTION B. Introduction.
The arrangement of the levels of existence in an ascending or
descending order is not necessarily the best way of representing
the hierarchy.
The linear, vertical arrangement emphasizes s par excellence' the
ranking in terms of priority, superiority, and metaphysical or
metaphorical "loftiness" and "sublimity".
	 Indeed, such imagery
and phraseology abounds in Proclus' writings (see quote 19, and
the quotes in ch. I.A.1 and 8.5.2 & 3). 	 But it also stresses
the separation and distance between the sensibles and the
intelligibles and the One (which is correct, nevertheless).
Another type of arrangement is by concentric circles (or spheres).
According to one of the two possible options, see Rosen, op.cit.
p.99-117, the One is at the circumference of the whole schema,
and Body occupies the innermost circle - that with the shortest
radius. It represents the procession from more universal to
more particular modes, the former "encompassing" the latter,
and it also demonstrates that the One (or the Limit, or Being,
depending on the fine variants thereof) is the "boundary" of
the universe. In effect, it is an extended version of the
familiar geocentric arrangement of the spheres of the 4 Elements
and the celestial bodies, with the "spheres" of the intelligibles
enclosing those of the sensibles. It became, in a Christian
context , very popular in the Middle Ages and in the
Renaissance. There are many examples of it in Proclus, see
eg. In Tim. II 281, 284, 286, El.Th. 60, 150. Cf. Diagram three
of L.Sweeney's article "Participation and the Structure of Being"
in the "Structure of Being" ed. R.B.Harris, on p.151.
According to the other, the One is at the centre of the system
of concentric circles, with the other modes of existence
radiating away, as it were, from the centre and occupying
successively larger circles. Body defines the circumference.
Cf. F.Novotny "The posthumous life of Plato" (1966), diagram
on p.154, on Plotinus' hypostases. It represents the emanatory
character of procession, expanding from the more unified to the
more separated modes, Body being, appropriately for Proclus'
theory of Space, the ultimate and spatial separation. However,
it also demonstrates, that whereas body is the outermost "shell",
unity is the innermost essence of existence, an insight Into
Neoplatonic philosophy not clearly illustrated by the other
representations of the hierarchy (cf. eg. Chald.Phil.IV, p211)‘
The similes employed are, firstly, of the One as the Sun
(ex. Plotinus, eg. Enn.VI 9,7-8 ) and secondly, of themonr
as the centre of a circle, whose radius is analogous to the
"prohodos".
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1. UNITY AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
1.1 THE ONE
The One is the designated single, first cause of the universe.
The first cause is by necessity "one", otherwise there would be
infinite regress.	 "All things that exist proceed from a single
first cause (mias, pr7yas aitias)...or else there will be regress
to infinity (ep' apeiron anodos), cause lying behind cause, so that
the positing of prior causes will never cease...there is a first
cause of all existing things (tin ontal) from which they proceed
severally (hekasta) as offshoots from a root (ek rhiz;s), some
near to it, and others more remote; for that there is not more
than one such first principle has already been established,
inasmuch as the subsistence of plurality is posterior to the one"(21).
The One imparts, naturally, unity (hen, henas, h;nomenon) to the
Universe, since all entities exist be-cause of the One, as "effects"
of that First cause. ' In this sense, the One represents both the
primal cosmic sympathy, and the "limit" of the cosmos, since 1.ts
absence would entail infinite regresses and infinite quantities in
every direction.
Furthermore, the One is also the designated goal of everything in
the universe, and is therefore their "good" (agathon).
"For if it belongs to the good to conserve and preserve (s;stikon)
all that exists - on account of which it is originally the desirable
object (epheton) of all - and if that which conserves and holds
together (sunektikon) the substance of each thing is unity (hen)
- since by unity everything is conserved in substance, but
scattering (skedasmos) alters the substance of each thing -, then
the good, wherever it is present, makes such a thing one and holds
-
its substance together by virtue of this union (enosin). But if
union is in itself good, and all good tends to create unity, then
the Good unqualified (hapliis) and the One unqualified are identically
the same...Goodness, therefore, is union, and union goodness,
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the Good is one, and the One is primarily good" (22).
Although the conception of the "good" as an ultimate principle
can be traced to the Aristotelian 'summum bonum% and Plato, the
explicit identification of the Good with the One is characteristically
Neoplatonic, and may be found,forexample,in Plotinus. 2 Essentially,
it facilitated the intimate linking of ethics with the general
Neoplatonic cosmological system, so that, roughly put, each mode
or grade of existence could count a set of appropriate ethical
properties among	 its overall number of characteristic
properties. Within the process of remaining - procession -
return, the good in its appropriate form is invariably the
"remaining" element to which things must "return", moving (but not
necessarily in spatio-temporal terms) from states of division and/or
privation to states which are more unified and "whole". It is not
surprising therefore, that the "return" to the good, unified and
whole is the theoretical basis of the Neoplatonic view of religion,
even in its theurgic form (cf. I.B.8.5.3).
If the One is both the First cause and the Good of the universe,
then the identification with the notion of one God is virtually
inevitable.	 "Now, that the One is God (to hen theos) follows from
its identity with the Good; for the Good is identically the same
with God - for such thing which is over and above all things, and
is desired (ephietai) by all, this is God (theos touto), and that
which is the 'whence' (aph l hou) and 'whither' (pros ho) of all
things, this is the Good" (23). This abstract, impersonal One God
sets the tone, as it were, for the concept of divinity in Proclue
Neoplatonic philosophy. 3 "Divinity" is effectively an appelation
for a certain essential principle, whose properties and functions
are such as to earn the title "God".
According to a strict definition of the One's properties, the
essence of the One in itself is placed above and beyond everything;
it is beyond any kind of attribute or definition.4 This follows,
or rather it is ontologically justified, partly from ranking
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"real-existence" or "being" below "unity", and the identification
of the existence of the universe with that, relatively, lower mode
(see I.B.2), but chiefly from the rule that the prime cause, viz.
the "unparticipated" entity, should be above and beyond the ranks
which are subject to participation. The One itself being the
exemplar is the "unparticipated" par excellence, and is the
Ineffable (arrh;ton), Unknowable (agn;ston), and Transcendental
- -(exeremenon).5
The designation of the One as an entirely transcendental entity
accorded with many theologies of the period which required a
God-above-all to be beyond the "materiality" of the world, namely
the dualistically based or influenced belief systems. 	 In this
respect, there is a marked similarity with the Gnostic notions
of a remote, good God, and "King of Light". 6
Philosophically, such a First cause could overcome the Aristotelian
problem of the patient reacting upon the agent. But the role of
a completely transcendent 'primum mobile' would seem to be in
conflict with its capacity as a causal entity. The solution to
this was the introduction of (i) the pair of first principles
Limit (peras) and Unlimited (apeiria), which essentially exteriorize
the causal ability of a "hidden" One, and (ii) the series of
participated members of Unity, namely the famous "henads" (henades).
These entities, in effect, bridge the chasm between the totally
inscrutable First cause and the real-existent Universe, which is in
agreement with the method of introducing "intermediary", bridging
entities between dissimilars.
Limit and Unlimited represent respectively the "delimiting" nature,
and the "infinitely" powerful capability of the One; their
successive "mixing" yields the various forms of existence. The
henads unify and join the universe to the One, since they are
participable and knowable.
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Union with the One invariably involved the state of "illumination",
based on the Neoplatonic concept that the One can be appreciated
by "analogy" to light. 7 "The light (ph;s) which proceeds from the
Good is a unifier (henopoion) of intellect and beings...the light
which is in the intelligibles illuminates them in the same manner
as the sun-like (hlioeides: see Plato Rep.VI 509A) light which
is in the visibles (horatiin)...all the intelligibles become like-
the-Good (agathoeide; also Rep.VI 509A) through the participation
in the light, and through this light every being is most similar
(homoiotaton) to the Good. 	 It makes, therefore, no difference
to speak of this light and of the One - for this light is
connective and unifier (sundetikon, henopoion) of the intelligibles
since it derives its subsistence from the One (tou henos
huphistamenon)" (24).
So, the One can be thought of as expressing its power by emanating
light, which acquires the appropriate nature of each subsequent
mode of existence, ending with the solar light; the light-procession
is thus identifiable with the procession from the One to plurality.
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NOTES ON I.B.1.1
1 Eg. El.Th. 1-5, 11
2 Plotinus Enn.VI,7,15-42 and VI,9.
Effectively it is the merging of the Socratic and the Parmenidean
elements in Platonism, see Proclus Pl.Th.II ch.7 & 6.
That the Final cause is identical with the First cause, see eg.
El.Th. 33, 146. It is linked to the "returning" to the
"remaining" phase. That the transcendental Final cause, El.Th.8
is the transcend. Efficient cause, E1.Th.11, and Identified with
the One, E1.Th.12.
3 But see also "The Hymn to God", in "Philosophia Chaldaica" of
Proclus, A.Jahn p.62-77; text and Engl. trans. in Rosan,
works of Proclus no.39. It had originally been attributed
to Gregory of Nazianzas,but as Jahn and esp. Rosan show, it most
probably is one of Proclus' hymns.
On the Neoplatonic view of God, cf. A.H.Armstrong
"The apprehension of Divinity in the Self and Cosmos in Plotinus"
in "The significance of Neoplatonism" (1976) ed.R-B.Harris,
particularly his remarks p.187-190.
The notion of the One as the God above any personification prob,
derives from Pythagoreanism or neoPythagoreanism, eg. Nicomachus,
see J.Dillon "The Middle Platonists".
4 The One transcends even its own "hypostasis", eg. In Tim. I 256,4
also see J.N.Deck "The One, or God, is not properly a Hypostasis"
in "Structure of Being" ed.R.B.Harris, p.34-9.
The One can only be approached, philosophically, by "negation"
(apophasis), the "negative" theology, or by "analogy" (analogia)
Pl.Th. II ch.5, ch.10-12 (negation), ch.7-9 (analogy); also see
Rosan p122-6.
5 Eg. E1.Th.123, 162; In Tim.I 3,30; In Alc.181,18; Pl.Th.II ch.6
They stem from the apophatic approach to God. See also Dodds
on the Unknown God in Neoplatonism, Appx.I in the "El.of Th."
p310-3; cf.J.M.Rist "Mysticism and Transcendence in later
Neoplatonism" Hermes 92 (1964) p213-25; and ref. in Lewy.
6 See H.Jonas "The Gnostic religion", eg., p.42-44, 57-8, 288-9.
for the "King of Light",E.S.Drower "The Secret Adam" (1960) on
Mandaeans, p.56 ff. There are-also parallels in Hermeticism.
For the One as "the first King" see intro, to vol.II of Pl.Th.
by Saffrey and Westerink, p.xxxv-xxxvii, and II ch.8 & 9.
7 For the "analogy" of solar light in Plato Rep.VI, esp.507.
See Proclus Pl.Th. ch.7 and ch.4, p.32-4 (Blade).
Also see Gersh "Spiritual Motion" op.cit. on the simile of light,
p.90-3.
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1.2 LIMIT AND THE UNLIMITED
The pair Limit (peras) and Unlimited (apeiria), also translated
limit and infinite, determinative and indeterminate,' make their
appearance as primary principles in Proclus' scheme somewhere
between the One and Being.
"All that is really existent (ont(3s on) is composed of limit and
infinite (apeirou).
	
For if it is to have unlimited power, it is
obviously infinite, and in this way it is given subsistence by the
infinite. But if it is to be indivisible (ameres) and unitary,
it should participate in limit; for what participates in unity
(henos) is finite ".
	 And, "Prior to all that is composed
of limit and infinitude there exist by themselves (kath' hauta)
the first Limit (priiton peras) and the first Unlimited (prOt;
apeiria)" (25).
"The Limit and the Infinite of the beings manifest (ekphainei)
that unknowable (agniiston) and unparticipated (amethekton) cause
(viz. the One), the Limit being the cause of the stable (monimou),
uniform (henoeidous) divinity, which holds things together
(sunektik;s1), and the Infinite being the originating cause
(prokatarchon) of the series which proceeds to all things and is
capable of multiplication (plethuesthai dunamenes), and in general
of all the generative order (gennetik.gs diakosmeseos).
	 For all
union and wholeness (holot;s), and the communion of beings and all
divine measures (theia metra) depend (ex.ert;tai) on the primary
Limit, whereas all division (diairesis), prolific creation and the
procession into plurality are given subsistence from this most
principal Infinitude" (26).
This pair of first principles manifest or "reveal unto light"2
(ekphainei) the substance of the One, the unifying element in
things, and the power of the One, the unlimited power of proceeding
forth and multiplying; Proclus avoids infinite regression by
pointing out that "power" is "infinite" in quality not in size
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or number.
Being a pair of first principles had its own added significance:
Firstly, it accorded with the Pythagorean number-symbolism which
associated the dyad with multiplicity;3 and secondly, in view of
the terms "father" and "mother" in the series of divine henads,
this pair seems to represent the Father - Mother God, whose union
is the universe, and which manifests the properties of the Ineffable
One.
L.J. Rosin seems to suggest (The philosophy of Proc1u2p.126-7),
that both elements of the pair are on the same level immediately
"below" the One and "prior" to Being. This indeed agrees with
however
Proclus, one minor problemAarises from the statement in El.Th.prop.
92 : "Infinitude is between the First principle and Being", which
appears to imply that the first Infinitude alone is ranked below
the One. But if Limit manifests the "substance" of the One it
must be relatively superior or prior to the Unlimited which
manifests the "power", inasmuch as "power" is the second term in
the triad substance - power - activity (or cause - power - effect),
and any principle of "unity" must be prior to plurality: strictly,
the Unlimited is relatively "lower" than Limit.
A similar kind of problem is the status of the henads with respect
to Limit - Unlimited together, since the henads, in themselves, are
also hierarchically between the Unparticipated One and Being.
Rosin states (ibid.) that they are on the same hypostasis,
presumably because they all are exteriorised properties of the One.
Yet throughout the "Platonic Theology" Proclus refers to the One as
the direct cause of the henads, and only refers to Limit - Unlimited
when he is about to embark on the discussion of their first mixture,4
Being; in other words, he seems to give priority to the "horizontal"
relationship over the "vertical", which would normally mean the
hierarchical superiority of the former over the latter. But perhaps
this is merely an example of Proclus' use of a shift in emphasis as
"appropriate" in the description of entities. Thus, (i) he emphasizes
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the relation between the One and the henads when the subject-matter
centres on the diversity of Unity, viz., that the henads are class
members of the One, but (ii) he emphasizes the relation between the
One and other modes of existence, ie. in the discussion about Being,
when the subject-matter centres on substantial change.
	 So,
essentially there should be no problem.
However, in El.Th. 159 Proclus himself seems to provide the solution,
thus: "Every order of divinities (the self-constituted henads, see
next chapt.) is derived from the two first principles Limit and
Unlimited...every order must proceed from both, because the
communications (metadoseis) of the first causes extend through all
the secondary (deuterli) ranks".
	 According to this statement the
henads are products of Limit and the Unlimited, which concurs with
the original intention that they do the actual "causing" of the One.
Therefore in strict hierarchical terms the henads are "inferior" to 5
Limit - Unlimited, which in turn confirms that talking about
"horizontal" and "vertical" hierarchies in Proclus may be misleading.
Proclus reinforces further the concept of "limit" and "infinitude"
as a series of principal properties (Limit and Infinitude being the
"monads" thereof) by giving lists of their corresponding functions
in the various cosmological modes.6
Eternity (see I.B.2) has limit
has inf in.
Intellect (I.B.4)
	
has limit
has infin.
Soul
	 has limit
has intin.
The celestial bodies have limit
have inf in.
by being the measure of intelligibles
by being an unceasing power.
by creating according to the Model
in virtue of the power to create.
by being the measure of periodic
motion
by being in a perpetual state of
motion.(as the principle of motion).
in their order and definite
periods
in the variety of planetary motion
and extent of their influence.
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Generation as a whole has limit in the finiteness of the forms
has infin. in the complexity and constant
change.
Every product of Nature is limit, by its form (eidos)
is infin. in its matter (hulen).
Formless mass-matter has limit
	 by being a definite quantity
has infin. in being capable of indefinite
division.
Thusf as Proclus points out, "limit" corresponds predominantly to the
"formal" cause, whereas "infinite" to the "material" cause, although
for him these correspondences are only reductions of "limit" and
"unlimited" insofar as they do not adequately encompass the full
range of meanings and attributes of "limit" and "unlimited".
There seems to be an omission in defining only the Limit and the
Unlimited as the exteriorized properties of the One: If they
correspond, respectively, to the "remaining" and the "proceeding"
elements, then the "returning" appears to be without a first
principle at this level.
Rosin suggests (p. 128) that "Providence" (pronoia) is this third
"returning" principle, co-existent with the other two.
	 This is
certainly justified by the appearance of "providence" in tandem
with "unity" and "power" - "infinity" in the discussion on the
henads, which implies the existence of all these three as "monads"
prior to the henads, ie. there must be Limit, Unlimited and
Providence. Furthermore, Proclue definition of "activity"
(energeia) is associated with the "returning" function of
the "intellect" (nous): "Where should an activity prior to the
Intellect be found, if not among those which are above Substance ?
And providence, as its nameInd cafes(etymological interpretation of
pro noia), is an activity prior to Intellect (pro nou)...the
gods exercise providence towards all things, filling all with a
good which is prior to Intellect" (27).
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RosAn also notes (p. 103), that such definition of providence is
doubly appropriate, since God by the very act of producing the
universe (providence as activity) exercises fore-thought (providence
prior to nous) towards it, protects it and cares for its welfare
(providence in the more common sense). 	 This is another aspect of
the deliberate fusion of ethics with the Neoplatonic cosmology in
the effort to systematise explanation.
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NOTES ON I.B.1.2
1 Eg. J.Trouillard "La Mystagogie de Proclus" p.243-6; and ref. in
note 2, below.
2 For the relation of the pair of principles to the One, and
general background, see Dodds note on p.246-7; A.C.Lloydb
remarks, "Procession and Division" in Soul and the structure
of Being etc, op.cit., esp. p.19-21; also Wallis "Neoplatonism"
p.148; with particular ref. to the "manifesting" role of the
Limit and the Unlimited, see Pl.Th.II 32, cf. In Tim.I 384 and
A.J.Festugiere's note 2 on p.248 of vol.II of his trans. of
In Tim.
3 Regarding the Pythagorean symbolism and background, and a
penetrating examination of the material in Syrianus and Proclus,
see A.D.R.Sheppard "Monad and Dyad as cosmic principles in
Syrianus" in Soul and the structure of Being etc op.cit.
p.1-14.	 In Proclus eg. In Tim.I 130-2; I 174.
For the "father" and "mother" divinity(ies) see Pl.Th.I ch.28,
in relation to Limit and Unlimited.
4 One and henads, eg. Pl.Th.III ch.1-4, 7; El.Th.6, 21(Cor.);
Limit-Unlimited and Being, Pl.Th.III ch.8, 9-11; E1.Th.89, 90-93;
and see A.D.R.Sheppard op.cit p.11, as she points out, in the
El.Th. the discussion about the divine henads, the "gods" in
Pl.Th. commences with prop.113, after the discussion on the pair.
5 E1.Th.159 certainly seems to have been a stumbling-block for
many, from the 12th c. Byzantine, Nicolaus of Methone and
including Dodds, see El.of Th. p.281.
	 As A.Sheppard op.cit.
explains, p.11-2, the problem is not only why Proclus
subordinates the henads to the pair of Limit-Unlimited, but
also, why he retains the pair and gives it such an important
cosmogonical role, when the henads alone seem to fill adequately
the gap between the One and the Being of the universe.
My suggestion is, that Proclus had at least two good uses for
the pair of First Principles: firstly, they could be made to fit
the triadic scheme for causation, and secondly, they could
explain the differentiation among the divine henads - gods.
According to the first, the pair together with Providence as a
third First Principle, are the One exteriorized, Limit is Its
hyparxis, Infinity Its power, and Providence Its activity; thus
they provide the basic pattern for the enneadic structure of
Being. According to the other, the pair, again together with
Providence, ensure that the divine henads can have an individual,
characteristic property, an idiots; this does not mean that
the godly unities are "contaminated by duality"- besides, it is
more like a trinity - simply (eg. El.Th.159, 151-3), some
manifest more of the determining, others of the infinite, and
others of the providential aspect.(of the One).
6 A composite list from In Parm.1119-23, and Pl.Th.III 33-4;
also cf. In Tim. 384-6, for "form" and "matter".
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1.3 THE HENADS
Literally "unities" (henades), they are the participated class
members of the One.
The henads are distinguished into two main groups, the ones which
are self-constituted and the ones which are not (see the "triadic
motif").
	 Of the two, the self-constituted alone exhibit the
attributes associated with the One, such as divinity, whereas the
others are simply "irradiations" and "images".
Proclus summarizes the status of eath, thus:
"The latter (ie. the irradiations) are upon such a level that they
belong to their participants - for being incomplete (ateleis) they
need a substrate for their existence. 	 The former (ie. the self-
complete) make their participants belong to them - for being
complete (teleiai) they fill (plerousi) the participants with
themselves...and they have no need of inferiors for their
subsistence...Prom this is apparent that some of the henads proceed
self-complete (autoteleis) from the One, while others are simply
irradiated states of unity (ellampseis henOse;n)...And so not
every unity is a divinity, but only the self-complete unity" (28).
"For if there are two sorts of henads, as it has been shown above,
the one consisting of self-complete henads and the other of
irradiations from them, and the divine terms are those which are
akin and of the same nature (sungenes, homophues) to the One and
Good, then the gods are self-complete henads" (29).
So, Proclus distinguishes between the mere state of unity which
every-thing has by virtue of existing, even a stone, and the
self-complete and self-determined unity which only the so-called
divine entities have. Yet, insofar as the mere states of unity
are irradiations from the self-constituted, then everything has a
spark of divinity, inherently. '
This result led to the principle of "divine allotment" (the -6n klerosf
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that each thing bears the sign of the appropriate divinity, which
in reference to the celestial objects - the lowest order with divine
henads - provided a theoretical basis for astrology.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the divine henad in itself is the "summit"
(akron) and "flower" (anthos), the inner-most essence of all
the attributes which partake of it (the henad contains in a unified
fashion being, life, intellect etc.), all grades of correlation such
as intellect-soul, soul-body, may be referred to a causal
relation either between the participants and irradiations of the
same divine henad, or between the participants and irradiations of
different, but appropriately related, divine henads.3
The henads, and especially the self-constituted ones, are said to
be more closely bonded to each other than any other series, for
example intellects or bodies, since qua unities they are in a
unio-ally unified state with the One and each other.4
Consequently, there seems to be an internal conflict between the
status of the divine henads as aspects and representatives of the
One in the universe, and as independent self-determined entities.
But this was not seen as a problem at all, on the contrary, it
accounted for unity in diversity with respect to divine nature.
Employing the method of shifting emphasis, from the One's point of
view the henads are its aspects and are united with it. However,
from the point of view of the entities within the universe and
especially physical beings, such as us humans, the divine henads
- or rather the entities predicated with a divine henad - are the
various individualistic gods. This was of course tailor-made
for the syncretic reconciliation of the many non-christian panthea,
but it also afforded a philosophic, abstracted explanation of the
nature of divinity.5
In reference to the participant attribute-entities of the henads
2roclus assigns a one-to-one relationshig with "substance" or
"being", the immediately "lower" mode of existencefs As E.R. Dodds
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observed (Proclus' The Elements of Theology p.271), this seems to
betray the Neo-Pythagorean origins of the concept of the henads,
where they represented the "limit" element of the "forms" (see
I.B.2).
The divine henads are participated by appropriate kinds of real-
existence, life, intellect, soul, and body, in the case of the
celestial bodies, which (intellect, soul or body etc) are not
divine in themselves, but are "divinized" (ektheoumena) by partaking
of the divine quality of the henad itself.
	 Other entities are
characterised and partake of an "irradiation" henad; and so every
thing that exists has its appropriate "unity" which defines it. 7
Returning to the independent, divine henads, they are said to have
both the "will" or volition (boulesis) and the "overflowing" power
-
(periousia dunameos) for action obvious corollaries of their
self-determined and self-complete status.
	 Such action is
essentially the transmission and sharing-out (metaeisis) of
"goodness" (agathotes), the divine henad's very substance, so it
is primarily the exercise of providence (pronoia). Nevertheless,
the causal power may extend to all fields, in the appropriate mode,
including the power to create (as in the Demiurge), and the seminal
capacity for self-determined motion (as in the celestial bodies).
The independent henads were by no means conceived as clones of one
single type, despite their unified substance.
	 Each is an
individual manifesting an appropriate character derived from their
common origin in the One's Limit and Infinite. So, according to
Proclus, some have predominantly the element of limit, others that
of infinitude, while others have a "returning" feature (see previous
chapt. limit, unlimited and providence). 9
 This specialisation
confirms
	 that they do not originate in the absolutely homogeneous
One itself.
The divine henads which have the limit predominating are said to
preside over the property of "unity" and "substantive existence".
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According to Proclus, they constitute the "father" (patrikos) series
of divinities, which from the level of Intellect 'downwards' they
have the more specific function of "creator" (demiourgikon),
insofar as they bestow "form" (eidopoiia) on composite things.
One grouping of them is also known as the "solar" (h-Liakos) series.
The divine henads which have the infinite predominating are said to
preside over the property of "unceasing" (to anekleipton) capacity
and procession (prohodos).
	 They manifest especially the multiplying
and continuous characteristic of "power", and in Proclus 2
 jargon,
they constitute the "mother" (meteres) series of divinities, also
called the "generative" (gennetikos) and the "prolific" (gonimos),
whose more specific function is to be the "life-giving" (z;ogonos)
causes (eg. the entitized power of the Intellect, see I.B.4).
Proclus also defines the divine henads which are said to preside
over the "perfecting" teleiCitikos, telesiourgos) quality.
	 They
take care of the "return", which is, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, associated with providence. The more specific form of
this series is the "elevating" (anag;gos), viz, the ones which
"uplift the soul".
He also defines the "guardian" (phrouretikon) series, whose more
specific role is to "purify" (kathartikos) the divine quality from
extraneous elements, particularly materiality, and to "liberate"
(exairein, apoluein) it from such involvement. The "guardian"
series is introduced in Intellect; from this level 'downwards'
there seems to be a need to protect and conserve the immutable
nature of entities with divine henad, as well as maintaining their
distinct identity. To this series seem to belong the so-called
"satellites" of the celestial bodies (see II.B.5; phrouros
doruphoros, meaning attendant bodyguard).
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The orders of self-constituted henads, which correspond to and are
characteristic of the main cosmological modes of existence, are as
follows :10
The intelligible (noetos), also called hidden (kruptos), referring
to Being.
The intelligible and intellectual (noetos kai floe-1.os), referring to
Life.
The intellectual (no;ros), referring to Intellect.
The leading or directive (hegemonikos), ranking above-the-mundane
world, hence called hypercosmic (huperkosmios), referring to Soul.
The liberated (apolutos) order, ranking both above and in the
mundane world (hama huperkosmios kai enkosmios), which most probably
refers to Nature.
The encosmic (enkosmios), viz, in the mundane world, referring to
the celestial objects.
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NOTES ON I.B.1.3
1 Eg. El.Th.144, 140; In Tim.I 209-10; and cf. El.Th.117
2 Eg. In Tim.I 135-42; In Rep.II 299.
3 Thus everything is part of the appropriate divine series, eg.
E1.Th.139-145; In Tim.I 210,17-25, In Tim.I 444,20-30,
In Tim.II 201,25-9; also In Rep.II 296,5-13; and Hier.Art, esp.
151,14-23, 150,22-3.
4 Cf. Pl.Th.III 10-2; E1.Th.118.
5 For the doctrine of the "henads" and its place in Neoplatonic
thought see Saffrey's and Westerink's intro, to vol.III of the
Pl.Th., esp. p.ix-xvii, li-lxxvii. Dodds had originally
maintained that the doctrine could be traced to Syrianus (p257-60)
although in the addenda and corrig. of the second edition, p346,
he observed that therewere difficulties and the doctrine must be
earlier. J.Dillon, "Iamblichi Chalcidensis" (1973) in his
praiseworthy examination of the difficulty, appedx.B p.412-6,
'stirred up the waters' by concluding that Iamblichus was the
originator. Saffrey and Westerink retain the doctrine of henads
within the Athenian School,withSyrianus in particular. However,
it is a truism that only Proclus fully developed and established
it in Neoplatonism, and in that respect it is his.
For the religious syncretic movements of the period, cf. F.Dunand
and P.Leveque "Les syncretismes dans les religions de l'antique"
(1970.
6 One-to-one relationship with "being", El.Th.135-8, cf.117;
the divine henads are finite in number, E1.Th.149: both confirm
that the unity "henad" is the potential and potent aspect of
existence, and being the actual.
7 Each "god", like every individual in Proclus i system, is a bundle
of qualities. The "henad" or unity is one of these qualities,
but since it is the most potent and essential of all qualities
(and according to the "realist" metaphysics), it is the quality
which characterizes the entity as a whole; hence by shorthand
"divine henad" is equiv. to the god as a whole. By similar use
of shorthand "henad" may stand for "divine henad". A "god"
will have also "being", but mu have properly (as opposed to
"causally") "life", "soul", "body" etc. depending on which
mode of existence it has a "foothold".
Cf. A.C.Lloyd, "Procession and Division" op.cit. p.34-8.
See El.Th.129, 117.
8 El.Th.120, 121.
9 For the "father", "mother", "elevating" etc. classification
see E1.Th.159, 151-8. Some, such as the anagogic have also
theurgical connotations, see Lewy op.cit. ch .iii.
10 See El.Th.162-5; cf. Pl.Th.III 26-8. List compiled Pl.Th.III-VI.
- 73 -
2. BEING, SUBSTANCE
This is the essential property of to-be or "substantive existence",
and is therefore, in Proclus' terminology, "participated" by all
that have actual, not just potential, existence, viz. "being".
In cosmogonical terms, Being (to on) is the first mode of existence
to proceed from the One's Limit and Unlimited (excluding the henads
themselves), is very like it, and is the most universal attribute
(again, bar unity).
"Being is above and beyond both the Intellect (nous) and Life (zoes),
since next to the One is the most universal cause, it must be the
highest entity (akrotaton)...And prior to it there is no other
principle save the One...Being, as composite of limit and infinite,
is a unitary manifold (plethos heniaion)...there is nothing prior
to Substance (tes ousias) unless it be supra-existent (huperousion;
ie. transcendent)...immediately above and beyond Being is the
not-Being (to me on) which is superior to Being and is Unity
(hen)" (30).
The above quote clarifies. Being's position as the first actuality,
the Universe as pure existence - hence in the triadic terminology
"x is in substance/essence (kat' ousian)" (see I.A.2).
	
The One,
and the henads, are "causally" (kat' aitian) only: in other words,
the transcendent state of unity in itself is like a state
of potential existence or not-being. "That which as yet is not
(oup; on), but exists only potentially (dunamei on), has already
by its own nature a unity Oien estin kata ten heautou phusin); and
that which is after this level jLs actual existence (energeia on)"(31).
The One is therefore purely power, a causative force, not a "thing"1
per se, whereas Being is purely substance, real existence
unqualified.
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In the "Platonic Theology" Bk.III, Proclus specifies 3 triads in
describing the "monad" of Being:
One triad for its substance proper, "being/substance itself"
(autoon, autoousias), presiding over the "abiding" element;
one triad for its power, the "intelligible life" (note z3;),
presiding over the "proceeding" element;	 and
one triad for its activity, the "intelligible intellect" (noetos
nous), presiding over the "returning" element.
Each triad follows the pattern, the self-constituted henad itself +
its power
	
the resultant entity (cf. I.A.1).
Being as a whole is called the "mixture" (mikton; ex. Plato Phlb.22),
since it is the first mixture of Limit and the Unlimited, in the
direction of procession which involves substantial change - ie. in
the 'vertical' sense; hence the other name, the "first class-order"
(pr3tos diakosmos).	 It is designated the "intelligible" order
(noetos), which is the object-of-thought, thought or intellect (nous)
occupying its own and separate level. This "plane of existence"
contains the manifolds of forms in a "hidden" manner (kruphi3s)2.
The various titles and cosmological attributes given to the
structure triads of Being, as well as the other hypostases, are
mainly derived from Platonic sources, although they are blended
with technical terms extracted from the Orphic writings and the
so-called Chaldean Oracles, or Proverbs, (Chaldaika Logia).
A good deal of these ascriptions and cross-correspondences between
the systems had been established in Athenian Neoplatonism long
before Proclus, moreover, it seems that they formed part of the
'inner' curriculum accompanying initiation into theurgy. 3
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The first triad represents the substance of Substance, the being of
Being, and therefore is the level (or the sub-level) where the
whole hypostasis of Being is expressed most appropriately, hence
the name "being-itself" and "substance-itself" (autoon, autoousia).
Furthermore, this is the highest, in strict hierarchical terms,
aspect of Being, and is therefore 'nearest' to the One. 	 In this
sense, it is very much like the One and can be said to be the place
where several of the One's features, which exist in the One "as
causes", exist here "actually" (viz. kath' ousian); hence the titles
"good", "one being" (hen on), "remaining" (mon5) and "limit" (peras).
It is also called the "symmetry" of the mixture (see Plato Phileb.
65A, cf Tim. 35A-37A), and "prior to eternity" (proaillios),
compared to the second triad.
The second triad lies, as it were, in the middle of Being, and
represents the life and power of Substance to proceed.
Appropriately, the technical terms for it include the "intelligible
life" (note zoe), "centre of the intelligibles" (kentron noet;n),
and "procession" (prohodos).
But the more cosmologically significant entities identified with
- 4this triad of Being, are: "wholeness" (holotes) and "eternity" (aion).
That Proclus places "wholeness" prior to "totality" (pan), which is
in the next triad, is most probably due to the Platonic and
Aristotelian argument, that "wholeness" has an internal unity which
is its form or essence, and therefore is more than the "totality" of
its parts, totality being merely an arrangement of parts? Here is,
then, the origin of the Universe-as-a-Whole. Implicit is also the
vitalistic view of the cosmos, since the whole-universe is at the
same sub-level as intelligible life. The identification of this
triad with the eternity of the world seems to follow from
"wholeness", which must be in a state of "eternity" in order to be
sustained. His Platonic sources for it included the discussion on
the Model (see next triad) and eternity in the Timaeus (37-38),
but the possibility that here is an appropriate, albeit uncredited,
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reference to the Chaldean Power Aeon, cannot be dismissed.
Thus the power of Being may be considered as the "monad" cause of
wholeness and eternity, with participated members the "beings"
which are whole and eternal.
The third triad is at the end, so to speak, of Being, and
represents Being's activity and "reverting" principle, Being's
intellect.	 The appropriate titles are therefore, "end-limit
of the intelligibles" (peras no-e't(7,n), "activity" (energeia),
"return" (epistrophe), "intelligible intellect" (noetos nous)
and "substance's intellect" (ousias nous).	 Also called "eternal"
(aiiinios), since it is posterior to eternity itself.
The cosmologically significant entities here, are:
"the total Universe" (to pan), "plurality-itself" (autoplethos);
the "Living-being itself" (autoz;on), "intelligible Living-being"
(noeton z3on); the "Model" or Paradigm, and "form of forms" (eidos
eid3n).6
After the Universe as a whole canes the Universe as the totality of
its parts. In effect, here can be found the nascent plurality of
the universe, the wholeness and unity existing prior to the sum
total of every-thing, hence the attribute "plurality itself" which
is the "first-born" of the power of Being.
The identification "intelligible Living-being" and the "Model" are
taken from Plato's Timaeus (30-1, 37 etc); they refer to the
intelligible realm which provides the "form" and "pattern" to the
sensible world, through the creative, efficient action of the
Craftsman, the Demiurge. In the Timaeus account, the universe
was conceived vitalistically, that is, as a living, moving being
with its own source of motion, soul, so the "model" by which it
was fashioned must be the "intelligible Living-being" itself.
More specifically, Plato had established the existence of four such
archetypal "living-beings" within the "Model", one corresponding to
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the celestial bodies, and the other three to the creatures of the
air, water and earth. 	 The Model naturally became the "intelligible"
origin of the 4 Elements, and Proclus seems to view it as such. 7
"Form of forms" is yet another reference to the "intelligible"
reality, although this particular expression betrays the splitting
of the intelligible realm, in general terms, into a specifically
"intelligible" hypostasis where the "forms" exist "causally", and
a specifically "intellectual" hypostasis where the "forms" exist
properly.
This splitting of the intelligible realm into separate niches or
modes of existence was almost certainly a development of Athenian
Neoplatonism, thus "thought" (nous) and the "object of thought"
(noeton) acquired their own grades of existence. The further, three-
fold division into "intelligibles", "intellectuals" and the
intermediary between them, the "intelligibles as well as
intellectuals" - perhaps a Proclan addition - followed,
philosophically, from the three-fold division being-life-intellect.
Thus the separate modes of existence mirror this three-fold internal
structure. The intelligibles and intellectuals can be considered
as hypostasized projections of the "proceeding" life of Being,
the intellectuals as projections of the "reverting" intellect of
Being, whereas Being itself is the essence of the intelligibles
which "remains". 8
As Proclus says in his Neoplatonic jargon, Being "embraces and
comprehendd'(perileptikon) everything: it is the prototypal matrix
of the universe.
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NOTES ON I.B.2
1 For the Platonic background to non-being and not-a-thing (mainly
in the Sophist and Parmenides) cf. G.E.L.Owen "Plato on not-Being"
art.12 in "Plato" vol.1 ed.G.Vlastos.	 However, Owen's poj.nt
relates primarily to the interpretation of negation as difference,
rather than to not-being as potential existence.
2 Eg. Pl.Th.III 101.
3 For the Orphic and Chaldean elements, eg. Pl.Th.III 80, 73, 99;
cf. In Tim.I 311-5; In Crat. 59,10.
The "mystagogy" which he received from his master, Syrianus, is
the secret, mystical theology of the "Hellenes", which was
assumed to have been passed on from the Orphic mysteries to the
Pythagoreans and then to Plato, see Pl.Th.I 25-6, III 52,20-1.
Also see J.Trouillard "La Mystagogie de Proclus", the preface.
For the Platonic sources, Pl.Th.III ch.27, the various triads
recapitulated.
4 "Wholeness" and "Eternity", from Parm.142 and Tim.37 & 38,
see Pl.Th. ch.25, and ch.16 & 18, respectively. For Eternity,
Aeon, hypostasized, also El.Th.53; about the Chaldean Aeon,
'adjusted' by Proclus from the god of Time to the god of
Eternity, Lewy op.cit. p.99-105. Cf. In Tim.III 16,5-10.
5 Wholeness and the totality of parts, cf. Plato Theat.203,
Laws I 903-4; Arist. Meta.V 1024a, VIII 1045a. 	 Also see Proclus
Pl.Th.III ch.14 p.50 (Bud).
6 "Totality" (to pan) from the Sophist 244, Pl.Th.III ch.20;
"Plurality itself" from Parm., III ch.26; "Living-Being" from
Tim., III ch.15 & 18; "Model" III ch.15; "Form of forms" ch.18
p.63,2.	 The term "first-born" (prBtogenes) is Orphic,
III 91,11, frg.64, although it is made to link with Parmenides.
7 The tetrad of the classes of beings or the tetrad of forms,
III ch.19; cf. In Tim.III 108-112. This is of course hardly
controversial since the "four ideas" had been modelled on the
Empedoclean "roots". Also see In Tim.II 52,20-53,10, which
includes the same ref. to the Pythagorean tetradic number-
symbolism as Pl.Th.III 64,19, and accomp. note 4 p.136 (Bude).
8 Eg. Pl.Th.III 35,8-36,8; E1.Th.103.
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3.	 LIFE, POWER
Apart from the obvious attribute of vitality, Life, in Proclus'
system, also denotes the rather more general properties of
multiplication, progression and emanation.
Cosmogonically it represents the expansive phase of the universe,
the dynamic parting and separating of the unified-whole, Being.
The hypostasis of Life seems to be essentially a dynamic process -
hence the identification with "dunamis", that is, power (to
proceed forth) - rather than a stabilized form of existence. In
this sense, it is unlike the immediately previous mode, Being,
where everything abides (remains) in the prototypal matrix, and
the immediately next mode, Intellect, where the products of the
procession have settled and clustered into "formal aggregates"
(eidetikai periochai).
But all this activity is still non spatio-temporal, space and time
themselves appear at a later stage. Nevertheless, the notion of
movement is very much present, firstly, by virtue of the dynamic
nature of this mode of existence, and secondly, through the
association with soul, the (Platonic) principle of motion per se.1
Considering that the motive activity of soul is said to take place
within time (see El.Th.191), Life seems to be the purely "causal"
aspect of motion, Soul where motion exists "substantially", in
its own level, with the tri-dimensionally extended Body having
motion "by participation" only, but manifesting it properly in
spatio-temporal terms.
However, Proclus found another appropriate role for this level:
that of providing the bridging, connecting link between the Intellect
and its object, the intelligible Being, in the direction of "return".
All of the attributes and entities which Proclus assigns to Life,
in Bk. IV of the "Platonic Theology", reflect this dual view of
it, viz, the cosmogonical and, for the lack of a better word,
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the epistemological.
"Cosmogonical" is very appropriate, because here is the "procession
into plurality", in effect, the birth, or the "bootstrapping", to
2quote the latest scientific jargon, of the universe out of its simple
and "hidden"
	 form of existence. 3 It is also no accident that
this is the panorama which all minds strive to behold in their
"return", the journey to full comprehension of the origins; indeed,
Proclus considers it to be the place proper to knowledge, science
(episteme).4
The various names and titles for this level are drawn chiefly from
the "Parmenides", "Phaedrus" and "Cratylus"?"Parmenides"
predominantly for the cosmological and proceeding aspect (eg. the
ref. to Number, Shape, Contact), and "Phaedrus" & "Cratylus",
predictably, for the more 'inspiring' returning aspect (the ref. to
the "beholding" of Heaven etc. in the Phaedrus Myth). 	 There is
also a concordance with the Chaldean sources, such as the references
to the tripartite division "empyrean"-"aetherial"-"material".
The self-constituted henads characteristic of Life are the
"intelligible as well as intellectual" (noeton ama kai noeron),
also designated the "connective" order (sunochike, sunag;gos,
sunektikos), that is, connecting the intellect with the intelligible.6
This intermediary role together with the overall dynamic quality
are probably the reasons for its omission as a separate hypostasis
- or rather its absorption in the preceding (and succeeding) order -
when Proclus gives a shorthand account.
"The intelligible and intellectual order of divinities are produced
according to all of the intelligible causes (noetas aitias), from
power (dunameUs) 	 they are alloted the characteristic property
of procession (idioteta tes prohodou lachousai), but from life
they i-eceive the portion of being (moiran ontos) which is suspended
from them (ex;rt;menen 	 - for life is coupled (suzugos) to
power, and life is in itself infinite (zoe kath' hauten apeiros),
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and since all motion has the unlimited (ten apeirian) co-existent
in its very own nature, and power is the unlimited which gives birth
to everything (dunamis apeiria(s) gennetike ton
(cf. I.B.1.2,3)" (32).
The rank of Life, as a whole, is made to correspond to the Heaven
of the Phaedrus Myth, so it is in effect the intelligible heavens,
as opposed to the sensible, corporeal heavens. 7 Another jargon
reference for it is the "second class-order" (deuteros diakosmos),
by comparison to Being, which is the"firstl
Proclus specifies, again, three main triads for the description of
the monadic Life, but this time each member of each triad has
exteriorised its own triadic structure resulting in 27 (exteriorised)
members in all (ie. 31 cf. Being 32, Limit-Unlimited-Providence 3 1 ,
with the One 3 0=1, as it were).
The first triad (or ennead) closest to the intelligibles of Being, is
the substance and the "remaining" element of Life, ie.
it is the "intelligible" part of Life.
The second in the "middle" is the power and life of Life,
where the quality of the whole hypostasis is expressed
most appropriately.
The third closest to the intellectuals of Intellect "below" is the
activity and the "intellectual" part of Life.
Many of the technical terms of the structure-enneads underline
the connective and "sympathetic" property: "continuity" (duneches),
"communion" (koin;nia), "friendship" (philia), "contact" (haphe);
and also the appropriate relationship with Being: "being",
"substance" (ref. to the first group), "wholeness" (holotes, the
aecond group; cf. second triad of Being); as well as with Intellect:
"perfection/completion" (teleiotes, the third group; cf.the first
paternal in Intellect, and the perfecting divine henads I.B.1.3).
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Most of the other technical terms for each of the triads/enneads
betray the differentiating and pluralizing quality of this mode of
existence: "difference" (heterotes; the 1st group); "one and many"
(hen kai polla), "whole and parts" (holos kai mere), "colour"
(chr;ma) and the tripartite division "empyrean"-"aetherial"-"material"
(all these for the 2nd group); "perfection" "prior to", "made up of"
and "within" "parts" (pro ton mer;n, ek t;r1 mer12, en t; merei)
(all of these for the 3rd group).
The level of the first triad/ennead is the place of "vision" (thea),
the place proper to knowledge-science, "knowledge itself"
(autoepisteme) and "true science" (alethes episteme), also the
"field of truth" (aletheias pedion), "soundness of mind" (sOphrosune),
where "right judgement" (dikaiosunZ) and cosmic "Law" (thesmos) are
operative; it is interesting to note that Proclus considers it to
be "feminine" (thelu, theluprepes) and "maternal" (metrikos) in
character. But above all this is where the "plurality itself",
in the third triad of Being,is expressed and delineated by "Number"8
(arithmos), so that the dynamic emanation is not chaotic or
haphazard.
"Number has many properties, not all comprehensible by the human
mind, which can be grouped into two primary capacities (dunameis),
the capacity to generate everything, and to reassemble all the
products back to unity...Number is in the middle between the
intelligibles and the intellectuals...on the one hand,it unravels
(anelissei) the intelligible manifold and brings out (prokaleitai)
its hidden (kruphion) and unified content into distinction or
separation (diakrisin) and productive generation (gonimon apogennesin),
on the other,it reassembles the intellectual multiplicity into union
...it gives subsistence, firstly, to the intellectual numbers
which constitute form (eidetikous) and are universal (katholikous)
and preside over the creation (poises) and generation of the
universe; secondly, those which are hypercosmic...and measure
(metretikous) the encosmic gods (ref. to Soul and the celestial
bodies); thirdly, these celestial 'numbers' which are the governors
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of the perpetual revolutions and revolve (sunelissontas) all the
circles according to their own intellective causes (noeras autiin
aitias) (see II.B.1,2,4); finally, those which are sublunar,
maintaining and delimiting (sunechontas, peratountas) the indefinite
and unstable nature of matter with 'numbers' and 'forms'
(Plato Tim. 53B)" (33).
With the circulation of the intelligible heavens (ref. to the 2nd
triad/ennead, in particular) the plurality acquires a kind of motion,
and in the third level it acquires "shape" (schema).9
Thus all stages of the formation of the universe are, as it were,
rehearsed in the intelligibles and intellectuals, prior to the
creation in space-time.
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NOTES ON I.B.3
1 Eg. El.Th.188-9; as Dodds pointed out in his notes, p.297,
Proclus tries to distinguish and reconcile the "life" of soul
from and with the Form of "life". Life and motion, cf. Pl.Th.
III 46,13-18, with inst. Phys.VIII, 250b.
2 The latest cosmological theories, S.Hawkins, A.Guth et al,
propose that before the .iBig Bangl and prior to the existence
of spacetime, there was a phase of ultra rapid "inflation"
brought about by quantum "bootstrapping" out of virtual
nothingness; for a good popular account P.Davies "Superforce"
(1984).
3 The "hidden" form of existence in Proclus' terms is generally
"unity" or uniformity, but in this instance it is the
"intelligible being", eg. Pl.Th.III 89,1; IV 11, IV 8,15.
4 For the place of "thea" and the Meadow (leimal, also antheias
pedion) of the Phaedrus, as well as flepistZme",
Pl.Th. ch.4, 9, 13-15.
5 The Platonic passages are Parm.142-5; Phaedrus 246-250; Crat.396.
6 "intelligible and intellective", "connecting", IV ch.2 .
This whole order and hypostasis seems to have both originated
and developed by Proclus, see E.R.Dodds p.282, cf. p.252-3,
of his notes on the El. of Th., and H.D.Saffrey . and L.G.Westerink
Pl. of Th. vol.IV p.xxxvi.
7 Intelligible vs sensible heaven, eg. Pl.Th.IV 19-22, cf.
In Tim.III 174- 5.
8 Proclus' treatise on Number occupies a significant part of bk.IV
see ch.28-32, esp. ch .29-30.	 Number is, effectively,hypostasized.
For the "Four Forms" see IV p.88.
The predication "feminine" has to do with the "gennerative" and
"multiplying" characteristics.
9 Celestial circulation, and motion of the intelligible heaven,
IV ch.20, cf. In Crat. 59,10 (Pasquali).
"Schema; IV ch.12, p.40 (Bude).
Proclus also places here "Contact" (haphb), p.40, which has to
do with the "joining" char.; interestingly, he says that this
is the "paradigm" of the "liberated" gods (see I.B.6), the order
which suffers the same fate of elimination as the "intelligible
and intellective", when he gives a shortened version of the
hierarchy.
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4. INTELLECT
The role of the Intellect (nous) in Proclus' system also reflects
the dual aspect of "proceeding" and "returning". Viewed as the
activity and intellect of Being but with its own specific mode of
existence, it is the third element, the returning principle, which
elevates things to the intelligible order proper. This is roughly
equivalent to the attribute of mind. 	 It includes, though, not
only the "separable" rational kind of intellect (cf. self-constituted
properties I.A.1) which entities such as man and his "betters" have
(ie. have as a participated property), but also the capacity for
bare cognition, which even the most irrational of creatures have
(ie. the animals; see I.B.intro.). 	 On the other hand, Intellect,
and especially the activity of the monadic Intellect, is identified
with the Creator of the physical world, the Demiurge - Craftsman of
the "Timaeus", the Efficient cause (poietik5 aitia); which puts
form and order onto the indefinite, chaotic matter.
So, the Intellect qua "mind" is at the tail-end of the intelligible
realm, but qua "form" (idea, eidos) is at the head of the sensible.
Whereas as "mind" it extends as far as to animals, and is in this
respect less "universal" (see I.A.1) than Being and Life, as "form"
it is as universal as Being, since even inanimate things have form.2
For Proclus this is far from being an inconsistency: on the contrary,
it is a good example of the appropriateness rule. Firstly, it
emphasizes the indivisible relationship between Being, Life and
Intellect, as differentially hypostasized orders of essentially the
same sort of existence, the intelligible (in general terms). It is
an example of diversity in unity among the intelligibles. Secondly,
it makes apparent the analogous aspect of the relationships, an
important element of the whole system since action takes place
through "analogy" and "sympathy". E.g., as the Creator is the
activity of Intellect, so the Model, which according to the Timaeus
account was "copied" in the crafting of the universe, is the
activity of Being; again, the relation Creator to Model-Form is
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as Intellect (as a whole) to Being, hence as intellect to
intelligible, resulting in the existence of the "forms" in the mode
proper to "nous" itself. The employment of appropriately shifting
emphasis is at once the pivot of Proclus' Neoplatonic exegesis and
the kernel of its apparent impenetrability.
The structure of the "monad" of Intellect, and the various technical
properties and terms pertaining to it are given in Pl.Th. Bk. V
(the text edition available at the time of writing is still only the
1618 of Portus).
The self-constituted henads of Intellect, which also characterize
the whole order, are the "intellectual" (noeron), meaning quite
simply the possesion of intellect, or the rank proper to intellect
itself (rather than to the object-of-intellect, the intelligible).
The properties of the "unparticipated", monadic Intellect spring
from, as mentioned earlier, both the formal cum efficient aspect
and the returning-intellective; for example:
"The intellectual divinities proceed from.all the divinities prior
to them, receiving union (hen;seis) from the One...but substance
(ousiais) from the intelligibles; and they are alloted all-perfect,
connective and generative life from the intelligible as well as
intellectual, but the intellectual property (idiots) they have by
themselves. They cause all the divided orders to return to them
but they are established in the intelligibles...They are all-perfect
substance producing all secondary things...neither diminished by
their procession, nor receiving anything additional by their
generation (apogonesin)" (34).
However, the structure of the Intellect marks a departure from the
triadic: "the intellectual divinities constitute a heptad (hebdomas)"
(Pl.Th.p 249). Proclus defends it by introducing the Pythagorean
number-symbolism which associated 7 with intellect;3 although it is
highly likely that convenience begins to prove the better part
of valour: according to the triadic he would have to account for
- 87 -
at least 34=81 entities; in the Pl.Th.V he only presents about 7.
Nevertheless, he predictably resolves the heptad into two triads
plus one monad. 4
 But this change in the pattern sufficiently
underlines the special position of Intellect with respect to the
creation of the physical world: the second triad and the monad are
chiefly there to preserve the immutable identity of the creative
source and the "forms".
The first triad is composed of three "father" entities (see divine
henads I.B.1.3), which are the source of the causation as it is
exersized by the Intellect.
	 They preside over, respectively, the
substance, power or life, and the activity or intellect of Intellect.
Furthermore, they are identified with three gods of the Greek
pantheon, Cronus, Rhea, and Zeus.
The first "father" is "according to the intelligible...abiding and
remaining in himself";
The second, who has also the capacity of "mother", is "according to
life.., proceeding and vivifying all things";
The third is "according to intellect...glittering with creative
(demiourgikas) productions" (35).
The second triad is composed of the "uncontaminated" (achrantoi)
entities, which belong to the "guardian" (see I.B.1.3) class,
guarding each "father" individually.
	 This is deemed necessary
because of the state of differentiation found at this level, and
because of the debut of involvement in matter.
The monad represents the state of differentiation itself, and is
the "dividing element" (diairetik; monas), "difference" (heterot;s),
and "source of differentiation and separation" (diakriseCis p;ge).
Here is, then, the formal beginning of the expansion, extension and
spreading of the universe, as well as its dispersion and division
into different forms.
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Examining the "fathers" in little more detail, the first represents
the purity of Intellect (as in Plato "Cratylus" 396) "being an
unmixed intellect (akerason noun)...pure, immaterial (aulos) and
perfect, established above the creation" (36). 	 The last statement,
that it is "above the creation" (tes d;miourgias huperidrumenos),
is a hierarchical comparison with the third "father", the Creator.
The second represents the prolific diversity about to be unleashed
in the creation of the universe, the purely dynamic aspect of the
action, the power which imparts movement to the world (via soul,
the more proximate principle of motion to body). Proclus identifies
it with a causal entity "female" in character, the Mother of the
Creator, out of whose womb both he and everything else were born.
"The life-giving Rhea...is alloted a maternal order among the
paternal classes, and produces the Creator of all...she is at the
middle-centre of the paternal intellectual triad, and is the
receiving womb (ekdochikos kolpos) of Cronus' generative power,
_
while she brings forth (apogennesin) all the causes which abide
(menousas) in him...She is filled and impregnated (pleroumene) with
the intelligible and prolific power of the father prior to her,
while she fills and completes (plerousa) the Creator who comes into
existence from her...On this account Plato calls her prolific
abundant capacity (periousian), 'flowing streams' (rheumata), as
Socrates says in the Cratylus (Crat.402), and this goddess is a kind
of 'flux' (rho; - Rhea)...she shows her property of being the source
of things by collecting in a unified fashion the divided currents of
life (zoes ochetc7n). For the primary flux belongs to the primal
source of things (pr;tourgon rheuma pegaion estin)...the causes of
subsistence of all divine entities are called 'flowing streams of
the primal source' (rheumata pegaia). And the World-Soul is
established as the fountain and principle of life (pegen arch; zoes),
because it proceeds both from, what I call, the indivisible
imparting of life (ameristou z3ogonias) and the divisible (meristou)
(ie. from the life of Intellect and from Soul: for the dual path of
causation see I.A.1)" (37). In the "Chaldean" associated references
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she is simply styled "the Goddess". 5
The third, being the intellect of Intellect, or the activity of
Activity, exemplifies the qualities of this mode of existence as a
whole.
	 Here are manifested, par excellence, both the returning-
intellective, and the proceeding-creative aspect.
	 Indeed, it is
the Creator and Father of the world. Everything that exists 'below'
this level is his created-thing, his creature. He is the generic
causal entity of creation, which encompasses creation as a whole,
and is the formal cum efficient as well as the more immediate
final cause of physical existence. "The Demiurge is not only a
divine entity, but he also contains in himself the intelligible and
true being, and has comprehended in advance (proeilephen) the final
cause (telikon aition) of mundane things and also the paradigmatic
(one of the three 'principal' (archikai) causes: they are, the
final, ex. the good4 the paradigmatic, ax. the activity of being;
and the efficient, ex. the activity of intellect; the formal and the
6
material are, according to Proclus, 'accessory causes' (sunaitia),
concerned with entities, in particular)" (38).
His appropriate bond with the paradigmatic, intelligible Living-
being, makes him the "intellectual Living-being" (noeron z3on)
_ -
	
-
containing the formal (eidetiken) and efficient (poietiken: lit.
"making") cause. 7
 Yet, by comparison to the first "father" of the
substance of Intellect, and because of his involvement with physical
creation, he appears rather sullied.
"Very properly therefore, this universe has two sorts of life,
period and revolution (sunkukleseis), the one Croniala, the other
Zeusian, as it is said in the Politicus Myth (Pout. 271 f.,).
According to the one, it has all of nature's goods (automata panta
phusein ta agatha),and life free of misery and weariness. But
according to the other, it partakes of the material error-discordancy
(hulik;S pljmmeleias) and multi-changing nature. For in the world
(en to kosmo) life is two-fold, the one is concealed or unnoticed
(aphanous) and more intellectual (noeriiteras), and the other is
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more physical (phusik;teras) and visible or obvious (emphanous), and
whereas the one is defined by Providence, the other, which proceeds
in a disorderly fashion, is defined by Fate (heimarmenen). 	 The
second, which is multiform and perfected through Nature (dia tes
phuse;s epiteloumene) is suspended from the Zeusian order (Diias
- _
exertetai taxes), but the first, which is more simple (haploustera),
intellective and unnoticed, is suspended from the Cronian" (39).
It is worth noting, that the above quotation echoes strongly the
Gnostic notion of a more proximate God Creator, who is decidedly
8less than perfect and 'rules' with Fate's compulsion. Yet, even
here there is neither an expressed nor an implicit admittance, that
the Creator or his physical creation are in any way "evil", unlike
the Gnostic view in the main.
On the contrary, by comparison to the physical and material realm
itself, the Demiurge is very much the glorious being, as it befits
his station.	 He is the "king of the universe" (basileus pantos),
bathed in and transmitting the light from the One, and kindling
the Sun with it (cf. II.B.7), hence his title "source of the Sun"
(pegaios h;lios).	 "He especially (diapheront;s) gives subsistence
to the Sun (ton holon helion), kindling its light from his own
intellectual essence, in order that it have a transcending
pre-eminence (exeremenen huperochen) over the other gods (ie. the
other planets)" (40).
The Demiurge's productive action seems to take place in broadly
three phases :
	
the first, is a participable property-entity of
the same kind as him, viz. an "intellect", and the others are
the substantially different, "soul" and "body".
"Zeus created the World-Intellect (noun tou pantos; this is
participated, and is one of the causal paths to World-Soul) from
himself, prior to all others", and then, still from himself "the
rest of the intellectual and whole classes (ie. the ideas, and forms)".
-91 -
"In conjunction with the 'Mixing Bowl' (krat;r) he created the
World-Soul (psuche pantos)' and the the "partible souls", prior to
the bodies.	 He also "created the souls' associated vehicles
(ochemata; see II.A.4.4) and arranged the appropriate souls around
the appropriate divinity...this includes all the celestial, dalmonic
and sublunary classes.. .all according to the law of Fate".
"In conjunction with the universal Nature (holes phuseCis) and
Necessity (anankes), he fashioned (plattOn) the World-Body (sOma
pantos) and the partible bodies, and delineated (diagraph;n) the
heavens".
Yet, this is not "creatio ex nihilo", and creation with a temporal
beginning (and end). It is the imparting of form and shape, and
fashioning, by "copying" on the appropriate substrate matter the
eternal "forms" of the intelligible Model. For Proclus, standing
in the Platonic tradition, it is essentially an eternal process -
contrary to the Judeo-Christian conception of genesis - Time being
"an image of Eternity", without beginning or end.9 Time itself
is not a measure external to the created universe, but intrinsic to
its fabric and created simultaneously with it, definable only by
manifested change (such as the motion of the celestial bodies).
"(The Demiurge) generates from himself (aph' heautou genna) the
whole of Time (holon chronon), by imitation of Eternity (mimesin
tou aion;s), and also all the measures of time, as well as the
gods which make manifest these measures (ekphainontas tauta theous:
the self-constituted measures of time, the celestial objects)" (41).
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NOTES ON I.B.4
1 For the development of the Timaean Demiurge as a "lower" God,
see Dillon "The Middle Platonists" p.7, 283-4, 299-300, 366-76;
"Iamblichl Chalcidensis" p37-9; Dodds notes on "El.of Th."
p.284-6, and in more general about the "intellect" in late
Neoplatonism, p.285-94. Also ref. on "intelligence" in Wallis
"Neoplatonism", mainly on Plotinus.
Proclus also calls the efficient, "demiourgikon" eg. In Tim.' 4,
I 5.
2 Cf. El.Th.57 Cor. and see Dodds comment to that effect, p.232.
Also see Pl.Th.V ch.1, p247 (Portus) with regards to the
intellectual-intelligible relation, and the intellectual-formal
relation.
3 It certainly seems that the "noeric hepdomad" had been established
by Iamblichus, see Dillon Iamblichl id. p.37, his comment on
In Tim.I 308,18 f. (where Proclus talks about the 7 members of
the noeric order and the Demiurge in relation to the Pythagoreans,
and Iamblichus) p.306-9, and his appx.0 p417-19. As Wallis,
"Neoplatonism" p.133-4, points out metaphysical consistency
has to give way to religious exegesis. See Pl.Th.V p249-52,
the noeric the first of seven heptomads (incl. the planets)p250-1.
4 The structure of Intellect in general, V p249-52;
the "fathers" p252-5; Cronus p256-65, Rhea p265-8, her "Chaldean"
equivalent is Hecate, Zeus p268-318;
the "uncontaminated" are identified with the Curetes,
and the "source of differentiation", whose "Chaldean" equiv.
prob. is the "membrane" (hupez3k3s humen) separating the
intelligibles from the "world", p325-35.
5 "thee" see Or.Ch. fr.54 extracted from many Proclan refs.;
also see fr.50-2, 56. 	 Strictly, she is Hecate, for as Lewy
pointed out, p.84,note 66, Proclus has 'adjusted' the Chaldean
scheme to fit the "Hellenic" theology.
Rhea's "life-giving power" is moderated by the "formal" nature
of the order as a whole, it imparts schema and bounds, V p248.
6 Eg. In Tim.I 2,1-10, I 3; cf.I 261, three "principal" and three
"sunaitia", the third is the "instrumental" (organikon) 263,21.
Also see Dodds p.240. There are simil. with the "principales"
and "proximae" (Cicero), and the "sunektika", "sunaitia" and
"sunerga" (Sextus); I do not, however, intend to pursue it
any further, in this study.
7 Pl.Th.V p290.
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8 For the Gnostic Demiurge, Dillon Middle Plat. p385 -9; Wallis
op.cit. p12-3; chiefly in H.Jonas "The Gnostic religion"
p42 -4, 96-7, 141-4, etc. Cf. J.Zandee "The terminology of
Plotinus and of some Gnostic writings" (1961) p.24- 6.
The two Gods, the Superior and the Creator, are also present
in the Hermetica, although the relative imperfections of the
latter are not considered as evil; there does not seem to be
an antagonism between the two; see Dillon id. p389 -92,
Jonas p148-173; also G.van Moorel "The Mysteries of Hermes
Trismegistue„ who on p21 remarks that because of this difference
with Gnosticism" it would not do to mention both at a breath:
The Hermetic position seems to be closer to the Neoplatonic,
cf. Plato Tim.30A, where the Demiurge desired a good and orderly
world, so far as possible, also 29E, although as Proclus
observes In Tim.I 370 f. the imperfection is not resident in
the gods but in the "lack of suitability" (anepedeiotes) of
the recipient. The same is also implied in quote 39, viz.
the discordancy is in the "suspended" series not in Zeus
himself.
9 See, of course,"the Eighteen Arguments in favour of the Eternity
of the world and Against the Christians" in Philoponus' de
Aeternitate Mundi, esp. Arg.1, 3, 15, 18.
Cf. In Tiin.II 281,1-2, comment. on Tim.36E where it says that
"after" the construction of Soul the Demiurge fabricated the
Body, Proclus emphatically states that the "after" has
sequential significance not temporal (me chronikon hupolabes
alla taxes semantikon).
For a thorough and penetrating survey, see R.Sorabji
"Time, Creation and the Continuum" esp. part III.
- 94 -
5.	 SOUL
5.1 GENERAL PROPERTIES, AND THE HYPERCOSMIC SOUL
In Proclus' system, Soul is the first of the intermediary levels
between the intelligible modes of existence and the sensible,
physical. Bridging of disparate, different forms of existence via
intermediaries is, as explained earlier (I.A.1), embedded in Proclus'
ontology. In this case, the two dissimilar terms are Intellect,
which is "activity", and Body/Matter, which have no active causal
property by themselves, but are solely the "effects" of superior
causes.
The order of divine henads presiding over Soul is called "directive"
-
or "leading" (hegemoniken), "principal" (archlkos), "assimilative"
or "copying" (aphomoiOmatikos).	 The title "hypercosmic", literally
above the mundane world, is reserved for (the divine henads of) the
unparticipated Soul, and denotes its hierarchical position, firstly
qua soul, in relation to the "worldly" body of matter, and secondly
qua unparticipated and originating cause of soul, in relation to the
soul series, the participated souls which operate in the corporeal
world, of which the World-Soul is the member most-like the
unparticipated "monad".
Proclus' theory of soul takes an inclusive view of the previous
and established theories, as it may be already gathered by some of
the above appelations. That Soul is a distinct hypostasis is
clearly Plotinian in origin. 1 There is also the chiefly Stoic idea
of the directive faculty in the psyche. Elsewhere can be found
elements of the Aristotelian concept of the faculty and form of
the body. But above all, for Proclus, soul is the Platonic principle
of motion, or rather, the principle of self-motion (autokingtos
archE)on which all other types of motion depend and hence called
moved-by-another (heterokinetos), as well as the faculty which is
a like image of "nous", also according to Plato. 2
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Thus soul is the immediate cause of motion and animated action to
bodies, and the principle between intellect and body, as it were,
absorbing, copying and then transmitting, all in one, the "forms"
which are in intellect to body. In many ways Soul acts much like
the creative aspect of Intellect, and this is reflected in the
technical nomenclature, as it will be shown presently.
"For the hypercosmic class subsists about the intellectual divinities
and according to intellectual paradigms, for being particulated
they entirely assimilate to the intellectuals the entities posterior
to them" (42). "Every image is produced through similarity to its
paradigm-model. For what else is able to assimilate (aphomoi;sin)
the world itself and everything in the world to the paradigms, but
this hypercosmic class of divinities?" (43).
The structure of the hypercosmic and originative cause of Soul is
described in the first half of Pl.Th. Bk.VI (text edition available
is, again, only Portus' 1618).
The pluralization endemic to the modes of existence nearer to the
realm of Matter would normally have resulted in an unmanageably
large number of structure-members, so for convenience Proclus
reduces them to about twelve, in a further departure from the
original triadic scheme (as in Being and Life), although they still
appear in (four) groups of three. The first group of three
consists of 3 "father" divinities (cf. Intellect), called the
"three"junior"creators" (treis, neoi, demiourgoi), and the "three
kings", by virtue of their affinity with the Creator. 3 The second
group is the "life-giving triad" (z;ogonos trias)(cf. I.B.1.3 the
types of divine henads), the third is of the "elevating" (anag;gos)
class type, and the fourth are the "uncontaminated" (achrantoi)
(cf. Intellect), which belong to the "guardian" series.
The three father creators represent the particularized aspects of the
Father Creator on level closer to the multiplicity of the mundane
world in accordance with the rule that everything is everywhere but
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in the appropriate mode.
Each of the three is responsible for the section of the universe
proper to him. So, "firstly, with respect to the universe as a
whole, the first of the three produces the substance of things, and
establishes in the Creator all that proceed from him, the second
produces the life (z;as) and generation (geneseis) of things, and
calls (ekkaloumenon) into procession all that is in the Creator,
and the third inspects the formal divisions (eidetikas diaireseis;
ie. the particular 'forms'), and returns everything to the Creator.
Secondly, with respect to the parts of the universe . (mere tou pantos),
the first arranges and orders (katakosmei) the fixed sphere and its
circulation (aplane periphoran; ie. the fixed stars), the second
governs the planetary (planoumenen) sphere and gives completion to
(apotelei) the multiform, life-giving and efficient movements in it
(polueideis kin-eseis drasterious kai gonimous), and the third
inspects the sublunary place (hupo selenen topon) and gives
completion to the terrestrial world (chthonion kosmon) in an
intellectual manner (noer;s).	 Thirdly, with respect to the
creative processions in the realm of generation, the first controls
(diepei.) the summit of generation (akroteta tn gennet;n), and
governs the sphere of Fire and Air. 	 The second, who is Poseidon,
moves in every way (kinei pantei;s) the middle and multichanging
elements, and is the inspector (ephoros) of all liquid substances
(hugras hapases ousias) in both Air and Water. But the third,
who is Pluto, honours (pronoias axioi) the Earth and everything in
it with providence" (44).
But the member-entity which seems to exhibit more of the elevated
properties of the Creator, is the "elevating" (ana6gos), which is
identified with Apollo, the triad consisting merely of three
attributes of his. He is assigned, appropriately, to the "solar"
(heliaken) series, the series whose common characteristic is the
light (ph;s), each member representing and distributing the
appropriate mode of light. The solar series commences with the One,
representing the purest form of light, and ends with the Sun,
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the visible light and the source of light among the sensibles.
Another member is, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Demiurge
himself. His qualities seem to be passed on to the "elevating"
entity in Soul by virtue of the link of the "solar" series, so,
the attribute of "efficient" is found on an entity which is not
classified normally as "father-creator": "(Plato) designates the
whole triad Apollonic...through the one of the three he participates
in unpolluted light and intelligible g harmony'...(and the other two
are) the creative dyad, called 'hands' (of Apollo), being efficient
(drasterious) and motive (kinetikas) and creative causes" (45).
An understanding of the role of the "solar" series, in Proclus'
system, is central to appreciating the value attached to the Sun
as a special body among the planets, and the helio-centred emphasis
(see II.B.7).
The process of differentiation - viz, the creation of the universe
in terms of individual, particularized existence - is continued and
confirmed in Soul. By analogy to the "differentiating,
distinguishing" principle in Intellect, Soul manifests the principle
.	 -
of "dissimilarity" 4(anomolotes; cf. I.A.3), albeit in a manner proper
to the "assimilating" attribute: Proclus makes Soul the mode of
existence presiding over the cosmic sympathy and communion (koiniinia);
"this order of divinities is particularly presiding over the
sympathy of the world (sumpatheia kosmou) and mutual communion...all
things are in each other and similarity is their bridging
-(sunagogos)" (46). This marriage of dissimilarity with similarity
parallels the joined multiplying-and-connecting function of Life,
which corroborates the special relationship, in terms of function,
between Life and Soul, in Proclus t scheme.
Nevertheless, on the whole, Soul is the principle which divides and
separates into parts and appropriate sections. As he phrases it,
"the group of the leading divinities is wholly arranged in the
partible orders" (47).	 "The order of the directive divinities
divides that which is united in the Creative Intellect, expands
- 98 -
that which is whole in the activity (energeia) of the intellectual
divinities (a synonym of the Creator) and brings into diversity the
simplicity of their providence" (48). Subsequent to the division
and separation of Soul is the division and separation of Body, the
mode of existence where differentiation results in and becomes
spatial extension.
Soul is also the principle of motion, expressing its ceaseless
activity in time, and manifesting it, in the first instance, in the
form of continuously periodic movement (and then, as finite, linear
or irregular).
The relationship between soul, body and space is not unconnected to
that between soul, motion and time; both are aspects of the causal,
active role of soul in and upon body. 5 Indeed, in Proclus' system,
the "living" entities, viz, the ones capable to some degree of
self-movement, are characterized and classified not so much by the
substance of their bodies, but chiefly by the kind of soul they have
(or partake of), in other words, by the dynamical rather than by
the inert constituent.
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NOTES ON I.B.5.1
1 Plotinus Enn.V,2 and for more general description of soul
Enn.IV esp. IV 1-2, on the "leading principle" etc., IV 3,17-23,
IV 7 the soul in relation to intellect, and to body.
Cf. with Proclus El.Th.186-200, 211, and In Parm.co1.1004-7,
one of the most important ref. on Proclus' theory of soul.
2 Psuche and the noetic realm, eg. Phaedo 65-7, 78-9, Rep.IV 435-44,
Tim.69-72;	 as the principle of self-motion, Phaedrus 245-9,
Laws X 894-5, Tim.89. 	 Both notions can be traced before Plato,
as the principle of animation is clearly pre-Socratic, and as
the immortal intellective principle in body seems to be
Pythagorean, however Anaxagoras appears to have combined both.
See Arist. de Anima 1,1-5.
3 The three creators correspond to a tri-partite division in
Neoplatonic exegesis; there is also the tri-partite monads
of the creation, the Zeusian for the intellectual, the
Adonaic for the "mundane", and the Dionysian for the
in-between, the "creators" of Soul belong to the Dionysian;
see In Tim.1 446, III 241.	 For the tri-partite division
of the universe, as in quote 44, also see In Tim.I1 56.
4 "Dissimilarity" Pl.Th.VI p347-50, 384-6.
5 Soul as a principle of motion, as opposed to Nature (Aristotle),
referred to a more purposeful kind of motion,
eg. In Tim.II1 119, also In Rep.II 206,10-15, where Anania,
the Necessity of Nature (see 1.B.6) is said to pertain to bodies
not to the self-moving entities (autokinet3n hupostase3n).
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5.2 THE WORLD SOUL
The concept of a soul, as a principle of motion and perfection for
the entire sorld originated in the Platonic tradition, which saw the
world as living being. In Aristotle, Nature (phusis) seems to have
fulfilled this role, although not as a single principle. 	 However,
the concept of a soul for the world was maintained in Stoicism and
Middle Platonism.	 Its importance was confirmed by Plotinus, who
made it one of his hypostases. The Plotinian Soul had both the
intellective and the animating attributes, and furthermore, it was
made responsible for the production of the sensible world - through
the process of "copying" - and its sympathy with the intelligibles. 1
Proclus' theory follows broadly Plotinus', although it bears witness
to the conceptual tidiness afforded by the distinction into
unparticipated and participated. Thus, Soul as the originative
cause of the family of souls is the unparticipated "monad", the
Soul above-the-world, whereas as the soul participated by the whole
world it is the Soul in and of the World; so, according to Proclus,
the World Soul is a participated property, as the variations of its
title testify: soul of the universe (pantos psuche), soul of the
world-cosmos (kosmou psuche), and encosmic, lit, in-the-world, soul
(enkosmios psuche). Nevertheless, it is the soul most like its
unparticipated "monad" and consequently it displays most of the
latter's properties and attributes; in effect, it represents it
'par excellence' in the world, so that the activity of Soul can
actually operate in space and time. This similarity can be
problematic because certain terms and references, such as "one soul"
(mia psuchZ) or even "whole soul" (holit psuche), may mean eit4er.
The distinction is made easier when there is also a reference to
"circular motion", an almost sure indication to the World Soul, since
unparticipated causesare exempt from movement.2
According to the twofold path of causation (see I.A.1), the World
Soul acquires its intelligible and intellective properties from
its very own World Intellect (nous pantos), which is derived directly
from the Demiurge himself (see ch. on Intellect).
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However, it acquires the soul-stuff and the principle of motion
from the unparticipated cause of Soul, although the dynamical
quality per se is inherited from "higher" causes, the power of
Intellect and the Power or Life itself (see I.B.4 and 3. respectively).
Consequently, the World Soul embraces both the formative and the
dynamic or energetic properties, which is then able to actualize
and operate within the World Body (sOma pantos), the spatially
extended and temporal, physical mode of existence.
Proclus derives the structure of the World Soul, predictably, from
the Timaeus account (Plato Tim. 34B-37C).	 "The Creator makes
(poietai) the World Soul as an image (eikona ) of all the divine
orders, in the same way as he makes the sensible world an image
of the intelligible. Firstly, he gives subsistence to the whole
'existence' (ousia) of the soul and subsequently divides it into
'numbers' (arithmous), binds it with 'harmonies' (harmonies), and
puts it into order with 'figures' (schemata), I mean, the rectilinear
and the circular. Then, he divides it into one circle and seven
circles...the monad subsists according to the circle of 'sameness'
(tautotes; also meaning 'identity'), but the the divided part
according to the circle of 'otherness' (heterotes;
also 'difference')" (49).
The main ingredients are the qualities of "sameness" and "otherness".
Among the intelligibles there is a predominance of "identity", but
among the sensibles a predominance of "difference" and separation.
The World Soul, as an intermediary, has evenly both.
The "harmony" is the harmonic blending of these two basic ingredients,
which in the "Timaeus" it was expanded into a complicated exposition
of the Greek diatonic musical scale, a rather obvious sign of
Pythagorean influence. Proclus' own interpretation of this
passage (Tim. 35C-36C), along with most of his references to the
World Soul, can be found in Bk.3 (Diehl vol.II) of his "Commentary
on the Timaeus". The "numbers" are those which form the numerical
ratios or proportions associated with the scale.
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The "figure" pertaining to the World Soul is the famous X shape
formed by the crossing of the circular bands, made from the stuff of
" sameness" and "otherness". These bands are in fact the equatorial
circle of the celestial sphere and the ecliptic circle, respectively,
so the X shape represents the diurnal and the zodiacal celestial
motion.
	
In later tradition, and under the "Chaldean" influence,
the symbolical 'metaphysical' character of the Timaean was
variously cultivated till it assumed a magical, virtually talismanic
status, doubtlessly by being coupled to the existing and religio-
mythologically rich symbol of the cross:1
Another figure which depicted the combined effect of the two types
of regular heavenly motion upon the planets, in particular, but
not directly pertaining to the World Soul, was the helix, the spiral.
As a religious symbol, it seems to recur among the cult-imagery
of the coiled snake, and is especially prominent, in late antiquity,
in the syncretic representations of Aion or Time, one of the chief
deities of the Mithraic pantheon. In geometrical theory, it
resulted from the simultaneous combination of two movements along
different planes, primarily a combination of circular and rectilinear,
but also of circular with circular, as in the planetary motion.
Proclus was acquainted with both the symbolical, 'elevated', and the
geometrical, astronomical ramifications; moreover, he found the
association with Time as deity to be aptly related to the
idea of planets as measures of time. 5
Within Proclue philosophy, the World Soul is a good example of the
application of the "appropriateness" principle: the "Same"
constituent with all the "intelligible" properties is appropriately
manifested in the uniform revolution of the sphere of the fixed
stars (aplaneis), whereas the "Different" constituent with all the
animating and physical qualities is aptly manifested in the
multiform circulations of the "wandering" stars (planetai).6
This double-sidedaess of the World Soul, the one aspect being a like
image of the realm of pure "form" but the other a principle of
motion "entwined" with the physical world, is itself part of
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the twofold, intellective-creative mode of activity, as it is first
encountered in Intellect, and in general, part of the division
into limit-unlimited.
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NOTES ON I.B.5.2
1 An example of pre-Socratic "world-soul" is Anaxemines' pneuma,
which pervades the cosmos, like the air-soul in man; fragm.2.
For Plato on the Soul for the World, see Cornford "Plato's
Cosmology" p57-96; A.E.Taylor "A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus"
p105-136; T.J.Tracy "Physiological theory and the doctrine of
the mean in Plato and Aristotle" (1969) p77-96; also see
R.Hackforth "Plato's Theism" (1936) article 20 in Allen, Studies
in Plato's Metaphysics", and on the "leimma" of the proportion
theory in the World-Soul account, E.G.McClain "The Pythagorean
Plato" (1978) with a detailed ref. on Proclud interpretation.
For Plotinus, A.H.Armstrong part III of the Camb.Hist.of Later
Greek etc Philosophy, p250-55, and R.T.Wallis "Neoplatonism"
p67-70; main text ref. Enn.V 2, also Enn.II 2, and for soul
in general Enn.IV.
2 Unparticipated, hypercosmic Soul vs the participated World Soul,
cf. El.Th.200, In Tim.II 285, 289; also see Dodds p.298 note 3
and p302 note 2.
3 World Soul and World Intellect, W. S. and World Body, see eg.
In Tim.I 402-6, II 285-6, III 2-3.
4 According to the doctrine that every soul is part of the World
Soul, the% was said to be "placed at the heart" (enkardion
entheis) of every soul (cross the heart?), In Rep.II 143,21-4;
also In Tim.II 247, 255-7.
See Lewy.op.cit. on the "Chaldean" and other non-Christian
background, p.252-4 and his notes, and p.270; cf. with p.xl
of the intro. to Vol.II of the Pl.Th.(Bude edition).
5 The "spiralling" snake symbolism appears also in the represent.
of Hecate, the deity identified with the World Soul,
Lewy op.cit. p92, 353-366; the winding of the stars as a
serpent see ref. on p.293 note 131; use of the cross during
initiation into the mysteries of Hecate cf. p269-73 op.cit.
The association of the serpent with the World and the domain
of the celestial spheres has the added implication of "evil"
in Gnosticism, and is linked to the notion of an evil Demiurge,
cf. Plato Laws I 896E an evil as well as a good World Soul
and in Dillon "The Middle Platonists" p202-4, 375; for
Proclus and his Platonists predecessors In Tim.I 282 ff.; the
"irrational" part is made to refer to the "Nature" aspect.
For the "spiralling" in Mithraism, Lewy op.cit. p405-6; also see
L.A.Campbell "Mithraic iconography and ideology" (1968).
Time, the planets and the helix, eg. In Tim.III 20, 40, 80, and
in Festugiere Comm.sur le Tirade, vol.IV notes on p.38.
6 Eg. In Tim.II 257, 259-60, III 296,16-18; In Rep.II 149.
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6 . NATURE
The position of Nature in Proclus' scheme presents many problems.
Firstly, it is often difficult to distinguish between the specialist
usage of "nature" as a cosmological property and the common
reference to the character of a thing.	 Even terms such as "whole"
nature (hole phusis) are not always used in a technical sense.
At a trivial level it merely attests to its origins in the Greek
vernacular, although Proclus may also be exploiting the convergence
with the Aristotelian and Stoic developments of the philosophical
concept as the properties naturally immanent in material entities.
Secondly, Nature as an intermediary mode of existence between
Intellect and Body seems to merge with Soul. This can very likely
be traced to the alternating emphasis on soul and nature as the
cause of motion; thus, according to Ros gm (p. 171), when Proclus
employs soul, the Platonic principle of motion, in its active
role, "nature" as a separate hypostasis invariably disappears, but
when he wants to stress the soul's intellective and copying function,
then "nature" reappears.
Similarities also extend to other attributes, which were normally
ascribed to Nature, such as the capacity for holding the "reasons",
or proportions (logoi) of the world.	 The originally Stoic concept
of "seminal reasons" (spermatikoi logoi; this form occurs in Proclus I
also) was intended to explain diversity within a monistic theory.
Compare, for example, the statement "the whole Nature contains in
one (en heni periechousa) the reasons (tous logous) of the celestial
and the sublunary entities, and distributes its own powers to the
many natures, which are divided from itself and apportioned about
the bodies" (50), with the statement "the World Soul has the reasons
(tou pantos psuchen logous echousan) and the hypostasizing powers
of all encosmic things, and by necessity has not only the
intellectual causes (noeras aitias) of man and horse and all other
animals, but also all the portions of the world" (51).
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This particularly strong affinity between Nature and the World Soul
in Proclus owes much to the Plotinian World Soul with its twofold
aspects, one intellective, and the other physical and inseparable
from body. 2 Indeed, Proclus i placing of Nature between Soul and
Body, and its usual designation as the corporeal "phusisq indicate
that he fully accepted its complementary role with respect to Soul, 4
although in his scheme there has to be an unparticipated cause of
Nature, which qua unparticipated ought to be entirely separable
and exempt from participation by any body, strictly even the World
Body, contrary to the intended function of "nature". 	 Proclus
does designate an unparticipated cause posterior to Soul as
"liberated" (apolutos) and "separable as well as inseparable from
the sensible world" (ch;risten hama kai ach "Oriston taxin tc7n
aisthet3n kler7m), in the second half of Pl. Th. Bk.VI, but this
contradiction is, I think, the root cause of his unusual coyness
in not identifying it unambiguously with Nature, the next problem.
Altogether, it seems certain that he was aware of the difficulty
created by an unparticipated Nature.
Thirdly, as already hinted, Proclus does not state clearly in
the appropriate section in the "Platonic Theology" that the
order of divine henads called "liberated", inter alia, and
corresponding to an unparticipated cause posterior to Soul (proper)
refers to the "monad" of Nature.
That there is such a problem at all appears to pass unnoticed by
most of the literature on, or including, Proclusephilosophical
system. Presumably, this stems, in the first instance, from
the inconspicuous presence of Nature in Proclus l scheme, and
secondly,from the fact that even in the majority of the more specialist
literature on Proclus' hierarchy it is simply stated, or assumed,
that the "liberated" order refers to unparticipated Nature without
further qualification. 5 At the other end of the scale, as it were,
a recent and detailed study of the El.Th. in relation to the Pl.Th.
does at least identify the problem, but unwittingly rather
exaggerates it by leaving, literally, a questionmark in the place
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specified by the "liberated" class. 6
As the identification of the "liberated" order with unparticipated
Nature does not appear to be fully documented, it would not be
.amiss to offer here at least a few pieces of evidence 7 In its favour,
internal to Proclus' Pl.Th. the place where the problem emerges,
from my own reading:	 (i) One of the divine henads of the liberated
order which he ascribes to the goddess Demeter, is said to generate
the "life inseparable from body" (ach;riston sanatos), ie. the
mode of existence characteristic of nature. 	 (ii) Another divine
henad, predicated as Artemis, is said to activate all the "natural
reasons" (phusikous logous); the adjective is a direct reference to
nature, and the noun to one of its main functions, that they occur
both together in tandem with Artemis, obviously in her older
and Ephesian guise as Mother Nature, reinforce the certainty of
the evidence.	 (iii) Proclus places Necessity with the liberated
order, in Pl.Th. Bk.VI; earlier, in Bk.V, he states that the Creator
produced Body in conjunction with Nature and Necessity (see ch.on
Intellect), which is a roundabout way of identifying the liberated
order with Nature. From all three it may be safely concluded that
the "liberated" and "separable as well as inseparable" class serves
to define the unparticipated cause of Nature, as it is required by
the general principles of his system, despite the aforementioned
problem. Besides, he would have undoubtedly regarded this
arrangement as a coherent solution and reconciliation of the divided
and inseparable quality of individual nature with the monistic
and 'governing character of Nature as a whole.
Other titles given to the liberated order also betray the delicate
and uncertain relationship of monadic Nature with the sensible
world, according to one of them it is almost literally, "touch and
-
go": "touching and not touching" (haphe kai me haphe), "both above
and in the world" (huperkosmios kai enkosmios); nevertheless, it
is decidedly "supercelestial", with the meaning above-the-visible
heavens (huperouranion), since the celestial objects are the first
order of divine henads to be in-the-world.
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The liberated divine henads match in number the hypercosmic of Soul,
they constitute a dodecad. 	 Proclus groups them either in two
monads plus one decad, or in four triads. The latter grouping
matches, again, the four triads in the structure of Soul; they
are, the three "fathers" and "creators", the three "life-giving"
(zOogonike) divinities, the aforementioned "Demeter" and "Artemis"
- _
among them, the "elevating"(anagogike), and the "uncontaminated"
- _
(achrantoi) and "guardian"(phrouretike).
In the "father" and "creator" triad Zeus is encountered, again,
signifying the presence of the Creator at each level, appropriately;
on the next level after Nature he is Jupiter the celestial body.
Poseidon, the middle father in Soul, is similarly also present
governin& in a manner proper to Nature, motion and generation.
However, the third "father-creator" of Nature, personified as
Hephaestus, is given the function of "breathing into" (empneei)
the "nature of bodies" (phusis sOmatc7n), and"fabricate the encosmic
seats of the gods". This rather poetic description in fact alludes
to the creation of body (cf. the statement that the Creator produced
the Body in conjunction with Nature and Necessity; see I.B.4).
The "encosmic seats" are the bodies of the celestial "gods",
whereas "breathing into" seems to have the double meaning, breathing
life into, and blowing in and inflating - as by the bellows of
Hephaestus. Both are highly appropriate, according to the one he
enkindles the nature immanent in every body, and according to the
other he imparts the spatial distension, the volume characteristic
of body. 8
The other members of the liberated order contribute in their own
particular manner to the governing of the material world, although
the more cosmologically important functions seem to be operated by
the "uncontaminated" and "guardian" class. One of them, for
example, personified in Hestia, "preserves the very being (auto to
einai) of things...every thing which is stable (monimon) and
unmoved (atrepton) is given subsistence...from the supercelestial
Hestia, and on this account the poles of the world are unmoved and
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the axes (axones) about which are the circuits (anakuklOseis) of
the spheres.. .but this earth remains in the middle-centre without
change...(however this Hestia, lit, the hearth) is not the earth
which is in the material world (he en to panti ge)" (52).
Another guardian-like cause which Proclus places with the liberated
order is that of Necessity (ananke- ).	 For the purposes of this
introductory account I do not intend to expand on the complex.
theory of Necessity and Fate in Proclus' philosophy, much beyond
the following quotation: "Necessity is entirely exempt from the
mundane world, but by the last of her powers she imparts movement
to the whole heaven...an orderly circulation from her own essence...
she is not governing by force-violence ("Zs bia), nor by obliterating
the self-moving capacity (autokine- ton) of life...but by comprehending
every thing in an intellectual fashion, and by limiting-defining
the indefinite and ordering the inordinate...she is a guardian...
nothing escapes the divine law" (53).
Necessity is said to be the monad which gives rise to the triad of
Fate (heimarmene) - elsewhere, Necessity is called the "divinity
established prior to Fate" (theote- ta ten proestosan tes heimarmenes)-
the triad being, of course, the three Fates.	 The three Fates
turn the "spindle" and impart 	 rotation to the heavens (see Plato
Rep. X, 616 ff.).
Nature is the last of the incorporeal, active causes which produce,
each in its own proper fashion, the sensible world; according to
Proclus , hierarchical arrangement, the entities posterior to
Nature are corporeal, viz, they have a body. Because of Nature's
special position with respect to the corporeal world, it seems that
its unparticipated cause is not only the originative "monad" of
the appropriate participated family of individual "natures", but
also that of bodies, as well.
It is certainly true, that there is no unparticipated cause of Body
In Proclus' scheme; the order of divine henads following those
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referring to Nature, correspond to the celestial bodies, which he
would have found almost impossible to call convincingly
"imparticipable", "monad", and the universal originative cause of
body.	 Anyway, body in itself being regarded a passive and
substrate quantity, a pure "participant", could hardly have deserved
to rank among the active, determining and perfect causes. The
only body in Proclus' system which comes closest to qualifying as
the monadic cause of all others is the cosmic Space (see II.A.6),
but even that is regarded as the vehicle of the World Soul.
Viewed in cosmogonical terms, Nature marks the stage in the formation
of the universe, where, after the successive separations and
particularizations, the "forms" have occupied their appropriate
niches as "seminal reasons", and subsequently are given the final
and ultimate separation, the spatial. It is the distension, the
expansion of the universe into three dimensions; consequently, all
dynamic activity and motion has, from this instant on, to be
realized through spatial intervals.
NOTES ON I.B.6
1 "Spermatikoi logoi", eg. In Tim.I 143,17-18; III 188,5-10,
III 191,7.
2 Nature as a lower soul in Plotinus, see notes on Plotinus' Soul
in I.B.5.1&2, and Wallis op.cit. p52, 67.
"Seminal" or rather "forming" reasons or principles (poiountes
logoi) occur also in Plotinus, although they are said to be in
the Soul, and act as causes of movement, Enn.II 3,16-17, IV 3,10,
IV 3,15; strictly, in the Nature aspect of the World Soul,
IV 4,13-14.
3 "amatike phusis"= Nature, eg. El.Th.21, this had earlier led
Dodds to translate it "bodies" (viz, nature in a non-technical
context) see p.209 of his notes; also El.Th.111, where
"corporeal nature" also means "Nature".
4 Cf. intro to vol.I of Pl.Th.(Bude edition) p.lxvi-lxvii.
5 A list would include, Beutler (article in Pauly-W.), Dodds,
Rosan, Wallis.
6 J.M.P.Lowry "The logical principles of Proclus' Stoicheiosis
Theologike as ground of the cosmos" (1980), see p.102 & esp.103.
7 Refs., Pl.Th.VI p403-4 (Portus); also cf. El.Th.209, 186, 64,
78-82, for the various attributes of the "inseparable" and
"nature".	 Also see In.Tim.I 79,5-6, II 146,4-9, III 241,25-8.
Demiurge, Necessity and Nature Pl.Th.V 314; Necessity, Fate and
the "liberated" order,.P1.Th.VI p404 ff. In Rep.II 94;(P1.Po1.269).
Another confirmation is via "Hephaestus", see below.
8 Pl.Th.VI p403-4, above; also see In Tim.I 142 ff., II 281,20-23,
III 241,26.
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7. SPACE AND TIME
Although in modern cosmology space and time are intimately connected,
in ancient philosophy this was not necessarily the case. 	 The
concept of place, only later to become widely regarded as space, was
predominantly associated with the theories on matter, as the
receptacle-room and as the substrate where change takes place, whereas
the concept of time was closely bound to the ideas on movement,
continuity and the experience of events. Time related to the
dynamics of change, but place to the container where change happens,
the underlying medium which receives and endures through change.
So, place had a somewhat inferior status with respect to time,
especially when the Platonic time was defined as the "image of
Eternity". One of the contributions of Neoplatonic thought was
the virtual elimination of this difference, mainly as a result of
the speculation on the hierarchical function of the intelligible
"forms" and the intelligible matter (which generalized the concept
of "image", and elevated, as it were, the substrates), but also on
the permanent body-vehicle of soul and the immanence of power in
body. 1
Proclus' conception of place is, that it is space, spatial interval
or extension, and an immovable, indivisible, immaterial body
(for a fuller discussion, see II.A.6).	 According to Simplicius'
evidence in his Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, specifically
the long Corollary on Place, our main source for Proclus l theory
on place/space as well as of .the other Neoplatonists, the
attributing of body to place was a novel idea (not withstanding
the	 definition of an "immaterial" body, see II.A.6).
"We will now put forward the theory, which was handed down as an
innovation (hen kainoprep; paradedae) by Proclus, the philosopher
from Lycia who was the teacher of our teachers; he was the only
one of all we know who chose to call place a body" (54).
This unusual conclusion was supported by, if not stemmed from, the
principle regarding the presence of intermediaries between different
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modes of existence (see I.A.1): Proclus' Space is an intermediary
between the World Soul and Body, ie. between the immaterial and
incorporeal state of existence, on the one side, and the material
and corporeal, on the other, hence the "immaterial body".
Furthermore, according to Proclus, Space as a cosmic body is
composed of and delineated by light, and is the direct instrument
(organon sumphues) of the World Soul. Both of these attributes
attest to its elevated status: as the instrument of the World Soul -
in his theory of causes, there is an "instrumental" (organikon)
cause, classed as "accessory" type of cause - Space imparts to the
entities of the world their appropriate "portions" of space, the
"suitable", proper places. 	 In this sense, it almost certainly
qualifies as the "monad" of place, and, by virtue of its corporeal
nature, of body. However, there is no evidence that Proclus
intended Space for such a role, most probably, because the cosmic
Space qua body does not possess a causal power of its own, but is
the instrument and vehicle for the power of the World Soul.
Yet it must be added, that insofar as Space is the direct or innate
instrument of the active cause immanent in the world as a whole,
this fine distinction between them may be extinguished, and thereby
allow for an "active" Space, especially when compared to the
multitude of material bodies proper.2
Time, on the other hand, together with its "model" Eternity, appear
unequivocally as a proper series of properties, in full accordance
with the triadic scheme, unparticipated - participated and
independent - participated but dependent.
There is the unparticipated cause of Time (amethektos chronos),
the "monad of Time" (he tou chronou monas), which is the essentially
motionless Time (akinetos, mean), and the Time which is participated
(en methexei chronou), and is essentially in motion (en kinesei).
Moreover, the participated time is subdivided into the "perpetual
time" (aei, aidios chronos) and the "temporary, part of time"
(pote en merei chronou), in other words, the independent and dependent
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aspects, respectively. 3
The unparticipated, originative cause of Time seems to be placed
with the Intellect and the Creator. This agrees well with the
concept of a calm, motionless Time, like the Intellect. 	 In addition,
it is in a near-perfect position for vindicating the definition
"image of Eternity": as the Creator is to the Model (in Being, see
I.B.2), so Time is to Eternity (also in Being), overlooking the
marginally imperfect match (Eternity is not on exactly the same
sublevel-triad as the Model). 4
Another option open to him was the identification of Time-Chronus
with Cronus, the first "father" of Intellect, in his scheme.
This was a very old and common substitution, apparently originated
with the sixth century BC philosopher Pherekydes, who was said to have
been one of Pythagoras' teachers.	 Later, it was adopted by Mithraism
and became widely established among the syncretic religions of
late antiquity.	 So, Proclus would have had many good reasons for
retaining the personification of Time as Cronus; yet, curiously, it
seems, both from the very small number of references to it and
their ambivalent tone, that he was not commited to it. 5 The most
likely reason for his hesitancy is that as a Platonist he actually
preferred, or at least he had to show his support for, the
Platonic derivation of the word Cronus as "pure intellect" (koros
nous; Crat.396B).
In any case, the origin and the species of Time itself antecede
Soul. "If something partakes of soul, it also partakes of time,
but not conversely (ouk anapalin); for those without soul (apsucha)
participate in time too; therefore time is placed over and beyond
soul (chronon epekeina psuches)" (55).
But soul is the first mode of existence to partake of the
participated quality of Time, and in its capacity as the principle
of motion it actualizes time in the physical world: indeed, while
soul's substance is said to be eternal (ousian aicinion), its
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activity is said to operate within time (energeian kata chronon).6
The participated and encosmic Time manifests in essentially two
forms, as already mentioned, the perpetual duration and the finite
(some time existence in a part of time).	 The latter is clearly
the kind of time, or life-time, of the transient events and beings
in the sublunary realm of coming-to-be and passing-away.
The former is chiefly the kind of time appropriate to the
everlasting celestial objects, but also to things with perpetual
existence only as groups-wholes (not as individuals), ie. the four
Elements. 7
Besides this subdivision there is another which differentiates
between the participated time as a whole, and as parts. 8 It is
aimed at the perpetual kind of time, which corresponds to the
independent "self-constituted" class, since the finite existence
in time is automatically by definition particulated.
The participated but self-constituted parts of encosmic Time, are
the "measures of time" (cf. Plato Tim.38C ff.) determined by the
celestial bodies, viz, the days, months and years, with the earth
as an accessory (see II.B.8). Although the Sun and the Moon are
the most obvious of the "measures", the others contribute their
own "times" too, so, there is a Solar time, a Lunar, but also, a
Saturnian, Venusian, etc., and according to Proclus, those of the
fixed stars as well
9 (see also II.B.6.1).
The participated and self-constituted whole of encosmic Time is the
total "measure" proper to the World Soul. "Every psychic period
is measured
measured by
psuches, in
is measured
-
to sumpanti
"monad" qua
time-member
by time; but while the periods of the other souls are
some particular time, that of the first soul (pr;tes
this case the first encosmic soul, the World Soul) which
by time has the whole of time for measure (metroumenes
chrono)" (56) (see also II.B.6.1).	 It is not the
unparticipated cause of Time, but the participated
derived from the true monad of Time, which resembles
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it most.
This monad-like universal Time complements appropriately the
monad-like universal Space, in Proclus , scheme. Both of them
relate to the active cause and principle of motion of the whole
world, the World Soul, and both of them are the integral whole
immediately prior to the multitude of the parts, Place/Space to
places/spaces, and Time to times.10 Furthermore, both are
essentially circular. 11 Space is, according to Proclus (see II.A.6),
spherical, a ball of light, and Time is periodic, without beginning
)r end.
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NOTES ON I.B.7
1 Main ref. works are, S.Sambursky and S.Pines "The concept of
Time in Late Neoplatonism" (1971); S.Sambursky "The concept of
Place in Late Neoplatonism" (1982); S.Sambursky "The physical
world of Late Antiquity" (1962), the section on space and time;
R.Sorabji "Time, Creation and the Continuum" (1983), esp. part I
on the reality of time; also, W.O'Neill "Time and Eternity in
Proclus" Phronesis 7 (1962) p.161-5; E.Sonderegger "Simplikios
zur Zeit" Hypomn.vol.70 (1982); P.Hoffmann "Iamblique exegete
du Pythagoricien Archytas, trois originalites d'une doctrine
du temps" Les Etudes Philosophiques (1980) p.307-23;
J.Moreau "L'espace et le temps dans philosophie antique" Revue
Synth.91 (1970) p.205-19; and articles in "Motion and Time, Space
and Matter" ed. P.Machamer and R.Turnbull.
2 In Tim.I 161 ff.
"Active" Space, Iamblichus' theory, see Simplicius In Phys.639-40,
In Categ.361-64, is mentioned In Tim.I 164,22-5; it is supposed
to be an "incorporeal cause" which sustains bodies with life and
contains all extension, not, as Proclus° theory, a corporeal
extension; however, it seems that, the Proclan Space is "active"
qua the "organon" of the World Soul; so, Iamblichus' incorporeal
cause would, in strict terms, be the World Soul itself qua
incorporeal "dunamis" in the Proclan Space qua corporeal extension.
3 For the above subdivisions, eg. In Tim.III 19, 26; III 28,1ff.
III 32,10; also El.Th.51, 53, 54, 55.
4 Pl .Th .V p289 (Portus), also In Tim.III 27, 53, 54; cf. Simplicius
In Phys.795,4-26.
5 Chronos as Cronos, In Tim.III 187,21; In Crat.59,15 where it says
that according to the Orphics, the first cause of all is called
Chronos(Time), being almost (schedon) the same in name as Cronos.
Also see note 4 on Eternity as god, I.B.2.
6 El.Th.191.
7 Also see Dodds, The El.of Th., notes for E1.Th.51-5, p.227-9;
and El.Th.48, 49, 94, 198.
8 For the following subdivisions, In Tim.III 53 ff.;
in In Tim.II 100,4, the cosmos is described as "enchronos" just
as time is "enkosmios".
9 In Tim.II 289-90; In Rep.II 11, cf. El.Phys. p30, definition
13, "Time is the number (arithmos) of motion of the celestial
bodies, cf. Aristotle de Caelo 279a 15, "time is the number of
motion".
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10 Just as the World Soul is the encosmic monad, as it were, of
souls.	 So, the World Soul is the active cause resident in and
immanent in the World Space and Time.
11 Notwithstanding the description of Time as "spiral", see
note 5 1.8.5.2; the periodic, "circular" character is restored
however, with the title "cyclo-spiral" (kukloelikton),
In Tim.III 20,25, lit. "twisting in a circular fashion", can be
also transl. as "revolving in a circle"(see Orphica Hymni 8,11;
and Or.Chald.199), although, I think my trans. brings out better
the relig. and astron. background.
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8. THE PHYSICAL WORLD
8.1 THE CELESTIAL BODIES
In Proclus' system the celestial bodies are the constituent members
of the "encosmic", in-the-world (enkosmios) order of divine henads
(the only other entity which would also be both encosmic and
"divine" is the World Soul). They are the last in the chain of
entities with a divine henad, which has its source in the One and
proceeds through the modes of existence of Being, Life, Intellect,
Soul and Nature, to Body. 	 Thus each celestial object has a unity,
a henad, which in their case is self-constituted, "divine", a
self-constituted being and life, an independent intellect,
a self-complete principle of motion, soul, and an everlasting,
physical body.	 Strictly, the Greek term "ouranios" is meant to
denote all the above qualities in one, each celestial Object being
- like every individual in Proclus' scheme - a unique bundle of
qualities, therefore, it is mildly incorrect to translate it as
"heavenly body" because it puts undue emphasis on "body".
This is particularly inappropriate for his theory because the body
is only the inert, passive, albeit the visible, part of -the whole
individual, and because the celestial object is primarily a "divine"
self-determined entity, rather than merely a body like a stone.
A distinctive feature of his celestial theory is that he rejects
the Aristotelian fifth Element, Aether, for the substance of the
celestial bodies, and instead retains and develops the Platonic
four Elements, whose properties he modifies in accordance with his
system (see II.B.3).
He also retains the idea that the celestial bodies move by themselves
through the action of their own principle of self-motion, the soul,
although in his theory, the concept of self-motion in free space
is more firmly established. Moreover, it is embedded In his
Neoplatonic philosophy, in particular, the dynamic process of
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"remaining-proceeding-returning" and the property of self-constituted
existence.
Proclus° theory of the celestial bodies is examined in more detail
in Part II, Section B.
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8.2 CELESTIAL ATTENDANTS AND SUBLUNARY INHABITANTS
These are the physical entities, except for the celestial bodies.
Generally they are characterized and classified by their souls,
the immanent active principle, rather than by their bodies, so,
for example, the humans are hierarchically "lower" than the
celestial attendants, the "daimons", because of the kind of soul
immanent in them.	 Of course, this does not apply to inanimate
objects, which are classed "lower" than the "living", because of
the lack of qualities.
"Daimons" (daimones), perhaps better translated as "guardian spirits",
or better still "alloted powers", is an all-inclusive group of
entities, who serve as the immediate attendants, guardians (opadoi,
phrouroi) of their "leading" divine celestial object. 	 Collectively,
they act as the intermediaries between the celestials and the
sublunaries. They are responsible for conveying and pluralizing
the characteristic property of each celestial individual to
the "suitable" sublunary inhabitants, be they humans, animals, plants,
or inanimate things. In this respect they represent the divine
element which exists even in the lowest of things, and are a link
with the divine causal-entities themselves, such as the celestial
objects, but also, it seems, with others still higher (eg. those of
Nature or Soul).1
Belief in the existence of such entities was widespread and
uncontroversial, another common title-expression for them was
- -
"our betters" (kreittones, kreittosin hemon).2
In Proclus they are divided in three groups, according to function:
the "messengers-angels" (angeloi), which manifest the peculiar
property (idiots) of their "leading" god, the "daimons proper"
(kath' hauton daimones), which bring the said property into the
multitude of the world by procession, and the "heroes", which
preside over the return and the elevation to the appropriate
divinity. 3
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The inhabitants of the sublunary realm of "generation" are arranged
according to hierarchical value as follows:
As an intermediary between the divinities in heaven and the
terrestrials he mentions the "ennead of gods" of Plato Tim.40E-41A,
whose status he adjusts by calling them, daimons who have the form
of gods. 4
Next should be the so-called "uncontaminated" (achrantoi) and
"incorruptible" (ou kakunomenei) souls. 	 They seem to belong
to the "occasional attendants of gods" (pote opadoi then), by
contrast to the daimons which are "always attendants" (aei opadoi).
These souls are said to be "descended" (kation) into generation,
meaning proper residence on earth. RosAn suggests (The Phil. of
Proclus, p.180) that these might be Proclus t equivalent of the
avatars or bodhisattvas. 5
Ordinary humans are next, since they (their souls) may descend right
down to Tartarus. Humans still have all the qualities afforded
by the ',higher" hypostases, although the human soul is said to be
a mixture of "immortal" (athanaton) and "mortal" (thnete) natures.
The immortal constituent is the rational soul (logike psuch;),with
its companion body the "Dminous", "astral" vehicle, and the mortal
is the irrational soul (alogos),with its own "pneumatic" vehicle.
Interestingly, Proclus seems to employ metallurgical-alchemical
phraseology in describing the "fusing together" (suntexis) of the
natures. 6
Animals (zOa, aloga) are assigned an irrational soul only. Proclus
classifies them into the traditional (and Platonic) categories
"flying" (ptena, aeropora), "aquatic" (enudra), terrestrial (peza,
chthonia). 7
Plants (phuta) are said to partake of life, although the kind of
life they have is only an "image" (see independent vs dependent
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properties, I.A.1). 8 They do not partake of intellect.
there
Finally,4are the inanimate things, which include those which can
be melted, the metals, and those which cannot, such as stones and
minerals. They are simple corporeal entities without intellect or
life, but with only "being", an "image" of being at that. 	 Yet,
they are frequently mentioned in connection with bearing the
"symbol" or mark of a god. Such references describe their
astrological and theurgical function (cf. the discussion on the
"daimonic" class, and on the role of the "image" in I.A.1).
With respect to the formation of metals, Proclus mentions various
processes with a strong astrological content: they form either as a
result of the solidification of the celestial emanations
(sumpekn;sis) or as a result of seeding (phuetai) by the celestial
bodies. 9
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NOTES ON I.B.8.2
1 For the status of "daimons" in Proclus, eg. In Tim.III 152-161,
III 165-167, In Rep.II 71-2, In Alc.31, 32, 40, 90.
Most of the daimonology in the later ancient thought is
derived from the Middle Platonist Plutarch, see in Dillon op.cit.
although in Neoplatonism there was a trend towards a more
philosophical interpretation of them as "principles" or "powers",
cf. Plotinus' Enn.III 4, with Iamblichus' De Myst.I 6, IX 6-9,
and Proclus, above.
2 Eg. In Tim.III 258; also in Aristotle de Anim.II,3 414b 15,
the "timiOteron" beings to man.
3 For the tri-partite division of the daimonic class, eg.
In Tim.III 165.	 Cf. Iamblichus four-fold division, three
corresp. to the "angels", "daimons" and "heroes", and one to
the "achrantoi" souls, see Dillon "Iamblichi " op.cit.p.48-52.
4 In Tim.III 167,25-30; cf. El.Th.139, that the celestials are
the last divinities.
5 In Tim.III 259,10-30, cf. I 131-2; also see note 3, above.
However, these may not be necessarily the "bodhisattvas" as
presented in Dillon "Iamblichi " p.243-4.
6 An extensive account of Proclus on the human soul can be found
in Rosan op.cit. p.194-216, and in Beutler's Proklos (Pauly-W.)
p.234-240; for more detailed studies, H.Blumenthal, eg.,
"Some probpms about body and soul in later pagan Neoplatonism"
Jahrbuch fur Antike und Christentum 10 (1983), p.75-84.
"Partial" soul, In Tim.II 228; "alloy mixture" of mortal and
immortal; In Tim.III 321, 246ff.
7 Eg. In Tim.III 196, 230, III 110-112; but also mermaids II 208,10
and dragons II 202,25.
8 As living things, In Tim.III 196, 239; cf. Pl.Th.III 22-25.
9 On the metals, see In Tim.I 43, III 321, and the Proclus frg.
in Olympiodorus In Arist. Meteor. p.266-7.
That they are "solidifications" is, as Olympiodorus points out,
both Platonic (solidif. of the Water Element, Tim.59AB f.,
"metal"= meltable) and Aristotelian (solid. of "vapour", the
moist of the two evaporations Meteor.III 6, 378a ff.) theory.
The ref. to being "planted" or seeded, can most prob. traced to
the Stoic concept of seed-principles (see I.B.6). However, in
both cases the causal role of the celestial bodies is central,
unlike the theories of origin. For a full examination of the
ancient th3ories on the metals, see R.Halleux "Le problame des
m4taux dans la science antique" (1974) with a section on the
astrological and alchemical ramif., p.149-160, where Proclus'
In Tim.I 43, and the Olymp. frg. are extensively mentioned.
Also see the classic work, R.P.Multhauf "The origins of Chemistry"
(1966), and F.S.Taylor "A survey of Greek Alchemy" J.H.S.50 (1930)
p.109-139.
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8.3 CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THE MATERIAL WORLD
Predictably, Proclus follows the long-established view that in
the sublunary domain all entities are in a continuous process of
change (metabole); this is the realm of "generation" (genesis)
where everything comes into being and then perishes away.
At this level of existence, causes and effects are no longer in
a "stable" and eternal relationship, as they were, for example,
among the intelligibles, but are in a temporal-temporary and mixed
mode (miktos, summiktos). 1 The incorporeal causes are embroiled in
and mixed with body and matter; soul, for example, acquires
"material garments" (see II.A.4.4).	 The material of the bodies
is also a mixture, and the Elements themselves are mixtures in a
2
state of constant flux. Matter itself is of course in a disorderly
and mutable state of agitated motion (p1;mmeleia, atakt;s); this is
the "gross" and "unstable" matter (pachutatli hulen, anedraston),
which is a mere shadow of the stable substrate-matter, the
" receptacle of the universe" (as interpreted by Proclus) pervading
through all the modes of existence (see II.A.6 and II.B.3).
Because of this state of constant change, every effect is largely
due to a "concurrence" (sundrome) of several contributing factors,
acting at the appropriate time (kairos) on the suitable entity
(epitedeios) at the appropriately alloted place (kleros ch;ra).
Each concurrence is subject both to the principle of sympathy,
the rapport and equiponderant relation between the participants
(logos, summetria), and the principle of "fitness" or "suitability"
- 3(epit;deiotes).
Since all causal power originates ultimately in and by the self-
constituted entities, the "divines", and the self-constituted
entities closest to the sublunary, material world are the celestial,
then, the sublunaries are mainly governed by (or through) the
celestials.
4
 The general principle underpinning this link is that
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"all is in all, but appropriately in each", especially in the form
of independent and dependent, "image" participation.	 Each
independent has its own unique character (idiots) which is
distributed among the non-independents, so that every thing, however
lowly in the hierarchy, is "alloted" (elachen, kleros) an appropriate
sign-ature (sunth;ma) and image of the independent's peculiar
property.
The nature of the result emerging from the concurrence of many
causes is determined by: (i) the place, (ii) the time, and (iii) the
thing itself.	 Furthermore, for Proclus, all these factors,
including perhaps (iii), need not be permanent. Some change
constantly in the ordinary run of things, even the divine "allotment"
may itself be of certain duration, while others can be promptdd 5
to change by those who know the 'what' and 'how'. It is a
characteristic feature of Neoplatonic thought that the link between
gods and men is not entirely asymmetrical.
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NOTES ON I.B.8.3
1 In addition to being a mixture of limit-unlimited, eg.
In Tim.I 410,11-19.
2 Cf. In Tim.II 26; ex. Plato's Tim.49B ff. and the doctrine of
Becoming, also see Part II the Section on the Elements.
For the'Heraclitan "everything is in a state of flux" see
Simplicius In Phys.1313.
3 Eg. In Tim.I 140, 163-4, 392; II 63-6; In Rep.II 266, 269, 303-4;
In Parm.916.
For the important concept of "suitability", E.R.Dodds The El.Th,
op.cit. p.344-5 of his addenda .
S.Sambursky's view that the concept of "suitability" is an
example of "mechanical-mindedness" in Late Antiquity with special
ref. to Philoponus' usage, has been criticized severely by
scholars of ancient philosophy for, in essence, taking it out
of its context within ancient philosophy.
S.Sambursky, "Conceptual developments" in "Scientific Change"
edit. A.C.Crombie (1963) op.cit. esp. p73-4; and "The physical
world of Late Antiquity" p104-9.	 For the criticism, G.E.L.Owen
comm. on Sambursky's paper in "Conceptual developments" p.97-8;
and the excellent art. by R.B.Todd "Epitedeiotes in philosophical
literature: towards an analysis" Acta Classica 15 (1972) p25-35,
which traces Philop. usage of "fitness" to non-technidal termin.
or at least to a-technical usage supplemental to the Aristotelian
potentiality, not an alternative.
In relation to the Stoic theory of causation, see R.Sorabji
"Necessity, Cause and Blame" p.64-5, 78-9. "Fitness" or
"disposition" is also linked to the development of occasionalism
in the Islamic philosophy of Ghazali (11th c), cf. Sorabji
"Time, Creation and the Continuum" chapter 19.
4 Eg. In Tim.I 139-40, II 200-2; Pl.Th.VI p352; cf. In Rep.II 13
and In Rep. refs. of previous note.
5 That the various factors can be subject to change, In Tim.I 145;
see also E.R.Dodds section on theurgy in "The Greeks and the
Irrational" (1951) p.291-311.
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8.4 THE FOUR ELEMENTS
Proclus' theory of the Elements is solely of the four Elements:
he categorically rejected Aristotle' fifth Element, Aether.
His solution to the problem the introduction of the fifth Element
was meant to address, namely, the difference between the imperishable
celestial and the perishable sublunary realm, is based on the
principle that "everything is in everything but appropriately in
each". According to it, the traditional four sublunary Elements
are only just one of the many cosmological modes of the four
Elements, a notion consistent with and embedded in his general
philosophy.
He retained the Platonic geometric or quantitative conception of
the Elements, which he developed in a way that was intended to be
an advance on the Aristotelian theory of two qualities per
Element, and which he perhaps regarded as the final replacement
it.
Very briefly, the particles of Fire, Air, Water and Earth are
defined by their characteristic Platonic regular polyhedra, which,
in turn, are defined by the "atomic" triangles. These allow
inter-transformations from one Kind (viz. Element) to another.
During these processes there can exist, according to Proclus,
half-formed particles. That such "intermediate" states of the
parts of matter are allowed to exist, emphasizes their proximity,
in hierarchical terms, to the completely indefinite matter.
Proclus l theory of the Elements is examined in more detail in
Part II, Section A.
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8.5.1 BODY
Body (siima) is the last mode of existence in Proclus' system.
"Of all the kinds of being (ontOn hapantli) the last one is the
corporeal (eschaton esti to sOmatikon); for it derives its
.	 -
existence and completion (to einai, ten telexoteta) from other
older and higher (presbuteras) causes, and is allotted from its
own proper power neither simplicity nor complexity of composition
(oute to haploun oute to suntheton), and, neither perpetuity nor
indestructibility (oute to aidion oute to aphtharton). 	 For no
body is either self-constituted or self-generated (ou authupostaton
oude autogenes)"(57).
Therefore, Body is not a proper cause-attribute, like intellect or
soul for example, but is only a "participant". It is not a
"participated" property, since there is nothing else which can
participate in it. Body is the last production of the Creator
(see I.B.4).
Body is also called "the substrate of ensouled existence"
1(hupokeimenon tes psuchoseos), which is of course in accordance
with the designation of body as the "material vehicle" (huliaion
ochMa) and the "shell" of soul (Plato Phaedrus 250; also the
expressional:, "tomb" and "prison" of soul).
It is in this capacity as substrate, that Body is intimately linked
with Matter, for Matter is "the substrate of all things"
(hupokeimenon panton). Nevertheless, there are hierarchical
differences between them. Since body is composed of matter and
invariably has a certain form or shape, then, Matter, which can
be formless, is "lower" still. Whereas pure body in Proclus is
identical with shaped three-dimensional spatial extension
(see II.A.6), pure matter is simply a power-to-receive, a
substratum without any other definition or quality.
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8.5.2 MATTER
Overall, Proclus does not wish to distinguish two kinds of matter,
one intelligible and one sensible.	 He prefers, instead, the concept
that matter is an aspect of one single, indefinite power, extending
through all the modes of the universe2 (see I.B.1.2).
His theory of matter is based on the ontological principle that
the "higher" the causal property, the more unified and the more
"powerful" it is (see I.A.1). 	 So, the universal causes of Unity
in tandem with Being extend as far as to simple bodies, such as
stones, whereas the more specific causes of Intellect or Soul, for
example, "irradiate" only as far as to the living creatures
(see I.B.intro.).	 Body is the most "basic" of things to be
"irradiated" by Being, while Matter, pure matter, the most "basic"
of things, can only be "irradiated" by Unity. 3
The relationship between the active, predicating causes, and their
bases, the substrates, is related as follows:
"All the characters which in the primary causes have a higher and
more universal rank (holikoteran kai huperteran taxin) become in
the resultant (apotelesmasi) entities, through their irradiations
(ellampseis), a kind of substrate (hupokeimena pos) for the
participation-communication (metadosesi) of the more specific
causes; and while the irradiations of the more superior causes
receive (hupodechontai) the processions of the secondary causes,
the characters of the secondary are established upon them.
Thus there is an order of precedence (proagountai) in participation
(methexeis), and different imprints (emphaseis) fall upon the same
substrate-base, the more universal affecting first (proenergounton),
and the more specific supplementing these with the bestowal of
their own characters upon the participants (tois metechousin)" (58).
So, "all the characters, which in the participants have the
relative position(logon) of a substrate, proceed from more complete
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-(teleioteron) and more universal causes (holikoteron aition)" (59).
In effect, as A.C. Lloyd perspicuously put it, the hypostases are
held in their place by their own bootstraps.4
Matter is described in approximately three ways:
(i) Matter as the simple, universal substrate complementary to
the One cause of the universe.
"For we do not say that there are many kinds of matter (kan pleious
hulas) of the universe, but that there is one kind of matter
starting from above (anothen) and proceeding downwards (di' hupheseOs)
till the very last sediment (hupostathmes), which is indeed
formless (ont;s aneideon; shortly before, Proclus called Matter,
undifferentiated and qualitiless)" (60).	 "For the last of beings
is, like the first (1;sper to proton; viz. the One), most simple
(haploustaton), because it proceeds from the first alone (apo monou
tou prOtou); the one is simple as being above (kreitton) all
composition, but the other as being below (cheiron) it" (61).
(ii)Matter as a potential, a power-to-receive
"The associates of Plotinus frequently point out, that Being is
composed of form and intelligible matter (eidous, hules noetes),
and correspond the form to the One and the Existence (to heni kai
te huparxei), and make the power (dunamin) analogous to matter.
If this is what they mean, they are correct; but if they attribute
to the intelligible essence some nature without shape (amorphon),
form (aneideon), or limit (aoriston), I th i nk they lose sight of
the Platonic intention" (62). 	 "Matter is potentially all'
(Arist. de An.III 5, 430 a 10-11), since it is given subsistence
by the first potency-(prOtes dunameOs). 	 But that is the generating
power of everything, whereas the power of matter is incomplete
(hules dunamis ateles) and is in need of the subsistence of every
actuality" (63).
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(iii) Matter as a mode of infinitude, and to a degree "good".
"If bodies are made of limit and unlimited (ek peratos kai apeirias;
cf. quote 25. in I.B.1.2)...it is evident, that matter is an
unlimited, and form a limit. If therefore, as we have already
said, God (ho theos; in this case, the One) gives subsistence to
all the unlimited (pasan apeirian), He also gives subsistence to
matter, which is the last unlimited (eschaten apeirian). And
that is the First and Ineffable cause (arrhetos aitia) of matter;
and because everywhere the sensibles are analogous to the
intelligible causes...likewise, the unlimited which is down-here
(entautha apeirian; viz, matter) derives from the first
Unlimited, just as the limit which is down-here (viz, form)
is from the Limit over-there. For it has been shown elsewhere,
that the first Unlimited, which is prior to the mixed existence,
is established at the summit of the intelligibles (en tZ akroteti
tOn natOn), and from there it extends (diateinei) its irradiation
(ellampsin) as far as to the last of things (eschat11), so,
according to it, Matter proceeds from the One and the Unlimited
which is prior to Being...For this reason, Matter is to a degree
good (agathon pe) and infinite, as well as the obScurest and
formless being (amudrotaton on kai aneideon), on account that
they (viz. the One and prime Infinitude) subsist prior to the
5 -
Forms and their appearance unto-light (tes ekphanse;s)"
Thus Proclus' Matter is essentially power to-receive, potential
power, and inasmuch as power is infinite, bound-less, not made-up
of discrete individuals since it is not-limit and not-form, then
it is indeed continuous and simple through all the modes of
existence.
However, Proclus seems to differentiate between matter as a
universal substrate, and the mass-matter of the sublunary domain.
The latter is the "most-gross" matter (pachutatZn hurdn;see II.A.6)
which is distinguished from the former, the "universal receptacle"
matter.
(64).
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Gross matter is equivalent to: (a) corporeal but formless matter,
a purely qualitiless quantity, as opposed to matter as an incorporeal
power, and (b) matter as the most distant mode of existence from
the One, matter at the very end of the hierarchy, as opposed to
matter as the unlimited power substrate complementary to and
originated by the One.
The distinction appears, therefore, to parallel that between Plotinus'
intelligible and sensible matter, although for Proclus, it is that
between the fundamental nature of Matter itself and one, the very
last and weakest, of its modes.
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8.5.3 MATTER AND THE INVERSE HIERARCHY
A paradoxical development arising from the application of the
general principle that the more universal cause is more powerful
than the more specific (see I.A.1) is, that some entities in the
"lower" ranks of the hierarchy can no longer be "effects" of the
more universal as well as the more specific causes, but only of
the more universal.
So, the hierarchy seems to proceed initially from simplicity to
complexity, until the mode with the maximum number of qualities
in its bundle, and subsequently, from complexity to simplicity.
The first simplicity is the One, and the last, Matter.
The precise character of the inverted part of the hierarchy depends
on which mode of existence is defined as the most complex. It, in
turn, depends largely on the precise role of soul and nature in
relation to body, as L.J. Rosin observes in his account of what
he calls the "second class of effects", viz, those of the inverted
hierarchy (the Phil. of Proclus, p.190-1). 	 If the contemplative
role of soul is emphasized and nature acts as the "physical" cause
of change, then, man will constitute the most complex being, while
animals, plants and the inanimate things, such as stones and dead
bodies, will be successively simpler (see I.B.8.2). 	 But, if soul
retains the "principle of motion" as well, with nature acting
merely as an auxilliary, then, everything subject to change-motion
will still be the most complex of things, and the inversion will not
commence until body considered in itself.
Of the two, the first is considerably better documented in Proclus
than the second, and moreover;forms of it seem to have been already
subject to discussion. 6
E.R. Dodds commented (Proclus° El. of Th. p.232-3), that this
paradoxical simplicity at the lower and material end had also been
noticed by Plotinus (Enn.VI,7,13 "the lower is similarly simple
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because of a fading-out of characteristic"), although it was Proclus
who was first able to provide a theoretical explanation for it.
It also accounted for the unsettling fact that both the
hierarchically superior celestial bodies and the inferior
terrestrial, inanimate bodies exhibit a simpler motion than that
of the hierarchically "between" terrestrial living-beings.
"For if we want to examine these things, we will observe that
everywhere those at the extremes (ta akra; in hierarchical terms)
-
are more simple (haploustera) than those in the middle (ton meson)
which are more complex; so, for example, we see that nature and
matter are more simple than body, and the irrational life and
intellect than the rational soul (cf. I.B.intro. quote 19.).
But, whereas the intellect is more simple by being higher in degree
of excellence (kata to kreitton), the irrational is simple by
being lower (kata to cheiron); for it lives without deliberate
_
choice (aproairetos; ie. in want of volition, contra the celestial
bodies which move by their own will and power, see II.B.6.3) and
conformably to nature (kata phusin). If therefore with respect
to motion, we see that both the divine living-beings (ie. the
celestial bodies) and the inanimate bodies have a more simple motion,
but those in between wander and move in various and many ways, what
is there to wonder at ? For the simplicity of the divine movement
is above (kreitton) the complexity of the mortals, but the simplicity
of the inanimate is below (cheiron)" (65).
Dodds concluded that dead, inanimate bodies do appear to be closer
to Unity than souls, which, he said, is consistent with the
importance attached to them in theurgy. R.T. Wallis ("Neoplatonismn
p.156-7), who followed Dodds in this, remarked further that the
inverted hierarchy would make it easier for man to contact divinity
and the One via material objects. Yet, he admitted that there is
no explicit evidence of this in any extant text.
I suggest that this lack of evidence is not at all surprising,
because the above extrapolations are singularly incompatible with
the fundamental Neoplatonic view of re-unification by the ascent
- 136 -
of the soul (as in Plato's Phaedo and Phaedrus). Contact with a
divine henad via material objects would have constituted the descent
of the theurgist's soul in the underworld, the Tartarus of matter,
and the descent into darkness, instead of the ascent to light. 7
Crucial to this point at issue is an appreciation of the role
of the independent and dependent participated attribute (see I.A.1).
The dependents only display a shadow of the participated property.
The independents, or self-constituted, are the ones which manifest
the property proper, since they proceed immediately from the
unparticipated, monadic cause. Hierarchical causation proceeds
via successive unparticipated and independent participated causes
not via the dependents. 8 Sublunary entities such as the plants
and the inanimate bodies are said to bear only the "symbols" of
gods.	 The accent is always on "gods" (as Wallis subsequently
observes), viz, the divine and independent cause , rather than on
the "symbol", in other words, on the entities which are like
the One in a "maximal" sense (as Dodds put it prior to his statement
on the importance attached to inanimate bodies), not on those which
are in a "minimal". Contact with divinity takes place via .
incorporeal and "elevating" powers, although material objects may
also be employed, as "symbols" of divinity.
This version of an inverse hierarchy may, however, be undermined by
the following objections. Firstly, it may be argued that although
there is an apparent simplicity at the lower and material end, such
simplicity does not take into account the process of multiplication
of discrete individuals: men counted individually are less in number
than animals, which in turn are less than plants, and finally all
the living things are less in number than all the inanimate. In
this way the hierarchical procession from the One to the many is
preserved till the very end. Secondly, inanimate bodies and simple
living bodies, like plants, although simpler than man and animals
are still "bodies" subject to Nature.	 Therefore, they can never
really compare with the entities which are above Nature and Body.
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The last objection leads directly to the second version, which
acknowledges that every corporeal thing in the material world, which
is subject to some form of change, will still be a complex entity,
"acted upon" by both universal and specific causes.
Rosgn focuses on the second (ibid. p.191), probably because he
accepts implicitly the argument against the first. He interpolates
a series between Body, as the most complex, and Matter as the
simplest in the inverted hierarchy, although, as he forewarns, it
is only partly stated in Proclus. Body in itself is thus made
to be "under" Intellect qua determinate form, Quantity (posot -es) by
itself to be "under" Life qua number, Individuality or atomicity
(atomotes), Privation (stereseis) and Particularity (merotes)
successively "under" Being, and Matter "under" the One.
There are many attractions to this scheme, not least for the scale of
"negation" towards Matter, which matches - or simulates - the return
to the One by the shedding of qualities. It therefore provides
a graded transition from the corporeal and shaped kind of matter to
the totally limitless matter, through the atom-like existence of
the four Elements (cf. I.B.2, II.A.4.1). 	 In this respect it
reveals perhaps the real character of the "inverse" hierarchy,
namely, that it is an arrangement of "substrates" by a process of
abstraction.
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NOTES ON I.B.8.5
1 E1.Th.72; ibid. for Matter as the substrate of all; but also
cf. In Parm.1123, where Body is called the "substrate of the
universe" insofar as it is as large as the universe.
2 For this reason Proclus' theory of procession has been accused
of being too materialistic (sic), since the same "dunamisn
produces the intelligible, the psychical and the material
world, M.-L.von Franz "Number and Time" (1974) p.82, note 55
(within the context of Jungian thought).
3 See, J.Dillon "Iamblichi " op.cit. p.236-7 with a very useful
diagram; also, Dodds p247, Wallis p.148-9, 66-7.
That the more "powerful" causes can irradiate further, is yet
another example of the physical imagery employed for metaphysical
purposes.
That Matter is an "effect" of the One alone Zeller claimed that
both the concept and its development are original to Proclus;
notwithstanding Syrianus, it seems that such a notion oan also
be found earlier, in the 1st c AD Alexandrian Platonist, Eudorus;
Zeller "Griech. Phil." 111,2 p.869-70, Dillon "Middle Plat." p127-8.
The concept that the One, and the "higher" causes, reach further
than the more specific is also linked to other:
the concept of "perfect" and "imperfect" dunamis, see I.A.1,
also see Pl.Th.Budd edition vol.III, notes complement. on p.34
and p.39-40 of the body text, p.122-3, and p.125 respectively;
the exegesis of the "hypotheses" of Plato's Parmenides, see
P1.Th.Bud4 vol.I intra p.lxxx-lxxxvii, Dillon op.cit.p.387-9
and p.402, Syrianus and Proclus considered only the first five
as representing levels of reality, thus Matter became the last
"hypothesis";
the explanation of the existence of primordial motion prior to
the imposition of order and form by the Demiurge, the problem
from Tim.30A, also see note 5 below. and Dodds p.238-9, 230-1.
Matter is also described as "dissimilarly alike" (anomoi5s
h6moi6mene) to the One, ref. to Parm.159E, a formula expression
occuring in Syrianus, and others, see Pl.Th.Bude vol.I, note
on p.55, p.144-5.
4 A comment made during a seminar on Neoplatonism at ICS in 1980
and subsequently confirmed.
5 Here, the darkness of matter is linked to the "abyss" (abussos,
aduton; a "Chaldean" term see Iewy and des Places) of the
unknowable First principles and the One; see, Thomas Taylor's
comment on the Tim. Comm. vol.I p.324, and Festugiere t s notes in
Comm. sur le Tim4e vol.II p.247-9.	 This is in fact a pointer
to Proclus' solution of the problematic primordial disorderly
motion in Matter: such a state of motion is not due to an evil
World Soul, but due to "higher" causes above and prior to the
Demiurge himself, also cf. In Parm.842-5 (for the doctrine of
evil W.-S. and disord.motion of Plutarch. and Atticus, see
Dillon"Middle Platon? p.202-6, 252-4
note 5 contin.
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(note 5 contin.). Matter "to a degree good" is a snub at
Plotinus l association of sensible matter with evil, Enn.I,8,4.
For Proclus the divine "good" nature reaches everywhere, besides
privations of good cannot be causes of evil, Mal.Subs. p240;
also cf. Wallis op.cit. p.49-50.
6 Previous kinds of 'inverted' progressions include the simplicity
of movement of the fixed stars and the Sun and the Moon, as
opposed to the complex movement of the planets, between,
Aristotle de Caelo 11,12 (see Loeb ed. with diagram on p.208).
I would like to thank R.W.Sharples for bringing to my notice
the wider aspects of the debate, see eg., his "Responsibility
and the Possibility of more than one course of action, a note
on Aristotle De Caelo II 12", ICS Bulletin 23 (1976) p.69-72.
For an exposition of the ancient debate on the subject, see
Simplicius In de Caelo p.482-490.
7 On theurgy and "elevation" see H.Lewy op.cit. ch .3 and excurs.8
cf. with Dodds' account of the theurgical mode of operation,
in "The Greeks and the Irrational" (1951) appx.2 esp. p.291-311,
where he stresses the use of "symbols" and other "intermediaries"
while almost overlooking the aim of theurgy, viz. "the elevation
(anodos) to the intelligible Fire" a quote from Iamblichus'
de Myst., which appears at the beginning of the section on the
modus operandi, but hardly expanded on later.
For the position of theurgy in Proclus' philosophy, see
A.Sheppard's excellent art. "Proclus' attitude to theurgy"
Classical Quarterly 32i(1982) p.212-224.
On the "Tartarus of matter", Proclus In Rep.II 183,17-21
describes Tartarus as the chOros of all disorderly and obscure
matter, contra to Olympus, which is all-shining and most-lofty
(cf. Arist. de Mundo 400a8).
8 El.Th.110.
PART II
THE PHYSICS OF THE ELEMENTS AND THE CELESTIAL BODIES
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SECTION A. THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNIVERSE.
Introduction.
The development of the 4-Element, geometrical theory of matter in
Late Antiquity did not come about solely as a result of the rise of
Neo-Platonism and the revival of Plato's doctrines, it was also
influenced by other schools of thought which espoused the 4-Element
composition of the universe (Stoicism) or promulgated the
mathematical view of the cosmos (neo-Pythagoreanism). Moreover,
Aristotle's doctrine of the 5th Element had come under persistent
criticism even from the early Peripatetics themselves, such as
Xenarchus and, perhaps, Theophrastus.
So, with the benefit of hindsight and influenced, in particular, by
their conception of a "Pythagorean" Plato, the late Neoplatonists
sought to describe the Elements of the universe and the matter,
where change takes "place", mathematically, as tri-dimensionally
extended entities.	 However, these were by no means conceived as
inert quantities but as the shape and form of the active powers,
or qualities, inherent in a dynamical cosmos.
Aristotle's fifth Element was dropped as an unnecessary, ad hoc entity,
whose primary role in providing an imperishable substance for the
heavens could be filled instead by an exalted, incorruptible and
non-destroying sort of Fire.
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1. THE PLATONIC BACKGROUND
Proclus/ Elements are the traditional four: Fire, Air, Water and
Earth.
These originally Empedoclean Elements were meant to be the irreducible
primary "roots" of the changeable physical world. They were called
"Elements" (stoicheia) from their comparison with the letters, the
alphabetical elements. Just as the letters of the alphabet combine
to form words, which are used to describe the world, so the elements
of the world combine in multiform ways to produce the various
entities and phenomena.1
In the Platonic tradition in particular these "roots" had become
associated with the four out of the five "perfect Platonic solids".
Geometrically, they are the only regular convex solids inscribable
in a sphere. Thus the four "roots" and their associated properties
could be represented and explained by the geometrical properties
of their "shape" or "figure" (schka): Fire by the tetrahedron,
Air by the octahedron, Water by the icosahedron and Earth by the
cube? The fifth perfect solid, the dodecahedron, was said to
have been used up (katechr;sato) for the universe as a whole.3
This opened the way to the subsequent developments leading to a fifth
Element or state being ascribed to the heavens.
The Platonic primary bodies were not totally indivisible and
absolute "atoms" in the Atomist fashion. Firstly, the solid
bodies were determined and bounded by plane surfaces, the faces or
bases (hedra) of the polyhedra and secondly these plane faces were
said to be composed of plane triangles. 4 Still further, Plato
recognized that only 2 types of plane triangle were sufficient to
build up the faces of the 4 solids: the rectangular scalene (sides
in ratio of 1:34:2), and the rectangular isosceles (sides in ratio
of 1:1:21 ).	 These were the true Platonic irreducible "elements".5
The first type of these elementary triangles was used for the
construction of the triangular faces of the tetrahedron (Fire),
the octahedron (Air) and the icosahedron (Water), whereas the
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second was used for the square faces of the cube (Earth).
The number of these basic, elementary triangles per face per
polyhedron determined the size of the corpuscle of each Element.
Firstly, with the triangles of all the polyhedra assumed to be
of the same size, the size of each polyhedron (except the cube)
would be directly proportional to the number of its faces. So
for example, by such reasoning, Fire's tetrahedral corpuscle
with 4 faces would be smaller than Water's icosahedral with 20
faces.
	
This size-factor affected the relative mobility,
penetrability and the weight of the corpuscle. So compared by
size alone, Fire would indeed be more mobile, more penetrating
6and lighter than Water. Secondly, by varying the size of the
faces through the multiple addition of triangles the size of the
same Element-polyhedron could vary and yield differently sized
corpuscles for the same Element. 	 This is because the size of
each face is directly proportional to the number of the basic
triangles that combined to form it. This size-factor had a
similar influence on the properties ofa particular Element.
For example, aetherial Air (least no. of basic triangles per face=
smaller faces=smaller octahedron) as compared to the misty and
dark Air (larger faces=larger octahedra). 7 The size variable
assumes an added significance in Proclus, where such size-
determined properties as inertness or mobility, thickness or
tenuity etc, are associated with the state of materiality of a
thing.
The kind of angle formed by the faces of the polyhedron determined
the penetrability (and indirectly the mobility) of each Element.
The angle to which Plato seems to have been referring is the solid
angle formed at the corner of the polyhedron- the vertex - by the
surrounding faces.8 Plato considered this polyhedral angle to be
acute for the tetrahedron but obtuse for the rest, This angle
variable especially differentiated Fire from the other Elements
and accounted for a family of penetrability-related faculties or
qualities. For example, the dissolving faculty, which affects
the transformation of the Elements, and the "cutting" quality
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of heat.
Plato therefore accounted for the characteristic properties of the
Elements by using: the size, the angle, the type of triangle
which constituted the face, and the type of face of each polyhedronl°
So for example, Earth's inertness or preponderance to remain stable
or stationary was attributed to the all-sided stability of the
isosceles triangle, which composed the square faces of the cube
(ref. to what we now call centre of gravity). 	 Furthermore, the
square faces or bases themselves were considered as more stable
than the triangular ones of the other polyhedral ]. So Earth as a
cube was the hardest to move from its place of equilibrium (cf.
Tim 63A Earth as a body in equilibrium at the centre of the
universe). On the contrary, Fire's readiness to move was explained
by the overall instability of the scalene triangle (presumably
because it has unequal sides) and the triangular faces of its
polyhedron. Its penetrabilityas already mentioned, was chiefly
accounted for by the acuteness of the angles.
Plato's composite polyhedral corpuscles of the Elements also
accounted, in a distinctly un-Atomist fashion, for the transformation
of one Element into others as witnessed by various phenomena, such
as boiling (Water into Air mainly) etc, in the world of continuous
change, the realm of "generation" (genesis). 	 This was allowed
through the interchangeability of the triangles; specifically,
through the scalene triangles of Fire, Air and Water. 	 These
did not have any inherent quality which branded them as exclusively
fiery, airy or watery, since such qualities were due to the overall
shape of the polyhedral solid. Therefore, during a transformative
process the polyhedra were thought to dissolve into the constituent
triangles which would then rearrange themselves into new polyhedra-
12Elements. Only the rectangular equilateral triangles of Earth's
cubes were excluded from participation in such transformation,
being geometrically incompatible with the scalene. Earth, therefore,
as a pure Element, could not be transformed into any other Element;13
nevertheless Plato allowed it to exist in a state of fusion with
other Elements, usually Water.14
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In this manner, the only primary quality of the Platonic Elements
was "shape" or "figure" (plus the self-moving power, which was
inherent in all generation)1 5 Specifically, it was the shape of one
appropriate polyhedron for the corpuscle of each of the 4 Elements.
This, in turn, was ultimately dependent on only two principal
(archai) types of plane triangle. The "perceived sensations"
of heat, liquidity, bitterness, smoothness, smell, etc., (see Tim.
616-68d) were secondary, since they were derivable, in a fashion,
from the geometry of the polyhedra.
This is essentially the geometrical or quantitative Element theory
of the Platonic School, which was held dear even by possibly the
very last of the "Successors", the 6thc,Neoplatonist Simplicius,
as it is evident in his introduction to Proclus' own arguments
against the objections raised by the rival theory of Aristotle,
the more famous and more influential qualitative theory of hot-
colddry-moist, light-heavy. 	 "Plato seeks for the origin of the
4 bodies, Fire, Air, Water and Earth in other principles (alias
archas) more fundamentalethan the ones derived from the qualities
of heat, cold, dryness and moisture, namely from the differences
in quantity (en t; pos; diaphorat), since quantity is more closely
related to body (sungenester -On ousli pros ta s;mata).
	 This is
evident from the fact that he accounts for the differences of those
qualities by the difference of the shape (schemat;n diaphoras)" (1).
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NOTES ON II.A.1
1 For the Empedoclean background see, eg., J.J.Longrigg,
"The Roots of all things" Isis 67 (1976) p.420-38.
For the Elements as the ABC of the universe, "stoicheia tou pantos"
in Plato, the main text ref. is, Theaetetus 201E-205, also
Timaeus 48B; for an important analysis of what constitutes a
"letter", "syllable" and a "word" in Plato's theory of the
Elements see A.E.Taylor "A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus"(1928)
p.306-9.
2 Plato's theory of the Elements, Timaeus 47E-69B.
There are a number of studies which examine the various aspects
of it, from the geometrical to the epistemological:
the 'classic' works are, A.E.Taylori"A Commentary on the Timaeus"
(1928), and F.M.Cornford "Plato's Cosmology" (1937); they are
rich in comments, notes and references covering in length
virtually every detail of Plato's cosmological thought; for the
Elements in particular, Taylor R.305-491, Cornford p.160-239.
To these may be added, P.Friedlander "Plato" vol. 1 (1958)
with a number of important diagrams on Plato's theory of the
Elements, and G.Vlastes "Plato's Universe" (1975), with ref. to
the Elements, the part on Plato's theory of the structure of
matter and appx. N; also C.Mugler "La physique de Platon" (1960)
For the geometrical foundation of the Platonic Elements and the
theory of transformation see also, P.Friedlander "Structure and
destruction of the Atom according to Plato's Timaeus" Univ. of
California Publ. in Philosophy 16 (1949) p.225-248;
E.M.Bruins "La chimie du Timee",Revue de Metaphysique et
de Morale 56 (1951) p.269-282; G.Vlastos "Plato's supposed -
theory of irregular atomic figures",Isis 58 (1967); W.B.Pohle
"The mathematical foundations of Plato's atomic physics",
Isis 62 (1971) p.36-47, and W.C.Waterhouse "The discovery of
the regular solids", Archives forthe History of Exact Sciences
9 - (1972) p.212-221.
For the more philosophical aspects, .
R.J.Mortley "Primary particles and secondary qualities in Plato's
Timaeus",Apeiron 21 (1967) p.15-17; W.Pohle "Dimensional
concepts and the interpretation of Plato's physics", Phronesis
supp1.1 (1973) p.306-323; F.F.Centore "Atomism and Plato's
Theaetetue,Philosophical Forum 5 (1974 pub1.1975) p.475-485.
Most of these refs are also relevant to the next chapter .
3 On the fifth solid, Tim.55C; the identification with the twelve
signs of the zodiac and the heavens is late Platonic, and is
prob. linked to the five-fold division of the Epinomis.
4 The construction of the four solids, Tim.53C-55C; see Taylor
op.cit. p361-380 and Cornford op.cit. p210-239.
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5 "archai", the two types of triangle as the "elements" meaning
the ultimate principle in a reductive process, Tim.53D, 54DE,
55B; see Taylor, above, and the ref. on the the "letter" etc of
Plato's Elements; also, H.J.Folse "Platonic atomism and
contemporary physics", Tulane Studies in Philosophy 27 (1978)
p.69-88, who points out that the polyhedra are not supposed to
be concrete material atoms, but are the forms of the Elements in
the context of describing processes in a constant state of flux.
However, it is also best to keep in mind the distinction between
the Elements as the four Kinds in the Universe, and the
"elements" as the particle-"seeds" of the four Kinds.
On the role of the equilateral triangle in the construction of
the Fire, Air and Water polyhedra, also see R.Falus "L I enigme
du 'plus beau triangle", Acta Antigua Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae 26 (1978) p.405-422.
6 Tim.56B.
7 On aether and air, and size of corpuscle, Tim.58DE, and Taylor's
notes p.411-12.
8 Tim.54E-55C, cf. 56A.
9 According to Plato's account, as Taylor points out p.375, the
solid angle of the Fire-tetrahedron is equal to 180 0 (not 179°
as in Bury's footnote, in the Loeb edit, p.132), and so the
others must be more.
The solid angle as described in the Tim. is geometrically known
as "tri-hedral", which, by definition, is : for Fire's
tetrahedron, 3 plane-angles of 600 each equals 1800 ; for
Air's octahedron, 4 plane-angles of 60 0 each equals 2400 ; and for
Water's icosahedron, 5 plane-angles of 60° each equals 300°; all
of which confirm Taylor.
	
But in my opinion,
the appelations "acute" and "obtuse" seem to apply more
appropriately to the di-hedral angles of the edges of the each
polyhedron, which for Fire are indeed - according to the .
definition of dihedral angle - "acute", being less than 900,
whereas for all the others, are "obtuse", being more than 900.
Earth, according to Plato, does not participate in this scheme.
because of the different constituent triangle; trihedral angle
is 3x900= 270°, and dihedral, 90 0 , ie a right angle.
10 However, as Taylor shows, p.380, the size-factor alone would be
sufficient in accounting for the differences in the properties
of Fire, Air and Water, as explained in the Timaeus.
11 Tim.55E.
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12 Tim.56E ff. This has been the basis for regarding it as
the chemistry of the Timaeus, where the polyhedra act more
appropriately as molecules, and the triangles as atoms, their
number being more or less conserved through the transformations.
13 Tim.56D
14 Tim.60B -D.
15 For the self-moving power inherent in generation cf. Tim.89,
Laws X 895, Phaedrus 245.
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2. THE 15 ARGUMENTS
The so-called 15 Arguments or Objections (enstaseis) of Aristotle
against the Timaeus were part of Aristotle's wider criticism of
the qinntitative Element theories in favour of his own qualitative
one.	 The whole passage de Caelo III 305a33-307b26 includes
criticisms against the Empedoclean, the Atomist of Democritus as
well as against the Platonic theory (the Platonic in particular
de Caelo III 306a1-307
b
18). The arguments against the latter
clustered around the problems of constructing physical elementary
corpuscles from geometrical plane figures, the triangles, and
around the difficulties of deriving contrary qualities such as hot
and cold from similar geometrical shapes.
Proclus' counter-arguments, which are found in Simplicius' Commentary
on Aristotle's de Caelo, were part of a more extensive criticism,
or counter-criticism, of Aristotle's physical views. 	 Fragments
of this treatise survive in the Aristotelian Commentaries of
Simplicius "in de Caelo" & "in Physica" and in Philoponus l "de
Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum".1
Proclus' responses are important not only for the study of the
development of the debate Platonism vs Aristotelianism, nor just
for the examination of the degree of his adherence to the original
Platonic doctrine, but also for the investigation of Proclue
physical conceptualization in its own right.
The 15 Arguments can be divided into four thematic groups:
1. The arguments concerning the exemption of Earth from the
processes of transformation (Arg. 1 & 2).
2. The arguments about the formation of void-gaps between the
polyhedra (Arg. 6 & 8).
3. The arguments about the derivation of qualities from the
geometry of the polyhedra (Arg. 9,10,11,12,13,14,15).
- 150-
4. The arguments directed at the "shape" of the polyhedra
(Arg. 5 & 7) and at the fundamentals of the Platonic
theory, viz, the plane triangles (Arg. 3 & 4).
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1. One of the consequences of the triangular structure of the
polyhedra, in Plato's theory, was that Earth did not have the
same elementary triangles as the other Elements and therefore
could not participate in the cycle of transformation. The
Aristotelian obje-tions against this were twofold:
(i) This is not consistent with either logic or sensory evidence,
primarily, because one principle, such as the ability to
transform from one Element into others, should apply to all
the entities involved (4rg. 1).
(ii)According to the theory, Earth would be the only incorruptible -
unchangeable - Element out of the four (Arg. 2).
Proclus, after apparently ignoring the above problem of logical
consistency, draws attention, instead, to the distinct lack
of sensory evidence in support of Earth's transformation. The
earthy substances which appear to change to other Elements are
not pure Earth but mixtures with Air or Water (geina... aeros
hudatos anapepl;stai). 	 Furthermore, processes such as boiling
and metal-working demonstrate that the pure Earth does remain
impassive (menei apathe) in the form of ashes (tephra), whereas
the admixed Water dissipates in Fire (hud;r phlogoumenon).
The immobility of Earth as a cosmic body also demonstrates its
unchangeable nature.2
Yet in reply to the 2nd Argument, Proclus emphasizes that although
Earth is unchangeable (ou metabl;te) it is nevertheless divisible
(diairete). He argues, that since the other 3 Elements are
"established in Earth's bosom" (kolpois ;drasmena), then Earth
is a "patient" (paschei) of the division (diairesis) which is
initiated by the other 3 Elements (which, incidentally, he names
Water, Aix; and sublunary fire). The choice of terms also shows
that Earth was viewed as a kind of substrate-matter for the
other Elements and Fire in particular. So, according to Proclus,
Earth in itself does relate to the other Elements by "suffering"
their dividing action, although it can not change into them.3
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2. The Arguments on the formation of interstitial void between
the corpuscles of the Elements centred around the geometrical
theorem, that only the tetrahedra and the cubes out of all the
five regular polyhedra can completely fill the space about a point.
Argument 6 stated precisely this fact, whereas Argument 8 elaborated
the criticism by introducing the impossibility of generating
continuous bodies, such as flesh and bone, by ill-fitting polyhedra
or triangles. Flesh and bone were particularly mentioned,
because in Timaeus' physiological exposition they were said to be
composed by all 4 Elements, not just by Earth-cubes or Fire-
tetrahedra.4
Proclus l reply reiterates the Timaean explanation,5 that the
overall binding of the heavenly sphere limits the movement of the
elementary particles. Thus the smaller corpuscles are able to
fill in the interstices between the larger ones and so no void is
left.	 In the case of composite bodies, he adds, the larger
constituents are more inert to motion (stasim;ter;n) and thus
keep the body continuous. But his explanation could only reduce
the magnitude of the inconsistency, which it sought to resolve;
it could never really nullify it. This is especially poignant
for Proclus, because in his Commentary on Euclid A he provides
the prodf of the geometrical result, which is employed in this
Argument. 6
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3.	 Predictably, the main battleground between the Aristotelian
and the Timaean Element theories was the derivation of the many
and diverse qualities from the geometry of the Platonic polyhedra.
This is demonstrated by the number - seven - of the objections,
whose philosophical merit or seriousness was perhaps not meant to
have been equally distributed.	 Simplicius bluntly states that
two of them especially (Arg. 11 & 12) are "mocking jests"
(sk;ptikon, k;m;dian).	 The main focus of this group of objections
was the explanation of the qualities hot and cold.
Proclus t main form of reply is that a quality such as heat is a
function of many geometrical properties, including the sharpness
of angle. With this basic argument he ripostes in a uniform
manner a number of these criticisms.
Specifically, in reply to the objection (no. 10) that all Elements
should burn with a degree depending on the angle of their polyhedra,
he recalls that Fire alone combines not only sharpness of angle
(oxut;s 6nias) but also small or thin sides (pleuras leptotes)
and rapid movement (tachos kinese;s). The difference between
burning (kaion) and purely illuminating (ph;tizon) fire depends
on the size of the tetrahedron. 7 Again in reply to Objection 15,
which queried how cold can be attributed to the large size of the
polyhedra of Water& Air when there can also be large corpuscles of
Fire, he restates that the properties of the Elements - such as
cold - are functions of many variables, including "size". 	 Therefore
a large corpuscle of Fire is not cold but still has fiery properties.13
A similar form of argument may also have been employed in reply
to the "mocking" objection (no. 11) that even mathematical bodies
should burn with their sharp angles. Although in the passage
Proclus simply points out that mathematical solids cannot burn
precisely because they are mathematical and not physical,
Simplicius supplements that mathematicals are neither enmattered
nor moving nor do they have physical sides.9
This line of argument can also be discerned in Proclus t reply to
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the criticism (Arg. 14) that if shape can account for cold then
there is no such thing as an "opposite shape" to account for heat.
Proclus exposes this superficial objection by observing that heat
or cold are not shape but the quality, faculty of a certain shape
(oude schema estin...alla dunamis tinos schematos).
	 Thus
different shapes can yield contrary qualities.10
Another form of reply is the introduction of the distinction
between "essential" and "accidental" elemental qualities. He
employs this differentiation to answer:	 Firstly, the other
"mocking" objection (no. 12), which argued that the transformation
of other substances into Fire, when burned, is equivalent to
saying that a knife transforms the things it cuts into more knives.
Secondly,
	
the more empirical objection (no. 13), which pointed
out that Fire coagulates substances as well as divides them.
Specifically, Proclus' answer is, that "cutting" (temnomenon) and
"dividing" (diakrinei) are "essential" properties (kat' ousian)
of Fire, whereas in the example of the knife, cutting is an
"accidental" property (kata sumbebekos) of the metal edge which
does the cutting. Again, any coagulation (sunkrisis) which is
due to Fire, as is evidenced in metal-working, is "accidental"
and independent of Fire's essentially dividing nature. In this
reply Proclus also introduces empirical examples from metallurgy
and drug-making - the drugs for "fiery" ailments in particular. 11
The 9th Objection drew attention to the relation of shape with
movement. If the cube is the shape of stability and of the
capacity to remain in one's own proper place, then all the
Elements should be cube-shaped, when they are in their own proper
places, like Earth.
Proclus replies by presenting the Timaean notion that movement
is primarily due to dissimilarity (anomoiot;ta). Earth remains
stable in its own place because apart from being at the cosmic
centre, its shape is "similar" in all - six - directions.	 The
other Elements, although they do not have this stability and
eveness, are able to exist in their proper places by moving around
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each other (peni allela trepomena) in a manner which imitates
the celestial circular movement (kuklik -en mimeitai phoran) .12
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4. Perhaps the most common misunderstanding of the Platonic
theory was the assumption that the polyhedra are the ultimate
elements. In fact the true elements in the theory are the two
fundamental plane triangles.	 The Aristotelian arguments about
the shape of the polyhedra rested on the position that the "simple
bodies" of the Elements should have a definite feature remaining
invariant through successive divisions. In this sense the
arguments rested on the above fundamental misunderstanding.
This is demonstrated by Arg. 5 which presented as a problem the
geometrical fact that the "cutting" of the polyhedra does not
yield figures analogous to the original. Proclus reproaches
(memphetai) this misreading of the Platonic theory and reminds
that the tetrahedron is the "seed-element" of Fire and not Fire
itself (puramida sperma puros...all , ouchi pur). Furthermore,
inasmuch as the original theory did allow for the drifting of
debris plane triangles until they are reconstituted into new
polyhedra, the existence of irregular forms of the Elements,
which are contrary-to-nature (para phusin), is not problematic
(to the theory itself). This is because these temporary irregular
forms will eventually take the shape of the appropriate regular
polyhedra 13
Arg. 7 argued the opposite. 	 The expected unchanging shape of
the polyhedral, as assumed, atoms is not really invariant, since
they ought to take the shape of their container. Proclus
counter-argues in an Atomist manner, that the characteristic
polyhedral shapes apply to the miniscule elemental corpuscles not
to the Elements as a whole. Thus, many but small and individually
invisible corpuscles can produce any kind of overall shape. In
addition, since the containers themselves are also composed of
elementary bodies then there is no mismatch-between the substance
of the contained and the walls of the container.
His solution for the problematic mismatch between the absolute
spherical shape of the heavens and the ultimately rectilinear
shape of the adjacent tetrahedra of the sublunary fire is that
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the plane triangles of the faces of the tetrahedra become convex
by the binding of the heavens (kurtoutai sphingomena). In this
way they are made to fit (ma epharmose) into the curvature of
the celestial sphere. 	 The "binding" of the heavens can be traced
to Timaeus 58 AB and the explanation on the filling of intersticial
void (see Arg. 6). But the "bending" of the tetrahedra has its
own difficulties.
15Simplicius' appendix to Proclus statement shows a certain
apprehension, that this bending would constitute a violent or
forced action even if it was supposed to be natural (hupo technes
-
e phuseos biasthenta sphairika gegonen).	 Proclus had earlier16
related the curving of the tetrahedral faces to the sphericity
of the wholes of the Elements. He had said, that this sphericity,
which is by imitation to the heavens (ta hola esphairOtai
sunexomoioumena t; ouran;), is due to something "better" (ti
kreisson) than the characteristic properties of the Elements in
themselves. This "better" nature has been imparted by more
divine causes (ek ton theioter;n). This also explains why bodies
which come closer (ta t; ouran; pfesiazonta) to the heavens move
in a circular fashion (te.n kukl; kin;sin; also see Motion of the
Elements chapter 5). This short sentence is in fact saturated
with Proclus' Neoplatonism. 	 The reference to the "wholes", in
this case, seems to be part of his much wider ontological
philosophy which links the scheme of participation and predication
with wholes and parts.17 This is confirmed by the reference to
the "better" quality due to "more divine" causes. 	 Proclus'
explanation can thus be summarized as follows: The wholes of
the Elements are spherical because they are the images of and
seek to imitate the "better" perfect spherical figure of the
"self-subsistent" entities of the "encosmic" world, namely the
celestials (see Part I, sect. B, Ch. 1.3 independent henads
identified as divinities). The particles of the wholes of the
Elements which are closest — literally and metaphorically — to
the heavens seek to and indeed do curve in a convex manner, in
order to fit into (or "unite" with) the concave curvature of the
heavens. This is not a forced bending but a natural manifestation
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of their own predisposition to become like their better nature.
It is interesting that Proclus did not pay attention to the more
physical alternative of extending his other argument, namely that
both the container and the contained are composed of the Elements.
This could have applied even in the case of a celestial container,
since the heavens, as he says, (see also II.B.4) are composed
of Fire. Furthermore it would have had the added bonus of
accounting for the Aristotelian zone of combustible material
(see Ch. 4.2) by the friction between celestial and sublunary
rectilinear tetrahedra. 	 It is also interesting that he did not
chose to make more of the Platonic reference in Phaedo 110 B6,
that the spherical shape (of the earth) is like that of an
inflated (and elastic) dodecahedral leather ball.
The plane triangles were both the fundamental constituents of
the Platonic theory and its most problematical entities. If
they were supposed to be plane, ie 2-dimensional, triangles, how
could 3-dimensional solid corpuscles he generated from them
_
(Arg. 4)?
	
Secondly, how could they exist suspended (paraioresis)
in a free state, albeit temporarily, during the transformation
of the Elements (Arg. 3) ?	The core of the problem was, as
Simplicius noted, whether the plane surfaces (epipeda) of the
polyhedra are mathematical (math;matika) or physical (phusika)
and enmattered (enula). As mathematical the planes would only
have length and breadth, but as physical they could also have
depth. 18
Proclus evidently chose the physical interpretation. His answer
to the 4th Arg. is "that the physical planes are not without depth
(ouk estin abath;); for if body extends (diistZsi) the whiteness 19
which falls upon it, it will all the more separate the planes
which encompass it (ta periechonta auto epipeda)" (2). Physical
planes — and the fundamental "physical" triangles — could thus
be said to produce 3-dimensional physical bodies: their assigned
depth attributed to them a kind of corporeality. As mathematical
entities they could not do so, because mathematicals were conceived
- 159 -
as incorporeals.	 ...(from previous passage) but if the plane
has depth (bathos), then the generation of body will no longer be
from an incorporeal (ex' as;matou), but it will be the generation
of a more composite (sunthet;teron) from a more simple body" (3).
Furthermore the physical planes provided the basis for accepting
the existence of free triangles in a physical world.
	 The plane
triangles would be capable of free existence, since by being
physical and by virtue of their depth they would be appropriate
entities for the physical and corporeal world. This physical
interpretation of the plane triangles is behind Proclus' candid
admission, in answer to Arg. 3, that there can exist half-formed
particles (amorphiita, mere emigene) during the transformations
20
of the Elements.
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NOTES ON II.A.2
1 Proclus' work was called "Inquiry into the Objections of
Aristotle to Plato's Timaeus" and was intended as a supplement
to his Comm. on the Timaeus, see In Tim.II 279,3; the frg.
relevant to this chapter is, Simplicius In de Caelo p.640-671;
the other refer to the nature of place, of light, the fiery
material of the heavenly bodies, the doctrine of Ideas, and the
non-temporal meaning of "generation".
In addition to the modern works on Plato's physics mentioned
in the previous chapter, the following are e3pecially useful
for this chapter: G.S.Claghorn "Aristotle's criticism of
Plato's Timaeus" (1954); F.Solmsen "Aristotle's system of the
physical world" (1960); S.Sambursky "The physical world of Late
Antiquity" (1962), particularly II 2.- 4. on Plato's theory of
matter and the treatment by Proclus. 	 Proclue fifteen Args.
can also be found mentioned in Taylor p.403-9.
2 Reply to Obj.1, Simplicius In de Caelo p.643,13-27. Simplicius
comments on p.644, that the dissolution of triangles may be
continued to the level of formless matter (amorph5tou hules)
thus allowing the mutual transformation of Earth as well;
however, it is not certain whether this is supposed to be
Proclus' opinion (cf. Sambursky, op.cit. p.52), also
cf. Part I.B.8.5.
	
3 Reply to Obj.2, Simplicius p.645,15-28. 	 Earth "suffering the
	
dividing action': cf. Plato Tim.56D,1-6.	 Simplicius comments,
again, that the Earth is transformable indirectly, via the
"common matter" (koinZn hulEn). The further argument-by
Alexander of Aphrodisias, that EartM.s_dissolution would result
in void - because Earth cannot be transformed directly into
other Elements - is not valid, for, as Simplicius observes, it
is linked to the fourth obj. and the physical interpr. of the
triangles.
4 Tim.738.
5 Reply to Obj.6, Simplicius p.656,6-14.
	 The Tim. passage, 58AB.
Firstly, there is the problem of how the term, "sphingei"
can be translated with ref. to the circular motion of the
heavens.
	 As Taylor, p.396-8, and Cornford, p.243-5, concur, it
cannot possibly mean that the heavens "compress" (see Bury's
trans., Loeb ed.), for a circular motion can hardly be conceived
as producing a centripetal 'squeezing' action. The better expl.
is, that the heavens "bind" by providing a "bound", a limit, to
the expansive motions of the Elements of the world.
Secondly, there is the question of interstitial voids, "diakena".
As Taylor rightly observes, p.384-8, 399, Plato does not deny
the existence of transient interstitial "gaps" between the
solids, also see Tim.60E, whose size is minute, see Taylor p.427.
After all, they seem to have a physical role in allowing the
interstitial motion of the particles, and perhaps in
(note 5 contin.)
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(note 5 cont.) in facilitating changes in volume, see Cornford p.245-6,
also cf. E.Grant, "Much Ado about nothing" (1981), p.69-76 on
"vacuum imbibitum". This view of transient micro-voids was not
uncommon and their existence was allowed as long steps were taken
to rectify them, cf. D.Sedley, "Two conceptions of vacuum",
Phronesis 27 (1982) p.175-193.	 However, the full answer to the
Platonic "diakena" lies in the concept of the Receptacle, the
"room" which has continuous existence through all change; in that
sense, there is no "void" anyway, see Taylor p.405, Claghorn
p.15; also see Proclus' conception of Space, filled with light.
6 Proof regarding the type of polyhedra capable of filling all
space about a point, Proclus In Euclid A ch.15, p.305 (Friedlein);
also Simplicius In de Caelo p.651-55.	 That the validity of
the arg. regarding ill-fitting polyhedra appears to have been
accepted, is betrayed by Simplicius' conclusion to Arg.6, p.657.
7 Proclus' reply to Obj.10, Simplicius p.664,1-13.
The point is not that Proclus' line of argument is just too
flexible and accoiadating, but that it is systematic; nor that
Plato's theory is, again, too flexible, but that Aristotle does
not take into consideration Plato's theory in full, and so his
presentation of Plato is unfair and this family of arguments
shallow; also see note 9.
8 Reply to Obj.15, Simplicius p.670-71. 	 Aristotle ignores the
angle-factor and the mobility of Fire. As Proclus says,
big tetrahedra only means big particles of Fire, not cold.
9 Reply to Obj.11, Simplicius p.665,10-24. 	 Here the point is
made specifically, viz. that Aristotle sets about to construct
his objections by subtracting the appropriate factor from the
shape-properties of the four Elements.
10 Reply to Obj.14, Simpl. p.668,20-669,3.
11 ditto
	
Obj.12 & 13, Simpl. p.666,9-30 and 667,22-668,5.
12 ditto
	
Obj.9, Simpl. p.663,3-15.	 The objection rests
entirely, as Taylor p.406, observes, on Aristotle's own notion
of an absolute "up" and "down". Plato's motion of the Elements
depends on the idea that they strive for their proper place
in relation to each other, as motion in a vortex; Fire drifts
upwards by contact action from the others, etc., Tim.57D-58C.
So, F, A, W, tumble, as it were, around each other.
13 Reply to Obj.5, Simpl. p.650,5-15. 	 Proclus adds that such
irregular states are not too foreign among the irregularities
of the sublunary realm. They are eventually put into proper
shape (thlibousin), p.650,10, by their surrounding polyhedra,
cf. Tim.56E-57, and Arg.3; also cf. G.Vlastos art. on the
irregular atomic figures, II.A.1 note 1.
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	14 Reply to Obj.7, Simplicius p.658,32-659,1. 	 The curving of the
Fire-tetrahedra is facilitated by their natural "plasticity"
(euplaston), perhaps a ref. to the "moulding" by the Creator,
	
as a "higher" cause, cf. Plato Rep.IX 588. 	 This implies that
all the Elements are liable to "curving" in the celestial mode.
15 Simpl. p.659,7-10; not clear whether it is part of Proclus'.
16 Simpl. p.658,30-32.
17 Wholes and parts ontology, cf. E1.Th.66-74.
18 Mathematical vs physical triangles, Simplicius p.646,21-4 and
also p.563 f.	 Part of a wider debate on the nature of
mathematical and physical entities with ref. to incorporeal
and corporeal existence, and the value of mathematics.
Criticism aimed at schools of thought which centred on the
geometrization of the physical world, such as the Pythagoreans
(and the Platonists). The arg. was how three-dimensional
solids can be said to be constructed from non-three-dimen.
figures, such as planes, lines and points; see, eg. Arist.
de Caelo
	
299a2-17, Sextus Empiricus III, Adv.Geometras, 72-82.
One of Aristotle's arg. against the Platonic plane-triangles
was that they need not be joined edge-to-edge to form solids,
but that they can be stacked on top of each other; de Caelo
299b 23-32, and see Simplicius In de Casio 573 ff.
However, as Taylor points out, p.408-9, there existed the notion
of a point as minimal volume (and planes with minimal thickness);
indeed, see also Claghorn p.32-35, within the Platonic
Receptacle there could exist physical triangles, although it
would be wrong to think the solids as built-up by laminae of
matter, rather as delimited by planes.
19 Distend the whiteness: similarity with Tim.67E and the theory of
colour vision is not appropriate, since the dilation of the visual
ray, which is said to produce "white", is not comparable to the
extension of planes by body. Perhaps it relates to Rep.IV 429
where the "hupodochm"-receptacle is likened to the "basic"
white background, which%ought in the process of dying cloth,
before the dye itself is applied; as Taylor, p.328 cf. 331,
comments, the coloured patch (meaning a physical thing) =
extension (hupodoche) + configuration + colour (shape and form).
20 Simplicius p.648,6-10; Proclus also says that in every change
there is something formless (aneideon) "to a certain degree"
(mechri tinos sunchiireteon); cf. Plato Tim.56E-57 and 59A.3-4,
Also the ref. to free triangles "in suspension" (parai5resis)
Arist. de Caelo 306a 22, and Simplicius In de C. p.647,9 ff.
See Taylor, p.383, 388-9 and 415 on the disintegration into
triangles as an intermediary state, and Sambursky, op.cit.
p.53.
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3. THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROCLAN ELEMENTS
From the fragments on the 15 Arguments the following can be
surmised:
(i) Proclus' Elements are broadly the Platonic ones, viz, they
consist of the 4 regular polyhedra and their associated
properties such as sharpness or bluntness of angle, moved
with ease or difficulty etc.
(ii)The plane triangles are physical and possess depth.	 In
this he may differ from the Platonic intention, that the
planes and their triangles are mathematical representations.
But the physical interpretation accords with Proclus' general
philosophical principle that all entities exist at every
level of existence in an appropriate mode. 	 Accordingly,
the Elements may indeed exist as mathematical entities at
the level of the incorporeal mathematicals, but in a
discussion pertaining to physical bodies (such as in the
Timaeus), the Elements and the elementary triangles
must be taken in their physical mode. 	 Such a "physical"
mode would have to be 3-dimensionally extended, according
to the Pythagorean standpoint (actually it is Neo-Pythagorean)
which Proclus assumes to apply throughout the Timaeus.
(iii)He allows a certain flexibility to the shape of the polyhedra,
but only due to metaphysical causes.
Another concept in Proclus' Elements theory which does not feature in
the 15 Arguments, but it does in the"Commentary on the Timaeudlis
that of "dunamis". 1 The word which originally denoted power and
influence but also came to mean the capacity of a thing to interact
with others, quality, and the Aristotelian term for potentiality.
In Plato, the sensory qualities or dunameis associated with Fire,
Air, Water and Earth seem to have pre-existed (but not necessarily
in a temporal sense) in the Receptacle until they were "put into
shape by means of forms and numbers (eidesi arithmois). And God
(viz. the Demiurge) constructed them to be as fair and good as
possible be dunaton) " (4). In other words, the qualities
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(poiot;tes) such as hot, cold etc, the means by which things
"affect" (pathos) each other in an interaction, namely an event,
happening or phenomenon, became subject to and were delineated
by the geometry of the polyhedra.
During the intervening eight centuries between Plato's Timaeus
and Proclus' Commentary, and his own re-interpretation, many
philosophical developments took place which on the whole increased
the role oedunamis"and of qualities.
The one major development directly relevant to the Elements was
of course Aristotle's qualitative theory.	 This also influenced
the systematization of the four Hippocratic humours largely
because the concept of powers (dunameis) or qualities was already
important in ancient medicine. Medical preoccupation with the
transmission of affliction reinforced the concept of "sympathy",
which together with the Stoic "connective power" (sunektike
dunamis) of the all-pervading pneuma, and the original Platonic
view of the World as living body animated by a World-Soul, led
to Poseidonius' world-sympathy, ie: world-affection, which is
transmitted by the "vital power" (via vitalis,zOtikE dunamis)
of the world. Other relevant philosophical developments of
dunapis include, the Aristotelian identification of dunamis with
potentiality and capacity to act or pass into actuality (energeia),
Philo's identification of "powers" with the Platonic ideas, and
Plotinus' conception of one dunamis per form (eidoa) per
intelligible (nogton).2
These strands were synthesized by Neoplatonists, like Iamblichlaw,
so by Proclus' time "dunamis" was conceived both as something
peculiarly individual to an entity and as its means for sympathetic
interaction with the rest of the Universe, in a manner not unlike
the modern conception of a field around a body. 3
Against such a strong background in favour of dunamis, which in
Proclus' own system, especially, is part of the triad, essence
(ousia) — power (dunamis) — activity (energeia) (and which is
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further associated with the triad real-existence —
 life— intellect),
it is hardly surprising to see him giving it a distinct identity,
in his Element theory: "for every physical body needs to have
(del echein) a physical power with which it is able to act
(dun;setai poiein) according to its nature (kata phusin)",(5).
This also accords with a statement made by Syrianus - Proclus' teacher
and predecessor, whom he acknowledged as his spiritual father —
in his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics: "The five figures
which are discussed in the Timaeus and which are employed in the
formation of the cosmic Elements, on the one hand, they are
interpreted in mathematical terms (mathematikois onomasin), but,
on the other, they hint (ainittetai) at active and creative powers
of Nature (drastikas kai demiourgikas dunameis t;s phuse;s)" (6).
This feature, that certain characteristics or concepts can have
both a mathematical, "ideal", interpretation and a physical,
"enmattered" (enulon) one, seems to have been one of the notions whch
Neoplatonism inherited from Neopythagorianism, in much the same
way Pythagorean number-symbolism had found its way in Plato's
mathematics. As Proclus maintains, "the physical entities are
images of the mathematical" (7), for although "the Elements are
everywhere bound by proportion:..In the mathematicals the
proportion possesses the exact and scientific quality (to akribes
echei kai to epistemonikon); for the proportions are immaterial.
Whereas in the physical entities it is no longer the same case" (8).
Nevertheless, he is quite definite that when the discussion calls
for physical entities then the physical explanation should
predominate over the mathematical. For example, in commenting
on the Timaeus 31 C5 - 32 A "the means of any 3 'arithmOn' or
fonk-on t or 'dunamell' ", which refers to the binding of the two
extremes Fire and Earth via two intermediaries viz. Air & Water,
he gives two different interpretations for the triad, number -
"onkos" (volume) — "dunamis" 	 (i) The mathematical interpretation,
where the triad, number-volume-power is said to refer to
Arithmetic-Geometry-Music (dunamis also the term for musical pitch):
hence the Timaean phrase is interpreted as arithmetical mean,
geometrical mean and harmonic mean:4
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(ii) The physical interpretation, where the above triad is said
to refer to the three constituents of a physical body: the
enmattered form; the corporeal bulk-volume, extension (ektaseis,
diastaseis); the enmattered powers or qualities (poiotetes).5
These enmattered and physical powers, the manifested qualities
of a body, are said to have been "emitted" (proiZtai) from the
"essential" form (ousi;des eidos) of the body like a breath
(hoion pno;n) when the body acquired its bulk-volume (onOthen).6
This phraseology is pregnant with Proclus' Neoplatonic philosophy
according to which entities that exist in a "causal" or "formal"
mode in higher hypostases "expand"and acquire physical spatiality
or 3-dimensional solid figure in their corporeal and material
mode of existence.
By analogy to the 3 dimensions of a solid figure, Proclus suggests
that the 4 perfect solids of the Elements should also have 3
powers or primary qualities each. He had a dual "raison d'etre"
for this, quite appropriately, one mathematical and one physical.7
The mathematical 8 originated in the Timaeus itself where thanks
to the Pythagorean influence the 3 sides of a solid were associated
with the 3 factors of a cubic number. Thus, it was said, between
two cubic numbers, a3 and b3 , there should always be two
intermediary cubic numbers which include factors from the two
previous, viz, the intermediaries a 2b and ab 2 . This results in a
continuous chain of proportion: a3 to a2b, as a2b to ab
2
, as
ab2 to b 3 .
This chain of proportion between 2 cubic numbers via another 2
intermediary cubic numbers, corroborated mathematically the
existence of 4 Elements in the 3-dimensional corpus of the universe.
So, if Fire and Earth were to be the two extremes of the universe,
as in the Timaeus, the one imparting visibility to the World-Body
and the other tangibility, like a3 And b3, then there will only be
two intermediaries which can harmoniously bind them together, viz,
the intermediaries Air and Water, like a2	 2b & ab.
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The physical9raison d'etrewas based on the principle of similarity
between adjoining entities.	 This (see Part I.A.3) governs his
whole hierarchy and is responsible for continuity and sympathy
in the universe. On this basis Proclus rejects those who
assigned 1 power per Element, such as heat to Fire, cold to Air,
moisture to Water and dryness to Earth. Firstly, because each of
the pairs Fire-Air and Water-Earth, is composed of contraries
which are next to each other (eg hot-cold). 	 Secondly, and perhaps
even worse, the qualities of the two pairs (ie hot or cold vs
moist or dry) are orthogonal to each other. In other words,
there is no relation at all between the two pairs, not even in
terms of contrariety.
He also rejects those — mentioning in the passage"Ocelluswthe
If2ndc.BC Pythagorean, although he would have known that this was
also Aristotle's theory10— , who assigned two powers or qualities
per Element, viz hot & dry to Fire, hot & moist to Air, moist &
cold to Water and cold & dry to Earth. Firstly, adjacent
Elements which have only two qualities "are both hostile and
harmonious in equal measure (is; metr;) and will in equal manner
(ison tropon) both dissolve and reconstitute the universal
communion.., will no more 'be' than 'not be' (ouden mallon estai
e ouk estai)" (9). 	 So, for example, Fire and Air have one quality
in common (hot), but they also differ by one quality (dry vs
moist).	 Secondly, in such a scheme the cosmological extremities
of Fire and Earth are made adjacent — sharing the dry quality —
instead of opposite.
Proclus' theory of 3 powers per Element accomodated the physical
and cosmological requirements. Firstly, in his scheme Fire and
Earth differ in all their three qualities and are therefore opposite.
Secondly, as each Element has 2 qualities, adjacent Elements are
made to differ by 1 quality at a time. Thus adjacent Elements
have 2 qualities in common but only 1 different and contrary. So,
paraphrasing the above sentence on "to be" or "not to be", thanks
to the Proclan Elements the "existence" of the Universe predominates
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over its "non-existence" by 2:1.11
The specific qualities or powers which Proclus chose to assign
to the 4 Elements are as follows:
"to Fire, tenuity or smallness of the particles (leptomereian),
sharpness or acuteness (ref. to the angle. oxuteta),
ease of motion or mobility (eukinesian),
to Air,	 tenuity or smallness of the particles, bluntness or
obtuseness (amblut;ta),
ease of motion or mobility,
to Water, grossness or bigness of the particles (pachumereian),
bluntness or obtuseness,
ease of motion or mobility,
to Earth, grossness or bigness of the particles,
bluntness or obtuseness,
difficulty of motion (duskin;sian), or immobility
(akinesian)" (10).
These elementary properties represent a formalization of the
geometrically determined qualities of the Platonic polyhedra, 12
whose combinations explained the more empirically derived qualities
such as hot, cold etc. They also represent the result of a
rather careful selection between_alternative versions; I am
referring in particular to the powers of the intermediaries, Air
and Water.
In the following passage, Proclus shows how Air's powers can be
constructed from Fire's, and how Water's from Earth's, using
the illustration of a solid whose 3 dimensions orw'sidesw can be
likened to the 3 powers: 13
"Therefore, because Fire has 3 physical sides (pleuras phusikas),
viz, the 3-ple powers tenuity, sharpness and mobility, we can make
(poiesomen) Air, which has 2 sides of Fire and 1 of Earth, or
rather 2 powers (dunameis) of Fire and 1 of Earth, by subtracting
(aphelontes) the power in the middle viz, sharpness, and by
inserting in its place (anteisagagontes) bluntness.	 So, it is
exactly appropriate, that the Element which is proximate to Fire
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should have more in common (koinCinein) with it, rather than with
the Element (le Earth) which is third distant (apostasin) from it.
Again, because Earth has 3 physical sides which are contrary
(enantias) to the powers of Fire, viz grossness, bluntness and
difficulty of motion, we can make Water, which has 2 sides or
powers (duo pleuras e dunameis) in common with Earth but receives
(labon) 1 from Fire, by subtracting the difficulty-of-motion and
by inserting (eisagagontes) the ease-of-motion" (11).
But observe how particular he is in choosing one specific power
out of the possible three for the replacement. 	 This is because
according to the principle of similarity alone it would be quite
sufficient to have Air=i Fire + 4 Earth, and Water= 4 Fire + i Earth,
indiscriminately of the character of the power. By choosing,
for example, to replace Fire's sharpness-of-angle with bluntness
in making Air, he imposes a "physical" constraint governed by the
geometry of the Fire & Air polyhedra. This excludes the other
possible Airs, viz the one with tenuity, sharpness and difficulty-
of-motion, or the one with grossness, sharpness and ease-of-motion,
both of which would still be Fire + 4 Earth?-4 And similarly
for Water.
Such a problem could not have arisen-in the Aristotelian scheme
because there each Element has one and only one pair of qualities
available.	 So, if we compare the number of all possible combinations
of the elementary qualities in the two schemes we will find that:
(i) In the Aristotelian the total number is 4 pairs, the same
number as the corners of a square. This result is of course
most convenient for a A Element theory.	 (ii) In the Proclan
the total number is 8 triads, one for Fire, one for Earth, but
three for Air and three for Water, the same number as the corners
of a cube.	 Such is the cost for rising to the third dimension.
The possibility of pseudo-Airs and pseudo-Waters, whose existence
• is allowed to slip into silence, in effect shows that Proclus'
elementary qualities are subordinate to the geometrical properties
of the elementary polyhedra; 15something he would not have seen as
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unwelcome, anyway.
But how well do other more "sensible" or more qualitative properties
tally with these geometrical ones ? There are numerous citations
of such qualities ascribed to the 4 Elements. Here is a selected
list.
Fire	 Air	 Water	 Earth
cutting,
impulsive,
penetrating
differentiating
/distinguishing
(diakritikon)
tenuity &	 glutinous
transparency	 (kollnikon)
unifying
connective &	 even &
transparent	 smooth
solidity &
stability,
solid & steadfast,
solid &
tangible
scatters,	 glutinous &
connecting
weakensactive
(drastErion),
able to divide
light, visibility,
illuminating
self-moving
power
less easy to be
affected than
Air
(duspathesteron)
connecting & unifying,
transparent intermediaries
The list does not include the qualities which are said to depend
on the cosmological mode of the Elements, eg. heat.
cf
sharp,
tenuous/small,
easily moved
cf
blunt,
tenuous/small,
easily moved or
displaced
cf
blunt,
gross/big,
easily moved or
displaced
cf
blunt,
gross/big,
difficult to
move or displace
Some of them exhibit a more obvious dependence on the Proclan
triple powers.	 For example, Fire's cutting (tmetikon),
penetrating (diadunon) qualities are directly attributable to
the shape of its tetrahedron, and impulsive (itetikon) may be
referred to the mobility (eukin'esian). Vag separating (diakritikon)
property — which also carries the metaphysical interpretation of
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"differentiation" — is sometimes found together with references
to the dividing (diairein) ability of Fire and are therefore also
variations of the cutting and penetrating qualities. Similarly,
Air's tenuity (leptot;ta) is a direct reference to Air's smallness-
of-parts (leptomereia).	 Again, Earth's stability (edraioteta),
steadfastness (to monimon) and solidity or firmness (stereotes)
are among the family of qualities that are derived from Earth's
immobility or difficulty of motion (a/dus-kin;sia) in combination
with the other two powers, viz bigness of the particles and
bluntness of the polyhedral angles. 16
But other qualities such as efficacious or active (drasterion)
and illuminating (ph3tizontos) for Fire, connective (sunektikon)
and transparent (diaphanes) for Air and Water, and tangible
(hapton) for Earth, do not show immediately a direct dependence
on the triadic powers. 17 Either the conceptual connection is more
indirect or they seem to include properties external to the triadic
qualities.
The attributes such as efficacious for Fire, scattered and
weakening (diaskorpizomenon asthenein) for Air, and impassive
18or affected with difficulty (duspathesteron) for Water, may be
referred to the relative state of mobility in conjunction with
the difference between sharpness (for Fire alone) and bluntness
(for all the other Elements): In that case "efficacious", which
means activity, may be derived from Fire's sharpness and mobility,
whereas "scattering" or impassivity, which seem to be different
degrees of resistance to an action, may be based on the differences
in corpuscular size: Air, small and more scatterable; Water,
large and less affected. The same line of argument can also be
extended to include Earth's tangibility, which Proclus defines as
a form of resistance. "For that which is solid is tangible
(hapton garesti to stereon) and able to offer resistance to the
-
touch (antereiden...pros ten haphen); for that which is easily
dispersed (euthrupton) and cannot endure under the touch is in
no way tangible. On this account Pythagoras calls the Earth
-
'enduring' (tlemona), since it is solid and resisting (antibainousan)
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to the touch and since it is moved-with-difficulty and is
participating in the staying power (monimou duname;s)" (12).
Yet there still is an internal imbalance between having Fire as
a kind of "agent" but all the rest as "patients", with Earth
offering the greatest degree of resistance. 	 For example,
whereas the "eukin;sia" of Fire endeavours to convey the notion
of active mobility — indeed Proclus does say that the fiery
element is full of life and self-moving power (autokinetou
dunameo- s)la , the "eukin;sia" of Air and Water seems to convey
the more passive notion of readiness to be displaced.
	 As
mentioned earlier, this is probably accountable by Fire's
sharpness-of-angle (oxut;ta). But a better candidate is perhaps
Fire's illuminating power, since in Neoplatonic systems light
exemplifies above all the dynam i cs of the universe and is almost
synonymous with inherent capacity for activity. 	 "...among
the Elements in the domain of generation, Fire has the relation
of 'form' to the other Elements (eidous epechei logon to pur)"
(13); "but the fiery element predominates ( epikratei) over all
in order that the form which is there controls the substratum and
maintains and preserves it from every side, and is itself full of
life (pleres zo;s) and self-moving power; hence it is also full
of divine and creative principles (logoi) and emanates (proeleluthe)
into multiplicity and spatial extension (eis plethoskai diastasin)
delimiting (horizon) the spatially extended and encompassing
the bulk-volume (onkon) of the body in every way" (14).
This is Fire as one of the terms of the contrariety Fire vs Earth,2°
visibility vs tangibility, or action vs resistance.
	
"For to
what else can he attribute visibility except to that which is
generative of light ? And what else can this be, except Fire ?
For Earth is the efficient cause (poietik;) of everything contrary
(enantiou) to light; for Earth is the cause of darkness (skotous
aitia)...; whereas Air and Water are transparent (diaphane) and
are not visible by themselves; hence each of these is an
intermediary between Fire and Earth, viz, the one which is
primarily visible and the one which intercepts visibility
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(epiprosthountos tois horatois), ...It remains therefore that
Fire alone, when it is present (pare) in the other Elements,
illuminates and makes them visible" (15). 	 "Therefore the earthy
element is also there as a certain solid substance and tangible
bulk (sterea tis ousia kai haptos onkos) on account of which it
resists our sight, whereas the fiery element is that which
illuminates and creates the form of the bulk and spatial extension
(hOsphotistikon kai eidopoion tou onkou kai tes distaseos). And
their intermediaries — viz Air & Water — are there as the connecting
and unifying (sunektika, henopoia) elements of the extremes" (16).
To illustrate it more clearly; Fire is like a torch sending its
beam of light through transparent but increasingly thicker media
(Air & Water) until the beam hits, say, the bottom of a pond (Earth),
which is thus fully illuminated:
The problem with illumination and visibility is that they do not
truly depend on the three powers of Fire; the elementary powers
are the ones which are intended to explain and express the essential
nature of light.	 It would seem therefore, that the whole class
of properties which rely on light being a species of Fire relates
to the "substance" (ousia) itself rather than to the "power" of
Fire. Perhaps this is an example of substantial power.21
The duality of Fire-Earth also explains the properties "connecting",
"unifying" and "transparent" for the two intermediaries Air and
Water, which "bind" the two extremes together. Nevertheless,
Proclus also recognizes the contrariety Fire vs Water, which is
usually found in schemes with two powers per Element. He observes
that this contrariety applies to the Elements which are subject-
to-change (metabletois, viz Fire, Air & Water),"we should no longer
say that they are Fire and Earth, but, instead, Fire and Water.
For Water can above all extinguish Fire" (17). The opposites
Fire and Water also appear as the two complementary elements in
metallurgy.	 "For melting (t;xe;s) and welding (kollese;s) are
necessary for the production of things whose parts are like each
other (homoimer;n), the latter being provided by moisture (hugrotes)
and the former by heat (thermot;s); for everything (to pan) is
- 174 -
melted down (t;ketai) by Fire and is glued together (kollatai)
by Water" (18).	 The last sentence of the quotation has been
recognized as an alchemical expression. The "melting" of Fire and
the "gluing" of Water would correspond, then, to the famous "solve
et coagula".
The "gluing" attribute also explains Water's glutinuous (kolletikon)
property, which for Proclus would carry the added, more cosmological,
bonus of helping to bind Fire and Earth together. The power
which almost certainly can account for the glutinous as well as
the even (homales) and the smooth (leion) qualities of Water, is
the largeness of its particles (pachumereia).	 The rationale
appears in the Timaeus itself, where the fusible (chuton) kind
of Water, to which the metals are classed, is said to be composed
of large (megal;n) and even (homal;n) particles, and is, as a
consequence, more stable.22
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NOTES ON II.A.3
1 The chief specialist study is, J.Souilhe "itude sur le terme
dunamis dans le dialogues de Platon" (1919), which covers
all the earlier Greek ideas on the subject.
Also see, G.E.R.Lloyd "Polarity and Analogy" (1966) on the
socio-political imagery behind the term, p.210-30.
For the Platonic dunamis, conceived both as something active
and passive, but characteristic to an entity, also see
F.M.Cornford "Plato's theory of Knowledge" (1935) p.234-247, 49;
and "Plato's Cosmology" op.cit. p.53, 197-205, on the "powers"
of the Elements; cf. H.L.Burstyn "The empirical basis of the
Four Elements" Acts XII International Congress of the History
of Science vol.3A (1971) p.19-24.
2 Besides Souilhe, on the medical usage of dunamis see,
W.H.S.Jones "Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece" (1946)
and T.J.Tracy "Physiological theory and the doctrine of the
'mean' in Plato and Aristotle" (1969) esp. part II and III,
where Proclus is mentioned with ref. , to the physiological
content in Plato's theory of the World Body and its Elements.
Plato was well aware of the medical term "dunamis" see
Phaedrus 270.
On the Stoic "connective" cause or power, see R.B.Todd "Monism
and Immanence: the foundations of Stoic physics" in "The Stoics"
ed. J.M.Rist (1978) esp. p.148-160; M.Lapidge "Stoic Cosmology"
in same, p.161-185.	 On Poseidonius, and "vis vitalis",
M.Pohlenz "Die Stoa" (1959) I p.214-8, II 58, 107; F.Solmsen
"Cleanthes or Posidonius? The basis of Stoic physics" Kleine
Schriften (1968) p.436-460; and cf. J.M.Rist "Stoic Philosophy"
(1969) esp. p.201-18.
On Philo, J.Dillon "The Middle Platonists" p.155-166; there are
similarities with the Chaldean "powers" (see H.Lewy, op.cit.).
On Plotinus, cf. R.T.Wallis "Neoplatonism" p.49-51, 61-62.
Also see I.A.1.
3 Cf. S.Sambursky "Physics of the Stoics" (1959) 1.33-40;
M.Jammer "Concepts of Force" (1957) p.26-46 , P.148 f.
M.Hesse "Forces and Fields" (1961) p.39-44, 67-73, 74-79, 91-97,
and 195; W.Berkson "Fields of Force" (1974) p.1-4, 252-4 with a
very useful table, and the refs. on field theory and contiguous
action.	 Also, R.Harr‘ "Powers1p Brit.Journal for the History
and Philosophy of Science 21 (1970) p.81-101; and E.H.Madden,
M.Sachs "Parmenidean particulars and vanishing elements", Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Science 3 (1972) p.151-166.
My contention is that in late Neoplatonism, "power" is both an
individualised as well as a general, universally diffused "field"
of action and interaction.
4 In Tim.II 20,19-23,8 ff.	 Also see, A.Franzoi "Analogia, onkos,
dunamis in Plato's Tim.31C4-32A1",Aion I (1974) p.51-63.
- 176 -
5 In Tim.II 25,1-8; in general, II 23,9-27,3.
Also see Cornford "Plato's Cosmology" op.cit. p.183-4, remarking
that Proclus distinguishes "enmattered form" and "qualities"
(poiotetes).
6 In Tim.II 25,1-8.
7 In Tim.II 39,16 ff.
8 The Timaeus ref. is 31C on the "bond" of the cosmos - cf. R.J.
Mortley "The bond of cosmos: a significant metaphor" Hermes 97
(1969) p.372 -3, and see I.A.1.
The mathematical chain of arithmetical "powers", as a math.
justification to the series Fire-Air-Water- Earth, occupies a
considerable space in In.Tim. (vol.II Diehl).
However, the mathematics of the scheme is not quite so simple,
see A.E.Taylor op.cit. p.94-99 for a full discussion.
9 In Tim.II 37,17-40 and ff.
10 On Ocellus Lucanus the Pythagorean, see the "De Universi natura"
ed. R.Harder (1926), who on p.37-8 comm. on Proclus l citation.
Furthermore, J.Dillon "The Middle Platonists" p.156 ftnote 1,
notes that according to Philo's evidence, some thought the
De Universi natura to be the source for Aristotle's theory.
11 Also cf. In Tim.II 39,26-7; II 41,3-9.
12 Tenuity - grossness corresponds to the size-factor,
sharp - blunt to the angle-factor, and facility for motion
is dependent on the type of face/ triangle.
13 le., since the polyhedra are three-dimensional bodies,
appropriately with three primary "powers", then, a "side"
dimension or factor can be likened to a "power"; in effect,
Proclus carries the mathematization of qualities and elementary
properties to the limit by linking them directly to the concept
of space.
14 Constraint governed by the geometry of the Fire and Earth poly-
hedra: the Air polyhedron, for example, cannot have acute
angles, because only the tetrahedron (Fire) has them; again,
it cannot be difficult to move, because according to the
Platonic definition, only the cube (Earth) has the kind of
faces and constituent triangles which produce great inertia
against movement.	 In other words, the Proclan "powers"
cannot be combined indiscriminately (as in Aristotle's pure
qualities) to form the four Elements, for they are essentially
geometrical.
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15 Here, I am being, of course, rather unfair to Proclus, since
with the definition of the Platonic solids, such pseudo-Airs
and Waters are impossible, in any case; the point is, in
effect, that Proclud "powers" are not directly comparable with
"hot", "cold" etc., as he tries to make them out to be.
16 Qualities of Fire, refs. In Tim.II 40,4 , In Rep.II 4,9;
of Air, In Tim.II 43,25; of Earth, In Tim.II 43,23, 50,7.
17 Next group of qualities: of Fire, In Tim.I 106,33 , II 50,10 ,
II 44,21; of Air and Water, In Tim.II 44,14, II 9,12, III 113,32;
of Earth, In Tim.II 44,19, II 47,18.
18 Q. of Air, In Tim.I 107,1; of Water, I 107,4.
19 Fire's "self-moving power", In Tim.III 114,4;
another term is "oxukinesia", lit, moving sharpish - rapidly,
was used to describe the motion of active entities incl. that of
the celestial bodies, but also the psychological l of the human
soul, for example.
20 Comparisons and parallels with the Stoic notions of active and
passive principles are indeed many. See refs. in note 2 above
and also, M.Lapidge "Archai and Stoicheia: a problem of Stoic
cosmology",Phronesis 18 (1973) p.240-278; R.W.Sharples
"On Fire in Heraclitus and in Zeno of Citium",Classical Quarterly
34i (1984) p.231-33.
21 In Proclus' terminology would be "internal power" (endos dunamis);
also see II.A.4.3.
22 Eg. In Tim.II 43,24, 50,11, 18,11-12; and see Plato Tim.58E.
"Smoothness" of water, also as the description of the Aegean Sea,
Herodotus Hist.III 117.
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4. THE COSMOLOGICAL MODES
4.1 GENERAL
The cosmological modes of the Elements are an example of the
general Proclan principle, that everything is in everything, but
appropriately in each.
The 4 Elements seem to make their first appearance at the level
of the intelligibles, which in Proclus' system refers to the
predicate of being, real-existence, or substance (see Part I.B2).
More specifically, they appear in the third intelligible triad
which represents the intellect or activity of Being. Proclus
places here the Model-Paradigm of the universe by which the
Demiurge (the activity of the Intellect) created the world.
Other cosmological appelations, which according to Proclus also
refer to the Paradigm, are: the Living-Being itself (autozam)
or the intelligible Living-Being or Animal (no .ataaaon), the
total universe (to pan), Plurality itself (autoplethos), and
Form-of-forms (eidos eidc3n).
This intelligible "all-perfect tetras" constitutes the quaternity
of the 4 classes of beings (gen; tn ontcin)1 which "pre-exist"
there (prohuparchein) in a "causal" mode before (but not in a
temporal sense) they "proceed" towards their physical mode of
existence.	 The tetras is said to be further subdivided into a
monad and a triad. The monad corresponds to the "idea" of the
celestial beings, which is fiery. The triad corresponds to the
"ideas" of the beings with airy, watery and earthy characteristics.
This subdivision (which is taken from Timaeus 39E - 40A) seems
to have at least two added virtues for Proclus system.
(i) It places the seeds of the differentiation between celestial
and sublunary entities as "high" or as essentially as the
intelligibles.
	
(ii) It confirms Fire's unique status among the
Elements. This perhaps also explains the statement made elsewhere,
that the relation of Fire to the other Elements is as the relation
of form to substrate!
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Yet inasmuch as the intelligibles are the first members of the
universe which participate directly in the unified nature of the
One, the emphasis is not on the differentiation into four distinct
Elements but on their unity in the form of a quaternity. Even
this quaternity is said to exist in a hidden mode (kruphi;s).3
The next level after the intelligibles, where the 4 Elements
are to be found still existing in a causal mode, is of the
intelligibles and intellectuals (see I.B.3). This level is
associated with the predicate of life. 4 According to Proclus,
here is Number (arithmos) as a principle. 	 Consequently here
should be the quaternity per se but presumably no longer hidden.
The Demiurge, the creative cause of the world, is at the level
of the intellectuals, in Proclus' hierarchy (see I.B.4).
Specifically, the Demiurge is the third member of the so-called
Father divinities and is the intellect or activity of the Intellect.
He is therefore most appropriately linked with the Paradigm, since
they both are the activities of their respective predicate. At
the level of the intellectuals is also the principle of differentiation
(diakriseCis pege; diairetike monas).
The 4 Elements are said to exist here as "distinct ideas"
(di;rismenas ideas) but still in the mode of "formal aggregates"
(eid;tikai periochai), ' ie: not completely separated ou-t.5 They
are also called,appropriately,intellectual (noera) and creative
or demiurgic, after their present mode of existence.6 More
precisely, they are intellectual and unparticipated (amethekta)
in the Demiurge himself, but intellectual and participated
(methekta) by the encosmic entities, in the intellectual series
which "process" from the Demiurge. This is because, in Proclus'
Neoplatonic jargon, the Demiurge belongs to the "unparticipated"
cause of intellect and is the monad of the multitude of the
"participated" intellects or "ideas" which proceed from it.
The next state in the procession is Soul (see I.B.5): The
Elements exist here appropriately in a psychical mode (psuchi0s).
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They are also said to become self-moved (autokineta). Whereas
the Elements in their intellectual mode are entirely unchanging,
ie. unmoving, in their psychical mode they acquire the principle
of motion, which in Platonism is soul. 	 This is the aspect of
animation by ensoulment (empsuch;sis) (in Proclus' thought life
or vital force per se would be the more "ancient and universal
cause", since it resides properly in the intelligibles and
intellectuals, "above" the creative cause of the world).7
The encosmic and corporeal state of existence of the 4 Elements is
subdivided into three:
The celestial, where the Elements exist in a celestial mode
(ourani5s).
The sublunary, viz the traditional four spheres of the Elements,
where they are said to be subject-to-change (metableta)
but are moving or changing in a relatively orderly
fashion (tetagmenCis).
The subterranean (hupogen), which constitutes their "very last"
(eschata) mode and where are the "sediments" (hupostathmai)
of the Elements.
As Proclus remarks: "their first mixing or combination (mixe;)
makes the heaven which has everything in a fiery mode (puri;s)
and where are the summits of all the Elements. From their second
mixing the sublunary realm is made, where everything exists in
an intermediary mode (mess). From their last-ultimate (eschates)
combination the subterranean entities are made, where are the
sediments of all (hupostathmai pantli); (as the Orphic tradition
says here are the four subterranean rivers) Pyriphlegethon (ie Fire),
Acheron (Air), Ocean (Water) and Cocytus (Earth)" (19).	 “By
descending (aphelon) from that which is immaterial and unchangeable
(aulon ekeino k.ametabl;ton; viz, the celestial mode) you will
produce (poieseis) the Elements which are subject-to-change
(metabl;ta) and enmattered (enula); and this mode in itself will
be inferior (Slattatai) to the previous, but it will be similar
(h;moiOtai) to them through the order and symmetry (taxin kai t;71
summetrian) of the movements and the unchangeability of the changes
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(tais metabolais ametablesian). But if you descend even from
this order and survey (ides) the much discordant (plemmeles)
and unstable (astaton) mode of the Elements, you will see the
Elements which have become the last-ultimate (eschata) of all
and are alloted the final differentiation or separation (teleutanian
lachonta diakrisin), ...being the sediments (hupostathmai) of all
of the ones prior to them" (20).
Three factors seem to determine the character of each of the
encosmic modes: 1. the degree of materiality; 2. the mode of
combination; 3. the degree of orderly movement.
1. Materiality or immateriality in the context of the encosmic
entities appears to be relative. For example, the celestial bodies
are called "immaterial by comparison to the changeable matter (has
prostl5nmetab1eten hul .gn)"T whereas the sublunary are truly
11 enmattered (enula)"? The hypercosmic entities, viz, the ones
above-the-world such as the soul in itself, are considered
immaterial in an absolute sense. But even this is by reference to
the physical mass-matter rather than to Matter as the universal
receptacle or substrate.
"For we would place (thesomen) in heaven all the Elements but in
an immaterial mode as much is possible in the material entities
(all' auliis h;s en hulaiois), and then only according to their
"summits" (akrotetas aut3n); for if the form (eidos) of Fire,
Air, Water and Earth exists even in the intelligibles, then it is
necessary that the heavens (ouranon) participate firstly (metaschein
-
proton) in this tetrad. But the proceeding creation gives
subsistence even to the last-ultimate nature of the Elements which
is indeed material (ontos hulaian)" 121). 	 "The Fire which is
enmattered is different from the Fire which is immaterial (allo
pur enulon, allo...aulon), which is immaterial with regards to
the matter of the sublunaries (s pros ten hulen ton hupo selenen),
and the corruptible is different from the incorruptible (phtharton
...allo aphtharton)" (22):
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Although the main difference between the immaterial and enmattered
modes of the Elements seems to rely on the size of the corpuscles;-0
Proclus also adds the more Neoplatonically inspired attributes.
"Pure fire (eilikrines pur) therefore is in the heavens and there
is the whole fire (holon pur), but Earth is there in a causal
mode (kat' aitan) and that is a different (allo eidos) form of
Earth and fittingly connate with the divine fire (eikos sumphuesthai)
for it only posseses the solid characteristic (stereon). 	 As
the Fire over-there is only illuminating (ph;teinon) and that Fire
is not burning (ou kaustikon), neither the Earth over-there is
gross (oude pachu)" (23).
Thus heat is only the characteristic property of the enmattered
forms of Fire, not of Fire per se.11 "And it must be said that
Plato does not characterize Fire by heat (ou thermoteti), nor by
moving upwards (oude epi t; an kineitai) - for these are the
characteristic properties (idia) of the fire down-here, which
is not in its own proper place- , but by visibility; for
through this it embraces all Fire (pan pur), viz the divine and
the mortal (theion...thn;ton), the burning and the vital
(kaustikon...rh;stikon)." (24).
Similarly, weight is only the characteristic property of the
enmattered mode of Earth: "The nature of Earth (ges phusis)
is not the same everywhere and in all parts of the World, but
in some places (hapou) it is more pure, immaterial and without
weight (kathar;tera, aulotera k,abares) - for weight (baros) is
not the characteristic property (idion) of Earth, but tangibility
(to hapton) is - , and in other places it is more enmattered,
heavy and moved with difficulty (enulotera, bareia duskunitos).
And in some places it exhibits (epideiknumen;) only its solidity
but elsewhere it receives in addition (proslambanousa) other
powers which are incident-to-generation (genesiourgous) and
enmattered according to the same manner as Fire " (25).
To further underline the statement that everything can participate
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in the Elements, and in Earth in particular, Proclus even brings
as evidence the appearance of incubi to the lustful Etruscans
of Italy. He affirms, that these entities prove themselves to
be earthy (elenchethesan ontes) by their reported seminal deposits
and ashes:12
This conception of materiality then seems to be identical with
and reducible to terrestriality: "And as the substantially-
existent (ont;s) pure Fire is over-there (ekei), in this way the
substantially-existent Earth (he ont;s ge) and the wholeness
(holot;s) of Earth is down-here (entautha), and the Fire down-here
is according to participation (kata methexin) and in a material
mode (hulik;s), just as Earth is over-there in a primary mode
(pra;s)" (26).
Yet the main operative terms are not only grossness — one of the
3 Proclan powers for Earth — but also disorderly, confused,
irregular, etc, viz, the qualities associated with the cosmological
realm of genesis, the domain of generation and perishing.13 But
inasmuch as that neither Earth's grossness nor the obtuseness of
its angles nor the difficulty of motion can by themselves fully
account for disorderly motion, then terrestriality in itself is
not the only element of materiality. Rather, it is Earth's
terrestriality as defined by the 3 Proclan powers and Earth's
cosmological role as the last level of the hierarchy, which is
both the "base" (hupobathra) and the sediment (hupostathme) 14
of the orderly cosmos. 	 "Fire is analogous to form (eidei) and
the masculine quality (arreni) and things such as these, whereas
Earth is co-ordinate with matter (hul; sustoichon) and the female
quality (thelei)" (27).
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2. The mode of combination is the manner with which the 4 Elements
are said to mix together. 	 Since the 4 Elements, as pure Elements,
are the constituents of the World, then the substance of anyone
of the encosmic entities is a mixture of them. 	 Thus, for example,
both the celestial bodies and the sublunaries are said to be
composed of the same 4 constituents namely Fire, Air, Water and
Earth.
To account for the many differences of the entities in the world,
while the constituents of their combinations are the same, Proclus
introduces the concept of "predominance" (epikrateia), the
predominance of one appropriate constituent over the others. 15 So,
the celestial bodies are a mixture of the 4 Elements with Fire
predominating, whereas the terrestrial are an analogous mixture
but with Earth predominating.
Fundamentally, the mode of combination is a particular application
of the general ontological rule that everything is in everything
but appropriately in each. The mixing or combination itself
(mixis, summixis, krasis) is equivalent to the first part of the
rule, viz everything is in everything, whereas the predominance
(epikrateia) is equivalent to the second part, viz, appropriately
in each.	 "The 4 elements and each of them are called 'Elements'
(ie pure constituents); for both heaven and generation are made
from them (ek tout;n)"(28)."Likewise the substantially-existent
(to ont;s pur) Fire is over-there (ekei) in the highest place
and on this account the stars are fiery (ta astra einai puria),
since they are alloted the place of Fire, and the summit (akrotaton)
of Earth is also there. Inversely, the whole Earth (hole g;)
is down-here (entautha), participating as much as possible to
Earth in the last mode of Fire (puros eschatou) which is most
earthy and gross (ganCitatou k. pachutatou), and accordingly the
Fire over-there possesses the summit of Earth (eiche ten akrot;ta
tes g;s)" (29).
	
"And the 4 Elements exist in the heavens and
under the Moon.::therefore in the heavens there is a predominance
of Fire, but under the Moon of Earth" (30). 	 "For as the Earth
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embraces (periechei) everything in a terrestrial fashion(cthoni;s),
thus the heavens embrace everything in a fiery fashion; so that
the one Element is the predominating (to epikratoun) and the
others are included (perieileptai) in it in a causal mode (kat'
aitian)" (31):
Furthermore even the Elements, as cosmological entities, are said
to contain admixtures from the others. 16 "For if you want to
examine each of the Elements, you will see much commingling in
them; thus Air is not simply small in its parts (leptomeres)
for it also has something gross (pachu), moist-like and watery
(homichlales kai hudat;des); neither Water is simply easily-
moved; for the last (eschaton) form of it is earthy and difficult-
to-move (geinon esti k. dusk5niton); and the-commingled (summiges)
part of fire resembles the obtuseness of air (eoike te tou aeros
amblut;ti), and this is so of necessity; for the summits
(akrot;tas) of the second must join together (sunaptein) with
the sediments of the first" (32): "The Demiurge made everything
in everything (panta en all;lois) together with the conservation
of distinction (dias;zein ten diakrisin)" (33).
The dependence of the macroscopic differences of the phenomena
on the predominance of one appropriate Element in the microscopic
mixture of the same 4 Elements offered the following advantages,
within the context of Proclus' system:
(i) It preserved the homogeneity of the world, which assured the
continuity and similarity between the different parts.
(ii) It explained the difference between the celestials and the
sublunaries without the need to postulate a separate Element,
as Aristotle did.
(iii) It retained as supplementaries the characteristic qualities
of each of the 4 Elements, such as Fire's penetration and
Earth's solidity. This provided a greater range of properties
for the description of a thing than those from one Element
only.
- 186 -
3. Movement in Proclus' philosophy is fundamentally related to
the status of an entity in the hierarchy. Apart from the
dynamics of procession and return, movement as the measure of
change could also act as a kind of gauge of the entity's serial
position within the order of the universe.
For example, the intelligibles are considered unmoved whereas
the sensibles are considered in some way moved. The intermediary
entities such as souls in themselves are given the principle of
motion, after Plato, and therefore are called "self-moved"
(autokin;tos).	 The celestials,among the first members of the
encosmic order to participate in souls, are also considered self-
moved, but by participation as "living" beings, because they
exhibit the observed order of the cosmos. The sublunaries, however,
are called moved-by-another (heterokinetos) because they suffer
from a predominance of materiality which makes them dependent on
the continuous presence of a principle-of-motion for movement.
Such a movement could never be orderly by itself.
Similarly, the Elements in their "intellectual" mode are called
unmoved (akin;ta), ie entirely unchanging, whereas in the
psychical mode they are called self-moved (autokineta) ie.
containing the principle of change.
In the encosmic and sensible workd the Elements acquire the
appropriate mode of order or disorder. In their celestial mode
they are still self-moved but by participation "And exactly as
-
the thing which proceeds from life to the living (zon) alters
-(exellaltai), so does the thing which proceeds from the immaterial
(apo aulou)-in essence towards the immaterial entities (ta aula)";
"The mode of the Elements...are self-moved and living (z;nta)
but are not 'lives' per se (ouchl z;ai onta)" (34).
In their sublunary mode however, the Elements themselves become
subject to change as they are "moved-by-another". "By descending
from that which is immaterial and unchangeable (ie the celestial
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mode) you will produce the Elements which are subject-to-change
(metäbl;ta) and enmattered; and this mode in itself will be
inferior to the previous, but it will be similar to them through
the order and symmetry of the movements and the unchangeability of
the changes (tais metabolais ametabl;sian) ...the mode of the
Elements... is moved-by-another (heterokineta) but moving in an
orderly fashion (kinoumena tetagmen;s)" (35). The sublunary is
the ordinary enviroment of terrestrial life, where the phenomena
retain a measure of overall order despite thd continuous changes.
Proclus parallels this apparently self-contradictory state of
affairs with the soul.	 "Furthermore the soul is one-single
(mian) and possesses (echei) within itself both the divine aspect
(to theion) and the irrational (alogon), and the soul in the divine
aspect comprehends (periechei) the irrational powers in a
rational fashion (alogous dunameis logi0s), by which it suitably
directs (kateuthunei) and orders the irrationality. And neither
is the unity (to hen) of the soul destroyed (apo101e) by the
different substances in it, nor is the multitude (by the unification),
for these parts or powers exist differently in the better aspect
(viz the divine) and differently in the worse (viz the irrational)"
(36).
In their final, subterranean mode, the realm of Tartarus, the
Elements become completely disorderly, tumultuous and confused,
probably because they encounter the remains of the "jiggling" of
the primeval chaos. 17 But if you descend even from this order
(viz, the sublunary) and survey the much discordant (p1;mme1es)
and unstable (astaton) mode of the Elements, you will see the
last-ultimate Elements of all ... The mode of the Elements is
disorderly (atakta), tumultuous (tarach;d;) and confused
(sunkechumena)" (37). 	 Yet it seems that materiality is not
in itself solely responsible for disorder. As Proclus declares,
"the discordant (plemmeles) and disorderly (ataktos) flux and
totion of the bodies (rho; ton somatc3n; cf Plato Theatetus 152 EP
is produced sometimes (pote) by the lack of power (adunamian) of
of the creative and defining principles (1o6n), and at other
times by the excess (pleonexian) of matter" (38).
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NOTES ON
1 Real Ideas for the Four Elements see, Plato Tim.53C-55C;
55D-570; 51A-52A; 500; 51A-B.
"All-perfect tetras" Proclus Pl.Th.III 64,22.
2 In Tim.III 113,24-114,4.
3 Eg. Pl.Th.IV 88,6
4 Cf. Pl.Th.IV 88.
5 As "formal aggregates" in Intellect, In Tim.III 110,14-30.
6 Elements described as "noeric", In Tim.II 48, also II 45,28-46,4.
7 In the psychical mode, In Tim.II 46,4-11.
8 The celestial bodies described as relatively immaterial,
In Tim.II 46,18 and see II.B.3 .
9 The sublunary mode of the Elements, In Tim.II 46,20.
10 Differences in properties of the same Kind-Element accounted
by size, cf. Plato Tim.58C-E ref. to Fire; also see the ch. on
the Platonic background.
11 That the "pure" forms of fire do not burn, as opposed to the
coarser which do, Plato Tim.58C; this gave rise later in the
Middle Ages to the doctrine of "empyrean" sphere.
Also see the Proclan frg. in Philoponus' De Aetern.Mundi
where the point is made quite specifically that the same kind
of Fire exists both in the celestial and the sublunary realm,
the difference being in the grade, or mode, as in Plato.
The refs. to the "vital" fire are probably from the notion of
vital heat, in Aristotle, cf. F.Solmsen "The vital heat, the
inborn pneuma and the aetherWournal of Hellenic Studies lxxvii
(1957) p.119-23, or may Rimply.refer to the violent, forceful
nature of sublunary, "burning" fire.
12 In Tim.II 11,13-17; and see Festugiere's explanatory note on
the incubi, Comm. sur le Timee III p.34. Etruscan women must
have had quite a reputation, but what of the men, no succubi?
13 Eg. In Tim.II 47,2
14 In Tim.II 13,9; II 44,9; 46,27.
Cf. Plotinus Enn.VI 3,4 hula being described as hupodoche- and
hedra ; also cf. Cornford "Plato's Cosmology" p.199f, Plato's
description of the Receptacle as a winnowing basket.
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15 The physical role of "predominance" in determining the overall
movement of a compound body, Aristotle de Caelo 268b 26 f.
This also features in the theories of motion and weight of the
Middle Ages.
16 Cf. Plato's theory of materials based on the four Elements, eg.
Tim.59D4-E5, Fire mixed with Water; and A.E.Taylor p.418.
17 This is Plato's notion of chaos prior to form and order of the
Demiurge, Tim.52D-53A; 30A; on the state of agitation, see
Taylor p.351-5, and Cornford p.198-207; also the art. by
G.Vlastos in R.E.Allen Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, art.27
"The disorderly motion in the Timaeus" (orig.1939) enlarged to
"The creation in the Timaeus: is it a fiction? (1964).
18 "Rho", bodies in a state of flux, the characteristic term
attributed to the philosophies which emphasized the importance
of "becoming"; the famous "everything is in a state of flux"
however, seems to occur first in Simplicius In Physica p.1312-3.
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4.2 AETHER'S STATUS
Although Proclus rejected the Aristotelian use of Aether as the
Element of the celestial bodies, he still used the term "aether"
in a variety of contexts. 	 These include the adjective aetherial
(aitherion) to indicate the tenuity (leptot;ta) of the substance
of a thing, for example the "vehicle" of the soui l and the medium
in which incorporeal entities are said to manifest themselves.2
As a noun, they mainly refer to a state which is semimundane or
semi-material, in other words, to an "intermediary" state of
existence. Proclus draws his references for these from non-
Aristotelian sources such as Orphic, Pythagorean, Platonic and
the so-called Chaldean.
For example, there is the Orphic Aether which Proclus identifies
with the intelligibles: Aether also features as the Meadow
(leim;n) of the Platonic Myth.3
The general triad which Proclus constructs from Platonic sources
is the heavens-aether-earth. 4 This conveniently corresponds well
with the Chaldean-based triad,empyrean-aetherial-material (hulaia),
since, as Proclus does not fail to repeat, Plato had said that
the heavens are made mostly of Fire.
There is also a tetrad which he appropriately calls Pythagorean,
according to which,"the Elements of the world exist in a
celestial (ouranic3s), aetherial (aitheri;s), aerial (aeri;s) and
in a terrestrial or subterranean (chthoni;s) mode" (39). 	 The
tetrad, elsewhere,5 takes another form; aether and water, earth
and air; although this is not called Pythagorean. This
particular tetrad seems to consist of two pairs of opposites as
in the Empedoclean or Aristotelian schemes: earth opposite air,
and water opposite fire, but in this instance fire.aether.
Furthermore, there is even a pentad of elements of the world:
earth-water-air-aether-the heavens.6
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For Proclus all these different arrangements express the same
thing. Namely, aether is not the Element of the heavens but
the first element of the subcelestial and sublunary domain, at
the beginning of generation.7 Aether, in such elevated place, is
most similar to the substance of the celestial realm, which is
fiery par excellence, but is not exactly like it. 	 Thus, aether
seeks to imitate the unceasing rotation of the celestial sphere.
"For the fire in the domain of generation is a certain effluence
(aporrhoia) of the celestial fire and exists in the interstices
(koil;masi) of the other Elements but a sphere of Fire per se
does not exist, but the upper extremities (akra) of Air imitate
the purity of the upper fire (an; puros). And we say that
these (ie. the extremities of Air + Fire) are sublunary fire
and is the place of fire under the heavens (puros topon tou hupo
to ouran;); for that is most similar (homoiotaton) to the
celestial realm (ouraniou bathos), just as the lower limit (peras
tou aeros) of Air with Water is thick and misty. This also
Aristotle seems to have had in mind when he thought fit to call
thus the fire which is down-here, but that which is directly
under the heavens and which he says is carried around together
(sumperipheresthai) with the celestial revolution he called fiery-
like (puroeides)" (40). 	 "Therefore the really-existing fire
(ont(38 pur) is in the heavens but the purest of the sublunary
fire is in the Air which is next to the celestials, which Plato
further on (Tim 58D1) calls aether" (41).
This definition of aether makes it identical with the Aristotelian
"combustible material" (hupekkauma) at the top of the atmosphereP
This band of fiery-like substance was thought to surround the
atmosphere and be in contact with the celestial Aether.	 The
friction between Aether and the fiery-like substance, which
Aristotle described as a warm and dry exhalation from Air proper,
would periodically ignite the combustible material in various
forms. This resulted, according to Aristotle, to the atmospheric
phenomena such as the shooting stars, the comets and the Milky
Way.
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Simplicius, in his Commentary on de Caelo, quotes the term
"hupekkauma" in his discussion on whether circular motion is
natural to the Elements. 	 Like Proclus, he does not fail to
see that Aristotle had effectively admitted that the fiery-like
substance has a circular movement in a natural fashion, although
Simplicius calls it "above-nature (huperphues)". He also places
Proclus in an august circle:"therefore even Ptolemy, Plotinus,
Proclus and Aristotle himself said that the combustible material
is moved (viz, in a circular fashion)" (42).
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NOTES ON II.A.4.2
1 Eg. In Rep.II 187,18-30, on the tenuity of the vehicle.
2 In Rep.II 242.
3 The Orphic Aether, eg. In Tim.I 176,13; III 208,30.
As the "Meadow" of the Platonic Myth, Rep.614-5, eg.
In Rep.II 163,24.
4 Eg. In Rep.II 157,15; II 135,20-25
In Plato, "aether" as the purest form of air, Crat.410,
Phaedo 109-110, Tim.58D, is arranged after the fiery domain of
the gods - aether corresp. to the "daimons". The same arrang.
is maintained even in Philip of Opus' "Platonic" Epinomis,
the dialogue where aether appears as a fifth kind; see Epin.
984B-C, aether coming next after fire, fire being reserved for
the celestial gods.	 Such "aether" is non-Aristotelian, even
as "fifth" body; see the pentad, note 6.
Also cf. Chalcidius' Comm. on the Timaeus (4th . c.AL, in Latin),
c.122 p.187, c.178 p.227-8, where the order of the world is
given as the planets, the Sun, the Moon, aether, air, the moist
of water and earth; cf. Proclus In Rep.II 130.
Aether as a pure air can be found in Empedocles, interchangeably.
5 In Tim.III 171,8-10.
Aether as fire seems to stem from Anaxagoras, frg.1, aether and
air being the principal components of the "mixture"; also see
Aristotle's report that Anaxagoras used "aether" and "fire"
interchangeably, de Caelo III 302b 4.
6 In Rep.I 193,7.
7 Also see In Rep.II 256,12-14; II 189,23-190,1.
As J.Dillon observes, "The Middle Platonists" p.49, 170, 315,
Middle Platonists such as Plutarch and Apuleius assimilated
the Stoic pure fire with the Aristotelian aether into a four
Element scheme; thus "aether" was seen, effectively, as a pure
form of fire, that is by comparison to the sublunary fire.
As he rightly points out the debate shifts on to the intelligibles
and sensibles, with the celestials seen as intermediaries, cf.
II.B.1, End away from the five or four Element schemes.
However, Proclus' neo-Platonisor certainly marks the subjugation
of the Aristotelian Aether (and the pneuma) to Fire, esp. in
the form of light.
For Proclus aether is something sublunary, and on this basis
certain works which are attributed to him, but which treat aether
as a celestial Element, must be looked upon with even greater
caution: they are	 chiefly the astrological works, the
"Paraphrase" and the "Commentary" on Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos, and
the lesser known "Uranodromos". It is, nevertheless, possible
that they are not intended to represent Proclus' own views but
be mere commentaries, or notes, muck like the (note 
7 cont.)
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(note 7 cont.) "Elements of Physics", a summary of Aristotle's
theory of motion of the Elements, see II.A.5.
8 See Aristotle Meteorologica I 339b-346b.
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4.3	 LIGHT
Light and light-related philosophy is one of the central
characteristic features of Neoplatonic thought. From Plotinus
onwards, the image of the emanation and the diffusion of solar
light through all the world typified the ubiquity of unity,
goodness and order. Just as light is flowing out of the Sun
without weakening the source, so the unity, goodness order and
all the realities of the Universe emanate or proceed from the
One and Good source of All without affecting or abating it.
The Plotinian light was primarily an incorporeal power. 1 "The
impossibility of vision without an intervening substance does
not depend upon that absence in itself; the sole reason is that,
with the absence, there would be an end to the sympathy reigning
in the living whole and relating the parts to each other in an
existent unity " ( 43).	 "Light is not accidental to something
else, requiring therefore to be lodged in a base; nor is it
modification, demanding a base in which the modification occurs;
if this were so, it would vanish when the object or substance
disappeared; but it does not, it strikes onward...we may gather
that the light never was an attribute of anything, but is the
expressive action proceeding from a base (the Sun)" (44). 	 "The
light therefore which emanates from bodies is an outgoing activity
of a luminous body, the light within luminous bodies, such are
primarily luminous, is the essential being embraced under the idea
of that body...And light is incorporeal even when it is the light
of a body" (45).
The Platonic light, however, like of the pre-Socratic physicists,
was corporeal. It was the purely illuminating emanation of
Fire which is not hot and burning in itself. Such a view
enabled Plato to regard the luminosity of the celestial bodies
the same as the luminosity of terrestrial fires.2
These two views were not held as antagonistic. Plotinus, for
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example, admitted them both: "Plato himself supports this when he
says 'God kindled a light in the second circuit from the earth
(Tim 39B) meaning the Sun...This light is a body, but another light
shines from it which has the same name which we say is incorporeal.
This is yielded from that first light, shining out as its flower
and splendour; that first light is the truly bright and clear
body" (46). These two views of light appear also in Proclus but
in their appropriate realms of existence. 	 Thus the view of light
as an incorporeal power seems to be the one which delineates the
whole system of procession return, and participation, and is
especially manifested in the so-called "solar" series (see
I.B.1.3; 5.1).	 The corporeal view of light is found in the more
physical subjects of the encosmic realm.
Proclus' conception of light has, therefore, the following modes:
1. Incorporeal light as the divine, or the intelligible light,
with all the concomitant attributes.
2. Corporeal light, in a pure and unmixed form. This light
is still perceptible by the intellect only, since as unmixed it
is not resisted by another Element: 	 "for Fire itself in itself
(auto kath' heauto) by being unm i xed (amiges) with the other
Elements is in no way visible by the senses (oudam;s horaton)
but is perceived mentally only (monon epinoeitai)" (47).
3. Corporeal light, but in a mixed form. Such light can be
perceptible by the senses, since light in its mixed state may be
resisted by another Element, especially Earth.
Of these, the first one mainly refers to the truly metaphysical
light and does not seem to be associated with the Elements as
such. Indeed, light in this mode is said to emanate from the
One. The corporeal modes of light are invariably called "species
of Fire" — paraphrasing Plato Tim 580 — and are therefore &ore
directly associated with the Elements.
The pure or unmixed light most probably corresponds to the so-
called immaterial (aulon) but corporeal light, which Proclus
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employs, like his predecessor Syrianus, as the constituent of Space
and the first body-vehicle of the soul. In this most tenuous
state (leptotaton) light could satisfy the philosophical criteria
of impassivity (apathes), interpenetration (ch;rein) and extension
(diast;ma) necessary for a concept of Space, and the main
requirement of imperishability (aphtharton) for the vehicle
(ochema) of the incorporeal and immaterial soul. 	 The celestial
light seems to be an intermediary. Although celestial fire shares
in the imperishability of the pure and unmixed light itself, it
nevertheless can be found mixed with the other Elements, albeit
with their "summits", and especially with the resisting Earth (ie.
the celestial and visible bodies).	 Material (ie. gross-material)
light, however, always appears mixed with the other Elements.
It is visible and perishable, since, like a man-made fire, there
are times when it ceases to be. Furthermore, since such light
is an emanation from a material fire, it is in most cases
accompanied by heat and burning.3
As mentioned earlier, Proclus calls light a species or form of
Fire (eidos on puros).4 An additional piece of evidence in
support of this for him, is the similarity between the shape of
the cone of emitted light and the pyramid of Fire's corpuscle.
"For the eye is the most elevated (an;tatou) of the sensory organs
(aisthet;riOn) as Fire is the most elevated of the Elements and
uses acute-angled activities (oxeiais energeiais) like the other,
for the conical form of visual emission has no small similarity
with the pyramidal form of Fire (to te Onoeides homoiot;ta echei
pros to puramoeides ouk oligon)" (48).
Yet, in his system, light itself always seems to be something
more than Fire. Indeed it is on this point that Simplicius
criticizes Proclus' statement that light is the most immaterial
of all Elements and the most incorporeal kind of Fire; "However
if light is a species of Fire, as we have learned from the
Timaeus, and the species is not superior to the genus (eidos
. _
ouk eie ton genous kreitton), then light would not be superior
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to Fire, as against to what is said by Proclus...And possibly
it indicates the luminous vehicle (augoeides ochema) of the
World-Soul (pantos psuch;s), as Porphyry interpreted it, but it
could also indicate something else. But when the Oracles say
that the Soul which is the primal source (iegaian psuchen) 'On
high animates light, fire, aether, the worlds', meaning that
light is different from the empyrean, aetherial and the material
(hulaion) and that it is above all others, this could be understood
in terms of division by dichotomy (antidiaires4s)" (49).
The more complete version of this Chaldean Oracle can be found
in Proclus' Commentary on the Republic, which most probably is
the source for Simplicius' comment.	 Proclus explains that the
primary distinction is between unmoved and moved; this is the
"dichotomy" to which Simplicius is referring. Thus the Chaldean
tetrad consists of a monad which is unmoved, viz, light, and a
triad which is moved, viz, fire, aether as an intermediary, and
lastly the "worlds" which are called material: "But light is
different from all the others (ph(38 allo para tauta panta) and
is superior and prior to all the others (pro pantli) which are
said to be animated (psuchousthai) by the primal-source Soul.
This indicates, I believe, that light is a body different from
the worlds, aether and fire...But if the empyrean is the first-
most (pr;tistou tn kinoumenat) of the moved, clearly then light
is unmoved by being given an order above fire; and as the aether
contains (sunechei) the material worlds, and the empyrean contains
both the material worlds and the aether, so the light contains all
(panta)" (50). These repeated references to the supra-elemental
status of light, despite it being called a species of Fire, are
not surprising because they point to the "divine" origin of
light.
Proclus' answer to the possible accusation that light in his
scheme is in effect a fifth Element in the Aristotelian sense
would have been, that light is indeed a species of Fire but is
its most immaterial and pure (ellikrines) form, and is therefore
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the "summit" (akrotes) of Fire and consequently of the other
Eleménts. - Simplicius seems to have admitted that only such an
interpretation would be consistent with Proclus' philosophy, for
in the same passage as above he continues: "But possibly this
light is the monad of the triad of the worlde, which he himself
confesses. It is a monad not in the sense of being the place
(ouchh3stopos) of the three, but in the sense of being a single
cosmos prior (pro) to the three.	 For there must be also one
prior to the three, just as the triad is prior to the hebdomad.
And this monad he perhaps (is;s) called 'light', both because
of its being 01;s...onta) the flower of the empyrean firmanent
(anthos tou empuriou stere;matos), and of its being the common
element of the phenomenal and visible (phainomenou), sensible
(aisthetou), corporeal universe (s;matikou pantos)" (51).
Consequently the above tetradic arrangement, light-fire-aether-
the material worlds, may be re-written, in view of Proclus'
conceptions of light and aether as: light, the summit of fire-
fire-sublunary fire with air-air proper, water and earth.
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NOTES ON II.A.4.3
1 Eg. R.T.Wallis "Neoplatonism" p.61-2.
For other aspects of Neoplatonic light, also see S.Sambursky
"The physical world of late antiquity" p.111-117; and
J.0 de Groot "Philoponus on de Anima 11.5, Physics 111.3, and
the propagation of light" Phronesis 28ii (1983) p.177-196,
who examines the employment of the Proclan. dunamis and energeia
for the transmission of light.
Also cf. M.Hesse "Forces and Fields" (1961) p.77-80 on
light and the emanation philosophy of Neoplatonism;
2 Three kinds of fire or light, daylight, a pure fire not
admixed with other elements, the visual current, like the
daylight, and flame, the light of material objects;
Plato Tim.45f, also 58C, 67D; see Cornford p.152, Taylor p.277
-283, 410-11.
3 In Tim.II 8,22-25; also see the frg. on light in Philoponus°
de Aeternitat gl Mundi,Arg. the first, p.18-19, p22-23.
4 Eg. In Tim.II 47,9.
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4.4 THE VEHICLE
Another important entity, which is also characteristic of
Neoplatonism, is the subtle body (lepton s;ma) or vehicle (och;ma)
of the sou1.1
Its importance lies in its intermediary status between the
immaterial and incorporeals and the material corporeals.
Consequently the body-vehicle functions as the mediating carrier
of the soul in its interaction with the physical world.
Proclus' theory of the vehicle assumes the existence of two such
vehicles, excluding the material vehicle (huliaion och;ma) the
shell-like (ostre;dous salatos) material body itself.
The first vehicle to be directly ensouled is the famous luminous
(augoeides), aetherial (aitherion, aither;des) or astral (astroeides).
This is the perpetual and first substrate-body of the soul.
"Every participated soul makes use of a first and perpetual body
(pi-Zit; aidi; s;mati) whose hypostasis is not in generation
(ageneton) and is imperishable (aphtharton). For if every soul
is essentially perpetual and if by its very being it firstly
ensouls some body (p;otos psuchoi ti tc7n s;mat(in), it must ensoul
it perpetually (aei); for the being (to einai) of every soul is
unchangeable (ametableton) (52). Because of this direct
relationship with the soul, it was also called "innate" (sumphuton),
coining an Aristotelian term.
The grade of soul which has this kind of vehicle is appropriately
-
the immortal (athanaton) and rational (logiken).. As it descends
towards the realm of generation, subject to its momentum (rhop;)
to incarnate, it was said to acquire increasingly material
envelopes or "mantles" (chitates) which consist of the four Elements.2
These successive envelopes of the 4 Elements constitute the equally
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famous spirit body or pneumatic vehicle. It was called the
"attached" (prosphuton) vehicle by contrast to the first which is
"innate". More precisely, the pneumatic is not the vehicle of
the soul in itself, but is the vehicle of the "descended" mode
of the soul, when it has acquired the irrational faculties.
This mode is in effect the irrational soul (alogos) which is
subject to the perturbations of generation and necessity.
Appropriately, it was called the mortal (thn;ton) soul.
During the "ascent" of the soul back towards its origins, both the
mortal soul and the associated pneumatic vehicle are purged away
and perish while the elemental envelopes are discarded in their
respective regions. Hence the pneumatic was also called the
"perishable" (phtharton) vehicle, although it is by comparison
longer lasting than the even more perishable earthly body.
Proclus' theory of the vehicles bears two similarities with his
order of the Elements.
Firstly, the Proclan distinction of two intermediary vehicles,
as opposed to the previous usually one-vehicle theories, seems
to parallel the scheme of two intermediary Elements between Fire
and Earth. By this I do not mean, that there is necessarily a
straight correspondence between the tetrad of the Elements and the
tetrad, soul — luminous vehicle — pneumatic vehicle — earthy body.
I mean,instead, that there may have been an underlying philosophical
thesis which postulated the existence of two "intermediaries"
between a form-like state of existence and a substrate-like one.3
Evidence for this appears in a passage where Proclus relates
Iamblichus' views on the two intermediaries between solids:
"And appropriately there are two intermediaries for the composite
things (epi tat sunthetiin); for the dyad is the supplier of all
complexity and division. And each of the composite things is
composed of many substances and powers (ousila kat dunatneTin),
wherefore there are many intermediaries which are at least double
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(dittai toulachiston); for the intermediary according to the
form is different from the intermediary according to the substrate
(all; gar kata to eidos mesot;s kai all; kata to hupokeimenon)" (53).
Proclus had elsewherel said that Fire is analogous to form, and
Earth analogous to substrate, so in the case of the tetrad of
the Elements, Air would be the intermediary directly related to
Fire, whereas Water would be the intermediary "according to"
Earth. Similarly for the vehicle-related tetrad, if it can be
assumed that soul is also form-like by comparison to its substrate
material body, then according to the previous statement there
should be an intermediary more directly connected with the soul,
which is the luminous vehicle, and another one connected more
with the body, viz, the perishable pneumatic vehicle.
Secondly, the adjectives of the first vehicle and the composition
of the second seem to parallel the relation between light and the
4 Elements (see Ch. 4.3 on light). 	 "Lum i nous" is an obvious
reference to light.
	
"Astral" is also attributable to light,
since the celestial region is mostly of Fire and is the region of
the solar light: the first vehicle was also called solar-like
(11;lioeide).5 "Aetherial" is problematic since for Proclus
"aetherial" can either be a general reference to tenuity, or a
more specific reference to aether.	 The second, more specific,
option can be excluded since the Proclan aether is not the
celestial Element but a form of sublunary fire, ie. it is sub-
"astral". The tenuously aetherial option is therefore the more
likely, especially since it relates directly to the subtle or
tenuous (lepton) body of the vehicle. It can also be related
to light itself, since Proclus refers to the visual emission of
the eye as "aetherial": "that which is visible...is Fire...
-
because sight is light (he opsis phos estin), emanating an
aetherial substance Cap' ousias proiousa aither;dous)" (54).
Yet confusingly, in a passage from a later work, the "Platonic
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Theology", the Elemental souls are said to have both a luminous
vehicle and "aetherial envelopes". Here the "aetherial envelopes"
of the Elements should read the second, pneumatic vehicle.
"For the celestial souls rule over simple bodies which are
immaterial and unchangeable (kata t;n hupostasin auln kai
ametabolli); but the souls which have dominion over the wholes
of the Elements (t.cin holat epikratousai stoicheill) are also
(hama men) covered with aetherial envelopes (aitherious chitlies),
through which they preside on the wholes of the Elements, which
as wholes are everlasting (aidiois) and simple, but as enmattered
they receive perishability (phthoran) and generation due to their
composition (sunthesin) from dissimilar parts (ek t;11 anomoial)" (55).
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NOTES ON II.A.4.4
1 The pioneering study on the vehicle theory, in this century,
is G.R.S Mead "The doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western
Tradition" (1919). The first scholarly examination of the
Neoplatonic vehicle is, R.C.Kissling "The ochema-pneuma of the
Neo-Platonists and the de Insomnlis of Synesius of Cyrene",
American Journal of Philology 43 (1922) p.318-330, who together
with Mead appreciated the background to Proclus° two-vehicle
theory, a fact which passed totally unnoticed by A.J.Festugiere
in his transl. of Proclue Comm.on the Republic (1970) as well
as by Kroll in the Teubner text ed. of In.Rep. (1901).
More well known is E.R.Dodds'broader study of the Astral Body
in Neoplatonism, Appx.II of his "Proclus on the Elements of
Theology", which traces its development from the various notions
of "subtle" bodies, incl. Galen's, to Proclus and the Cambridge
Platonists, esp. Ralph Cudworth.
On Proclus' vehicle an important art. is, J.Trouillard
"Reflexions sur	 ochema dans les 'Eldments de Theologie' de
Proclue„ Rev. des ttudes Grecques 70 (1957) p.102-7, which
points out the links with the theory on matter and the pair
finite-infinitude.
2 Eg. El.Th.209.
3 See II.A.3 and 4.1; cf. In Crat.93,25-29, where intellect is
likened to Fire, soul to Air, phusis or irrational soul to Water,
and body to Earth.
4 In Tim.III 113,24-114,4.
It has been pointed out to me by M.Balgent, that Fire-Air,
Earth-Water has also astrological implications.
5 "Aetherial"= "solar-form", In Tim.III 194,30.
With regards to the appelation "astral", E.R.Dodds states that
it does not seem to occur earlier than Proclus, op.cit. p.313,
ftnote 4.
-206 -
5. THE MOTION THEORY OF THE ELEMENTS
Proclus' theory of motion regarding the Elements is "that every
simple body (sSma haploun) which is in its own proper place
(oikei; tops) either remains stationary, or is moved in a circle;
for if it moves in a different manner (all;s), either it is no
longer in its own place ( ouketi estai en tS1 aut; tops), or is
not yet in it ( oup; estin en aut;)" (56).
This seemingly Aristotelian theoremwas in fact part of a long-
standing criticism of Aristotle's Aether. 	 Proclus cites
Plotinus and Ptolemy as the other personalities who had participated
in this lite of criticism. 1 According to Simplicius, it had
commenced with the lstC BC Peripatetic Xenarchus and included, as
Proclus said, both Ptolemy and Plotinus. The debate centred on the
2
question of natural motion of the Elements in relation to proper place.
Thus, according to the above statement, the true state of motion
of the Elements is either circular by imitation of the cosmic
circumference, the heavens, or stationary like the cosmic centre,
the earth. The upward and downward movements of the Aristotelian
theory are not the natural movements of the Elements. Instead,
they are the movements of those corpuscles of the Elements which
are not in their natural place and are therefore desirous to move
to it. Consequently they move in a manner which in itself is
contrary to their own proper state of motion, viz, they move in
a straight line. "For when Fire is carried upwards (epi to an;
pher;tai) it is in a foreign place (en allotriS tops) and hence
is carried upwards towards its own place, and likewise a lump of
Earth (baos) is moved downwards (epi to kaTo), and in general the
tendencies of the Elements to move in a straight line (al ep'
-
eutheias phorai) are those whose condition (diakeimen	 ion) s contrary-
to-nature (para phusin). Therefore it is false to say that Fire
is naturally moved upwards (kata phusin). For it only has its
own natural motion whenever (hopotan) it occupies (eche topon)
its own proper place, but when it tends to move towards its own
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proper place, it does not yet occupy its natural place" (57).
The advantages which Proclus saw in this theory of motion were
many:
1. It explained witesingleprinciple both the celestial circular
and the sublunary rectilinear movements of the Elements, especially
that of Fire, and nullified the need for the Aristotelian Aether.
2. The theory accorded with the overall theme that entities
behave appropriately in different "places". "And we must not be
afraid of those who are especially skilled in dialectic (deinous
tn dialektiOn: viz. the Peripatetics) who by looking at some
small part of Nature believe that are able to ridicule Plato, who
say that Fire is moved upwards (an;pheres), whereas the stars are
moved in a circle; for these opinions have no place in the case
of the heavenly fire. For just as the intelligible fire (noetou
puros)...does not have the same movement as the corporeal, likewise
neither does the celestial fire have the same movement as the
subcelestial (hupouraniou); for the types of movement (ai kineseis)
exist in accordance (sunuparchousi) with the order of the substance
of the realities" (58).
3. It reduced the importance of the qualitative properties
weight (barut;s) and lightness (kouphot;s), since the movements
which are associated with them, namely the downward and the upward,
were said to be contrary to the natural state of motion of the
Elements. "For the characteristic property (idion) of all Fire
(pantos puros) is to be visible, and not to be hot nor to float
upwards (epipolastikon); and the characteristic property of all
Earth is to be tangible and solid, and not to be heavy, sink
downwards and to have a downward tendency (ou to baru kai huphizanon
pasi kai kat;phoron)" (59).
4. It accorded with a variety of metaphysical tenets which
associated the lack of motion or the circular motion with
unchangeability and perfection (ct unmoved or circulating intellect
or soul), and rectilinear motion with procession from or return to
the entity's own state of existence (of. soul's descent to and
ascent from matter).
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5. It enhanced the Platonic paradigm that such properties as
3up-down or gravity-lightness are relative, whereas circularity or
stationariness are more objective or absolute. Furthermore it
harmonized Plato with Aristotle in a fashion (one of the general
aims of the Neoplatonists) by including the Elements' rectilinear
movements (in Plato they were only driftings in a certain direction).
A problem of consistency with Proclus t theory on the motion of
the Elements is why he promulgates the above theory of motion
in the "Commentary on the Timaeus", whereas in the "Elements of
Physics" he states the Aristotelian one:
"Definition VI. Every simple body (haploun s;ma) is moved
naturally (kata phusin) with only one movement.
Definition VIII. Heavy (baru) is the body which moves towards
the centre.
Definition IX. Light (kouphon) is the body which moved away from
the centre" (60).
"A simple body is moved with a simple motion (haplen kin-esin)
either with the circular (kuk1(3)...or with one of the rectilinear
(ep' eutheias) movements, and if it is only moved away from the
centre, then it is Fire, but if it is only moved towards the
centre, then it is Earth, however if it is light by comparison
to the one and heavy by comparison to the other, then it is one
of the intermediary Elements (le Air, Water)" (61).
The answer is that the "Elements of Physics" aa a whole is a precis
of Aristotle's motion theory as it appears in the "Physics" and
"On the heavens", rather than an exposition of Proclue 9wn
thoughts on the subject.4
The "Commentary on the Timaeus" clearly is not a summary of Plato's
Timaeus (over 1200 pages of Commentary for 44 pages of the Timaeus)
but is an extensive restructuring of it in the light of Proclus'
Neoplatonism (although he himself saw it as an orthodox exegesis
of Plato's teaching). The "Commentary on the Timaeus" is
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effectively a dissertation on his own physical conceptualization
which uses Plato's Timaeus as a framework.
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NOTES ON II.A.5
1 Proclus cites Ptolemy and Plotinus, In Tim.III 114,31.
2 See Simplicius In de Caelo 11-50, on de Caelo I 2.
Secondary literature on the criticism of Aristotle's Aether,
as a fifth Element, and his theory of motion of the four
Elements, as "gravity" and "levity", includes,
S.Sambursky "The physical world of late antiquity" op.cit.
ch. on Xenarchus against the aether, p.122-132;
J.Longrigg "Elementary physics in the Lyceum and Stoa",Isis 66
(1975) esp. p.213-229, an account of the criticism of Aristotle's
cosmology from the early Peripatetics and the Stoics.
The other personalities which Simplicius, like Proclus, mentions
as early promulgators of the motion theory, that when the
Elements are in their proper place they either remain stationary
or are moved circularly, are interestingly enough Ptolemy and
Plotinus (Simpl. p.20). 	 With regards to Ptolemy, the sources
which Simpl. gives as ref. for this formulation are not extant:
"On the Elements" (peni t3n stoichei3n); the "Optics" is for the
most part extant, but the first book, the most likely place for
the theory, is not (see A.Lejeune "L' Optique de Claude Ptolemee
dans la version latine	 apres 1 1 arabe de l'emir Eugene de
Sicile" (1956)). With regards to Plotinus, the passage which
has been identified with this theorem is, Enn.II 2,1.
However, on closer examination, it does not exactly say that
every Element moves in a circular fashion in its proper place.
Rather it refers to Fire, which as a body moves rectilinearly
upwards until it reaches its ordained place, which happens to be
the outermost place of the world.	 There, since it can no
longer move any further in a rectilinear fashion, its path
curves as it glides under the heavenly arch. This, in my
opinion, is linked to the notion of the "binding" of the
heavens (see II.A.2). The true circular motion to which
Plotinus is referring in the passage, as a whole, is the
psychical one, which can affect the rectilinear one of the body.
From the evidence of Proclus and Simplicius, as well as that of
Philoponus, arg.10 in the Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum
(p.380-403), it seems that in the dominant school of thought
in Late Antiquity this theory of motion of the Elements came to
replace the Aristotelian.
3 See Plato Tim.56D-57C; 62C-63E; on the drifting "tendencies" of
the Elements, A.E.Taylor op.cit. p.390-6.
4 Cf. Ritzenfeles introduction to the Teubner ed. of the text,
and Rostin "The philosophy of Proclus" op.cit. on Proclue works,
El.Phys. is no.35 in RosEin's list.
- 211 -
6. SPACE, BODY AND MATTER
The entity which seems to bring best into focus the relationship
between Body, Matter and the Elements in Proclus' system, is
place.	 Like others, from Strato onwards and all the Neoplatonists,
Proclus rejected the Aristotelian view that place is the boundary
of a body and came to the conclusion that place is the space
between the boundaries. Proclus' innovation was that space, the
true place (to diastema kai ho alethSs topos), is an immaterial
body, whose substance is light)-
His reason for conceiving it as a body rests on the premise that
only quantities of the same kind are commensurable (which implies
that he accepted the Aristotelian Category that place or space
is a quantity, cf. Arist. Categories 5 a , space is a continuous
quantity; also 6a , equality and inequality are predicates of
quantity). "But if it were incorporeal, it would be absurd,
for place must be equal (ison) to the objects in place (tS en
tops), but how could body and incorporeality (asSmaton isa) be
equal ? For equality exists in quantities (ea posois), and in
particular in quantities of the same kind or genus (homogenesi
posois), such as lines in respect of lines, surfaces in respect
of surfaces and bodies in respect of bodies. 	 Therefore,
extension is a body, if indeed place is space-extension (diastema
ho topos)" (62). Inasmuch as a body is a solid and solidity
always implies 3-dimensionality, then place-space as a body, for
Proclus, basically means three-dimensional extension.2
But this notion of place as a body would have conflicted with the
Aristotelian exclusion principle, that different bodies cannot
occupy the same place at the same time. In other words, a body
could never be in a place, if the latter was also a body.3
Philoponus solved this problem by making place an incorporeal
void, but Proclus relegated it to the question of interaction
between bodies. Like Syrianus, he saw materiality as the root of
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the mutual susceptibility and division, when bodies come to
penetrate each other. So, by regarding place as an "immaterial"
body he assured its "impassivity" and its integrity when the
other material bodies come to occupy it. In other words, such a
body-of-space can be occupied by another body, since the
immateriality of the former renders it unsusceptible to interaction
with the materiality of the latter. "Therefore, place is an
indivisible body (adiaireton...sSma;ie. it retains its integrity).
And if it is indivisible it would be either an immaterial or a
material body (enulon). But if it were material, it would not
be indivisible; for all material bodies undergo division when
other material bodies penetrate them (chSrountOn), as when our
body is immersed in water. Only immaterial objects cannot be
divided by anything and this is by necessity; for every immaterial
body is impassive (pan gar sSma aulan. apathes), but every
divisible object is not impassive; for division is an affection
or quality (pathos) of bodies which destroys unity, since also in
a continuum qua continuum you will not discover any affection
except the division destroying continuity" (63).	 "The immaterial
body...neither exerts resistance nor experiences counter-resistance
(oute antereidei oute antereidetai); for that which experiences
resistance has the nature of being able to be acted upon (paschein
hupo tSn antereidonton dunamen 'Sn) by those who exert resistance.
but the immaterial body neither divides nor is divided, being
impassive" (64).
Proclus' usage of immateriality does not refer to matter as
substrate l "I mean (legs) by 'immaterial' and 'material' (enulon)
by reference to the most gross (pachutaten hulSn) matter, which
cannot sustain separate forms, and which stands apart (diistas)
from the matter which always remains in its own-proper form in
the same manner (t;n aei SsautSs en tS oikeiS eidei menousan);
because we learn that this matter (ie.the substrate) pervades
(diaein) through all cosmos, just as the Gods say (ie.the Chaldean
Oracles); hence Plato proceeds to call matter 'the receptacle of
the universe' (pantos hupodochen)" (65).
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Although the immateriality of Space or Place seems to be akin to
that of the heavens (see Ch. 4.1 also Sect. B.3 the celestial
body), it is substantially more immaterial. Viewed in hierarchical
terms, the Proclan Space is, on the one hand, immediately next
to the World-Soul. 	 "For this space is immediately suspended from
the World-Soul (apai;reitai aut;s) and is an organ innate (sumphues)
to it" (66).	 But, on the other, it is superior to the corporeal
and moving world, even the heavenly bodies, precisely because they
move.4 "The unchanging but corporeal (ametabaton, s;matiken)
life (viz. Space) must be intermediate between the incorporeal and
unchanging life, such as that of the primal Soul (ie the World-
Soul), and the corporeal life which does involve change of place
-(ie the moving bodies)" (67).	 "Place is an unmoved (akineton),
indivisible (adiaireton), immaterial (aulon) body. If it is
such, it evidently is more immaterial (auloteron) than all the
bodies which move, even the immaterial ones among them (tli en
tois kinoumenois aul;n: the celestial bodies)" (68).
Quite fittingly he allocated light to be the substance of Space.
"Summing up all the arguments: Place is thus an unmoved,
indivisible, immaterial body. If it is such, it evidently is
more immaterial than all the bodies which move...Consequently,
as light is the most simple (haploustaton) of all these...it is
manifest that Place will be light, the purest (eilikrinestaton)
among the bodies. Let us conceive (noes;men) two spheres, one
made of light alone and the other of many bodies, both equal in
volume (isas allelais kata ton onkon). The former is placed
homocentrically with the universe and the other is immersed
(embibasas) in it. The whole cosmos will thus be seen moving
in the unmoved light. As a whole it will be unmoved, so as to
imitate Place China mim;tai ton topon), but each of its parts
will be moving (ie in relation to each other), so that in this
respect the world will be inferior to Place (elatton eche tou
topou)" (69).
Light had several features helpful for Proclus t concept of Space.
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Firstly, the image of extended light also included the notion
of "shape" or "outline", both corporeal characteristics. 	 Plato
regarded light as a body, in any case. But in Neoplatonic terms
especially, the notion of extended or "filled out" shape was
considered as a consequence of the procession into the corporeal
and sensible world. 5 "The Gods (ie. the Chaldean Oracles) advise
us to consider the extended shape of light (morphen ph;tos).
For being without shape above (an; amorph;tos) it becomes shaped
(memorph;men;) through the procession (prohodon)" (70).
	
"For
in the light, Proclus says, the shapeless (atup;ta) things acquire
shape, according to the Oracles. And because of that it may
well be said that it is called place, 'topon', as being a certain
shape, 'typon l , of the whole cosmic body, making spatially
unextended things (adiastata) to be extended (diistasthai)" (71).
Secondly, the diffusion of light would have filled every part of
the world, presumambly even the possible void interstices between
the elementary polyhedra. Thus the "ball of light" would drown
every possible void.
Thirdly, light allowed interpenetration by other three-dimensional
bodies. In this Proclus was almost certainly inspired by
Syrianus' image of interpenetrating beams of light. "They only
say that it is absolutely impossible (adunat;taton) for two
material and mutually resistant (enula kai antitypa) bodies to
occupy the same place, but that the immaterial ones are like
lights (ph;sin eoikenai) which, being emitted from different
lamps (diaphor;n lampad;n), have interpenetrated (hech;r;kosi)
throughout the same chamber and have gone through each other
(pephoitaosi) without confusion and without division (asunchutiis
kai adiairet;s). For although one would call these lights
incorporeal, they are nevertheless, through being spatially extended
and stretched out together with (sundiastanta) bodies in the three
dimensions (treis diastaseis), not prevented from occupying the
same place as each other and as bodies, for no other reason than
that they are simple (hapla) and immaterial (aula) and are not
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split up (merizetai) when divided (diairoumena), but, t1-rough
being joined together (sunemmena) with their source and depended
on it (exertemena), they exist as long as the source irradiates
(ellampouses)" (72).
Fourthly, Place could be regarded as the luminous body-vehicle
of the World-Soul, in accordance with the general rule that every
participated soul should have its appropriate imperishable body.
"Proclus says, that Place is animated (psuchousthai) by the primal-
source Soul (pegaias psuches) and has a divine life, being self-
moved (auto kineton) according to its intrinsic substance (ousiedes)
but not according to its external activity (kat' energeian)" (73).
"Thus I (Proclus) know that even the best of the philosophers,
Porphyry, suspected as much as we now write, when he proposed
that light is the first vehicle (ochema priiton) of the World-Soul"
(74). "For this Space is immediately depended on the World-Soul
and is its innate instrument (organon sumphues)" (66).
The notion of Place or Space as the direct instrument of the
"informing" World-Soul accorded also with the notion that the
World-Soul appoints the alloted place of each encosmic entity.
This is the active rather than the passive and substrate view of
Place, according to which it is the (accessory) cause of imparting
appropriate places to the material world "below", and is unlike
the later Philoponian place as the substrate-matter of body.
"And if one wants to inquire into the active notion (kat' energeian
kinesin) of Place...one will see that Place is the motive cause
(kinetikon) of the moving bodies which unfold (exelittonten) the
parts of Place (tou topou mere) as spatial extensions (diastematikos)"
(75). Furthermore this "active" view of Place coincided with the
conception that the geometrical shapes of 3-dimensionally extended
entities, such as the Elements, are full of "powers" (see Ch.3).
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NOTES ON II.A.6
1 Also see, I.B.7 and I.B.8.5. 	 Additional ref. works:
P.Duhem "Le systeme du Monde" (1913-7) esp. vol.I p.333 ff;
M.Jammer "Concepts of Space" (1954) p.12 ff.;
G.S.Claghorn "Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Timaeus" (1954)
p.5-19; E.R.McMullin (ed.) "The concept of Matter in Greek
and Medieval Philosophy" (1963) esp. p.39-58, art. by
L.J.Eslick "The material substrate in Plato"; E.Grant
"The principle of impenetrability of bodies in the history of
- concepts of separate space from the Middle Ages to the 17th c."
Isis 69 (1978) p.551-571 (the account starts with Philoponus,
Proclus is not mentioned); also, D.C.Lindberg (ed.) "Science
in the Middle Ages" (1978) p.270, 272-280 art. by E.Grant on
Cosmology.
For Proclus' "space as the true place" In Tim.I 161,1-3.
2 Cf., In Tim.II 77, II 113,12, III 113,12-14;29-32, III 329,30-32.
Also see Plato Tim.53C, and cf. II.A.2 and the discussion on
physical planes and triangles& see A.E.Taylor "A Commentary on
Plato's Timaeus" op.cit. p.346-7 and p.362. According to M.
Jammer, op. cit., p.22-36, the Platonic "matter" developed
either as a kind of qualitiless body, as in the Stoics, or as
the mere sense of corporeality, as in the Neoplatonists.
Also see the analysis of the definitions of tri-dimensionality
and corporeality in Sextus Empiricus Adv. Grammaticos, I 19-28,
Adv. Geometras, III 19-22, 77-91.
3 Aristotle Physica IV 1, 209a 5-7; IV 8, 216a 26-216b 11; cf.
211b 14-29; also see Philoponus In Phys. 557,8-28, 562,29-
-563,26, for example.
Philoponus' concept of Space has been the subject of a number
of papers delivered in 1983 at the Institute of Classical
Studies, London, inter alia, D.Sedley, D.Furley and R.Sorabji.
Also relevant is, of course,	 the Stoic concept of total
interpenetration of bodies and blending of qualities.
See, S.Sambursky "Physics of the Stoics" (1959) p.11-16, cf.
p.95-8, but esp. R.B.Todd "Monism and Immanence: the foundations
of abic physics" art.6 in "The Stoics" (1978) ed. J.M.Rist,
p.137-160; R.B.Todd "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics"
(1976) esp. p.28-49, where it is argued that the total blending
was only applicable to the relationship between pneuma and
matter, not to any interaction between encosmic bodies:
this would not be too dissimilar from Proclus' "immersion" of the
world into the light of Space.
4 Cf. Simplicius In Phys. 615,5-12, who is critical of Proclue
def. of "immaterial body",
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5 The formulation of light, spatial extension and filled-out
shape through the "procession" is the origin of the light-
metaphysics of the Middle Ages, eg., John Eriugena (9th c.)
and Robert Grosseteste (1168-1253).
Other Proclus ref. In Tim.II 6, II 79-80, III 328,1-7.
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SECTION B. THE CELESTIAL BODIES.
Introduction.
Proclus' grasp of the mathematical complexities of Ptolemy's
"Syntaxis", in Hyp. Astr., is particularly noteworthy as it
demonstrates amply that interest in mathematical astronomy was
maintained at a high level in an age which is supposed by a number
of scholars to have been marked by a decline in science. Indeed,
in an epigram (Paton, III p.105) Proclue name is linked to that of
Theon of Alexandria, Hypatia's father and author of important comm.
on the "Syntaxis": "Theon and Proclus the all-wise...Both are worth
of equal praise...for Theon, assuming the learned propositions of
Proclus, demonstrates by these the courses of the stars; while
Proclus, assuming the demonstrations of Theon, resolves and propounds
his positions by their aid. All hail, learned pair".
However, he distinguished sharply between the mathematical and the
dynamical or physical accounts of the celestial bodies and their
motion. He considered the various epicyclic, eccentric and
"counteracting" spheres as mathematical devices not as "real",
physical spheres carrying the stars.
Thus his theory on the constitution and dynamics of the heavenly
bodies is part of his overall philosophical system of explanation
regarding the "real" entities of the universe.
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1. THE STATUS OF THE CELESTIAL BODIES
The ranking and the mode of existence of the heavenly bodies in
Proclus' system reflects the traditional Greek belief in their
"divine" orderly nature.
The attribute of divinity (theion) was used in all periods in a
wide and loose sense without necessarily meaning cult worship.
In philosophy, the earliest (pre-Socratic) usage of "divinity"
related to the nature of the "ultimate principle" (arch;) of the
world and the presence of motion; in Anaxagoras for example, nous,
the motive and purposeful principle of his cosmology, was called
divine for this very reason. The heavenly bodies were thought
to be divine not because they were regarded as gods for religious
worship, but simply because they were seen to exhibit order and
regular, eternal motion. These characteristics made them the
appropriate objects for philosophical contemplation, and supported
the notion of an orderly, eternal, intelligible world" over-there
(ekei) as opposed to the disorderly, transient, material world
ndown-here"(entautha).1
Proclus places the celestial bodies between the intelligibles and
the sensibles. Like the intelligibles they are everlasting but
like the sensibles they are perceptible. Their motion is basically
orderly, but because of their hierarchical proximity to the disorderly
material domain, the planets in particular exhibit a certain limited
irregularity. "For as we begin (eis archen kathistametha) the
comprehension (katanoese;s) of the celestials with these instruments
down-here (t;de organli : ie. the astrolabe etc), likewise the
celestials over-there (ekeinli) remind us (anemimneskometha: ref
to Plato's theory of knowledge) the invisible circulations; for
the heaven is intermediate (mesos) between the generated entities
(gen;ton) and the intelligible (noeton)" (76).
"...the irregularity (an;malian) is attributed to the stars themselves
(tois astrois autois) but this irregularity has a certain order
(to tetagmenon) — for it recurs (apokathistatai pros heauten) in
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fixed periods of time (tetagmen;n. chronli) — since the wandering
stars are intermediate (mesois) between those which are moving
regularly in every way (homal;s pant;) and those which are moving
irregularly in every way (an;mal;s); for they are alloted a
movement which is regularly irregular (homal;s anc7malon) or
irregularly regular (ancimalos homalen)" (77). 	 "The wandering
stars (planoumencin) ...have varied and complex (poikilas) movements,
but orderly (en taxei) and according to certain measures (metra)
and. bounds (horous); for their simplicity (haplotes)contains
the plurality (plethos : of movement), their order confines
(sunechei) the variety (poikilian), and their measure delimits
(horizei) the wandering (t -en plan;n)" (78).
There are certain, intended, affinities between the celestial
objects and the mathematical entities, in Proclus' scheme, for the
latter are also placed in an intermediary order between the (proper)
intelligibles and the sensibles (although the mathematicals as
incorporeal entities are hierarchically "higher" than the celestials):
-
"...the intelligibles (noeta), the physical (phusika) entities and
their intermediaries which ate usually called mathematical;
considering that everything is in everything appropriately, in the
intelligibles presubsist both the intermediary and the last (ie.
both the mathematical and the physical) as principles (archegi0s),
and in the mathematicals exist both the first as images (eikoni0s)
and the third (the physical) as paradigms, and in the physical
exist the appearances (indalmata) of the previous" (79).
	 (ie.
in the mathematicals there exist images of the intelligble and
paradigms of the physical). Besides, the description of the
celestial orbits constitutesthe mathematics of Astronomy, and the
various horoscopic calculations the mathematics of Astrology.
The celestial bodies, therefore, may be said to exhibit first and
best the mathematical and incorporeal proportions in the physical
world, yet inasmuch as they are mobile bodies the "proportions"
are only relatively precise. "In the mathematicals proportion
(analogia) possesses the exact and scientific quality (to akribes
kai to epist;monikon). Whereas in the physical entities (en tois
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phusikois) it is no longer the same case; but such proportion
as it exists in the celestials partakes of a certain exactness
(metechei tinos akribeias). 	 (note the hierarchical relationship
between mathematicals and celestials, the latter "participating"
in the former; see Part I.A.1)...The celestials are in a certain
respect closer to the exact proportions (sungenstera piis esti
tois akribesi logois)" (80).
The heavenly objects may be immaterial and everlasting or unchanging,
but only relatively so — relatively to the sublunary, changeable
matter. This relativity is sufficient to make them change in
Aristotelian terms by loco-motion, which, in the case of the planets,
extends in all the six directions of longitude, latitude, and
"depth", meaning distance from earth. Thus for Proclus the
celestial bodies are the philosophical causes 2of change within the
corporeal and physical world (see term enkosmios in Part I.B.8.1).
"The heaven is immaterial as far as it is possible in the sensibles
(aulos hos en aisthetois estin)" (81). "It is requisite that the
cause of complexity (poikilias aitian) and the principles of
contrariety (enanti;se3s archas) are anticipated (proeilephthai)
in the heavens; or how could the heaven (ouranon) comprehend the
generation and how could it guide (podeget;sei) the transformation
(metabolen) of the sublunary elements if it did not contain in itself
the principle of contrariety ?" (82). "And because generation
(genesis) is undividedly joined (sumphas sun;ptai) to the heaven...
the lower end (peras) of the heaven is not entirely without a share
in change, since it comes close (pelazon) to generation"(83).
"The local movement (topik;) is superior (kreittal) to the other
(change-movements: Proclus has already ref. to Aristotle), and of
the local movements the one in-a-circle (he kukl;) is first (pr;t7)
and the forward (epi to pros;) is second; for the latter is in
the fixed stars 'but each of them is stationary (hest;s) and not
moved (akineton) with respect to the 5 movements' (Plato Tim.
40B)" (84).
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"For every natural body (s;ma phusikon) is moved by itself and
not by accident (kath' hauto kai ou kata sumbeb;kos), inasmuch
as nature is a principle of movement and change (metaboles
this is the Aristotelian definition of movement as change).
But the stellar body (astr;on slim) is not moved according to all
the other (change) movements (kineseis) being perpetual (aidion)
through all time, thus it is only possible (manen dunaton) to
accept (epidechesthai) the local movement (-an kata topon), and
in particular the circular one (kukliken)" (85). "The movement
towards the front (eis to pros;) is added (prostetheisa) to the
stars as a visible evidence that this movement is the principle
(arche) of rectilinear motion (euthuporias), whereas the complexity
of the planets guides all the indefiniteness(aoristian) of
generation, inasmuch as it (the planetary complexity) moves it
(the indef. of generation) from a proximate position (prosech;s)
with its many counter-revolutions (anelixesi: including the
retrogradations)" (86).
	 "And precisely because the planets are the
natural (kata phusin) intermediaries between the fixed stars and
the sublunaries they are moved in longitude (mekos), latitude
(platos) and depth (bathos) both in an irregular and a regular
fashion (an;malos kal homal;s), in order China) that they may
possess (ech;si)the paradi gms of those posterior to them
(cf. earlier, the mathematicals containing the paradigm of the
physical entities)(meth l heautous, which move in all (six)
directions (pantoi3s), and in order that they may imitate
(mimCintai) with their circular movement the uniform (monoeides)
motion of those prior to them (pro hautiin;viz the fixed stars)"(87).
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NOTES ON II.B.1
1 The impersonal "theion" seems to have had an earlier history
than the personal "theos".
	 For example, there is Xenophanes'
criticism of the anthropomorphic characters of Greek mythology,
who rejected however motion for the divines.
For this and other ref. see, eg., G.E.R.Lloyd "Polarity and
Analogy" (1966) p.41-2, 47, earth-sky antithesis, gods p.187-8,
91-6, 219, heavenly bodies p.309-15, 317-19, 259-60, 267.
"Arche", and presence of motion associated with divinity, eg.
Aristotle De Anima I 405a, 411, Phys.III 203.
Anaxagoras attributed divinity to the purposeful mover "nous"
(frg.14); however, he denied divinity to the heavenly objects,
on account of which he was allegedly, Diogenes Laertius"Lives"
loeb 11,12, put on trial on the charge of impiety. He thought
the celestial bodies simply as bodies, like stones; this seems
to be linked to the first formulation of the eclipse of the Sun
by the Moon, as an opaque body, see T.Heath "Aristarchus of
Samos" (1913) ch.X.
Belief in the divinity of the stars and the planets in
particular seems to have been contemporary to Plato; see Tim.38D
Mercury called the "divine star of Hermes", and Philip of Opus'
Platonic Epinomis 984-987; also cf. Arist. Meta. 1047b.
	 It is
almost certainly due to influences from the astral religion of
the Syrio-Babylonians.
"Theologian
 seems to have been used first by Plato, eg. Rep.379A
for the various poetical or mythical descriptions of cosmogony,
cf. Arist. Meta. 1000a, 1071b.
	 Aristotle, Meta. 1026a 18 ff.,
developed it to mean the "First" philosophy dealing with
unchanging, permanent entities.
Both Plato, Laws 820a ff., 885, 967-8, and Aristotle, eg. De
philosoph. frg.10, each for his own reasons, link belief in God
with the contemplation of the heavens, also see Arist. Phys.196a,
Ethic.Nicom.1141a.	 "Ouranos" is used in many occasions
interchangeably as cosmos-order, eg. Plato Tim.28B, Phaedrus
247, Politicus 269D, Aristotle De Caelo I 278.
"Entautha", eg., Arist. Meta. 990b; "ekei", eg., Plato Phaedo
61E, 64A for the otherworld, and for the intellig. more extensiv.
Plotinus Enn.II 9,4; II 4,5; I 2,7. In Proclus, see
In Tim.III 80, 111, 112, 128-131.
Proclus regarded the celestial body as the "agalma", meaning
statue-image of the(celestial)god; cf. Plato Tim.37C6, and
Laws X 898D-899D, where Plato distinguishes carefully the
divine celestial souls from the celestial bodies themselves.
See also, G.Vlastos "Theology and Philosophy in early Greek
thought", Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1952) p.97-123.
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2 Philosophical causes of change, differentiated from the more
physical "astrological" effects of mainly the Sun and the Moon
on the seasons, weathers and climates, for example, which were
held to be largely uncontroversial, see De Generat. et
 Corrupt.
II 10, 336b, and cf. Ptolemy Tetrabiblos I ch.1 & 2. 	 Also see,
R.W.Sharples "Alexander of Aphrodisias on divine providence:
two problems" Classical Quarterly 32i (1982) p.198-211, esp.
p.200-7.
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2. THE CELESTIAL
The choice of the term "celestial", as opposed to "celestial
body", maybeunusual but as a noun it conveys a more accurate
impression of Proclus' conception of the celestial objects
(ouranioi).
In Platonism, the world was conceived to have been "modelled" on
the "paradigm" of the "living-being" (ziion). Just as a living-
being can move its body by itself (autokineton) — unlike the
inanimate stones1which can only be moved by external action
(heterokin;ton) — so the world is moved by itself, since to
assume moving principles external to it would undermine its
uniqueness and perfection and would ultimately lead to infinite
regress.
This self-moving principle was attributed to the soul of the
-living-being.2 Although the intellection (noesis) of the living-
being may initiate the movement, it is the soul which executes it.
The body is the "visible and tangible" part of the living-being;
is inert in itself and only able to be acted-upon) In these
terms, the soul of the living-being "moves" but the body "is
moved". This is very briefly the background to Proclus l composite
celestial.
Each celestial by virtue of its very existence, in Proclus'
philosophy (see Part I.B.1.3; 2 and B(intro)), is a henad —
viz a unity — and a real-existent being. Since it has its own
principle of motion, soul, it also has an intellect to initiate
and give "form" to its movement. Finally as an object which
exists in the world of sensible perception, it also has a body,
the celestial body, which is visible ( and in principle, tangible).4
Yet the above do not describe a celestial fully, or satisfactorily,
because they cannot distinguish it, say, from a human living-
being.5 A celestial, unlike a human being, is a self-constituted,
eternal entity. These qualities refer to a particular kind of
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henad, namely the self-subsistent (authupostatos) or independent
henad (see part I.B.1.3 cf. I.A.1), which according to Proclus
may bear the appellation "divine".
Thus the celestial is an independent, so-called divine, entity
with its own ability to move its body. "The henad is immediately
deity (henas autothen theos), the intellect most divine (theiotaton),
the soul divine (theia), the body deiform (theoeides)... The
primary participant of the supra-existential (huperousi;n) henads
will be the undivided mode of existence (ameristos ousia: from
the context it implies both existence and intellect: Proclus
here bunches together the hypostases), next that one which touches
generation (geneses ephaptomen;: prob. soul) and third generation
(h; genesis: ie. body); and each will participate through the one
immediately supradjacent(prosech;s huperkeimenon) to it.	 The
divine character (idiot -es) penetrates (phoita) even to the last
terms of the participant series (tois metechousin), but always
-
through intermediaries (dia meson) akin (sungenon) to itself.
Thus the henad bestows (did;si) first on an intellect that power
(dunamin) among the divine attributes which is peculiarly
(exaireton) its own... If this intellect is participable (ei...
methektos), through it (dia de nou) the henad is also present in
-
a soul (psuche paresti)... Through this soul again, if it is
participated by a body, the henad communicates even to the body a
faint echo (ap;ch;ma did;si) of its own quality; in this way the
body becomes not only animate (empsuchon) and intellective (noeron)
but also divine (theion), in the sense that it has received from
a soul life and movement (kin;sin), from an intellect indisoluble
permanence (aluton diamon;n: effectively a permanence of form)
and from the henad in which it participates a divine union (hen;sin),
-
each successive term (hekaston) communicating (metadidosi) to
the consequent one (tois ephexes ) something of its own mode of
-
existence (huparxeos) " (88). 6
For convenience, each celestial can be regarded as having
essentially two parts (although it should be noted that this is
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not an explicit Proclan demarkation) an incorporeal and a
corporeal. The Incorporeal includes the independent henad, the
intellect and the soul of the celestial. 	 Since all these are
ultimately responsible for the movement of the celestial, then
the incorporeal may be rightly called the "celestial mover".8
The corporeal part is of course the celestial body per se, the
aspect of the celestial which is perceptible by our sight,
whose visible circulations constitute the celestial "phenomena".
If the corporeal and visible part represents the physical
nature of the celestial, then the incorporeal represents the
metaphysical. Appropriately, the latter relates to the more
metaphysical entities and processes in Proclusa system (these in
themselves are not subjects of this study). For example, a
number of them may be grouped under the heading of the relationship
between humans and their "betters" (kreittosin), including the
divines: fate and providence, the exercise of intellection and
contemplation, ethics, the types of life (bios) man can lead, etc.
Such considerations are also linked to the issue of celestial
"influence" and the attendant "daimon-spirits", and together they
provide the philosophical backbone of his religion.
Yet the metaphysical is not altogether separated from the physical.
They are linked via the soul. Moreover, inasmuch as the
metaphysical part is the "inner" energizing element which determines
the "external" behaviour of the body, then it is this which
dominates the manner the celestial object appears to behave in the
heavens. As Proclus emphasizes "as the visible (phainomenos)
Socrates (ie. his body) is one thing, but the true (alethinos)
Socrates is another", so, the "true" element of a celestial
like the Sun or Jupiter is to be found in the incorporeal and
invisible part rather than in the corporeal. 9
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The constituents of the celestial "mover" in little more detail
are as follows:
(i)	 The divine henad is the celestial's own source of motivity.
The henad or unity in Proclus' Neoplatonic jargon has both a
logical and a cosmological value. In dialectical terms it is
purely the necessary ultimate limit to the number of "first"
principles or predicates an entity can have, without which there
would be infinite regress. From this follow a number of
concomitant cosmological properties: the "unity" is the ultimate
and true essence of an entity; as a unity, ie. not divided up,
it is the concentrated source of the power of an entity, in a
manner analogous to the First Cause; etc.
That the celestial's unity is a "divine" one is basically a
further qualitative emphasis of its "unique" quality. For Proclus,
"divine"is merely the conventional, traditional expression for
causes or causative entities which philosophically can be said
to be self-constituted or self-subsistent (authupostatos) and
complete in themselves (autoteles). "And so not every unity is
divine (theos), but only the self-complete henad (autotel;s
henas)" (89).	 It must not be forgotten though, that even such
self-complete entities were not supposed to operate in a vacuum,
that is,cut-off from each other. For Proclus, the celestials
were thought to be the last link of the chain of entities with
divine henads, which originates in and by the One Cause of all,
the First Divinity.
By virtue of its divine henad a celestial has always both the
necessary "will" (boulesis) and the power (dunamis) to act.
Such action can take the form of providence (pronoia) over lesser
entities1 t0ef. chapter 5), and the passing-on of the general process
of "progression-return". Action with respect to itself would
simply be the celestial's own cycle of "procession" from and
"reversion" to itself, since this is the property (and one of the
11definitions) of self-constituted entities. The necessary power
for all this activity comes from the divine henad's own "super-
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abundant power" (periousia duname;s) which is "originative" or
"sovereign" (archike) and has "control" (kratik;) over the
actions. Furthermore, according to Proclus, "will" or volition
seems to be an aspect of "power", perhaps literally will-power,
for, as he says, the relation will (boulesis) to providence is as
the relation power (dunamis) to activity (energeia).13
Concepts and relationships such as these are behind Proclue almost
cursory remark about the "motive deity" (kinZtikes theotetos)
which is in each star.14
(ii) The theory of the intellect (nous) and its operation (noesis)
is at least as complex in Proclus as in the earlier ancient
philosophers. Suffice to mention here that following Plato
(Tim 40B etc) the intellect of a celestial is supposed "to think
(phronei) the same thoughts about the same objects of thought (ta
auta peni tO'n salt -On) and always in the same manner (aei hosaut;s)"
(90).
This is the "formal" origin of the celestials' circular motion
both around the centre of the universe as a group and around their
own, as individuals (Proclus, unlike Plato, extended axial self-
rotation to the planets as well)P although for him the "true"
cause of circularity would have been the celestial's self-reverting
process due to its divine henad, upon which, as it were, is added
the layer of the intellect's own self-contemplation. He also
identified the Chaldean term "zone", meaning celestial sphere,
-
with the intellections (noeseis) of the celestials themselves.16
(iii) The principle of motion, as mentioned earlier, was thought
to be the soul. Soul is situated at the boundary between the
intelligible levels of existence and the spatio-temporal one,
the corporeal. Soul, therefore, is both the most proximate
metaphysical entity to body and the principle of spatio-temporal
movement (as opposed to the "unmoved" movement of the intellect,
for example).
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The relationship between the soul and the intellect and divine
henad is that of participation (see earlier Part I.B.(intro) and Part
I.A.1).	 Soul participates in or partakes of (metechei) the
properties of the intellect and the divine henad. Accordingly,
it can be called a "divine" soul by virtue of its participation in
a divine henad, and is said to have a threefold activity (energeia):
"...their threefold activity as souls, as recipients (hupodexamenai)
of a divine intellect and as dependents (exertemenal) on a divinity;
as divinities they exercise providence ...(there is a chiasmus
here), by virtue of their intellectual life they know all things,
and by virtue of their self-movement (kata ten autokin;ton
huparxin) proper to their mode of existence they move (kinousi)
the bodies... Their third activity is that proper to their own
characteristic mode of existence (idian huparxin energeia) whose
function is to move (kinetike) ... for this the distinctive
operation (idion energema) of every soul whereas the other activities
such as intellection (noein) and providence (pronoein) are by
participation (methexis)" (91).
As with the divine henad, and of course the intellect, the
celestial divine soul does not operate in a vacuum. Apart from
the vertical relationship divine henad-intellect-soul, it is also
a member of the horizontal (see Part I.A.1) hierarchical series of
souls as a member of the family of souls per se. The soul which
is especially dominant over the celestials, as it is over the
world, is the famous World-Soul of the Timaeus (see Part I.B.5.2).
Therefore, in Proclus, the celestial soul acts not only with its
own self-determination, due to its own individual intellect and
divine henad, but also according to the instructions received,
as it were, from the World-Soul through its differentiated aspects
of the "Same" (for the fixed stars) and the seventhfold "Other"
(for the planets) circulation.
It is through the soul (and onto the body) that properties or
actions of the intellect and the divine henad, such as volition
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(boul;sis), may take spatio-temporal expression (cf. Chapter 6.3
on planetary movement). Besides, it is characteristic of the
general Proclan theory of motion, that something which originates
purely as an internal dynamic process within point-dimension, so
to speak, can unfold, through the graded superposition and
accumulation of increasingly less unified, less abstract modes of
existence with their own specific functions, into three-dimensional
and temporal, physical motion.
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NOTES ON II.B.2
1 The celestials are not mere stones or earth, contra Anaxagoras,
Plato Apology 26 f., Laws X 886D.
2 Self-motion as a Platonic category, Laws X 8940, 866-897, Tim.43;
soul essentially "self-motion" Phaedo 78B-79B, Phaedrus 245-6;
and cf. Form of motion, Sophist 254.
Also see, G.S.Claghorn "Aristotle's criticism of Plato's
Timaeus" (1954) p.60-70, 99-120.
For the more systematic arrangement of "self-motion", "moved-by
another" etc., in Proclus see, eg., El.Th.14, 20 with Dodds'
notes on p.201, and cf. I.B (intro).
In relation to the celestials, however, it should be noted that
an innate soul resident in each celestial may not have been
necessarily Plato's own conception of celestial mover (see note
2 on II.B.6.1).
3 Tim.31B; see, Taylor op.cit. p.88-90, 93-4; and cf. laws 896.
Incorporeal being something "active" poiein, whereas corporeal
being "passive" paschein, has also parallels in Stoicism.
In Proclus, also see, E1.Th.80 and Dodds' notes p.243, where
the incorporeal-does not remain entirely unaffected by the
corporeal - perhaps related to the "shaking" of Philebus 33D?
4 See Proclus In Tim.II 6 and Philoponus De Aetern. Mundi
p.520-1; as it has been pointed out to me by R.W.Sharples,
these refs. are important for the issue whether Theophrastus
(3rd.c.BC Peripatetic) abandoned the Aristotelian Aether or not.
For Proclus the case is certainly more clear, the heavens are
composed of all the four Elements, including the "tangible"
Earth.
5 Celestials acting like animals, having both life and initiative
can also be found in Aristotle, de Caelo II 12, esp. 292a 20 -
292b 10.
6 See also Pl.Th.I 67-8, and particularly, In Tim.III 126,14-23,
all of which confirm that participation has the role of
predication; cf. I.A.1.
7 Cf. In Tim.III 59,18 ff, and El.Th.14-16.
8 This would coincide with Plato's moving cause, insofar as there
is a transcendental "form" of motion (corresp. to intellect in
Proclus), eg. Sophist. 2549 Laws 894B-C, and the "self-motion"
of soul, the arch, principle of motion.
9 For the whole quotation, incl. the ref. to Socrates and the
planet Jupiter, In Tim.III 72,16-21; also III 151,20-27 for
visible - invisible but ref. to the occult quality of the henad.
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10 See, eg., E1.Th.120-22; the issue has featured in a number of
studies, however, nothing more need be added, here.
11 Cf. E1.Th.42-44, 82.
12 See, eg., E1.Th.121, and note 11 on II.B.4.
13 See esp. In Tim.I 371,15-372.
14 In Tim.III 57,17-20.
15 See II.B.6.1
16 In Tim.III 133,6 f.
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3. THE CELESTIAL BODY
"For the nature of the celestial bodies (ouranili s;maton phusis)
-
is immaterial and unchangeable
1(aulos kai ametabletos)" (92).
But Proclus rejected the 5th Element, Aether, which was meant to
fulfill precisely the above conditions of immutability (and
impassivity). He made use instead of the Neoplatonic theme that
everything is in everything but appropriately in each. So, the
substance of the heavens does not consist of a fifth and different
Element, but of all the 4 Elements in an appropriate, celestial
mode. Although his objection against a fifth Element for the
heavens may have been due to his own preference for the Platonic
doctrine of fiery stars, he also had other philosophical, scientific
arguments against it. His objections are thematically linked to
the longstanding criticism of Aristotle's Aether, which according
to Simplicius' evidence was centred on the problems of the Elements'
natural motion in relation to proper place. It had begun with
the lstC BC Peripatetic Xenarchus and included among others Ptolemy.
Proclus attackes the ad hoc nature of the 5th Element for not
relating to anything else in the world. "Since to simply say
(legein hapGs), that heaven is a fifth body, does not make clear
anything about it (ouden diasaphein) except that it is different
from these sublunary Elements (plen hoti tcinde tal stoichei;n
heteron)" (93). For him the undecaying character of the heavens
can also be accounted by a kind of Fire which is capable of moving
naturally in a circular fashion. As he iterates, Aristotle
himself may be conceived to have admitted this much in the
Meteorologica with the "hupekkauma", the burning material, which
was said to circulate at the top of the atmosphere just below the
first celestial orbit of the Moon. 2 But Proclus also carefully
avoided the possible extreme Platonic position that the celestial
bodies are made exclusively of Fire.3
Since all the 4 Elements exist on all levels of the universe, then
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it is fitting that all 4 of them should exist in the heavens.
As on earth they exist in a terrestrial and material mode, with
Earth predominating, then in the heavens they exist in a celestial
and immaterial mode, with Fire predominating 4 (also see II.A.4.1).
"They who say that the nature of the heavens (ouranou phusis) is
different from those entities subject-to-change (metabletli)
which are really enmattered realities (ont;s enuln pragmatIO,
speak correctly (orthiis), but they overlook (amelountes) our
and the Platonic words (hem;n kai tCin PlatoniOn rh;maton) on
this matter, ...that the Demiurge 'bound and constituted together
the heavens' with the proportion of the 4 Elements (Tim 32 B) and
elsewhere (Tim 40 A) that they are 'fabricated from the form of
Fire' ... for by necessity:
(Query a) the celestial element is either totally different (allo
pant;) from the 4 Elements, ie is a 5th Element (pempton stoicheion),
as some say; (Q. b) or, that the heaven consists of the 4 Elements
also; (Q. c) or, from one Element out of the 4 (hex henos tinos
tn tettar3n); (Q. d) or, from more than one out of the 4 (ek
pleionCin henos). If it (the heaven) consists of the 4 then
(Reply to query b., option 1) it consists in form (kat' eidos)
of the same sublunary elements, (R. b 2) or of different ones
(; all3n).	 (R. a) But if that celestial Element is different
from the 4 how is it, as Plato says (Tim 32 BO ) that the whole
world consists (einai) of the 4 Elements ? 	 (R. c) Whereas if it
consists of one Element out of the 4, how is it as he says shortly
afterwards (Tim 40 A), that the stars consist for the most part
from Fire (ek pleiston puros) ? (R. d) And if from more than one
Element (NB. implying, not from all four), how could the divine
body be not imperfect (ouk steles) if it does not have all the
Elements, when earth possesses (echouses) wholly (hol;u) all
(panta) the sublunary ones ? (Returning to b.1) And if the
heaven consists from all of them, how is it that their combination
over-there (ekei...sunthesis) is indissoluble (alutos), whereas
down-here it is dissoluble (lute) ? For they are not indissoluble
because they are in equilibrium (isokrateians meaning, there is
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no 'predominance'); for how can the variety (he poikilla) in the
heaven be derived (pothen) from equivalence (isokrateias)...
(R. b 2) But if it is composed from different elements how is it
that the heaven is moved (kineitai) with a simple motion if its
elements are compounds (suntheta: cf. Arist. de Caelo 306 b20) ?...
Such therefore being the queries (aporcin), it is better (beltion)
to state that: the heaven consists of Fire which is predominant
(ek puros epikratountos) and comprehends (periechei) in a causal
mode (kat' aitian) the powers (dunameis) of the other Elements,
such as the solidity and stability of Earth (stereot;ta...edraioteta
t;s g;s), the glutinous and unifying property of Water (to
kolletikon kai henCitikon tou hudatos) and the tenuity and
transparency of Air (ten leptot;ta kai ten diaphaneian tou aeros);
for as the earth embraces everything in a terrestrial fashion
(chthoni;s) thus the heaven embraces (periechei) everything in a
fiery (puriiis); so that one Element is the predominating (to
epikratoun) and the others are included in it in a causal mode
(en aut; kat' aitian). It is necessary therefore to acknowledge
(dei nomizein) that the fire over-there is not identically the
same (oude ekeino...tauton) with the sublunar, but that (ekeino)
is divine fire coexistent (sunuphistamenon: the Q text version) 5
with life and an imitation (mimena) of the intellectual fire
(noerou puros), whereas the fire down-here (entautha) is really
enmattered, generated and corruptible (ont;s enulon k. geneton k.
phtharton)" (94).
Of the two requirements on the nature of the celestial bodies,
viz, immaterial and unchangeable, the more fundamental — for
Proclus — was probably the "immaterial". This is because, as
explained more fully elsewhere (see II.A.6 and A.4.1), he regarded
materiality both as the root cause of the mutual susceptibility and
division when bodies interact with each other, and as one of the
factors responsible for disorderly movement. This view of
materiality refers to "gross" matter and ought not be confused with
that of "substrate" matter which exists everywhere. "The heaven
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is immaterial — by this I mean the matter which is unstable
(anedraston), possesses a bastard (nothon) beauty and is deformity
itself (aischos.ousan)" (95).	 Thus, an immaterial body is
unchangeable since it is impassive (apathes) to anything that
seeks to change it. 6 He could also lay claim to invariability
for the celestial bodies in its own right. According to El.Th.
proposition 76 "All that arises from an unmoved cause (akinetou
aitias) has an invariable existence (ametableton...huparxin);
all that arises from a mobile cause, a variable". In his scheme
the celestial bodies themselves are said to be fashioned by the
Demiurge in conjunction with (the monad of) Nature, especially
its so-called third demiurgic cause (see Part I.B.6), both of
which as unparticipated causes are unmoved. 7 Therefore the
celestial bodies are also invariable as direct products of unmoved
causes.
The material — if that is the right term in this case — of the
celestial body, the so-called celestial mode, consists of a
mixture of all the 4 Elements but with Fire predominating.
Appropriately, the celestial fire is the pure and immaterial form
of Fire which possesses only the illuminating quality and not the
burning, like the sublunary and enmattered fire. In other words,
the celestial form of Fire is light.8
"The fire which is enmattered is different from the immaterial
(allo pur enulon ...allo aulon), immaterial with regards to the
sublunary matter, and the corruptible is different from the
incorruptible (allo phtharton... allo aphtharton)" (96). 	 "In
the heaven (en ouran;) is the really-existent fire (to ontos pur)
which is pure light (phc3s on katharon)" (97). "For to be visible
(to horaton) is characteristic (idion) of all Fire (pantos puros)
but not to be hot, nor to float upwards (ou to thermon oude to
epipolastikon)"(98). "Thus Fire predominates (epikratei)
everywhere (pantachou), and all heaven is characterized (charakttrizetai)
by its power (dlinsmin), and the fire which is over-there (ekei)
is neither caustic..., nor destructive (phthartikon) of anything
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... 
but it shines-forth (dialampon) with life-producing heat
(thermot;ti z;ogon;), illuminating power (dunamei ph;tistik.;)
and with purity and translucency; for the violent quality
(sphodron) is different from the pure (katharon), as Socrates
showed in the Philebus (Phlb. 52C1). So, the fire, which is
there, is light" (99). "The fiery element predominates over all,
in order that the form (eidos) which is there controls the
substratum (diakratei to hupokeimena), maintains (sunechei) and
preserves (t;rei) it from every side, and is itself full of life
(p1;res zs) and self-moving power (autokinetou duname;s)" (100).
The celestial fire is indeed incorruptible for "over-there" (ekei)
is Fire's own natural place, where it can move perpetually in a
circle. "But if Aristotle should query9(aporoi) what is asserted
by us, if Fire is in the heaven (en ouran;) how does it move
circularly (kukl;) and not in a straight line (ouk ep' eutheias),
10
we can reply to him with the Plotinian statement, that every
simple body which is (on) in its own-proper place (oikei; tops)
either remains stationary or is moved in a circle, in order that
it never leaves (m;de apoleip;) its own-proper place; for if it
moves differently (all;s), either it is no longer in its own place
(7) ouketi estai en t; aut; heautou tops) or is not yet in it (7):
oupo estin)" (101).	 "For it only has the motion according-to-its
nature (kata phusin) whenever (hopotan) it occupies (eche topon)
its own-proper (oikeion) place, but when it tends (hotan...pheretai)
to move towards it, it does not yet (oup;) occupy its natural
place (kata phusin). This however having been demonstrated, it
is evident that the celestial fire (ouranion pur), since it moves,
is moved circularly (kukl;) ...; for if the Fire did not move
in a circle then it would not yet (oup;) be in its natural place.
And if it is in its natural place it will be either unmoved (akineton)
or moved in a circle. But it is impossible (adunaton) for it to
be unmoved; for all Fire is mobile by nature (phusei gar eukineiton
pan pur); hence it will only move in a circle" (102). "It is
natural to the fire which is not fire in its final mode (me tele;s
purl) to be carried upwards (an;), but to the actualized fire
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(kat' energeian pun) it is natural to remain up-there (menein
en to an; kata phusin), where remaining (menon) if it should
move (ei ekinoito) it will only have the circular motion" (103).
Air, Water and Earth are also in the heavens (see pg. 236 ) but
in a "causal mode" (kat' aitian) which is roughly equivalent to
saying that they exist in principle. Another Proclan expression,
which means virtually the same, is that"over-therd'are the
"summits" (akrot;tes) of the Elements, which for the celestial
bodies carries a significance of both place and value.
He had good reasons for proposing the presence of the other three
Elements in conjunction with Fire. Apart from satisfying the
philosophical tenet that "everything is in everything,
appropriately" he could also provide with one rule a physical
explanation for both (i) the visibility and the occultations of
the celestial bodies, and (ii) the transparency of the rest of the
celestial region.
Fire with the "transparent media" Air and Water, (see II.A.3)
but without Earth, constitutes the stuff of the general celestial
region, which is evidently transparent to our sight. Fire with
the "solid" Earth and perhaps including Air and Water as well
(their presence in this case does not make any material difference)
constitutes the stuff of the visible celestial bodies. 	 In
Proclus' theory, something is perceived by our senses when it
offers "resistance" to them; and the Element which is "resisting"
par excellence is the "solid" and "steadfast" Earth. Therefore,
whereas the vacant space of the so-called celestial spheres is
transparent to our sight, the celestial bodies are not. Or in
other words, we can see through the celestial spheres because
their heavenly fiery substance does not include Earth, but we
can not see through the celestial bodies because their fiery
substance does include Earth.
"All heaven is composed from all the Elements, but in some place
- 240 -
(hopou) predominates Fire with the summit of Earth, in another
Fire with the summit of the Air-like (aerodous) and in another
Fire with the summit of Water, and just as the variation (exallag;)
of air and of fire itself is numerous, so is for each of them,
on account of which some are more visible (horata mallon), such
as the parts which have Fire with the solid (meta tou stereou)
quality, whereas the others are more invisible (aoratOtera),
such as the parts which have Fire with the translucent (diaugous)
and the transparent (diaphanous), and through (dia) these it is
possible to see the objects above them (dunaton horan ta aniiter;)
just like looking through air, but the others intercept our
vision (epiprosthei pros tn hemeteran opsin).	 ...appropriately
(eikot;s) the spheres have the more attenuated and more transparent
substance (leptoteran echousi kai diaphanesteran ousian), whereas
-
the stars have the more solid (ta de astra stereoteran)" (104).
The occultations of the celestial bodies also demonstrate that
there is an element of opaque Earth in them; a heavenly body which
happens to be directly in front of another in the line of sight
of an observer prevents it from being seen because it is able to
obstruct the visual path. 	 "There exists a celestial Fire...and
a celestial Earth (kai g;s) - or how can the Moon produce a shadow
(skian) when it is illuminated by the Sun, and the solar light
can not penetrate through it completely (ou dieisi dia pas;s
au-as) "? (105). 	 "For to intercept (antiphrattein) is the
property of Earth- and this is also evident from the stars which
obscure the visible apprarance of the others (tais opsesin antiph-
rattonta), as they produce a shadow of themselves" (106).
This difference in the essentially fiery mixture of the heavens
could also have explained how the planets can "wander" umimpeded
through the rest of the heavenly medium (although this does not
explicitly appear in Proclus). The fiery mixture of the celestial
spheres with the "easily moved" or "easily displaceable" Elements
of Air and Water would not offer any resistance to solid bodies.
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NOTES ON II.B.3
1 It should be added, "everlasting" (aidios), but this is
derivable from "unchangeable"; cf. Aristotle de Caelo 1,3 and
11,1
2 In Tim.III 112,1, ref. to the "fiery-like" material.
However, Aristotle would have hardly described the motion of
the hupekkauma as natural.	 See, 11.A.4.2.
3 This would not have been the position of any Platonist proper,
for in the Timaeus 40A it is clearly stated that the celestials
bodies are made "for the most part of Fire" (ten pleisten idean
ek puros), and earlier, 32D, that the cosmos was fashioned from
all the four Elements.
That the celestial bodies are made of Fire (only) corresponds
to the Stoic position, see for refs. note 2 and 20 11.A.3, also
S.Sambursky "The physical world of the Greeks" (1956) ch.8.
Plotinus' discussion "On the heavens" Enn.II 1, esp.6 shows
that the Platonic position was preferrable because it could
account for the solidity of the celestial bodies.
An additional argument against Fire as the sole constituent of
the heavens is, according to Proclus, In Tim.II 8 f., that
Fire on its own is invisible; visibility comes about "due to"
and "together with" Fire, also cf. In Tim.III . 112 ff.
Proclus also makes more of the term "idean", in the above Tim.
passage, in the formulation of the concept of the "summits"
of the Elements, cf. In Tim.III 112,27-113,20.
4 This can be found in the Epinomis 981D-E, although uncredited by
Pro clus.
The theme, that the celestial realm does not consist of an
Element which is "different" or "alien" from the four Elements
of the sublunary realm, recurs in Proclus: besides the quote 93
above, it can also be found among the frg. of "The Inquiry into
the Objections of Aristotle to Plato's Timaeus" - see note 1
II.A.2 - in Philoponus' De Aeternitate Mundi, p.523.
Also see Plotinus Enn.II 1, and in De Aeternitate Mundi p.524 ff.
As A.E.Taylor underlines, op-cit.p.88-89, the notion that there
are not two radically different kinds of matter, terrestrial &
celestial, was widely established before Aristotle.
5 See In Tim.II 43,30; Diehl has "sunuphasmenon", meaning "weaved
together", perhaps as in Tim.78B; however I prefer the Q text
word, because it accords better with the cosmological content
of the passage: it also has the meaning, "established together".
6 Cf. Simplicius In Physica p.613,15-17 f.; and Plotinus Enn.II 1
7-8. Impassivity is, perhaps, not so much relevant to the
heavenly realm itself, since there is no interaction between
the bodies, anyway; it ensures, mainly, impassivity from
action by sublunaries.
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7 The Demiurge as a member of the monad of the "akinetos"
Intellect (see I.B intro. and B.4) is certainly unmoved. 	 Soul
and Nature as unparticipated entities (see I.B.5.1 & B.6) should
also be unmoved, notwithstanding Soul's self-moved essence,
however, I have not come across any passage dealing directly
with the state of mobility of unparticipated causes.
Also see De Aeternitate Mundi Argot', p.55-6.
8 The definition of a pure form of fire for the celestial bodies
is often met in the cosmologies which adhered to the four
Element theory as opposed to the Aristotelian fifth Element,
Aether. Invariably, such form of fire is called non-burning,
by contrast to the sublunary form of fire which causes things
to pass-away, ie. be destroyed.	 In Stoicism, the emphasis was
on the "divine" and "creative" fire, and the vital heat;. in
Neoplatonism, emphasis was placed on the purely illuminating
aspect of fire; that is not to say that the differences were
so clear cut: Proclus in a frg. from the Inquiry into Arist.
Objections against the Timaeus, ibid., for example, makes use
of both, De Aeternitate Mundi p.523,11-524,8. 	 There, besides
calling the celestial fire non-burning, he also calls it
vivific, after Arist. De Generat. Animal., and illuminating.
See the rêfs. on Stoicism in note 3 above, and cf. F.Solmsen
"The vital heat, the inborn pneuma and the aether" J.H.S.77
(1957) p.119-23.
Also see II.A.4.3, and II.B.7 the note on tne solar light.
9 Arist. de Caelo 268b-269a, and cf. Meteorologica 341b 13 f.
with the ref. to the "fiery-like" material, above.
Also see Festugiere's note 3 p.34 vol.111 of Comm. sur le Timee,
op.cit.
10 See II.A.5; also cf. De Aeternitate Mundi p.486.
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4. STARS AND SPHERES
The figure which haunted ancient Greek Astronomy was the sphere.
Although initially the heavenly spheres had a cosmographical role,
they soon became the means for describing both the order and the
motion of the celestial bodies. The question whether they were
real objects or mathematical devices was the main area of contention
between the astronomers and the cosmologically inclined philosophers
(who were supposed to look for the true entities in the cosmos).1
Eudoxus' theory of counteracting spheres, as it was developed
by Aristotle, was perhaps the most successful system to combine
both the mathematical representation of the "appearances", as
were known at that time, and the cosmology of which it was part.
Later increasingly more systematic observations necessitated
alternative mathematical models for the description of the
apparently more complex heavenly phenomena. These were the
eccentrics, the epicycles and the Ptolemaic equants. They were
indeed more successful in describing the phenomena — the
astronomical predictive power of Ptolemy's system was not bettered
until Kepler — but their very sophistication and ad hoc use widened
the gap between cosmological reality and mathematical invention.
For example, Ptolemy's own need to satisfy in some way the very
question of the reality of his mathematical model produced a
different system. In a separate work, on "the Planetary
Hypotheses", it seems, he abandoned the equants at least, and
settled for a cosmological system which consisted of spheres
driven by self-moved planets.2
So, whereas the mathematical models of the universe became more
complex (the eccentric and/or epicyclic motion was able to yield
3
a variety of circle-like shapes, including the ellipse), the
cosmological ones remained essentially the same:a geocentric
system of spheres, the outermost being that of the fixed
stars, then the 7 planetary spheres and finally the sphere or
spheres of the 4 sublunary Elements.
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Proclus frequently confessed to being pre-occupied with the reality
of entities, so it is not surprising that his writings are mainly
concerned with the cosmological rather than with the purely
mathematical models of the heavens - yet, although he was not an
astronomer but a philosopher, he is nevertheless unique in having
written a complete book on the Ptolemaic system and on the astrolabe.4
His options were basically two (corresponding roughly to a Platonic-
Aristotelian dichotomy):
(i) The "spheres" represent parts or regions of the heavens
bounded by the concave surface of a greater and the convex surface
of a lesser sphere. 	 The celestial bodies move freely within these
areas in longitude, latitude and "in depth", viz, closer to or
further away from earth. Cosmologically, the movement in such
"spheres" is a simple circulation, the "wandering" of the planets is
usually accounted for by assigning to them the ability to move
"actively" by themselves.
(ii) The spheres are physical bodies. 	 The celestial bodies are,
in this sense, "passively" moved by being fixed to one spot of the
sphere which carries them. There is a whole system of supplementary
spheres which carry the celestial bodies around their observed orbits
in accordance with the "phenomena".
Proclus opted for the first, not least because it had a Platonic
pedigree, and because it suited his scheme of self-determined and
self-moving entities. Equally, he may also have been aware that
Ptolemy had favoured self-moving planets, although there is no
reference to that effect in his astronomically related works. In
his Platonic-based arrangement, the "spheres" are so placed that
each nests neatly next to its adjacent without overlappings and in
accordance with the general requirement that there should be no void
between them. Thus, although there are many heavenly mspheres",
the heaven as a whole is continuous 5(on the problem of contiguity
and continuity in the Middle Ages see note 6). "The greater
-
spheres engulf the lesser (meizonon enkolpisamenon tous ellasonas)
and encompass
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them with their concave surfaces (koilais ...epiphaneiais), and
the lesser fit well (enermosmen;n) into the greater with their
convex (kurtas) surfaces" (107). 	 "(The spheres) are like jars
(kadois eoikenai) which are placed within each other, the lesser
inside the greater; and such as this is the insertion of the
'whorls' (sphondul;n: A Platonic term, which Proclus interpretes
as spheres) which makes the expanse of the heavens (n;ton) one
continuous surface (hen suneches). For there is no vacuum at all
(m;denos kenou) between the whorls which are fitted into each
other so that there is one continuous surface from the convex
surface of the innermost (endotat;) of all spheres as far as to
the outermost (ex;tat;); for the whole of this depth (bathos)
is called the celestial expanse (nOton) and not only the surface
of the greatest of the whorls" (108).
With regards to the "depth" of the sphere of the fixed stars there
were no disputes. 	 It was the thickest sphere of all. Early
parallax considerations had led to the maxim that the relation
between the earth's size and the distance to the fixed stars is
as the relation between the point-centre of a circle and its
circumference: "The earth has the relation (logon) of a point-
centre to the circle of the fixed stars" (Proclus In Remp II 218,
10-11;of. Ptolemy Syntaxis I Ch.6)7 Furthermore, as Proclus
observes, the fixed stars are not spread along a single ring-
layer only but are distributed in depth as well. This explains
the existence of optical binary stars. "The outermost whorl
-
of the fixed stars, contains such a large number (tosouton plethos)
of stars scattered (katesparmenon) in all its depth...the fixed
circle (aplane kuklon) is vast (platutaton) as it is Shown by the
distances (megethe) and numbers (pl -eth;) of the stars which are
-
not one surface, as it is evidenced (hos estin delon) from the
apparent double stars" (109).
But with regard to the depth of each of the planetary spheres,
there were many different ways of defining it. iroclus
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reports an earlier method based on the size of the corresponding
8planet, although he comes to accept reluctantly the more modern
Ptolemaic method based on the difference between apogeical and
perigeical distances. According to it, the thickness — the z-
direction, the depth — of each sphere is defined by the distance
of the planet at apogee (furthest from earth) minus the distance
at perigee (closest to earth). Although he feels that this
thethod is the thin end of the wedge for ascribing cosmological
reality to the "counteracting" spheres and the epicycles, to
which he was opposed, he agrees to it because it is the least
inconsistent with observation9(and could perhaps be justified
by the very real motion of the self-moving planets in depth).
The immaterial-kind of substance of the heavens is, as explained
elsewhere (see Ch. 3 on The celestial body), a mixture of the four
Elements with Fire in its purely illuminating form predominating.
Proclus differentiates the celestial bodies themselves from the
rest of the heavenly medium by including the "resisting" and
"solid" Earth Element in the mixture of the stars but not in
the mixture of the spheres: This accounts for the transparency
(and therefore sensory invisibility) of the spheres and the
opacity (and visibility) of the stars. "For different Elements
abound (pleonazein) in different (allachou) places, and in some
the fiery Element is far-shining (einai telauges) due to the
solidity (stereoteta) as on the stellar bodies (hOs epi t7n astrn
somat;n), but in others it escapes our notice (lanthanein hemas)
due to the tenuity (leptoteta) as that of the spheres" (110).
"And if you want to inquire, what is the composition and substance
of the planets themselves and of their whole spheres (sustasis• •
kai tak holla sphairli) and whether the same one is for both the
stars and the spheres or a different, we will answer...that all
heaven is composed from all the Elements, but at one place
predominates Fire with the summit of Earth, at another Fire with
the summit of the Air-like and at another Fire with the summit of
Water. ..some are more visible (horata mallon) those of the sort
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which have Fire with the solid quality, whereas others are more
invisible (aorat;tera),those which have Fire with translucent and
transparent quality... If we speak correctly, then it is reasonable
to suppose that the spheres have the more attenuated and more
transparent substance (sphairai leptoteran echousi kai diaphanesteran
ousian), whereas the stars have the more solid (ta de astra
stere;teran)" (111).
In other words, the spheres are not solid bodies like the stars,
but regions of space.10 Two physical consequences of this lack of
solidity are: Firstly, the celestial bodies travel entirely
mihindered through-but are also physically unsupported by the
medium of-the spheres.	 Secondly, since the spheres are not solid
and since they are continuous with and contiguous to each other,
then ,there is no such thing as a solid boundary between them
either. Any substantial differences between them would perhaps
be a marginal variation in tenuity due to some having more of
an Air Element content and others more of a Water content.
The celestial spheres are in fact the corporeal (in the basic
connotation as 3-dimensional space: see II.A.6) representatives
of the World's principle of self-motion, viz. the World-Soul.
As relatively immaterial spatial regions they are mere tracks in
which the stars move by themselves. However, their "true" nature
is to be the pluralized and specialized aspects of the World-Soul,
the "Same" and the "Other" circulations" (see Part I.B.5.2),
which guide the celestials into a regular and even motion with
their "governing power' i(dunamin kratiken: see Ch. 2 on the
celestial).
- 248 -
NOTES ON II.B.4
I See the discussion in Plato Rep.VII, esp. 529-30.
2 On ancient astronomy there are a number of studies, including,
besides P.Duhem's "Le syst6me du Monde" (1913,1954) esp. vol.'',
T.Heath "Aristarchus of Samos" (1913), J.L.E Dreyer "History
of Planetary Systems" (1906/53), and among the more recent works,
0.Neugebauer's authoritative three part "A History of Ancient
Astronomy" (1975). 	 Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses is examined
in B.Goldstein "The Arabic version of Ptolemy's Planetary
Hypotheses" Transactions of the American Philosophical Society
57 (1967) p.1-55.	 For the distinction between physical and
mathematical astronomy, R.Palter "An approach to the history of
early Astronomy" Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 1
(1970) p.93-133.	 For the Eudoxan-Aristotelian schema also,
L.Wright "The astronomy of Eudoxus: Geometry or Physics"
Studies in History and Phil. of Science 4 (1973) p.165-172;
and on the possible relation to Plato's Timaeus, see,
G.E.L.Owen "The place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues"(1953)
art.16 in R.E.Allen Studies in Plato's Metaphysics op.cit.
esp. p.325-6; cf. J.M.Rist "The order of the later Dialogues of
Plato" Phoenix 14 (1960) p.214-60,(the conclusion is that
there is not any: besides the chronology, Eudoxus' mathematical
model would not have been useful for the dynamical expl. of the
Timaeus).	 For a source see, Simplicius In de Caelo p.491-510.
On Ptolemy's 'vitalist' position regarding the dynamics of the
motion of the planets, also see, S.Sambursky "The physical
world of late antiquity" p.140-45, whiOh leads on to Proclus.
The study particularly usefulfor this chapter as a whole is,
E.J.Aiton "Celestial spheres and circles" History of Science 19
(1981) p.75-114 (Proclus and the nested spheres, mentioned p.84-5).
3 See 0.Pedersen and M.Pihl "Early physics and astronomy" (1974),
fig.7.19 on p.96.
4 Such a topic deserves, of course, a fuller and separate
examination, which I cannot present here.
There are many passages which testify to his awareness of the
problems about cosmological, or physical reality, and mathematical
modelling, as a "useful" tool to understanding. The one most.
widely-known is his conclusion to the Astron.Hypoth., the
account of Ptolemy's mathematical system of the heavens, with
Proclus' own doubts on its physical reality: see, S.Sambursky
The physical world of late antiq., op.cit., p146-49;
S.Sambursky (edit.) "Physical thought from the pre-Socratics to
the Quantum physicists: an Anthology" (1974), item 117, p.112-4.
Proclus on the construction and use of the astrolabe, Hyp.Astr.
ch.6; the treatise on the astrol., which was to become
influential in Islam and the Middle Ages, was by Philoponus.
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5 See Plato Republic I 616 f.
For the "whorls" etc. see, T.Heath Aristarchus op.cit. p.148-9,
153-57; and their similarity with the Parmenidean "bands" p68-9.
The nested spheres, per se, stem from Ptolemy, see Aiton op.cit.
6 See E.Grant on cosmology, ch.8 in "Science and the Middle Ages"
(1978) edit. D.Lindberg, esp. p.272-283, also 291-3, with a
useful table on p.292 showing the dimensions of the universe,
based on the "nested spheres" doctrine; cf. note 9.
7 It stems from Aristarchus of Samos and his estimates for his
heliocentric system; it seems to have been intended as an
answer to the lack of stellar parallax, indeed, Aristarchus
appears to have" used the same formula-phrase also for the dimens.
of the lunar orbit around the earth, besides that of the earth
around the sun (which does in fact produce stellar parallaxes;
the first stellar distances estimated by this method were
produced by Bessel, Henderson in 1838 and Herschel in the 1850's).
See T.Heath Aristarchus op.cit. p.302, 308-10, 353, 412.
Archimedes, from whom we have the passage on Aristarchus on the
heliocentric system and the distance .of the fixed stars, in the
"Sand-Reckoner" translated the statement into a very large, but
finite, estimate of the distance of the stars; hence it was
taken up and continued in Greek mathematics and astronomy.
See also, G.E.R.Lloyd "Greek Science after Aristotle" (1973) p.42,
54, 116 and cf. R.W.Sharples "Responsibility, Chance and Not-
Being(Alexander of Aphrodisias mantissa 169-172)" B.I.C.S.22
(1975) esp.p.39 and p.62 note 140.
8 In Rep.II 218. Proclus seems to be the only source regarding
this method; reported in T.Heath Aristarchus p.156.
9 In Rep.II 219,23-222.	 A.E.Taylor Comm.on the Timaeus op.cit.
p.161-2, note 2, praises Proclus for being a good Platonist
in not wanting to allow the perigee & apogee measur. generated
by the eccentrics and epicycles. -
The epicyclic parameten3given in In Rep.II 222 coincide with
those in Ptolemy's Syntaxis, except that of the Moon: it is
taken from Ptolemy's Canobic Inscription r see 0.Neugebauer
"The exact sciences in antiquity" (1957) p.195, ftnote 1, and
Hist. of Math. Astr. op.cit. p.903.
10 Cf. also In Rep.II 215,17-19.
11 In Rep.II 215,24-216,4.	 Cf. also Plato Tim.36C7-D1, where
the Same circle is said to have "kratos", sovereignty or
predominance, presumably over the Other; see A.E.Taylor op.cit.
p.152 n.1 and p.158 n.l.
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5. THE SATELLITES
The planets and the fixed stars are not the only objects in the
heavens. According to Proclus, the celestials and especially
the planets have satellites, companions normally invisible to
us, because they are overshadowed by the brilliance of the
celestial body to which they belong.
These conclusions are remarkable because they seem to mean that
Proclus had anticipated, long before Galileo's famous observation,
the existence of satellite-moons.
But the context is rather different: "There are some other
celestial divine living-beings (alla z;a theia ei ourania)
which accompany the circulations of the planetary ones, whose
leaders (hegemones) are the 7 planets...; they also 'turn'
(trepomena) and 'have such kind of wandering' (cf. Tim 38 E)
...for their order revolves (sumperipolei) and returns-to-its-
point-of-departure (sunapokathistatai: technical term for a
period) together with their principles (archais)" (112). 	 "Each
of the planetary spheres is a whole cosmos which collectively
comprehends (perileptikon) many divine classes invisible to us
(h;min aphanc3n), but each visible star is the leading (hegemonian)
principle of all of them" (113).
The satellites to which Proclus is referring are part of the
"attendants" or rfollowers" of the celestials as divine causes,
the so-called daimonic orders (see Part I.B.8.2). These are the
dependent entities which are the immediate participants in the
celestials as independent divine henads.
Their cosmological status rests on:
(i) The premise that each entity which can be regarded as a
"first principle'," is the "leader" of its appropriate multitude
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of entities/characteristics. For example, using the arithmetical
analogy (cf. Part I.B.1.1), I would be considered as the leading
principle of 2,3,4 etc.	 The latter could then be called the
"attendants" of 1 since they 'rely' on it. 	 According to Proclus,
the sphere of the fixed stars as a whole can be regarded as a
monad because of the simplicity of its motion. The fixed stars
as a crowd of member-entities can then be the multitude appropriate
to it. But each of the planets, for analogous reasons, can
equally be regarded as a monad in each respective sphere. The
appropriate multitude will then be the "choruses" of the satellite
entities. 1 "For the stars which are called planets are governors-
of-the-world (kosmokratores: a term with astrological pedigree)
and are alloted a 'total' power (holik;n dunamin), and as the
fixed sphere has a number of starry living-beings (z(111 astr33n),
so likewise each of the planets is a leader (hegeitai) of its
appropriate multitude of entities, viz, of living-beings or other
beings of that kind. Hence from this the query may be solved,
ie. how the one-single sphere of the fixed stars encompasses
(perieilephen) a multitude of stars, but the many spheres of the
planets lead around (periagei) one star each" (114).
(ii) The concept of "circulation" about (in a loose sense, not
necessarily in a circle around a single centre) a "leading"
cause. Such an attending circulation is essentially an intelligible
sort of motion, although spatio-temporal manifestations are
possible. An example of this (as Proclus saw it) is the close
satellite-escorting of the Sun by Venus and Mercury. 	 "Ptolemy...
places the Sun in the middle of the seven planets...and those who
are after it move together with it (sunontes aut;), escort it
(propompeuontes) or are its satellites (doruphorountesf" (115).
So, the satellites and their motion are essentially metaphysical,
and relate to the metaphysical aspect of the celestial (Cf. '
 Ch: 2
the celestial, and Ch. 7). Yet, insofar as the daimonic orders
are not wholly metaphysical entities in Proclus system, but are
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"in-the-world", semi-material entities (cf. I.B.8.2 ), and the
satellite-escorting was perceived to have its occasional
physical parallel,as in the case of the Sun, Mercury and Venus,
the satellite theory does not refer to an entirely metaphysical
and incorporeal state of existence. Moreover, at times Proclus
seems to allow the obscuring of the difference between the physical
and metaphysical, as in the following passage, where the clues
that the "disappearances and re-appearances" do not refer to a
visible phenomenon are not as clear as the occasion demands:3
"The celestial gods and their accompanying classes (sunepomean
autois gen11), which are sometimes (ha de pote men) hidden by the
bright rays (kaluptetai hupo tas augas) of the leading gods, when
they reappear (pote de anaphainomena) they produce terrors and
the signs of future things" (116).
Apart from populating each of the planetary spheres with more
entities, the satellite class serves two other important functions:
(i) With the original Greek meaning doruphoros=attendant or
bodyguard, they act as representatives of the ho-called guardian
series (see Part I.B.1.3; also I.B.4 and 5.1) analogous to the
"guardians" in Intellect and Soul. These are entities, which
primarily are meant to conserve and preserve the order and
distinct identity of principal causes. In the case of the celestials
the satellites are said to guard their immutability from any
disorder that arose from the multi-changing matter. This is
probably deemed necessary because of the hierarchical proximity
of the celestials (and especially the planets) to the domain of
generation and perishing.
(ii) They act as intermediary carriers of the characteristic
property (idiots) of the chain of divine "causation". Thus the
specialization which occurs on every level - of the hierarchy can
be extended as far as and be distributed to the material world
by these intermediaries of the last of the divine henads, the
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celestials. As Proclus says "All the powers of the gods, taking
their origin (anothen archomen&i) above and proceeding through
the appropriate intermediaries (mesoteton), descend even to the
last existent (eschatla) and terrestrial kegions...and hence it
is that even in these appear reflections (emphaseis) of the first
principles, and there is sympathy between all" (117).
The satellite entities are said to be invisible because they are
overshadowed by the brilliance of their "leading" star. This
invisibility seems to have its parallel in the Elements. In the
Element theory (see Part II.A.3. on their properties) the
"visible and tangible" Elements are the two extremes, Fire and
Earth. The intermediaries Air and Water are said to be transparent
and invisible to our sight. Similarly, the satellites are said
to be suitably invisible as their order is intermediate between
the visible fiery celestial bodies and the tangible terrestrial
ones. In other words, the scheme,Fire — Air-Water — Earth seems
to be analogous to celestials — satellites — terrestrials.
"But that in each of the planetary spheres there is a multitude of
entities coordinate with it, you may establish from the two
extremes; for the fixed sphere has its own coordinate multitude
and the earth is itself the wholeness of the terrestrial
(chthoniim z(7311) living-beings... But the intermediaries escape
the notice of our sense-perception (lanthanei h;m;n ta mesa
aisth;sin), whereas the extremes are made manifest to us, the
celestials through their exceedingly bright substance (huperlampron
oasian: ie. light) and the terrestrials through their kinship
(sungeneian) to us" (118).
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NOTES ON II.B.5
1 In Tim.III 130-1. Much of the satellite theory was first
noted by Thomas Taylor, the "Platonist" (1758-1835), and copious
notes on it, as well as on the other physical and astronomical
theories of Proclus, can be found in his transl. of Proclusl
Comm. on the Timaeus, and of Plato's Timaeus: eg., "The
Cratylus, Phaedo, Parmenides, Timaeus and Critias of Plato"
(1793) p.262-4; "The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus
of Plato in five books" (1820) vol.II p.280-1, 299.
For the class of celestial "divine" daimons, eg.
In Tim.III 109,12 f.
2 "Satellite" has also astrological significance, meaning the
planets which flank or are near the Sun, for example, cf.
Ptolemy Tetrabiblos III 4.
The "satelliting" of the Sun by Mercury and Venus was widely
known, and Plato described it in the Timaeus 40C-D with the
terms, "choreias", "parabolas", "epanakukl6seis"; and see
A.E.Taylor op.cit. p.241-3.
3 With ref. to satellites and invisible stars see, Thomas Taylor
The Timaeus of Plato etc., p.283; The Comm. of Proclus
vol.II p.299.	 Also seR.Temple "The Sirius Mystery" (1976)
appx.I which is devoted entirely to Proclus.
For the question of whether Proclus is describing a physical
or metaphysical "obscuring" also cf. In Tim.III 149,13-20,
150,12-20.
4 The "bodyguard" preserving principal causes also cf.
In Tim.I 39 -40, III 149,24 -8, III 262,14-20; In Rep.I 90-2.
There are obvious influences from the Phaedrus Myth, 247-252,
the attendants of the celestial gods; it is mentioned by
Proclus In Tim.III 149,24-28.
	 In addition, similarities
with the.Late Roman institution of "Protector of the Emperor"
are very evident, see the Biographical and Historical note.
The "protectores" were the officer cadets of the Empire, who
received their commissioned rank in a ceremony during which
they personally "adored the sacred purple".
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6. CELESTIAL MOTION
6.1 GENERAL
The premise of Proclus' theory of celestial motion is that the
fixed stars and planets move by themselves; their movement is due
to agents immanent in rather than distinct from them. A physical
consequence of this is that the celestial bodies do not need any
"crystalline" spheres, or epicycles, to carry them around, and in
this respect the Proclan theory of celestial motion is linked to
the Keplerian and the Newtonian. 1
His theory is a development of the Platonic concept of motion, as
mentioned earlier (Ch. 2 on the celestial), that the principle of
self-motion (autokin;sis) is soul (psuchTit: which in Greek originally
denoted the ability to move). The body by itself is regarded as
an inert entity moved only by the action of agents external to it,
much like a dead body which can be tossed about but cannot move by
itself.
	
Celestial motion, therefore, consists of the motive
action of the soul upon the body, viz, the psychic upon the
corporeal and visible part of the celestia1.2
Furthermore, each celestial is affected both by its own individual
moving soul and by the general moving soul of the universe as a
whole. Although both are essentially self-motions, the former
pertains to an individual specialized movement within the "control"
of the latter.	 "The celestials must be animated (psuchoutai)...
both by the Cosmic Soul (ie. the World-Soul) and by their own
individual soul (idias hekasta psuches), because if they are like
the whole heaven, in which they are, then they are moved in a
circle (kuklophoretika). And if this is so, then they are all
moved in a circle about their own centres (kukl; panta kineitai
peni ta kentra ta heaut;n). And if this is so, and all perpetual
movement has its own individual moving cause (idion...kinoun
aition) and there so many moving causes as individually moved
(idi;s kinoumena) bodies, as Aristotle says (see Phys VIII, 4),
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then it is necessary that the stars have their own individual
appointed souls (psuchas...idias ephest;sas) which move them
(tas kinousas)" (119).	 "Hence it is necessary that each of
the stars has its own individual presiding divine soul (idian
echeia epib;bekuian theian psuch;n) and through these souls, which
are in them (en autois ousli), the stars are linked (sunaptesthai)
to the Whole Soul (in this case, the World-Soul)" (120).
Another feature of celestial motion was its association with Time.
Soul, in Proclus' system, is essentially eternal (ousian ai;nion
echei) but its actions and effects are temporal (energeian kata
chronon). 3 Not surprisingly, the type of movement which can be
perpetual and still be temporal, is the periodic (periodois
metreitai),4 since it has neither beginning nor end.
	 "For if it
is measured by time (hupo chronou metreitai) and has a transitive
activity (metabatiOs energei) and movement is its distinctive
character (idia kinesis), and all that moves participates in time,
which if it is perpetual, moves in periods and periodically
returns in a circle (periodiOs anakukleitai) and is restored to
its starting point (apokathistatai), then it is evident that every
encosmic soul having movement and exercising a temporal activity
(energousa kata chronon), will have a periodic motion and cyclic
reinstatements (apokatastaseis)" (121).
The term "apokatastasis", meaning to return to the state or point
of origin, was the chief characteristic of celestial motion in
Plato's Timaeus and it was regarded as the means for defining the
measure of time. For example, the Solar and Lunar periods (the
"years" and "months") are the most obvious time measures, but the
planets are also valid candidates.5
Proclus boldly extended this "measure of time" to include not only
the orbital but also the axial period of both theplanets and the
fixed stars. 6
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Time and motion are in this way inextricably linked so that a
relation of time-lengths is equivalent to a relation of movements.
Probably the only form of "absolute" time is the period of the
World-Soul.	 "Now it is evident that the soul which is first
measured by time has the whole of time for measure (sumpanti
chron; metreitai). For if time is the measure of all movement,
the first mobile (to pr;t;s kinoumenon) will participate in the
whole of time and be measured by time in its entirety (hupo pantos
memetr;menou); for if the sum total of time (ho sumpas chronos)
does not measure its prime participant it cannot as a whole
measure any other (lesser entity). And that all other souls
(NB. bar the first, the World-Soul) are measured by certain
measures less universal (merik;terois) than the total time is
apparent from the above. For if they are less universal than
the soul which primarily (priits3s) participates in time, it follows
that they cannot make their periods coextensive (epharmosousi)
with time in its entirety" (122).
Apart from the relatively abstract considerations about the
length of the "great year", thelapocatastasis" of all the periods
in the universe, the measurement of periodic times had also the
more immediate astronomical advantage of determining the rapidity of
celestial orbital motion (the axial periods, except perhaps the
Moon's, were unobservable).7
Although periodic movement in time need not necessarily mean
circular movement in space, Proclua l attitude to the virtues of
the circular shape is that of all Greek philosophers and
astronomers. The main reason was its over-all symmetry which
made it literally the perfect shape for the smoothly continuous
movement of the celestial bodies. 8 The sphere's qualities of
"symmetry", "beauty" and "simplicity", and their relation to
"truth", were valued at least as much by the ancient as they are
by the - modern theoretician. "The discourse about movement follows
that on animation (psuchoseos); because each of the stars is
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animated and through this is alloted its appropriate movement;
for the soul is a principle of motion (arch; kin;se;s). And it
is also connected with the theory concerning their shape (schematos);
for each of the stars has its own proper (oikeion) circular shape
(sch;ma kuklikon) and this it receives from the demiurgic/efficient
cause, and by necessity it also has an activity (energeian) and
circular motion (kuklik;n phoran) which is appropriate to the
circular shape" (123).
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NOTES ON II.B.6.1
1 Eg., cf. Kepler "Mysterium Cosmographicum" ch.20, "Astronomia
Nova" ch.45, "Epitome of Copernican Astronomy" IV, 3.
Kepler chose to make the soul-like force resident in the Sun,
as the "heart" of the system.	 Also see
2 It should be mentioned that Plato did not explicitly have the
star-souls resident in the celestial bodies; some of the options
he considered can be found in Laws X 898-9, viz, resident in
the celestial body, or outside it and acting upon it either
by corporeal contact (the souls possesing their own "body" of
fire or air) or by incorporeal power.	 The same ambivalence,
viz, the star-soul resident in or attached to the celestial body,
is discerned also in the Epinomis (probably, since the author
of the Epinomis was the editor of the Laws), 982-3.
Another interpretation is that the options of an externally
acting soul are presented in order to exemplify the validity of
an internally resident soul, see G.Vlastos "Plato's Universe"
(1975) part 2 esp. p.31-52 (part 2 is a ref. for this and the
following chapters on celestial motion). 	 Whatever the precise
position of Plato, it is quite clear that for Proclus the
star-souls are resident in the celestial bodies.
Aristotle rejected independent motion for the celestial bodies,
however, a soul-like kind of action was transferred to the
celestial spheres, as opposed to the celestial bodies themselves.
Cf. the art. by R.W.Sharples on. the complexity of the issue,
"Alexander of Aphrodisias on divine providence" Cl.Q.1982 p.208-11;
"The Unmoved Mover and the motion of the heavens in Alexander
of Aphrodisias" Apeiron 17i (1983) p.62-66-
Aristotle's rejection of independent motion for the planets,
both as "whirling" and "rolling like a wheel" is, of course,
linked to the notion of axial rotation; see T.Heath Aristarchus
p.233-5.
On the value of self-initiated motion also see, A.E.Taylor
op.cit. p.64.
3 Eg., E1.Th.191.
4 Eg., E1.Th.198.
5 See, eg., In Tim.III 53,16-25, 54,18-21, 55,14-56,1.
and K.R.Dodds notes on E1.Th.199-200, op.cit., p.30I-3.
Plato in Tim.38C-39E denominated the planets as the instruments
of Time, however Proclus included the fixed stars' proper motion
viz, the self-rotation as well as of the planets.
Also see Cornford Plato's Cosmology op.cit. p.97-107; A.E.Taylor
op.cit, p.190-1.
6 As in note 5; also see Festugiere Comm. sur le Time op.cit.
vol.IV p.76-7 n.1; IE.Taylor op.cit. p.219 n.2; T.Heath Arist.
op.cit. p.174.
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7 On the difference in orbital speed .between the Moon (the celest.
body closest to earth) and Saturn (the body furthest), eg.,
In Tim.III 75,21-76.
On the "Great Year" see the discussion T.Heath Aristarchus op.ct.
p.171-4, 315-6; A.E.Taylor op.cit. p.216-9. 	 It is not, in
the main, the total period of the precessional movement -
although some, such as Hipparchus, may have confused the two -
but the sum total of all the periods which define Time, ie. the
periods from all the motions of the celestial bodies.
The issue of the Moon's axial rotation is complex:
Cornford, op.cit. p.119, uses the Moon's axial rotation, ipso
facto, to justify the Platonic self-motion of celestial bodies,
moreover, he infers that Proclus employed the Moon as an
example for his extension of self-rotation to the planets; this
is, however, misleading because no such arg. exists in the
Proclus ref. given by Cornford, nor anywhere else, on my
reading. Nevertheless, it would be correct to say, that
attributing axial, spin rotation to the Moon does indeed
follow from Proclus' extension of self-rotation to the planets.
But, as A.E.Taylor points out, op.cit. p.225-6, in the Timaeus
self-rotation seems to have been reserved solely for the
fixed stars, not the planets (incl. the Moon). 	 This would
agree with the prevalent Greek notion that the celestial bodies
revolve as if they move fixed on cartwheels, Taylor 148, which is
essentially Aristotle's position: for him, De Caelo II 8 290a,
that the Moon always shows the same face, is proof that it does
not rotate axially. However, another interpretation of this
phenomenon was,that itwas purely an illusion, created by the
reflection of the earth's mountains and seas on the Moon's
smooth surface; attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias by
Simplicius In de Caelo p.457.
8 Cf. 0.J.Brendel "Symbolism of the sphere" (1977) Etudes prelimin.
aux religions orient. dans l'Empire romain 67.
The sphere, not unexpectedly, features strongly in the modern
"super-symmetry" theories about the "grand-unification" of
forces.
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6.2.1 THE FIXED STARS
If the diurnal motion of the heavens as a whole represents the
first step from simplicity to complexity in a hierarchy of
movement, then the movement of each fixed star represents the
second.
Firstly, the fixed stars move as a group in accordance with the
"Same" circulation (periphora) of the World-Soul about the centre
of the universe. This is the diurnal revolution whose westerly
direction was called "towards the leading" zodiac signs (epi ta
proegoumena). 1 It could also be regarded as a translational
movement, since in the Timaeus (40 AB) it had been called "forward"
(eis to prosthen): This, as Proclus explains, is just a way of
describing the movement of a fixed star from one place on its
orbit to the next in the "leading" — interpreted as "forward" —
direction. It does not imply rectilinear motion, since the
overall trajectory of the "forward" motion is circular.2
Secondly, each fixed star moves about its own individual centre
performing an axial rotation, as it were, on the same spot. 3
Proclus does not specify the sense of this self-rotation but it
would be safe to assume that it is also right-handed, "imitating"
the heavenly movement of the "Same".
Each fixed star therefore has both a singular group and a
singular individual movement. "How can that which is of the
same substance (autes ousias) as the whole heaven not revolve
(kuklophoroTtikon) with its own individual (idian) movement ?
And how can it otherwise imitate the universe (to pan) than by
moving around its own centre (peni to heautou kentron pheromenon) ?
By necessity, therefore, the stars are moved with a twofold motion:
in themselves (kath l hauta) around their own centre, and in
conjunction with their own wholeness (meta tes heauton holot;tos:
•i.e . their sphere). What kind therefore are these two movements ?
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For different people say different things; some say that they
are both corporeal, others say that the one is psychical and
the other corporeal. 	 But it is best to make (poiein) both the
psychical and the corporeal twofold... The stellar soul is moved
in two ways (dich;s), and the body is led around (periagetai)
its own centre ... and is carried in the forward direction (eis
to prosthen) of the fixed circulation " (124).
"Each of the stars ... has a circular motion which is appropriate
to the circular figure; for every natural body (s;ma phusikon)
is moved by itself and not by accident (kath' hauto kai ou kata
sumbeb;kos), inasmuch as nature is a principle of movement and
change (kineseos kai metabol -es; this is the Aristotelian
definition of movement as change).. But the stellar body (astr;411
soma) is not moved (akin;ton estin) according to all other kinds
of change-movement (kin;seis) being perpetual through all time
(ton panta chronon aidion), thus it is only possible (monen
dunaton) to admit (epidechesthai) the local movement (t -en kata
topon: locomotion), and of this only the circular one" (125).
It was aptly significant for Proclus l scheme that each fixed
star has a local movement because it marked the first change-
movement in the hierarchy of spatio-temporal motion (which also
enabled him to blend in the Aristotelian definition of movement).
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6.2.2.	 THE PRECESSION
Proclus rejects the existence of this phenomenon — A.E. Taylor
called it one of his occasional whimsicalities ("A Commentary on
Plato's Timaeus" p. 209). 	 The issue in fact is - not simply the
precession of the equinoxes but the apparent backward motion
(epi ta hepomena: ie. eastwards) of the fixed stars about the
axis of the ecliptic. 5
The discovery, by Hipparchus 2ndC BC, in its original form related
to the change in the longitude of certain stars over a long
period, while their ecliptical latitude remained the same.
Ptolemy's own observations 265 years later6 confirmed the existence
of this change in longitudes. He also confirmed that the pole
(in modern terms the axis) of the very slow easterly motion is
indeed the ecliptical rather than the celestial: apart from the
invariability of the ecliptical latitudes, which Hipparchus had
already noted, the celestial latitudes changed in a manner consistent
with an additional, ecliptical movement. 	 This led him, like
Hipparchus, to assign ecliptical rather than celestial coordinates
to the stars.
Yet the actual phenomenon in its bare form was not the precession
of the equinoxes as such, but that the distances between the
fixed stars and the equinoctial points (and the solsticial) alter:
ie. the stars change with respect to the points which were (and
are) used as references for their astronomical positions.
Whether this meant that the equinoxes — the reference points —
are the ones which move, or the fixed stars themselves, was a
matter of preference.
Hipparchus, the discoverer himself, seems to have preferred the
first hypothesis, as the title of the treatise which set out
the phenomenon shows, "on the precession of the solsticial and
the equinoctial points"(peri tEs metaptaseEs t3n tropik5n kai
isEmerinon simeion).7
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Ptolemy, on the other hand, seems to have opted for the second
hypothesis, for his account ("Syntaxis" VII 2 & 3) refers
repeatedly to the backward motion of the fixed stars, or of the
fixed sphere, about the ecliptic pole rather than to the
equinoxes: he accepts that both the celestial and the ecliptical
poles are fixed in the heavens and so are the equinoctial points.8
Proclus l view of the phenomenon is likewise the second, viz.
that the fixed stars themselves (are supposed to) move backwards
with respect to the direction of their diurnal revolution,
moreover all his references point to an even stronger physical
interpretation of such a motion. This accords with his overall
premise that the celestial bodies and their motion are physically
real entities.
Virtually all of Proclus' criticism, as it appears in three
separate works, the Commentaries "on the Timaeus" and "on the
Republic", and the "Outline of Astronomical Hypotheses", employs
arguments based on observation rather than on theory. His
chief argument against the movement of the fixed stars about the
ecliptical pole is that many stars which have always been — and
still are — observed and considered to be visible should have
become invisible, and vice versa. 9 His favourite example is the
perennial circumpolarity of the Great Bear constellation: it
recurs both in the "Comm. on the Timaeus" and in the "Outline".
. "The celestial phenomena are sufficient to convince those who
have eyes and can see (tous echontas ommata peithein hikana);
for it is evident, that if the fixed stars were moving about the
poles of the zodiac circle in the direction following the order
of signs (eis ta hepomena: ie. eastwards) then the Bear, which
since Homer's time has been called always-visible (aeiphanous:
ie. circumpolar), must set in these latitudes (dunein en toutois
edei) in no small part since it should have moved by now by
more than 15° ...Yet (alla m-en) the Bear is still always-visible...
Therefore the motion of the fixed stars in the direction following
the order of signs, which they keep on babbling about (thruloumene)
- 265 -
is not true (ouk al;th;s)" (126).
Although Proclus' statement regarding the setting of the Great
Bear at Meditteranean latitudes due to the precession may
deserve a separate fuller treatment, it suffices to mention
here that his argument in itself is correct (although his assumption
that it does not happen, is in fact not true). The precession
does change the declinations of the stars and over a sufficiently
long period some stars long held to be visible will become
invisible and vice versa (although the rate of change with respect
to declination is V. small, not the 50" p.a., nor even.Ptolemy's and .
Proclus' 10 per 100 years, which is the general precessional
rate.	 It is only, at max., approximately 20" per year). 10
Proclue other line of attack is to cast doubt on the reliability
of the observational evidence in support of the phenomenon.
He draws attention to the low number of observations which record
the backward motion of the stars and the relatively short interval
of time over which they have been made. He contrasts the number
of observations listed by Hipparchus and Ptolemy (taken over
approx. 400 years) against the reputed countless number made by
the Babylonians and the Egyptians over considerably longer periods,11
which do not record such phenomenon. "I would principally refer
to the Chaldeans (in this case at least, meaning the Babylonians),
whose astronomical observations (t;r;seis) span over whole cosmic
-
periods (holon kosmikon periodon) ... Why then are we asked to
accept as evidence (ti	 hemeis marturometha) the records
(histor;mena) of few observations (ex o1i6n t;rserm) and the
sightings (theamata) which are not so accurate (meta tosautes
akribeias)" (127).
This is a particularly perspicacious objection for it questions
the value of quantitatively slender observational evidence when
the quantitatively greater (both in number, and in time-interval)
is negative, especially for an alleged phenomenon which demands
by its very nature a great quantity of evidence for its
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verification (the backward motion is very slow, ie. it has a
very long period of "apokatastasis": see Ch. 6.1).
	 What he
does not take into consideration in the argument is the
quality of the evidence (or even the method by which it was
taken), which can outweigh Any quantitative deficiency.
Yet there are also some statements which indicate that
Proclus rejected the precession because he found objectionable
the very suggestion of an additional ecliptical movement for
the fixed stars.
	
"The astronomers' theory of the fixed stars
(aplaneis asteras), for they are called and indeed are non-
wandering (aplaneis...ontas), does not leave them in peace
(m-ede apragmonas), but according to their observation even they
are supposed to become more or less distant from the celestial
pole and appear to occupy different places at different times
(topon allote allon epechein), as if (has an) they are themselves
moving just like the planets" (128). "This movement of the
fixed stars, which is as we showed earlier, we do not find
acceptable (ouk areskon hemin)... and all the philosophers (sophoi:
lit. wise-men) agree with this and have the fixed sphere move around
the World-pole (ie. the celestial axis) not that of the ecliptic"(129).
The problem with this theoretical argument, viz, the fixed stars
should not move like the planets, is that within Proclus' system
it is not a good argument for excluding such a motion. One of
the main rules of his philosophy is that the hierarchically
"higher" entities "anticipate" and "contain the principles" of
the characteristics of the"lower". For example, the planets
are said to contain the "principles" and the "paradigms" of
sublunary motion (the latter being hierarchically lower; see
Ch. 1 Status of celestial bodies). That is, the theoretical
framework of his own system far from being incompatible with the
planetary-like movement of the fixed stars, is. actually quite
fit to support it: the fixed stars could be said to "anticipate"
the motion of the planets.
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Another probable reason is,of course, that as a Platonist and
especially as a Platonic Successor he had to regard the
precessional movement as a priory objectionable (it is overtly
contrary to the statements about the fixed stars, in the Timaeus).
This position does indeed accord with his other "whimsicality",
the defence of the Platonic order of the planets - (see Ch. 7).
On balance though, Proclus appears to attach considerably more
value to the astronomical or observational rather to the
intrinsic grounds for rejecting the precessional movement.
This agrees with the apparently piecemeal acceptance of the
phenomenon even three-four centuries after Ptolemy. 	 Simplicius
( 6th C AD) for example, admitted it cautiously ("alethesteron
isCo' s an eie legein") only because his teacher and Proclus t student
Ammonius of Hermeias had personally verified it by observation. 12
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NOTES ON II.B.6.2
1 Astronomical jargon, meaning the zodiac signs "leading" in the
diurnal celestial motion. Proclus In Tim.III 77-78, and eg.,
Geminus I, 5 (Manitius).
2 In Tim.III 120,25-121,30; also see Taylor, op.cit., p.226 comm.
on Plato Tim.40B; cf. T.Heath op.cit. p.162 who distinguishes
between the phrase "to the right", as in a straight line, from
"rightwards", as in a circle.
3 See Plato Tim.40B.
J.L.E.Dreyer "History of Planetary Systems" op.cit. comments
on p.71, that it is a curious fact that Plato by purely
philosophical reasoning was brought to the conclusion that
the heavenly bodies rotate around their own axis. The same
would apply to Proclus, esp. in view of his self-rotation for
the planets, as well, and, perhaps, his satellite theory.
4 Eg., Aristotle Physica II 1, 192b, etc.
5 It refers to "precession" as a full gapokatastatic" backward
movement, as opposed to a short-term oscillation of the
equinoxes, the "trepidation", which was not disputed by Proclus.
The whole problem is examined in detail by 0.Neugebauer
History of Math.Astronomy op.cit. p.296-8, 598, 631-34, where
Proclus is mentioned. The issue of how and whether the two
were seen as separate or the same id further complicated by the
possibility that Hipparchus was the inventor of both.
Also see, P.Duhem op.cit. vol.11 p.181 ff.
For Proclus, cf. Hyp.Astr. the "hypotheses" no. eight and nine;
he views Ptolemy's promulgation of the "variation" of the .
positions of the fixed stars as an artificial hypothesis
employed for the solution of the anomalies of planetary motion,
ie. as a way for 'adjusting' positional coordinates(in the
"Syntaxis" the account of the precession, Bk.7, is placed just
before that of the planetary motion, Bk.9 etc, Bk.8 is mainly
on coordinate geometry and data) ..see Proclus Hypoth.Astr.
p.136-140, his preamble to the theory on the planets.
6 The figure given in Ptolemy "Syntaxis" VII,2.
7 "Metapt6sis" means lit."variation"; more strongly "falling
back", with respect to the "leading" direction.
Also cf. Hipparchus In Arati et Eudoxi phaenomena comment. libri
tree (ed. Manitius, Teubner 1894) p.30.
8 Also cf. Syntaxis VII 3 and 4.
9 In Tim.III 125; In Rep.II 235; HYpoth.Astr. p.234.
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10 For the possibility that some of the Bear constellation
has indeed become invisible due to precession see, T.Heath
Aristarchus op.cit p.8-9 n.2.
The technical ref. in the parenthesis from W.M.Smart "Textbook
on Spherical Astronomy" 6th ed. (1977) ch.10 on Precession and
Nutation, esp. p.229-23I, which includes the formulae on the
effect of precession on the declination (angular distance from
celestial equator) of a star. On the options of interpr. the
phenomenon, see n.5 above, ibid p.226-8.
Briefly, the limits of visibility of a star can be estimated from
the geographical latitude of the observer and the declination of
the star, with allowances for atmospheric refraction.
Specifically, the tail-end of the Great Bear, Eta Ursae Majoris,
the southernmost of the seven, has declination of approx. + 500.
Therefore, it will be circumpolar for observers north of latit.
N (900_500=400), such as Byzantium and perhaps Thessalonica,
certainly not Athens or other more southern places.
Another piece of evidence forProclus was that Canopus of the
Argo constell.whichwas seen "grazing" (paraxeonta) the horizon
by observers of the "fourth latitude", ie that of Rhodes (36° N),
should also have changed. Using present values for Canopus,
with declination -52° 40' it would be permanently invisible
for observers north of approx. 37 0 N (900-530 ), and therefore,
it may still be, as Proclus said, only just visible for observ.
of the "fourth latitude" (In Tim.III 125).
11 A similar statement regarding the quantity of observations and
lengths of time of the Egyptians and Babylonians is made by
Simplicius In de Caelo p.117, in support of the unchangeability
of the heavens.
12 Simplicius In de Caelo 462,20-25; also see, 0.Neugebauert
Hist. of Ancient Math. Astr. op.cit. p.1037.
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6.3 THE PLANETS
Proclus' view of the complex movement of the planets is, that it
is appropriate to their intermediary status and therefore ranks
between the simple movement of the fixed stars, and the entirely
complex and disorderly movement of the sublunary inhabitants.
"In order that by being intermediaries (mesoi) between the fixed
btars and the rectilinearly moving (kat' eutheian kinoumen;n)
entities, they have a mixed (mikten:..kin;sin) movement, viz.
are carried in altitude and depth (eis hupsos...kai bathos) and
are moving direct (propodizontes) and retrograde (hupopodizontes),
but all of them take place in regular periods of time (en chronois
tetagmen;s)" (130).
Although the planets, like the fixed stars, are still moved both
by the World's and their own individual moving principle, the
soul, both of these factors are no longer singular in action.
Firstly, the diurnal westerly revolution is not the only celestial
movement imparted to them. They are also subject to the "Other"
circulation, the much slower easterly (from West to East) annual
movement along the ecliptic in the so-called direction following
the order of the zodiacal signs (epi ta hepomena). 1
 Secondly,
even the group-movement of the "Other" circulation is splintered
into 7 sub-circulations with different speeds appropriate to each
of the 7 planets. Thirdly, according to Proclus, the individual
motion of each of the planets is no longer singular, ie. a pure
axial rotation, but is also expressed in the numerous "anomalies"
of their orbital motion, the orbital excursionsl and the
retrogradations of the 5 proper planets. 2
"It is the characteristic property (to idion) of the fixed stars
to move 'towards the same things' (kata ta auta)31 on the same
spot' (en t; aut;)3with their own individual (idi:an) movement,
...but the planets have 'changes-of-direction' (tropas)3while
they travel through the heavens; ...It is evideftt therefore that
the planets become more distant from and nearer to (apogeiotera
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ginesthai kai perigeiotera: apogee & perigee) earth by themselves
(di g heautli) and make the changes-in-direction in latitude (kata
platos...tropas) by their own travelling (poreuomena) and not by
being carried by others (ouch' hup' allon pheromena), such as some
say by certain 'counteracting' spheres (anelittousli tines: i.e.
the Eudoxan and Aristotelian system) or by the epicycles, since
they have l as it were, in the mode of their own singular nature
(kata -an heaut;n mian phusin), both a singular and a varied
motion (mian kai poikilen kin;sin) with which they advance and
retrace their path in a spiral form (propodizonta kai hupopodizonta
helikoeid;s: ref. to the combined diurnal and ecliptic motion)
and change-the-form (metaschematizonta) of its revolution in all
various ways (pantoiCis), hence their motion is triple: the one,
with which they are changing-direction and moved (trepetai...
kineisthai), moving both about their own centres and in latitude:
depth (kata platos...kai kata bathos), the second, with which
they are led around (periagetai) towards the left (ep' aristera:
ie. to the East) by their own circles-spheres (kuk111), and the
third, with which they are led around by the 'Same' circulation
(hupo te.s tautou phoras) which governs (kratouses) all the
circulations of the 'Other' (thaterou: ie. the ecliptic
movement)" (131).
So, whereas the fixed stars move along their orbit in one sense
only, the planets move in all six, both with their regular (ie.
diurnal and ecliptic) and their anomalous movement (ie. the
retrogradations, stoppings and advancements (hupopodismous,
sierigmous, propodismous)4 ): in longitude, forwards and
backwards — or right-handedly and left-handedly depending on
point of view — ; in latitude, up and down; in depth, ie.
closer or further from earth, and from another point of view up
and down (since depth = distance from earth = height). 5
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The variety in speed and direction of planetary motion presented
two fundamental problems to Proclus:
(i) The chief problem inherent in a geocentric system, namely
the "loopings" of retrograde movement.
Proclus rejected the counteracting spheres of Eudoxus as well as
the eccentrics and the epicycles as artificial inventions, which
do not have any bearing on the real nature of planetary motion.6
He objected to them not only because of their ad hoc handling
(Proclus was well aware of both the Aristotelian and the Ptolemaic
mathematical systems)but also because his own system had no place
for them and relied instead on self-generated action.
	 "The
irregularity is only apparent (phainetai monon) through the
contrary motion (phoras) of their revolutions (anelittousal)
and through the retrograde (antiperiphoras), which are explained
either by the epicycles (epikuklous) and eccentrics (ekkentrous)
or by other causes (aitias); but not all hypotheses have the
same probability (to eikos), and of those which have been invented
(eskeucir;menai) by the later scientists (ne;ter7m), some are far
from the simplicity (tes haplot -etos aphistantai) of divine things,
and others suppose that the motion of the celestials is as it
were (h;sper) sustained by a machine (hupo mechanes: ie. the
celestial motion is mechanical; also a pun on 'deus ex machine)"
(132).
His solution seems to have been that the same principle which
is responsible for the movement of the planets must also be
responsible for their observed irregularities. Like others
before him, including Aristotle in his earlier Platonic period,
he accounted for these variations by employing the "volition"
(boul;sis, see 11.B.2 and 1.11.1.3 ) of the planets; as self-
determined entities. 7
"These stars move in different ways without needing these kind
Of contrivances (toiout7an mechanZmatiin: viz, the epicyclespetc)
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... hence this variety of movement must depend on the motion of
the souls (exaptein tes kin;se;s ton psuch;n) according to whose
volition (boul;sin) the bodies are moved faster (thatton) or
slower (braduteron)„ but not through lack of power (astheneian)
... for the very same irregularity is effected (gignomen;n) in
ordered intervals of time (en tetagmenois chronois)" (133).
"For the planets are not moving irregularly through lack of control
as the inanimate things (kathaper ta apsucha), but through the
volition of their presiding souls. And the - various intellections
(no;seis), which he called 'zones' (NB.ref. to the 'Chaldean'
terminology of spheres), are turning with their own order and
lead the apparent 'indiscipline' (phainomenen tOn s;matOn ataxian)
of the bodies into their proper order, by preserving (diasOsamenas)
-
each of the planets with their own power (tais heauton dunamesi)"(134).
This is consistent with his theory of self-constituted entities
(see Ch. 2 the celestial) as well as his theory of celestial
motion. It is also indicative of the consistency between the
ontological and cosmological elements of his philosophy.
There is an objection which can be aimed at all the dynamical,
physical explanations ( as opposed to kinematical, mathematical
accounts) of celestial motion, which rely on the action of a
property immanent in the celestial body. They carry the concept
of self-action to its logical extreme and fall into the trap of
spontaneity which may be said to render scientific explanation
impossible. As G. Vlastos ("Plato's Universe" p.59) points out:
"The explanatory value of such ancillary hypothesis (le. the
volitional action) would have been bogus. It would purport to
explain observed irregularities in the motions of this or that
star by postulating that the star simply chose to move in just
those ways for just those periods of time. Why it should have
made those choices rather than any of the infinitely many
alternative ones it could have taken at those same points in its
trajectory would remain a mystery. The proposed explanans
(ie. the explanation), itself no less obscure than the explanandum
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(ie. that which is to be explained ), would explain nothing".
This criticism is even more poignant for Proclue,than, for
example, Ptolemy's physical explanation of planetary movement,
because the former relies exclusively on free motion in space,
whereas the latter seems to have included "crystalline" ring-
spheres as well (albeit driven by the self=moved planets).
Part of the objection is that spontaneity Implies indeterminacy
and at best irregularity, randomness, if not chaos - something
whichwas particularly inconvenient for a theory on celestial
motion.
But this does not hold true for Proclus' view of the celestials.
Inasmuch as the mode of manifested behaviour is dependent on the
immanent property, power, which initiates it, and since the
celestial 'mover' (see Ch. 2) is both deliberate & orderly in
itself, then spontaneity at least for the celestials means
built-in intended order, neither accident nor chance.8 Proclus
is at pains to emphasize (see the quotes 133 & 134) that the
"wandering" is not due to lack-of-power (astheneian), an expression
also employed in the description of gross matter and the disorderly
movements associated with it. Besideso the planetary anomalies
take place in regular, ordered terms, "in measures and bounds"
(see quote 78,Ch. 1), which can after all be defined quite
successfully by mathematics.
So, the hypothesis of self-moved planets does not lead to
indeterminacy, nor to unpredictability moreovert it renders their
orderly behaviour inherent rather than dependent on other
physical factors.
But the central argument, that the "explanans" is no less obscure
than the "explanandum", still standa, even if - it can be accepted
that the "mystery" reats with the observers rather than with the
objects of observation, the planets themselves, as Ptolemy had
concluded in his physical accounto the "Planetary Hypotheses"
- 275 -
(XIII,2).	 "It is not fitting to judge the very simplicity of
heavenly objects from those that seem to be simple with us, when
not even with us is the same object equally simple to everyone
alike ... Rather (we should judge their simplicity) from the
unchangeableness of the natures in heaven itself and of their
movements. For them all would appear simple, and more so than
those things that seem so with us, since it is unthinkable that
there is any labour or difficulty in their revolutions". 9
 As
long as there is even a trace of irregularity among self-moved
stars the above objection holds. It can only really disappear
with the last irregularity.
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(ii)	 The planets are subject to contrary actions.
According to Aristotle the heavenly substance is unchangeable,
neither generated (gene-ton) nor destroyed (phtharton) because
there is no opposite action or motion to the circular; change,
"generation and perishing, takes place among opposites" (en
tois enantiois far he genesis kai he phthora). 10
Proclus accepted this thesis p for some of his statements in the
"Elements of Physics" — the physics of Aristotle — say much the
same, and more importantly, he does not override them elsewhere
(eg. in the Comm. on the Timaeus; see II A5). 	 "Nothing is
contrary to the circular movement (ouden estin enantion)" (135).
"Those which move circularly by nature (kata phusin) are not
aubject (oute...epidechetai) to either generation or perishing
...for if something is generated and perishes, it comes-to-be
from a contrary (ex enantion ginetai) and passes away into a
contrary (eis enantion phtheiretai). Except that which moves
in a circle does not have a contrary; therefore it is ungenerated
and imperishable" (136). He seems to have appreciated that
since his theory of celestial motion is pivoted on self-motion
then the changes of direction of the planets imply that their
self-moving principle is subject to contra-dictory actions,
which manifest themselves in the characteristic "wandering' ,
 motion.
Therefore, according to Aristotle such theory would yield transient
rather than eternal celestial bodies and movement. Proclus
was able to divert some of the force of this damning implication
with the "spiralling" of the planets as the locus of different
circular movements on different planes. 11 So for example, the
westerly diurnal revolution and the easterly ecliptical may
appear as contrary, but the plane of action of the latter is inclined
with respect to the plane of the former (the angle of inclination
of the ecliptic is approx 24°, the angle of the dodecahedron:
cf. II.A.1). Furthermore, the excursions of the planets, including
those of the Moon and the Sun, from a truly circular path are
not in themselves indicative of contrary, opposing action; since
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they take place in latitude and in distance from earth, not in
longitude. They too can be regarded as a kind of spiralling.
"How do we admit (paradexometha) an opposite sense (enanti;sin)
to the cyclical movement ? The cause of the spiralling (te's
helikos) is not that each of the planets is carried in two
opposing motions (phoras), but that each is moved along the
oblique circle (ie. the ecliptic) with respect to the equinoctial
(to epi loxou kineisthai kuklou pros ton isemerinon) — for if one
were to immediately suppose (autika hupothoito) that the Sun is
moved along the equinoctial in a sense contrary (enantian) to
that of the universe (ref. to the diurnal motion), this would
not be a spiralling (helix ouk estai) although it would be a
revolution in an opposite sense (antiperiphoras) ... May not
therefore the phrase 'progress in two opposite directions' (Tim
39 B) mean that the planets are moved (kineisthai) at one and
the same time (to hama) not only (ou monon) towards the East
and to the West, but also (alla kai) in latitude (platos) and in
depth (bathos: ie. distance from earth), nearer or further from
the earth (prosgeioterous apogeioterous) and northerly or
southerly (ie. in latitude: there is a chiasmus here); for
these two (duo) movements produce, in conjunction with the
revolution of the universe, the helix. For the spiral (helix)
is the appropriate (prepousa) figure for the planets since they
are intermediate between the fixed stars and the sublunar entities,
the fixed stars moving (kinoumenon monon) solely in a circle,
but the sublunaries moving in straight lines (euthuporoumena)"
(137).
"For, as it was said before, the circle applies solely to the
fixed sphere (epi tes aplanous), but the straight line (eutheia)
to the generation, whereas the spiral to the planets,
commingling (summixin echousa) both the curve (periphereias)
and the straight line, and the movements in latitude and in depth
are the proximate (prosecheis) causes and paradigms of the
movements down-here (entautha), viz, the up-down and the sideways
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ta plagia)" (138).
But the retrograde phase itself of the 5 proper planets could
not be explained away in this manner, because it involves
backtracking in longitude as well as excursion in latitude.
His answer is to accept that contrariety does exist in the
heavens but in a "causal" mode of existence since the heavens
are immaterial.
Firstly, the existence of contrariety among the planets agreed
with their hierarchical status as intermediaries between the
simplicity of the fixed stars and the multi-conflicting
complexity among the sublunaries. Secondly, the "causal" mode
of existence emphasized that the contrariety is only "formal",
and contrary forms can co-exist by themselves without mutual
interference. Thirdly, by reiterating that the heavens are
immaterial — albeit in relation to sublunary matter --Proclus
rendered the heavens "impassive"(cf. II.A.6) and, in effect, denied
the gross material substrate necessary for contrariety to result
in proper material perishing.
"Therefore it should not be surprising that there is some kind
of opposition in some of the movements in the heaven; for...
these are not the contraries which conflict with (enantia ta
machomena) and are destructive of each other — for these pertain
to the enmattered and particulated entities (enula kai merista)
— but these are simply the efficient causes (poietika) of
contrarieties (tn enantill)... And the figure of the helix is
not an empty coincidence (ouk esti sumpt;ma kenon), but it
-
appropriately fills (sumpleroi) the intermedium (mesoteta)
between the bodies moving rectilinearly and those moving
circularly (kuklophoroumenon)" (139).
"For it is requisite (edei) that the cause of complexity (poikilias)
and the principles of contrariety (enanticisec3s archas) are
anticipated (proeilephthai) in the heaven; or how could the
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heaven comprehend (periexei) the generation and how could it
guide (podegetesei) the transformation of the sublunary Elements
if it did not contain in itself (periech;n en heautO) the
principle of contrariety ? Because the heaven is immaterial as
far as it is possible among the sensibles (aulos Os en aisthetois
estin), and does not contradict (ou machetai) the contrarieties,
which are in it (en aut;), nor is at variance (oude stasiazei)
with either (pros allela), but it coexists (sunuparchei) with
both. And the same star is moved in twofold circulations and
it does not have the one 'In itself' (kath' hauto) and the other
'by accident' (kata sumbeb;kai, for if I must voice my opinion,
it has both circulations 'in itself'; for what is accidental
(ti...estin ekei sumbebekos) over-there among all the immaterial
real-beings (au 1-on ontli) all of which are given subsistence
(huphistamenat) from the whole creation (hole demiourgias) ?
... Therefore because (epeid;) the heaven is immaterial — by
this I mean the matter (hul;n) which is unstable (anedraston),
has acquired a bastard beauty (nothon kallos) and is deformity
itself (aischos ousan) — the heaven is able to embrace both
contrary movements (enantias kin;seis); for when the real-beings
-
which are contrary are outside (ex) this matter (hules tautes:
ie. gross matter) which embraces (stegous;s) nothing, they are
concurrent (sundroma) and united (hen;tai) with each other, but
when they are within matter (en t; hul;), they contradict
(machetai) each other because this matter is not able to admit
the presence of both 'forms' (eid;n: which are mutually contrary)
because of this matter's lack of power (asthe.neian) " (140):
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NOTES ON II.B.6.3
1 Astronomical jargon, again, for the eastward positions, meaning
"following" in the diurnal movement of the heavens; it also has
the connotation of "backwards", for it is in the opposite sense
to the diurnal motion, and it is related, also, to the precession,
see II.B.6.2.2.	 Cf. 0.Neugebauer6Hist.of Math.Astr. op.cit.
p.807.
2 So, whereas the fixed stars have "two" kinds of motion, the
planets have "three", ie. the hierarchy of motion is maintained;
cf. Simplicius In de Caelo p.462, and see T.Heath,Aristarchus,
op.cit. p.173-4, and P.Duhem op.cit. vol.II p.203-4.
Also, Proclus In Tim.III 79-80.
For the "splintering" of the "Other" circulation, viz, that of
ecliptical motion, see Plato Tim.36D1-6 ref. to "schisas",
meaning, (the Demiurge) "split" the Other circul., and see the
discussion in Taylor op.cit. p.152-3.
3 "Kata ta auta", "en t3	 "tropas", all Platonic terms taken
from Tim.40AB, and used as jargon.	 "tropas", as A.E.Taylor
points .out, op.cit. p.220, is not intended to mean "rotations",
viz, self-rotations, but "turnings back", as in the ecliptical
motion, cf. n.1 above; however, from the overall content,
Proclus extends its meaning to include the anomalous movements
as well.
4 Eg., In Tim.III 56
5 The "six" directions see Plato Tim.34A, 40B, 43BC-E; to which is
added the "seventh" motion, that of "rational" rotation, cf.
Laws I 898, and see G.Claghorn "Aristotle's criticism of Plato's
Timaeus" op.cit. p.60-1 ff.	 Also see Proclus In Tim.III 122-3.
For the debate on what handedness is to be attributed to the
diurnal and the ecliptical circulations see, A.E.Taylor op.cit.
p.150-151, and T.Heath, Aristarchus, op.cit. p.160-163.
6 It relates to the problem of physical reality and mathematical
modelling; see, II.B.4 note 4.
Suffice to note here, that for Proclus the planetary anomalies
are real, ie. they cannot be explained away by the sophisticated
mathematical systems of epicycles etc; in other words, the
anomalous movement of the planets is a "real" problem.
7 Cf. Plato Laws I 896, where soul,"the movement which can move
itself': is firstly the originator of such self-motions as
thoughts, choices, desires and the like (tropoi k. ;the,
bouleseis k. logismoi...); Aristotle on the voluntary motion of
the planets, On Philosophy frg.24. Also see, Cornford Plato's
Cosmology op.cit. p.107-109.	 "Will" in general is examined by
A.Dihle "The theory of will in Classical Antiquity" (1983),
but is not very useful regarding planetary motion.
Will is intrinsically linked with the concepts of deliberation
(bouleusis) and deliberate choice (prohairesis) see fol. note.
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8 On the voluntary and deliberate action in planetary motion see,
J.M.Rist "Prohairesis, Proclus, Plotinus et alii" in
De Jamblique a Proclus, Entretiens Hardt 21 (1975) p.103-122,
and R.W.Sharples discussion in Class.Quart.(1982), Apeiron (1983)
op.cit. II.B.6.1 n.2, and in B.ICS (1976) op.cit. I.B.8.5 n.6.;
also cf. J.M.Rist "Plotinus: the Road to Reality" (1967) ch.9
and 10.
The complex issues of deliberate choice, deliberate action -
defined as a narrower class than voluntary action -, volition
and voluntariness, and determinism and freedom are rigorously
examined by R.Sorabji in "Necessity, Cause and Blame" (1980)
p.227-239, p.243-256.
Also see R.W.Sharples "Responsibility,Chance and Not-Being"
B.ICS (1975) op.cit. II.B.4 n.7.
A more detailed discussion on the problems of free-will and
determinism is beyond the scope of this study; it suffices to
add here, that free-will, for the ancients, did not necessarily
mean indeterminate behaviour, for the other interpretation was
the freedom to follow a single purpose without interference.
This was very much applicable to the "perfect" and "rational"
entities such as the celestials, since they exist above the
material, sublunary realm; hence they have the "free-will"
to follow their "good", which is "order".
9 Translation of G.E.R.Lloyd "Greek Science after Aristotle"
(1973) p.128-9.
10 Aristotle De Caelo 270a 22-23.
11 On the"spiralling" motion of the planets, Plato Tim.39AB.
This is essentially the compound motion of the diurnal and the
ecliptical, see eg., G.Vlastos "Plato's Universe" op.cit.
p.32-59, the "contrariety", Tim.36D, is nothing more than
the opposite sense of direction of the two. More problematic
was the recurrence of "contrary" in Tim.38CD for the
"overtakings" of the Sun by Venus and Mercury, which Proclus
ascribes to the differences in orbital speed, In Tim.III 64-5
(the correct approach for resolving the retrograde motion).
See the discussions, Heath op.cit. p.166-7, Cornford op.cit.
p.88-92, 106-112, Taylor op.cit. p.196-200, 204-211.
Also see Theon of Smyrna "Mathematics useful for the reading of
Plato" (text ed.Hiller, Teubner, 1878) ch.41-43.
Proclus produced a number of theorems for generating complex
motions from a combination of simple ones, in connection with
astronomy; one of them was used, and cited, by Copernicus.
For the detail see, 0.Neugebauer,Hist.of Math.Astr., op.cit.
p.1035 and diagram p.1431.
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7. THE PLANETARY ORDER
That there is any need at all to discuss Proclus on the order of
the seven planets (strictly, the "two luminaries" the Moon and the
Sun, 1and the five planets proper) is due to his "whimsicality", as
A.B. Taylor called it ("A Commentary on the Timaeus" p.209), to
defend the Platonic order of the planets.
Both the Platonic and the Aristotelian-Eudoxan arrangement of the
planetary spheres, in an ascending order from the earth, was:
the Moon, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn.
This order was by no means universally accepted. Although the
relative position of the Moon and the triad, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn,
were not contested, those of the Sun, Mercury and Venus seem to have
been in constant dispute even in Ptolemy's time (2nd c. AD).
According to Theon of Smyrna (also 2nd c. AD, treatise2about 20-30
years before the "Syntaxis") some kept to the Platonic and
Aristotelian order and placed after the Moon, the Sun, Mercury and
Venus, in that order. Others, like an ostensibly 1st c. BC
Pythagorean, had maintained the order, Mercury - Venus - the 8un,
thus keeping the Sun at "the heart of the universe" (kardia tou
pantos) between two triads of planets. 3
 There was also the
mathematical system of Heraklides of llontus (4th c. BC), the alleged
precursor of Tycho Brahe's geo-heliocentric arrangement (the claim
now largely disproved)! which joined Venus and Mercury to the Sun.
The order with the Sun in the fourth, rather than in the second,
position distant from earth may have had some mathematical advantages
stemming from the measurements of Aristarchus of Samos (3rd c. BC).
But overall, the issue was complex, for it was not just a matter
of astronomy, it was primarily of cosmology, a field belonging,also,
to philosophy and astrology; thus, different orders co-existed.
The rise of the order with the Sun in the middle position to
predominance followed from Ptolemy's adoption of it for his famous
system, which stamped it, as it were, with his mark of authority.
Besides, for the more 'philosophical' thinkers, it had also the more
metaphysical virtues (derived from Pythagorean, Stoic and Chaldean
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sources) insofar as the Sun held the central place among the planets.
Proclus' defence of the Platonic order consists mainly of an
undermining of the others — in the tradition of all Greek
philosophers. His actual defence of the Platonic order
occupies less space and for some of it he employs Iamblichus
as a mouthpiece.
His argument against Ptolemy's order is directed at the way he
had arrived at the conclusion, that the planets which keep
"equal-pace" (isodromoi) with the Sun, viz. Mercury and Venus,
are below it (cf. "Syntaxis" IX,1).
Ptolemy had admitted that there is no significant parallax for
Venus and Mercury, this being the method for estimating linear
distances (using the so-called parallactic instrument). He
had also argued that any objections regarding the possibility
of occultations — which had not been observed — of the Sun by
the intervening bodies of Venus and Mercury,6 could be answered
by noting the differences in latitude due to their differently
inclined epicycles. 	 Similarly, the Sun is not eclipsed by the
Moon at every New Moon. He had concluded, that the placing of
the Sun in the middle of the 7 celestial bodies is a convenient
way for dividing the 5 proper planets into two groups: those
who move angularly far from the Sun (modern term is "elongation")
and exhibit significant parallax, ie. Saturn, Jupiter and Mars,
and those who "satellite" the Sun, ie. Venus and Mercury. 7
For Proclus this order is Indeed a "conjectural assumption"
(pithanologein), not "proven by demonstration" (apodeixis
anankaion). 8 As he points out the parallax method is useless
because the Sun's light obscures Venus and Mercury when the
measurements have to be made. 9
Furthermore he is doubtful about the manner by which Ptolemy
had mathematically fitted the ratios of apogee to perigee (the
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defining limits of each "sphere") for Mercury and Venus between
the parallactically measured ap6gee of the Moon (upper limit of
the sphere of the Moon) and the perigee of the Sun (lower limit).
Although he does not explicitly voice it in precisely these
words, it is clear that he regarded as a mere fortuitous
coincidence, the result that the mathematically adjusted ratios
of apogee to perigee for Mercury and Venus (see Ch. 4) could be
made to fit successively very neatly between the objectively
measured distances for the Moon and the Sun. 10 After all,
Mercury's and Venus' distances could not be measured directly
(see criticism of the parallax method, above).
The other party who, unfortunately for a Neoplatonist, also
believed in a Sun situated at the middle of the planets were
the "Chaldeans" and the "Theurgists".
Proclus' response to them is to divert the implicit challenge
so to speak, by placing it within an astro-theological context.
He maintains — and this is his actual defence of the Platonic
order — that in terms of the physical and visible mode of the
cosmos, the Sun is more closely related to the Moon and should
therefore, appropriately, be adjacent. 11 Both are the "luminaries"
(phcita) of the heavens, and the Moon's phases are due to the
Sun; with regards to the domain of generation the Sun and the
Moon are like "father" and "mother" to it. Anyway, it was
Anaxagoras — a "physicist" — who was the first to propose this
order. The arrangement of the planets, which has the Sun in
a central middle position, insofar as it is Chaldean, refers to
a more meta-physical interpretation of the planetary order.
12
Proclus knew that many seventhfold classifications with planetary
correspondences, which he himself used, such as the 7 ages of
man and the 7 classes of people in the ideal city, followed the
Chaldean order 3most probably because of its Babylonian
astrological origins. Such metaphysical view of the heavens is
appropriately "heliocentric" because it emphasizes the Sun's
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role as the source of light, both intelligible and sensible,
rather than its purely corporeal aspect.
... and this in fact is said by the Theologians (theologoi:
the "Chaldean" or "Hellenic") when they talk about the
'firtasents above-the-world' (huperkosmili stere;maton).
On this account therefore it seems to me that Plato (Tim 39
B2-C1) gave a twofold constitution to the Sun, the one in common
(homou) with the 7 cosmic governors (kosmokratorsin: viz the
7 planets), when he discussed the formation of their bodies and
the placing in their circulations (periphoras), but the other
with respect to the kindling of the light (tou photos exapsin),
according to which he gave-a-share (metadiasin) of the hypercosmic
power to it; for the bulk-volume of the Sun in itself (kath'
heauton ton onkon) is one thing, but its 'principal' characteristic
(h;gemonik;s idiotetos) is another, due to which the Sun is
called king of the visible universe (basileus...tou horatou
pantos) and stands analogous to the One source (mian pegen)
of good (agath;n)" (141).
This is the Sun in all its glory as the visible representative
of the One source of All. About this Sun all the other
celestials "circulate as a chorusnlind "escort it as satellites";
Mercury and Venus perhaps more so than the others (see Ch. 5
on the Satellites).
"For through the motion of these planets, which are circulating
around the Sun (peni ton hilion choreuont12), is produced the
recognizable time (sunegn;smenos)" (142).	 "But if you must
insist (ei de kratoie) that the Sun - is Arranged in the middle
of the 7 planets, just as the theurgical oracles (logoi) and
the gods say, with Mercury above the Moon, observe (skopei)
that this order is appropriate (prosekousa) in relation to the
protectors (prostatais: the planets as astro-theological entities)
of the generation as a whole. For the Sun is escorted
(doruphoreitai) by all the cosmic gqvernors (kosmokrator;n: ie.
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the other 6 planets) both in its capacity as the king of every-
thing visible and its ability to express-by-imitation
(apomlmoumenos) the demiurgic powers through the light-rays:
- -
it brings forth (gennon) as well as fills (pleron) with life
and renews (ananeaz;n) the generated things. But above it
are the 3 masculine (an astrological term) planets which exhibit
(epideiknumenoi) active creating (drasterious poieseis) with
respect to the cycle of generation; Saturn combining, (sunkrin;n),
Mars distinguishing (diakrinli) ... and Jupiter bringing the
other two into symmetry (summetros). Below it are the other three,
of which the two at each end (ie. Venus and the Moon) are
feminine (th;leis) but the one in the middle, Mercury, is common
to both genders (koinos: also astrological term)" (143).
Nevertheless Proclus thought that the Platonic order could also
match this "heliocentric" emphasis. He notes that according
to it the Sun is between two pentads: (i) Above it, the five
proper planets-wanderers. 	 (ii) Below it, the Moon at the
boundary with the realm of generation, and the 4 sublunary
15
Elements.
By taking into account both the planetary (but not the fixed
stars) and the sublunary spheres together he not only
emphasized the unity of the cosmos but effectively made the
Sun's middle position even stronger than in the Chaldean
arrangement. Whereas in the Chaldean the Sun is metaphysically
at the centre of the 7 planets, in the Platonic — according to
Proclus — it is at the "centre" of a system composed of both
the planets and the earth. 16
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NOTES ON 11.B.7
1 The Sun and the Moon referred to as the "luminaries" (phOta),
see Proclus Hyp.Astr. p.88,22, 104, 126, 144 ; and cf. Ptolemy
Tetrabiblos 11,17
2 Theon of Smyrna "Mathematics useful for the reading of Plato"
(ed. Hiller) p.141-143.
3 The 1st c. BC Pythagorean is Alexander of Ephesus, or Polyhistor,
not of Aetolia, as Theon wrongly calls him, T.Heath, Aristarchus,
op.cit. p.112-3.	 This theme of the Sun as the "heart"
became popular in the "heliocentric" systems of the Renaissance
and later, cf. Harvey's dedication to Charles I of his treatise
on the circulation of blood.
4 On Heraklides of Pontus, T.Heath op.cit. p.249-283;
0.Neugebauer "On the allegedly heliocentric theory of Venus
by Heraclides Ponticus" (1972) repr. in "Astronomy and History:
Selected essays" (1983) p.370-72; "A History of Ancient Math.
Astronomy" (1975) op.cit. p.694-8; H.B.Gottschalk "Heraclides
of Pontus" (1980) esp. p.69-82. Very briefly, both Neugebauer
and Gottschalk agree that the refs. to "over" and "below"
mean distances in longitude not depth, viz, distance from earth,
ie. they mean "ahead" and "behind", but they differ insofar as
Neugebauer is categorically against any inferences for a
heliocentric system; Gottschalk seems to allow such possibility
as an added bonus for explaining the changes in brightness
(brightness as a function of distance). Thus it would be fair
to say that Heraklides1 system was not an important factor in the
development of an "helio-centred" arrangement of the planets.
It is certainly more probable that the cosmic dimensions as
measured by Aristarchus and Archimedes were instrumental in
shifting the Sun further away from the Moon, see fol. note.
5 The two tables of distances for the Moon, Sun, Venus and Mercury
assumed by Archimedes, see 0.Neugebauer "Aspects of early
Astronomy" (1972) repr. in Astronomy and History op.cit. esp.
p.365-67, and Hist.of Math. Astr. op.cit. p.647-651: according
to the one table of values, the Moon - the Sun - Venus - Mercury,
and according to the other, the Moon - Venus - Mercury - the Sun.
The estimates of Hipparchus and Poseidonius put the Moon approx.
3x further than accord. to Aristarchus, and the Sun 7x and 33x
respect; Ptolemy put the Sun approx. 3x (using values and tables
from Heath and Neugebauer).
The metaphysically inspired arrangements which placed the Sun
in the middle of the heavens/world were not necessarily
concerned with astronomical developments; the "Pythagorean"
eg., was clearly not, for it was based on the "harmony of the
spheres", cf. Theon ref. above, and the"Chaldean" was astrolog.
Also see, Heath op.cit. p.256-9; Taylor op.cit. p.193-4;
Neugebauer, Hist.Math.Astr. op.cit. p.148, 604, 690-3, 785, 1029.
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6 These are in fact the "transits" of Mercury and Venus, which are
not only difficult to observe because of the Sun's brightness,
but rather rare too (approx. 14 times a century for Mercury).
On Ptolemy, also see Neugebauer Hist.Math.Astr. p.691.
7 Also cf. Proclus In Tim.III 62,17-24.
8 In Tim.III 62,19 f., Hypot.Astr. II ch.5 par.11.
9 Hyp.Astr. p.144; cf. In Tim.III 62,6-16; the measurements have
to be made at culmi nation, when Mercury and Venus are at the
meridian, Hyp.Astr. p.116.	 Also see Neugebauer op.cit.
p.100-118, 148.
10 The full analysis of fitting Mercury and Venus between the
Moon and the Sun is given in In Tim.III 62,24-63,20: (my trans.)
"From what Ptolemy had shown in the Syntaxis, if the unit
distance is from the earth's centre, the distances yielded are
thus:	 the minimum distance (elachiston apostema) of the Moon
is 33 earth radii, and the maximum (megiston) is 64 - by
making integers the ratios (moria) which have the monad
as a denominator -, and again, the minimum distance of the Sun
is 1076 units, and the maximum 1260; and if the hypothesis
is that the ratio of Mercury's minimum distance to the maximum
is nearly (engista) 34 to 88 (ie. 34/88), then it is evident,
that by joining together the max. distance of the Moon to the
min. distance of Mercury, the ratio of the max. distance of
Mercury to the min. is (nearly) the same as 166/64. Again,
because for Venus the proportion of the min. distance to the
max. is approximately evaluated as 16/104, it is obvious
(phaneron), that by joining the max. distance of Mercury to
the min. of Venus, the proportion of the max. distance of Venus
to the min. will be as the numbers 1079/166; consequently,
since the Sun's min. distance is 1076.units, differing only so
little from Venus' max. distance (ie. 1079) so as not to be
noticed (even) by the hypotheses themselves, it is evident that
the spheres of Mercury and Venus can be arranged (esti takteon)
between those of the Moon and the Sun; thus Ptolemy joins
the Moon's max. distance to Mercury's min. and Mercury's max.
to Venus' min., and Venus' max. very nearly with the Sun's min.
For it is necessary that there is no void (between the spheres).
Through these sort of arguments Ptolemy concludes (sunagei) that
the Sun is in the middle of the seven planets".
Also see C.Mugler's notes on the construction of the ratios in
Festugieie's Comm. sur le Time vol.IV p.86-7. Also cf. Proclus.
Hyp.Astr. p.220-224.
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11 In Tim.III 60,31-61,7; III 63,24-27; III 65,17-22.
Macrobius, Somn. Scipio I 18.3, also defended the Platonic order
on the grounds that the Moon is the only celestial body to be
directly illuminated by the Sun, therefore it is the only
celestial body "under" the Sun.
Anaxagoras etc., Proclus says that it is according to Eudemusi
evidence, In Tim.III 63,28-30. 	 Proclus seems to be the only
source for this order of planets, see Heath Aristarchus op.cit.
p.85, although it is more certain that Anaxagoras t
 arrangement
was the more general, the Moon - the Sun - the stars, as for
Parmenides, Heath p.74.
12 Proclus in this respect accepted the "Chaldean", as well; this
. is why Rosan "The Philosophy of Proclus" op.cit. p187-9 and
particularly Beutler, art. Proklos in Pauly-Wiss. p.241,
make the mistake of giving the Ptolemaic order as the (only)
Proclan order of the planets.
13 Eg., In Tim.I 34; In Ale. p.196.
However, the order of faculties of soul and that of its descent
follow the Platonic order, In Tim.III 355.
14 The Sun as self-luminous, whereas the planets may be reflecting
the solar light, or as self-luminous but very faint, cf.
In Rep.II 223-4; and see the discussion in Taylor op.cit.
p.213-4.
The planets "dancing as a chorus", Pl.Th. VI 358/
Cf. In Tim.II 312-3; Festugiere Comm. sur le Time op.cit. III
p.358 n.2, and H.Lewy op.cit. p.195 n.75 & 76.
Also see Taylor op.cit. p.242-3 for a discussion of the
circulation of Mercury and Venus.
15 In Tim.III 67,27-68,10.
16 The metaphysical "heliocentred" order, with the Sun as the
source of light and king of the visible universe, together
with the Pythagorean connotations was to be Neoplatonismis
legacy to the Renaissance, and became the physical heliocentric
system of Kepler; see, eg., G.Holton "Thematic origins.of
Scientific thought: Kepler to Einstein" (1973) p.69-90, esp.
p.80-82, where Proclus is mentioned as well as the role of the
Sun, as a mathematical, physical and metaphysical centre.
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8. EARTH AND THE CELESTIALS
The status of the earth and its motion in ancient science is still
perhaps a controversial subject. It would be fair to say that there
is a concomitant historiographical problem, inasmuch as with the
benefit of our present knowledge, and hindsight, it is very difficult
not to praise or blame the ancients according to the extent to which
they came nearer or further to modern views on the earth's motion.
It is certainly true, that Plato's ambiguous passage in the
Timaeus 40 B9-C3 about the earth1was debated as much by the ancients
as it is by the moderns. But it is equally true, that notwith-
standing Aristarchus' mathematical heliocentric system, after
Aristotle and certainly by Ptolemy's time it was regarded as the
unmoved centre of the cosmos. 	 After all, the essence of the
problem was not earth's motion in itself, rather, that given the
phenomenon of celestial diurnal motion was it heaven or earth which
moved in a circular fashion.
Despite its status as the unmoved body at the centre of the world,
the earth, for Proclus, possesses certain general attributes which
underline the unity of the cosmos rather than the dichotomy into
heaven and earth.
Like the celestials, the earth is a "living" body as a member of a
universe which has a World-Soul and a World-Body. "And if the
truth (to alethestaton) is to be said about the earth, it is a
living-being (z3on) composed of a divine soul (psuches theias) and
a living body (s;matos z;ntos); ...for there is in it (en aut6) an
immaterial (aulos) and separable (ch;ristos: also, distinct)
intellect which maintains (sunechiin) in the same position (en tautS:
ie. at the centre of the cosmos, cf. III 136,4) this bulk-volume
(tonde ton onkon), and a divine soul 'burring (choreuousa) about this
-
intellect, and an aetherial body (soma aitherion) immediately
attached (exert;menon) to the soul, and lastly is this visible bulk
(houtos ho phainomenos onkos)" (144).
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Like the planets, and especially the Sun and the Moon, the
earth is also an "instrument of Time"? since the opacity of its
Earth-Element genérates the nights and is therefore responsible
for the day-night cycle. 	 "And it is evident, that the earth
creates (poietike) the night; for it produces a cone (kTmon)
and this cone is its shadow (skia), and its size (megethos)
and figure (schema) gives magnitude and shape (tosondi kai
toiondi schema) to the shadow of night. But how is the earth
likewise the creator of day ? Does it not produce both the day
- _
and night together ?" (145). "The earth (he ge) is therefore the
creator (demiourgos) of both of these, producing them both in
conjunction with the Sun (sunapotelousa to heli;); except that
the Sun is more the cause of day (mallon...helios hemeras), but
the earth is the cause of night (ge nuktos aitia)" (146).
And in a remarkable statement Proclus does not hesitate to call
the earth a kind of star: "If these are true, one must also call
the earth a kind of star (ten gen astron ti rheteon), not with
respect to its visible bulk but because of its aetherial vehicle
which is star-like (astroeides)" (147).
The expected differences from the celestials, such as the lack
of motion, relate to the earth's physical properties rather
than to the metaphysical (cf. Ch. 7 on planetary order). In
Proclus' scheme, the root difference is that in the heavens
Fire is predominant but on earth the Earth-Element. As has been
discussed in extent elsewhere (see Section II.A.3), according
to Proclus' theory of the Elements, Fire is "active" and
"rapid-moving" (oxukineton), whereas Earth ia "difficult" to
thove (duskine.ton) or even Unmoved (akineton), *hich together
with its other quality-powers (dunameis), obtuseness and
grossness, make it an overall inert and - resistant Element.
Earth's natural (kata phusin) state of motion, therefore, is
to be - at rest. And according to Proclus' theory of motion for
the Elements (see Section II.A.5) the place where this "natural"
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motion is exhibited is the Element's own proper place (oikeios
topos ). Not surprisingly, since the Earth-Element's proper
place is the earth itself, the earth is at rest.
But this produced an asymmetry with the other 3 Elements, for
according to Proclus their natural motion in their proper place
is circular. He did in fact notice it and went as far as to
admit that the earth might have had a circular motion as well:
"Every simple body which is in its own proper place (oikeiS
tops) either remains stationary (akineton menei) or is moved
in a circle (e kuk1S kineitai) in order that it never leaves
(Mede apoleipe) its proper place ... and therefore the celestial
body by being fiery,when it moves, it moves circularly by
necessity; accordingly, the earth also (epei kai he g;), which
does not leave the middle of the universe, if it were moved
(eiper ekineito) it would move circularly (kuk1S an ekinethe)"
(148).
The reason3why the earth is not moved circularly, not even
around its axis like the celestial bodies, is the physics of
the Earth-Element. In other words, it is the physical
restrictions which keep the earth both unmoved and at the centre
of the universe, and consequently make it physically different
from the celestial bodies.
The earth's more metaphysical properties make it, in Proclue
system, more like the celestials, and is generally through these
that it is "fit" (epitedeios) to receive their influences.
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NOTES ON II.B.8
1 In essence there are two problems: (i) whether the earth has
an orbital motion, which is the issue of geocentricity or
heliocentricity, and (ii) whether the earth has an axial,
self-rotation, which is linked to the issues of diurnal motion
for the heavens and the distance of the fixed stars from earth
(ie. estimates or notions of near infinite heavens were better
suited to a stationary sphere of the fixed stars, cf. .
Heraklides and Aristarchus).
The debate on Plato centred on the exact form and interpretation
of the particle "eillomenZn" or "illomenen": the first had
connotations of movement, but the second, although it could mean
"rolled", it was mainly interpr. as "conglobed" or packed
(around the centre or axis of the world).
The issue is very complicated, and an examination of it in this
study is not appropriate, since Proclus very definitely insisted
that the earth is stationary at the cosmic centre, and that
correct interpr. of the Platonic term is "illomenZn", as in
"conglobed" or "congregated" (sunagomenen) around the cosmic
centre.
For Proclus' account,including the defence against Heraklides,
In Tim.III 133-144; and cf. Simplicius In de Caelo 517-9.
Also see, T.Heath, Aristarchus, op.cit. p.174-181, 186-9,
250-255, 304, 308; F.Cornford Plato's Cosmology op.cit.
p.120-137; A.E.Taylor op.cit. p.226-240; and the analysis by
G.S.Claghorn op.cit. p.71-83. 	 Also, J.L.E.Dreyer op.cit.
p.72-8, and H.B.Gottschalk "Heraklides of Pontus" op.cit.
p.58-69, 81-87,
2 Earth is a passive instrument of Time, it does not have to
counter-rotate to produce the day-night cycle, cf. Cornford
p.131-4, 137.	 Also cf. Simplicius In de Caelo p.511-512.
3 This is of course hardly a "reason", more of a justification of
a position which has been established already.
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REVIEW AND CONCLUSION
Neoplatonism is usually looked upon as a philosophy rich in
metaphysical and theological content but largely irrelevant to
science. This view seriously underestimates its scientific and
physical content. Neoplatonism attempted to address all forms of
knowledge including the "natural". Natural or Physical Inquiry had
after all been part of Platonic philosophy at least since the
"Timaeus". Stoicism and (neo)Pythagorianism were two other
philosophies renowned for their strong physical and mathematical
components, respectively, which influenced Neoplatonism. 	 There are
numerous treatises by Neoplatonists which are concerned with the
physical universe, although most of them are in the form of
commentaries on appropriate titles from Plato and Aristotle according
to the literary fashion of that age. These commentaries on the
"Timaeus", the "Heavens", or on the "Physics" are the main sources,
but an additional, considerable amount of references on physical
entities can be found scattered in works on entirely different
subjects, such as ontology and ethics. This is characteristic of
their cohesive and synthetic approach.
For Proclus, physical conceptualization was likewise an integral
part of his whole philosophy. This was so by necessity, because
the physical world was conceived as the "visible and tangible"
aspect of a universe governed by incorporeal causes, and structured
in accordance to the same set of philosophical and logical
principles. To have explained the "sensible", that perceived by
the senses, in a totally different way from the "intelligible",
that apprehended by the intellect alone, would have constituted in
his eyes a failure of his philosophical system, for it would have
proved the whole universe to be inconsistent, if not irrational.
Belief in the essential unity of the cosmos, far from being
"irrational" (see the Preface), was in fact the very assertion on
the rationality of the cosmos, for the existence of this unity is
what renders certainty and knowledge possible in science, according
to Neoplatonic thought.
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In view of the application of his system in diverse fields in a
particularly cohesive manner, his concern with a rational universe,
and his avoidance of ad hoc cosmological hypotheses, Neoplatonism
may be said to emerge also as a method, with the function of
providing a consistent and integrated means of explanation for all
the apparently unrelated modes of defining and describing things.
There are a number of philosophical leitmotifs which constitute the
core of Neoplatonism as a universal form of "explanation" for
obtaining "real" knowledge. The most well-known is the arrangement
of entities and properties in a hierarchical fashion. It is
constructed from other, more fundamental general principles, such
as the triadic structuring and the operation of similarity and
sympathy. Basically, it is the identification of logical with
metaphysical priority; but in addition, it is a cosmology, being
the graded ordering of the various entities of the universe both
visible and invisible, physical and metaphysical. Each level in
the hierarchical sequence constitutes a certain mode of existence,
orderliness, dimensionality, etc. 	 Physical objects appear,
predictably, among the lowermost levels or grades, since they
represent the least "whole" and most "particulated" kind of existence.
Their concomitant attributes are corporeality, motion and change,
varying degrees of order, etc. The heavenly bodies are to be found
in the orderly strata "up-there", whereas the multichanging
inhabitants of the sublunary realm are, naturally, "down-here".
Associated with the hierarchical arrangement is the less well-known,
Janus-faced theme, that "everything is in everything but _
appropriately in each". On the one hand, this was at the heart of
Neoplatonic philosophy for it endeavoured to address_the problem
of one and many: that there is an underlying unity in diversity,
and that unity multiplies into diversity. On the other, it enabled
Proclus to explain variety and heterogeneity with one simple rule.
For example, the four Elements are not only the traditional four
sublunary Elements but also the four species of being, they exist
as "forms" and as "subterranean sediments". Similarly, the
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same 4 Elements are the constituents of the bodies of two
diametrically different entities, the celestial and the sublunary,
which renders the Aristotelian 5th Element redundant.
In order to avoid the tendency to merge distinct identities, and
thereby confuse different states of existence and different
functions, Proclus emphasized repeatedly the role of
"appropriateness". For him the second aspect of the theme, which
relates to the mode proper to each state of being, was vital in
keeping the distinctions present and in preventing the collapse of
the hierarchical ordering into a unified but chaotic heap. Hence
he insisted that the "Physical Inquiry" (phusiologia) should
concentrate on the physical properties and interactions, and he
chastised those - even respected Neoplatonists like Porphyry and
Iamblichus - who took on many occasions a more "elevated" view of
nature and mingled indiscriminately metaphysics with physics.
A parallel consequence of this was the idea that the entities of
the natural world present a different aspect of themselves and their
relationships depending on whether the observer-examiner concentrates
on their intelligible or sensible part. There are many examples
of this in Proclus' physical theories. In the Elements, the plane
triangles are assumed to be physical and have a nominal depth.
The tri-dimensional corpuscular Elements are assigned three primary
physical powers each. Place is, on the one hand, tri-dimensionally
extended space, but on the other, the active instrument of the
World Soul. The latter also appears in his conception of the
celestial spheres. But it is in the dual arrangement of the
planets (see I.B.7), where he accepted the Chaldean (and Ptolemaic)
order, while stubbornly defending the Platonic, that the metaphysical
and physical views of the universe are sharply contrasted. Whereas
in the Chaldean the Sun is the "king of the visible universe" and
rightfully occupies the middle position among the planets, according
to the Platonic the Sun is just a celestial body like the others
and no longer occupies that privileged place.
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Proclus is on the whole remarkably consistent in his application of
the appropriateness rule, even if at times, such as in the defence
of the Platonic order of planets, it may be thought as misdirected.
His theories preserve the distinction between the purely corporeal
properties of physical things and the incorporeal. But there are
instances where this is not so. In the Elements theory, the
rectilinear Fire polyhedra are said to curve as they approach the
spherical heavens, because of "something better" in their nature:
ie. the corporeal changes in the shape of the polyhedra are explained
by employing an incorporeal, metaphysical property. In the
Celestial theory, the essentially incorporeal status of the
"satellites" does not seem to be clearly stated. Again, the
distinction between the metaphysical order of the planets
(the Chaldean) and the physical (the Platonic) seems to be blurred,
when he proposes that the latter may have an equally good
metaphysical role (the Sun between two pentads).
Yet such are the vagaries of this dual view of the cosmos, that had
Proclus developed the metaphysical into a physical system (cf.Kepler),
the most likely result would have been an heliocentric system with
the planets and the earth (also viewed as a "starry body") revolving
around the "king" Sun. Satellites would revolve around each planet
much as the Moon does around the earth. Finally, all the bodies
would have an axial, spin rotation.
This leap would not have been too great to take, since the underlying
premise of his philosophy was, that all actions and motions are
initiated by incorporeal, metaphysical causes, circular motion being
perhaps the best example of this. So, it would not have been too
unthinkable to assume that any metaphysical relationship between
things, such as the celestials and the earth, would tend to manifest
itself in a physical form, too. Besides, this is the sort of
argument which can explain the few, but perhaps significant,
instances where Proclus appears to blur the distinction between
the physical and metaphysical domains.
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However, his system of the planets and the earth in fact remained
geocentric, because the physical properties of the Earth kept it
unmoved at its traditional and proper place, the centre of the
physical universe.
Because of the emphasis on "proper place" in the hierarchical
arrangement, Neoplatonic schemes and especially that of Proclus
are frequently described as "rigid". Such a view, firstly,
overlooks the trivial but nonetheless true fact that the hierarchy
did change from philosopher to philosopher: Iamblichus' is different
from Plotinus', and Proclus' is different from Iamblichus'. It was
never monolithic. Both the modes of existence and their relative
ranking were in constant dispute even after Proclus. But the
alterations in the number, order or properties were never
catastrophic to the hierarchical method of explanation itself.
This, in turn, emphasizes its role as a working, meaning modifiable,
hypothesis: that which can be modified in the light of further
thought within the style of philosophy which marks it from any other.
Proclus' scheme may give the impression of being 'firmer' (or "rigid").
only because he is more systematic over its structure and
application than the rest.
Secondly, it ignores the basic component of the hierarchy, ie. the
triad, remaining-proceeding-returning, which is fundamentally a
dynamic and continuous process, although, strangely to our thinking
it is essentially non-dimensional (or perhaps point-dimensional)
and certainly non spatio-temporal. All forms of motion ultimately
originate in this process. In conjunction with the concept of
proper place and appropriate mode of existence, both the circular,
periodic movements and the rectilinear could be explained with one
principle. The circular movements, such as that of the stars and
the three Elements (excluding Earth) in their own place, are
characteristic of entities which do not necessarily require
progression to another level of existence, and so proceed and return
with respect to themselves only. The rectilinear, such that of the
terrestrial
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bodies and the up-down movement of the Elements, are characteristic
of entities which are not in their own proper place and so proceed
from one state to another.
But the concept which stresses even more strongly, and appropriately,
the dynamic nature of the Neoplatonic view of the world is that of
"dunamis" itself. Neoplatonists used it often and in a variety of
contexts, ranging from the Aristotelian-based "potential existence",
to the theurgic "powers", including the technical term for "power
to proceed". As Proclus formulated it, all the different types
of "dunamis" being facets of the dual power to be acted upon and
power to act, the relatively more passive served as the Neoplatonic
equivalent of potentiality, the power to pre-subsist or to exist in
principle, and the more active described virtually everything else
from the characteristic quality of a thing, to the ability to cause,
act or create. Thus "power" is the property characteristicof each
and every thing, which determines its movement and behaviour, and
enables it to affect or interact with others. "Quality" or
"physical power" is the power of the Elements, and "volition" or
"will" is one aspect of the power of the celestial bodies.
So, although Proclue theories of the Elements and the celestial
bodies are based, respectively, on the Platonic quantitative,
geometrical 4 Element theory, and the concept of soul as the principle
of self-motion, the ideas of hierarchical ordering and proper-
appropriate place, "dunamis" power, plus the overall mode of
explanation make them distinctly Neo-Platonic.
Proclus' contributions as a scientist are manifold. His
mathematical competence (not the subject of this study), it would
be true to say, has never been doubted, and continuing research in
the history of mathematics seems to reveal new aspects of it; for
example, David Fowler of Warwick University has found an early
formulation of the theory of ratio. However, a full and detailed
study of Proclus t mathematics is still awaited.
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In physics, one can certainly list some of his 'achievements':
the clear formulation of the geometrical theory of the Elements
and the wholesale rejection of the Aristotelian Elements, viz. the
5th Element of the heavens, and the fundamental qualities, hot-cold,
dry-moist, light-heavy, of the 4 sublunary Elements; the further
expansion of the concept of place as three-dimensional space and,
again, the rejection of another Aristotelian idea, that of place
as boundary; and the development of the theory of celestial motion
as free motion in space with the concomitant rejection of material
"crystalline" spheres and epicycles.
However, trying to assess Proclus as a physicist presents problems
most of which may be traced to the general attitude of ancient
philosophers towards the world of matter. Nevertheless, although
Neoplatonism too argued against total involvement with material
things, it retained the classical, optimistic view of the material
world, seeing Matter as complementary to the One origin of the
universe and therefore to a degree "good". In this it is, on the
whole, unlike Hermeticism and especially Gnosticism, the other two
isms of the period with which it is often quoted in tandem.
But perhaps the main obstacle is Proclus' different form of
expression and framework of thought concerning the universe, from
our own. One way of overcoming such a barrier is by attempting
to translate, so to speak, these concepts into modern terms or
concerns, a task frought with methodological and epistemological
dangers, in addition to the historical problems. Nevertheless,
it is tempting to make some speculative associations with modern
notions:
One idea, which is peculiar to Proclus, is that the whole of space
is a spherical body of light. A not too unfamiliar notion in view
of Einstein's curved space delineated by light geodesics, which as
a whole may indeed be spherical.
The parallels between the concept of "dunamis" and field of force
in Stoic physical thought have already been indicated elsewhere.
As mentioned earlier here (II.A.3), in Neoplatonism
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"dunamis" as a field of force operated in a particular as well as
in a diffuse, general form.	 Such a field-force, in itself
immaterial, may exert its influence beyond the body concerned, so
interaction can exist between bodies not in direct (bodily) contact.
All these field-forces are essentially differentiated developments
of one "primary force" (pr3tZs duname3s), as Proclus called it,
which is reminiscent of the present unified field theories.
Since everything in the universe is due to one unified cause, then
the cosmos is ultimately a unity, which consequently warrants a
uniform mode of explanation. Uniform does not mean exactly the
same at all circumstances, since different rules apply, or rather
prevail, at different conditions. 	 Similarly, in present-day physics
there may be only a few general laws, but the kind of physics that
applies to each particular condition is depended on the magnitudes
of size, velocity, charge, mass or energy involved, ie. the precise
form of explanation is hierarchically dependent.
All this perhaps helps to demonstrate, that intellectual activity in
Late Antiquity was far from being a spent force, and that due to
Neoplatonism it was developing into new directions, which sought
to examine the very fundamentals of the cosmos in an especially
integrated and systematic way.
In conclusion, the least that can be said about Neoplatonism is,
that its physical content is a worthy subject of the History of
Science, and merits further study.
- 302 -
LIST OF QUOTED PASSAGES
Translations are my own; where indicated, they are based on existing
translations,as specified,with some amendements.
Part I.
(1) El.Th. proposition 1.
(2) El.Th. prop. 28, (E.R.Dodds).
(3) Pl.Th. III 18,12-20.
(4) El.Th. prop. 21, (E.R.Dodds).
(5) El.Th. prop. 28 (different part from (2)).
(6) El.Th. prop. 108, (E.R.Dodds).
(7) El.Th. prop. 99. (E.R.Dodds).
(8) Pl.Th. III 27,20-24.
(9) El.Th. prop. 65, (E.R.Dodds).
(10) El.Th. prop. 103, (E.R.Dodds).
(11) Pl.Th. VI, Portus text ed., p.347.
(12) Pl.Th. VI p.344.
(13) Pl.Th. VI p.352.
(14) Pl.Th. VI p.352.
(15) Pl.Th. III 6,21-24.
(16) Pl.Th. III 7,11-13.
(17) Pl.Th. IV 59,18-25.
(18) Pl.Th. VI p.384.
(19) Pl.Th. III 20 - 26.
(20) Pl.Th. III 13,4-17.
(21) El.Th. prop. 11, (E.R.Dodds).
(22) El.Th. prop. 13, (E.R.Dodds).
(23) El.Th. prop. 113, (E.R.Dodds).
(24) Pl.Th. III 16,9 -17,1.
(25) El.Th. props. 89 & 90.
(26) Pl.Th. III 32,14-23.
(27) El.Th. prop. 120, (E.R.Dodds).
(28) El.Th. prop. 64, (E.R.Dodds).
(29) El.Th. prop. 114, (E.R.Dodds).
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(30)El.Th. prop. 138, (E.R.Dodds).
(31)El.Th. prop. 138.
(32)Pl.Th. IV 12,6-14.
(33)Pl.Th. IV 84,1-6; 84,12-17; 86,8-17.
(34)Pl.Th. V p.248.
(35)Pl.Th. V p.249-50.
(36)Pl.Th. V p.358.
(37)Pl.Th. V p.265-6.
(38)Pl.Th. V p.281.
(39)Pl.Th. V p.258-9.
(40)Pl.Th. V p.289.
(41)Pl.Th. V p.289.
(42)Pl.Th. V p.273.
(43)Pl.Th. VI p.346.
(44)Pl.Th. VI p.367-8.
(45)Pl.Th. VI p.376-81.
(46)Pl.Th. VI p.351-2.
(47)Pl.Th. VI p.349.
(48)Pl.Th. VI p.347.
(49)Pl.Th. VI p.255.
(50)Pl.Th. III 8,15-18.
(51) In Tim. II 266,1-5.
(52)Pl.Th. VI p.401-2.
(53)Pl.Th. VI p.404-5.
(54) Simplicius In Phys. 611,10-11, (S.Sambursky, Concept of Place).
(55)Proclus In Tim. III 32,27-30.
(56)El.Th. prop. 200, (E.R.Dodds).
(57)Pl.Th. III 20,9-14.
(58)El.Th. prop. 71, (E.R.Dodds).
(59)El,Th. prop. 72, (E.R.Dodds).
(60)In Tim. II 65,21-24.
(61)El.Th. prop. 59, (E.R.Dodds).
(62)Pl.Th. III 39,24-40,4.
(63)Pl.Th. III 34,7-11.
(64)In Tim. I 384,27-385,16.
(65) In Tim. III 328,20-31.
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Part II.
(1) Simplicius In de Caelo 641,1-5.
(2) ditto	 In de Caelo 648,19-21.
(3) ditto	 In de Caelo 648,21-23.
(4) Plato Tim. 53B 4-7, (R.G.Bury, Loeb)
(5) Proclus In Tim. II 65,6-8.
(6) Syrianus In Metaphysica 85,38-86,2, (S.Sambursky, Concept of
(7) Proclus In Tim. II 39,18.	
Place).
(8)In Tim. II 51,3-7.
(9)In Tim. II 38,13-16.
(10) In Tim. II 39,21-25.
(ii) In Tim. II 40,23-41,2.
(12)In Tim. II 12,21-25.
(13)In Tim. III 113,25-26.
(14)In Tim. III 114,1-6.
(15)In Tim. II 9,18-26.
(16)In Tim. III 113,29-32.
(17) In Tim. II 6,11-14.
(18) In Tim. III 321,22-25.
(19)In Tim. II 49,14-18.
(20)In Tim. II 46,19-27.
(21) In Tim. III 113,16-22.
(22)In Tim. II 9,11-14.
(23)In Tim. II 44,1-4.
(24) In Tim. II 10,11-16.
(25) In Tim. II 11,18-24.
(26)In Tim. II 44,5-8.
(27) In Tim. II 17,18-20.
(28) In Tim. II 49,23-25.
(29) In Tim. III 114,24-29.
(30) In Tim. III 142,3-8.
(31)In Tim. II 43,26-28.
(32)In Tim. II 51,20-27.
(33)In Tim. II 51,29-30.
(34)In Tim. II 46,12-18; 46,31.
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(35) In Tim. II 46,19-23; 47,1.
(36)In Tim. II 47,28-33.
(37)In Tim. II 46,23-25; 47,2.
(38)In Tim. I 39,1-3.
(39)In Rep. II 69,3-5.
(40)In Tim. III 111,22-112,1.
(41) In Tim. III 112,13-16.
(42) Simplicius In de Caelo 37,33-34.
(43) Plotinus Enn. IV,5,3, (A.H.Armstrong, Loeb).
(44) ditto Enn. IV,5,6,	 ditto
(45) ditto Enn. IV,5,7,	 ditto
(46) ditto Enn. 11,1,7,	 ditto
(47) Proclus In Tim. II 8,14-16.
(48) In Tim. II 8,8-13.
(49) Simplicius In Phys. 615,28-616,3, (S.Sambursky, Concept of
(50) Proolus In Rep. II 201,21-29.	 Place).
(51) Simplicius In Phys. 616,4-9, (S.Sambursky, Concept of Place).
(52) Proclus El.Th. 196, (E.R.Dodds).
(53)In Tim. II 37,9-14.
(54) In Tim. II 8,2-3.
(55) Pl.Th. III 19,3-9.
(56) In Tim. II 11,27-31.
(57) In Tim. II 12,3-8.
(58) In Tim. III 114,6-15.
(59) In Tim. II 47,16-19.
(60) El.Phys. Book II Definitions.
(61) El.Phys. Book I prop. 14.
(62) Simplicius In Phys. 611,35-612,1, (S.Sambursky, Concept of
(63) ditto	 In Phys. 612,16-24, (S.Sambursky, op.cit.). Place).
(64) ditto	 In Phys. 613,15-17, (S.Sambursky, op.eit.).
(65) Proclus In Tim. II 10,4-9.
(66)In Tim. I 161,9-10.
(67) Simplicius In Phys. 613,38-614,1, (S.Sambursky, op.oit.).
(68) ditto
	
In Phys. 612,25-27.
(69) ditto	 In Phys.-612,24-35.
(70) Proolus In Crat. 31,12-14.
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(71)Simplicius In Phys. 613,7-10, (S.Sambursky, op.cit.).
(72)Syrianus In Metaphysica 85,18-27, (S.Sambursky, op.cit.).
(73)Simplicius In Phys. 613,21-23, (S.Sambursky,
(74)Procluq In Rep. II 196,24.
(75)Simplicius In Phys. 613,27-29, (S.Sambursky, op.cit.).
(76)Proclus In_Tim. III 150,23-28.
(77) In Tim.
(78) In Tim.
(79) In Tim.
(80) In Tim.
(81) In Tim.
(82) In Tim.
(83) In Tim.
III 57,2-6.
III 127,7-11.
I 8,15-20.
II 51,6-15.
III 122,11.
III 122,6-10.
III 142,9-10, 21-22.
(84)In Tim. III 124,1-5.
(85)In Tim. III 119,23-30.
(86)In Tim. III 124,15-18.
(87)In Tim. III 79,15-19.
(88)El.Th. prop. 129, (E.R.Dodds).
(89)El.Th. prop. 64, (E.R.Dodds).
(90)In Tim. III 120,21-23.
(91)El.Th. prop. 201, (E.R.Dodds).
(92)Pl.Th. I 91,27-92,1.
(93)In Tim. III 115,6-8.
(94)In Tim. II 42,22-43,31.
(95)In Tim. III 122,18-20.
(96)In Tim. II 9,11-14.
(97)In Tim. III 112,5-6.
(98)In Tim. II 47,16-17.
(99)In Tim. III 127,30-128,7.
(100)In Tim. III 114,1-4.
(101)In Tim. II 11,25-31.
(102)In Tim. II 12,7-15.
(103)In Tim. III 130,13-16.
(104)In Tim. III 128,18-29.
(105)In Tim. II 47,9-12.
(106)In Tim. II 44,12-13.
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(107)In Rep. II 213,24-27.
(108)In Rep. II 216,5-13.
(109)In Rep. II 218,5-6, 13-16.
(110)In Tim. II 47,13-15.
(111)In Tim. III 128,15-29.
(112)In Tim. III 129,9-14.
(113)In Tim. III 131,1-3.
(114)In Tim. III 58,8-13.
(115)In Tim. III 62,17-21.
(116)In Tim. III 151,32-152,2.
(117)El.Th. prop. 140, (E.R.Dodds).
(118)In Tim. III 131,10-18.
(119)In Tim. III 117,11-18.
(120)In Tim. III 117,20-22.
(121)El.Th. prop. 199, (E.R.Dodds).
(122)El.Th. prop. 200, (E.R.Dodds).
(123)In Tim. III 119,17-23.
(124)In Tim. III 120,1-8, 13-17.
(125)In Tim. III 119,23-30.
(126)In Tim. III 125,4-16.
(127)In Tim. III 125,27-32.
(128)Hyp.Astr. 14,17-23.
(129)Hyp.Astr. 234,7-8, 20-22.
(130)In Tim. III 147,9-12.
(131)In Tim. III 127,29-128,13.
(132)In Tim. III 56,25-31.
(133)In Tim. III 147,1-7.
(134)In Tim. III 133,4-10.
(135)El.Phys. Book II, prop. 4.
(136)El.Phys. Book II, prop. 5.
(137)In Tim. III 78,31-79,15.
(138)In Tim. III 80,7-12.
(139)In Tim. III 79,28-80,6.
(140)In Tim. III 122,6-24.
(141)In Tim. III 82,19-26.
(142)In Tim. III 53,23-25.
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(143) In Rep. II 220,21-221,11.
(144) In Tim. III 135,14-20.
(145) In Tim. III 139,23-28.
(146) In Tim. III 139,32-140,2.
(147) In Tim. III 308,15-17.
(148) In Tim. II 11,28-12,2.
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